Wednesday, October 31, 2007

CIDRAP: Part V Of Pandemic Vaccine Puzzle Online

 

 

# 1210

 

 

Part five of the seven part series by Maryn McKenna is now online on the CIDRAP (Center For Infectious Disease Research & Policy) website. 

 

 

 

 

THE PANDEMIC VACCINE PUZZLE
Part 5: What role for prepandemic vaccination?

Maryn McKenna * Contributing Writer

Editor's note: This is the fifth in a seven-part series investigating the prospects for development of vaccines to head off the threat of an influenza pandemic posed by the H5N1 avian influenza virus. The series puts promising advances in vaccine technology in perspective by illuminating the formidable barriers to producing large amounts of an effective and widely usable vaccine in a short time frame. Part 4 examined the possibility of using adjuvants to stretch the supply of pandemic vaccines and the regulatory barriers to that strategy.

 

Oct 31, 2007 (CIDRAP News) – Experiments with vaccine adjuvants have raised some hope of removing one of the great stumbling blocks to pandemic influenza preparedness: the impossibility of making a vaccine that protects against a pandemic virus before that virus actually emerges.

 

A number of the studies that have shown adjuvants may be able to stretch the vaccine supply also demonstrated a secondary benefit: The formulas protected not only against the H5N1 flu strain on which they were based, but against other H5N1 strains as well, a phenomenon called cross-reactive protection (see Bibliography: Nicholson 2001, Stephenson 2005, Govorkova 2006, Hehme 2007, Hoffenbach 2007). Most recently, the GlaxoSmithKline-backed team that described an acceptable immune response after two adjuvanted 3.8-microgram (mcg) doses found that three fourths of their subjects were protected not only against the clade 1 Vietnam virus on which the vaccine was based, but against a drifted clade 2 virus from Indonesia as well (see Bibliography: Leroux-Roels 2007).

 

The findings are not completely understood, though researchers agree that they make biological sense. Adjuvants stimulate the immune system in some manner that is broader than and different from the body’s reaction to the antigen packaged with them. The discovery that adjuvanted flu vaccines may invoke cross-reactivity has generated tremendous excitementbecause that could allow production of at least partially protective vaccines well in advance of a pandemic’s beginning.

 

A tough ethical problem

But the next logical step—that if vaccines can be formulated without waiting for a pandemic, they could be administered before a pandemic began—is a much tougher one to take, and policy makers are approaching it with great caution. The scientific, logistical, and especially ethical questions raised by prepandemic vaccination are grave.

(Click to Continue Reading)

Pay Now Or Pay Later

 

 

#  1209

 

 

A reoccurring theme in this blog has been the quandary that health care workers will find themselves in should a pandemic erupt and there not be sufficient PPE's (Personal Protective Equipment) to protect them.

 

A conversation is going on right now, on Allnurses.com, an online community of more than 240,000 health care professionals, about this issue in a thread called  Will You Work In A Pandemic?

 

 

Officials who assume that nurses and other Health Care Workers (HCW's) will blindly risk themselves, and their families, by working without protective gear should read this thread.  

 

It is an eye-opener.

 

 

Without masks (good ones, not surgical masks), gloves, and gowns, health care workers in direct contact with infected patients will likely contract the virus at an accelerated rate.   Many would be sickened, and some might die, for lack of proper protective gear.

 

 

It would be hard to fault anyone for not being willing to work without the proper safety equipment. 

 

We don't expect fire-fighters to run into a burning building without their bunker gear, how can we expect a nurse or other health care worker to treat infectious patients (with a potentially fatal disease) without masks and gloves?

 

 

While the United States has reportedly stockpiled 150 million masks in the Strategic National Stockpile, and hospitals, doctor's offices, and ambulance services undoubtedly have some reserves on hand, during a pandemic these disposable supplies will be consumed at an incredible rate.

 

Many hospitals have been reluctant to order in large quantities of PPE's due to the uncertainty of the pandemic threat, the costs involved, and the logistics of storage.   Few facilities could operate without weekly deliveries of fresh supplies.

 

An N95 mask becomes difficult to breath through after a few hours of wear, a nurse or HCW's would be hard pressed to get more than 4 or 5 hours out of one, if that.  Working a 12 hour shift, at best, they might get by with 2 masks a shift, but more likely they will need 3, perhaps 4.

 

Gloves? 

 

Well, technically they should be changed between each patient, but that `standard of care' will likely be modified during a pandemic.  Still, an hour, maybe 2, and most latex or vinyl gloves are going to be ready for the bio-hazards bin. 

 

Gowns?  

 

Well, as long as they don't get grossly contaminated, you can wear one for some time. Perhaps an entire shift, but you would quickly become a walking bio-hazard, and you'd risk not only infecting yourself when you changed your mask, drank or ate, but others as well as you worked.

 

With roughly 8 million HCW's,  assuming they were all working (which they won't), you'd need 25 million masks per day, and probably 50 million pairs of gloves. 

 

Suddenly that 150 million mask stockpile doesn't look so impressive. It might last a week, 10 days if we are lucky.

 

The private stockpiles held by hospitals would extend this timetable, but they too would quickly run out.  In a matter of weeks, during a severe pandemic, our current supplies would be extinguished.

 

What then?

 

Your answer can be found in the All Nurses forum, where most of the respondents say they won't work without PPE's. 

 

A pandemic wave is expected to last for 6 to 12 weeks, and multiple waves are anticipated during a pandemic.  Even when the number of cases in a community have died down, hospitals will likely be treating some patients.  There will be little rest for the weary HCW.

 

If 1918 was any indication, HCW's could be dealing with 200 `pandemic days' over an 18 month period.    That's going to take a lot of PPE's.  And the ability to restock in between waves, when everyone in the world will be clamoring for supplies, is doubtful.

 

You can add to these PPE's all of the other disposables that hospitals use routinely.  IV's, Infusion kits, syringes, medicines of all sorts . . . even oxygen . . . these may all be in short supply during a pandemic.

 

We have 2 choices. 

 

We either pay now to protect our healthcare workers by laying in the needed supplies, or we accept that somewhere down the line in a pandemic we will pay a much steeper price.

 

And no, this isn't just about influenza patients.  While a pandemic rages, heart attacks, strokes, c-sections, car accidents, and every other medical need we see today will continue.  More than 275,000 people rely on dialysis treatments.  Who will care for them during a pandemic?  What about those on chemotherapy? Or receiving radiation treatments? 

 

There are nearly 1 million people in hospital beds in the United States on any given day, and 2 million more in long-term nursing facilities.  Who will care for them?  

 

Any way you slice it, health care workers are going to be one of our most precious assets during a pandemic.   Having them on the job will mean the difference between life and death for millions of people.   They deserve to be protected. 

 

Yes it's expensive, and difficult, and we could prepare and a pandemic might not come for years.  It's the cost of doing business in a dangerous world.

 

The idea that we might coerce (force is such an ugly word) HCW's into working without PPE's, by threatening them with revocation of their licenses or fines, isn't an answer.   Even if it could be done, without protection, most would probably fall to the virus in short order, and all that would have been gained is a few days of coverage at a horrific cost.

 

It's been two years since the warning went out. Hospitals and other medical facilities have had two years in which to prepare.  A pandemic should catch no one by surprise. 

 

How many are prepared to weather a 90 day pandemic wave?

 

Not many, I fear.

 

One of the nurses on this forum, Indigo Girl, put it better than I possibly could. I'm sure she won't mind if I quote her.

 

 

I hope that that the CDC and HHS are noting the responses in this thread.


The public will assume that nurses are going to be working.


The govt assumes this also.


Homeland Security, are you reading this?


When will you sit down and talk with us? We are not just statistics.


We are real individual people with families that depend on us.

 

This is an avoidable tragedy.  But only if we face it head on, and do something about it now, before a pandemic strikes.

 

Is anyone listening?  Does anyone care?

Meanwhile, Back In Indonesia

 

# 1208

 

 

While only a suspected case, this one raises additional concerns due to its proximity to Singapore.  Batam, with a population of over 700,000,  is an island just 20 kilometers from that nation's coastline.

 

 

 

10/30/07 21:02

Another suspected bird flu sufferer hospitalized in Batam


Batam (ANTARA News) - A patient of the Sagulung regional general hospital in Batam has been referred to the Batam Authority hospital for intensive treatment as she was suspected of having been infected with the bird flu virus.

 


"We are afraid Widya is suffering from bird flu and therefore we have referred her to the Batam Authority hospital for intensive treatment," the director of the Sagulung hospital, Dr Nenden Siti Komariah, said here on Tuesday.

 

Dr Nenden worried Widya Rahmadai (9) was infected with the birdflu virus because a chicken had suddenly died near her home.

 

She said Widya from Kampung Ponjen, Tanjungriau, was first brought to a polyclinic for fever but a medical examination showed the fever was not a common one.

 

She said she had already reported the case to the local health service for the government to take measures. (*)

Copyright © 2007 ANTARA

CIDRAP: Part IV Of Vaccine Puzzle Online

 

# 1207

 

 

Maryn McKenna continues her outstanding series on the Pandemic Vaccine Puzzle on the CIDRAP (Center for Infections Disease Research & Policy) website.

 

Part IV, The Promise and Problems of Adjuvants  was posted late yesterday.  

 

 

 

THE PANDEMIC VACCINE PUZZLE
Part 4: The promise and problems of adjuvants

Maryn McKenna * Contributing Writer

Editor's note: This is the fourth in a seven-part series investigating the prospects for development of vaccines to head off the threat of an influenza pandemic posed by the H5N1 avian influenza virus. The series puts promising advances in vaccine technology in perspective by illuminating the formidable barriers to producing large amounts of an effective and widely usable vaccine in a short time frame. Part 3 discussed the immunologic challenges posed by the H5N1 virus, including its poor immunogenicity when incorporated in vaccines and the difficulty of assessing immune responses to the vaccines.

 

Oct 30, 2007 (CIDRAP News) – Adjuvanted vaccines appear to hold the greatest promise for solving the grave supply-demand imbalance in pandemic influenza vaccine development. They come with obstacles—immunologic, regulatory, and commercial—but they also have generated more excitement than any other type of vaccine thus far.

 

In an example of the hope being hung on adjuvants, the WHO last week issued a statement declaring that the pandemic vaccine supply is "sharply" increasing and forecasting that annual manufacturing capacity will rise to 4.5 billion two-dose courses by 2010 (see Bibliography: WHO 2007: Projected supply). The forecast is based on the expectation that flu vaccines made in 2010 will include an adjuvant permitting the use of just one-eighth of current vaccines' antigen content. (Adjuvants are chemicals that are incorporated in some vaccines to improve response to the vaccines' active ingredient. Adjuvants make it possible to reduce the dose of antigen in a vaccine without dampening the immune response.)

(Click to Continue Reading)

 

 

 

 

 

SophiaZoe, back to blogging, has been on a roll this week. She tackles the adjuvant issue from a slightly different angle than Ms. Mckenna, focusing more on safety concerns than regulatory issues.  

 

Drawing heavily on the writings of SusanC of the Wiki, a medical doctor, she outlines the concerns that adjuvants may induce unwanted autoimmune responses.

 

 

 

A Journey Through The World of Pandemic Influenza

 

October 30, 2007

The Pandemic Vaccine Puzzle Part IV

CIDRAP's Part IV of their series The Pandemic Vaccine Puzzle "The Promise and Problems of Adjuvants", Maryn McKenna contributing writer, has now been posted.

In the interest of full disclosure I will admit that the concept of adjuvants used on the general population scares the you know what out of me.

 

(Cont.)

Indonesian Parents Refuse Isolation For Child

 

# 1206

 

 

The success rate of Indonesian hospitals treating H5N1 infections isn't something to brag about.   Thus far, 89 of 111 patients have died, despite treatment. 

 

That's an 80% CFR (Case Fatality Ratio). 

 

If you remove the Indonesian cases from the mix, worldwide, the CFR sits around 52%.  Not great, but better.

 

Today we learn that the parents of a child from Tangerang that, a suburb of Jakarta, have refused hospitalization and isolation for their son.   They have taken the child home against medical advice.

 

The child is reportedly improving under home care.  Good news for the boy and his family.

 

The downside is, without isolation, there is a stronger likelihood this virus could spread; carried by family members treating the boy into their community.  

 

This from the Straits Times.

 

 

 

Oct 31, 2007

Indonesia's bird flu boy defies hospital orders, returns home

 

JAKARTA - THE parents of a three-year-old Indonesian boy infected with bird flu have defied hospital orders that he stay in isolation and taken him home, a hospital official said on Wednesday.

 

The boy from Tangerang, a satellite city west of the capital Jakarta, stayed in hospital for just half a day last Saturday, said Sardikin Giriputro, deputy director of Sulianti Saroso hospital.

 

'We had no choice but to let the boy leave the hospital as his parents insisted on taking their child home,' he said.

 

He added that a patient should remain in isolation until a test showed the infection was over.

 

Doctors wanted him to remain in isolation to ensure there would be no possibility of human-to-human infection, he said.

 

The boy was under home observation by medics from a health centre in Tangerang and Wednesday's report said that his condition was improving, Mr Giriputro added.

 

Indonesia has reported 111 cases of bird flu, 89 of which have been fatal - the highest number of any nation.

 

The H5N1 strain of bird flu is endemic in birds across nearly all of Indonesia. Scientists worry that the virus could mutate into a form more easily transmissible between humans, sparking a global pandemic. -- AFP

Tuesday, October 30, 2007

Bangkok International Conference on Avian Influenza 2008

 

# 1205

 

 

In late January of next year an impressive group of world-class scientists and researchers will gather in Bangkok, Thailand for the 2008 International Conference on Avian Influenza

 

The cost of registration goes up after November 15th, so anyone interested should act soon.

 

Thailand, btw, is a delightful country with some of the friendliest people on earth. My brother has lived there for the past year, and has nothing but good things to say about the experience. 

 

The conference  program is enough to induce a Pavlovian response in anyone who follows avian influenza.   This is a veritable `Who's Who' of influenza experts.  

 

 

 

 

 

Bangkok International Conference on Avian Influenza 2008 : Integration from Knowledge to Control


January 23-25, 2008 at Napalai Ballroom, The Dusit Thani, Bangkok, Thailand

23 January 2008

07.30-09.30
Registration & Poster set-up

09.00-09.30
Opening ceremony

09.30-10.10

Keynote lecture by Prof. Robert G. Webster
Subject : H5N1 influenza: Continuing evolution and spread

10.10-10.50
Keynote lecture by Prof. Albert D.M.E. Osterhaus
Subject : Development of pandemic influenza vaccines

10.50-11.10
Coffee break

11.10-11.40
Plenary lecture by Prof. Malik Peiris
Subject : -to be announced-

11.40-12.10
Plenary lecture by Prof. Yong Poovorawan
Subject : -to be announced-

12.10-13.30
Lunch & Poster set-up

Track I : Animal virus sequencing and epidemiology

13.30-14.00
Plenary lecture by Prof. Lei Fumin
Subject : Protect wild birds and their wetland environments from the current HPAI H5N1 prevalence

14.00-14.30
Invited lecture by
Dr. Scott H. Newman
Subject : The truths about HPAI in wild birds

14.30-14.50
Correlation of human pathology of H5N1 infection with exvivo models
Dr.John M. Nicholls, The University of HongKong, China

14.50-15.10
Subject : -to be announced-
Dr. Mongkol Uiprasertkul, Mahidol University, Thailand

15.10-15.30
-to be announced-

15.30-15.50
Coffee break

15.50-18.00
Oral and poster presentation session

18.00-19.30
Welcome dinner

24 January 2008

Track II: Virology

09.00-09.40
Keynote lecture by Prof. Kennedy Shortridge

Subject :
Confronting pandemic influenza : Just don’t let it start

09.40-10.20
Keynote lecture by Prof. Yoshihiro Kawaoka

Subject :
Pandemic influenza

10.20-10.40
Coffee break

10.40-11.10

Plenary lecture by Prof. Yasuo Suzuki
Subject :
Highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses – Mutations responsible for the binding to human-type receptor

11.10-11.40
Plenary lecture by Dr. Mikhail Matrosovich
Subject : Receptor specificity and host range of influenza viruses

11.40-12.10
Plenary lecture by Prof. Prasert Auewarakul
Subject : Determinants of the avian influenza viral adaptation to human hosts

12.10-13.00
Lunch

Track III:  Immunology, pathogenesis, and antiviral

13.00-13.30
Plenary lecture by Prof. Pilaipan Puthavathana
Subject :
Antibody response to H5N1 virus infection
in humans

13.30-14.00
Plenary lecture by Dr. Menno D de Jong
Subject : -to be announced-

14.00-14.30

Plenary lecture by Prof. Frederick G. Hayden
Subject : Antiviral drugs and antiviral resistance

14.30-14.50
Coffee break

14.50-15.20
Plenary lecture by Dr. Jacqueline M. Katz
Subject : -to be announced-

15.20-15.50
Plenary lecture by Prof. George F. Gao
Subject : -to be announced-

15.50-16.20
Plenary lecture by Dr. Richard Webby
Subject : Genetic factors affecting H5N1 disease in murine models

16.20-16.40
-to be announced-

16.40-17.00
-to be announced-

17.00-17.20
-to be announced-

25 January 2008

Track IV: Vaccine development

09.00-09.40
Keynote lecture by Prof. Peter M. Palese

Subject:
Can we improve influenza virus vaccines?

09.40-10.10
Plenary lecture by Dr. Kanta Subbarao
Subject : Active and passive immunization against avian influenza viruses

10.10-10.30
Coffee break

10.30-11.00
The use of vaccine for the control of Avian Influenza in Vietnam
Dr. Nguyen Tien Dzung, National Institute of Veterinary Research, Viet Nam

11.00-11.30
-to be announced-

11.30-12.00
-to be announced-

12.00-13.00
Lunch

13.00-13.30
International Pandemic Preparedness; Requirements and Responsibilities
Prof. Michael T. Osterholm, University of Minnesota, USA

13.30-14.00
-to be announced-

14.00-14.30
-to be announced-

14.30-14.50
Coffee break

14.50-15.50
Panel discussion
Subject : -to be announced-

15.50-16.00
Closing ceremony


A Predilection For The Young



# 1204










(click to enlarge)



They say a picture is worth a thousand words. When I see this chart, I come up with more than that, but most are unprintable in polite company.


The H5N1 virus, unlike normal influenza, prefers children and young adults. Thus far, it has been its deadliest among teenagers, followed closely by twenty-somethings.


While those in their 30's still appear susceptible (based on this limited dataset), their survival rates have been markedly superior to any other age group under 40, with only a 28% fatality rate.


I say `only', because that group is near the top in survival rates. Compared to any other flu we've ever seen, a 28% CFR (Case Fatality Ratio) is devastating.


The trend is obvious, avian influenza attacks and kills the young.


Among those under the age of 10, roughly 50% have died.


It gets worse for those aged 10-19, where slightly more than 75% of those infected have perished. The news for 20-somethings isn't much better, with a CFR of 70%.


More startling, perhaps, is the fact that so far, 95% of all reported cases have been in those under the age of 50.


While the number of cases is probably too small to draw any conclusions, the CFR for those over 50 has run about 33%, which is bested only by the 30-39 demographic.


In 1918, we saw something akin to this, with young adults being hit particularly hard by the Spanish Influenza. Those over 65 were largely spared. But the trend today seems even more skewed towards the young than 1918.


Of course we can't know with certainty that this trend will continue should H5N1 achieve pandemic capability. With mutations, the situation could change. Or not.


Anyone who hesitates to close schools early in a severe pandemic, and keep them closed for as long as is required, needs to study this graph. Attempts to `maintain normalcy' or to `ensure education continues uninterrupted' will kill kids.


Sure, closing schools will be a pain. It will inconvenience parents, deprive kids of a social life, deny some kids their school lunches, and interrupt their education.


All serious ramifications, but none are life threatening.


When schools close, however, it will be up to the parents to ensure their kids aren't hanging out together someplace. Kids are not only susceptible to the virus, they have been historically good spreaders of the disease. That means they can spread it amongst themselves, and bring it home to their family.


While our eyes have been glued to the CFR, the other side of the coin is the Attack Rate. And here, we only have guesses.


In 1918, roughly 1/3rd of the world was reportedly infected with the Spanish Flu. Why the other 2/3rds escaped without illness is unknown. Most were certainly exposed, but somehow their immune system fought off the infection.


The thinking is, the next pandemic will have roughly the same attack rate.


The hitch in this thinking is, we don't know why 2/3rds of the population escaped unscathed in 1918. Had a similar H1N1 virus circulated sometime in the 1800's, conveying some immunity - particularly to the elderly?


We simply don't know.


It is conceivable that we could see a pandemic with a very low attack rate, under 20%, or a pandemic with an extremely high attack rate, over 50%. Undoubtedly we'll have a better handle on how pandemics work for the pandemic-after-next.


For now, we'll take the 35% attack rate, but add a grain of salt.


There are roughly 42 million kids between the age of 10 and 19 in the United States (2006 Est. US Census Data). Those under the age of 10 add another 40 million kids. Call it 82 million, give or take.


Now, assume that during the next pandemic 35% contract the flu. That's almost 29 million sick kids.


And to be honest, the attack rate won't be even across all age groups. Those under 20 may well see a 40%+ attack rate while those over 50 see less than 35% infected. But we'll go with 29 Million sick kids.


It is enough to prove a point.


The hope is, the CFR will drop (well, frankly, it will have to plummet to help much), and so it is all but taboo to mention a death toll based on today's fatality rates. In years past, it was assumed any virus would have to give up lethality to become an efficient pandemic. Last year, the WHO indicated that wasn't necessarily so.


The following chart shows the number of fatalities among those under the age of 20, assuming a 35% attack rate, at various CFR's.









Of course, a 64% fatality rate is unthinkable. As long as you ignore the fact that we are seeing roughly that among reported cases of avian flu right now.


A 2% CFR is quite bad enough, however. More than a half million dead kids. And the virus will have to lose more than 90% of its lethality to get us down to that number.


Personally, I do expect the CFR to drop. How low it will go, I can't say. And frankly, I have no scientific rationale to back that up. Intellectually, I understand that it doesn't have to lower. That the CFR we are seeing today could persist through a pandemic. But for my own sanity, I have to assume the virus will attenuate, at least a little.


We keep hearing that 1918 had a 2% fatality rate, and so that is the definition of a Category 5 Pandemic. The worst of the worst. And that is what the Federal government (but not all states) plan for.


The truth is, it was probably between 5% and 10% world-wide.


The 2% number is a bit of comforting math wizardry based on what happened in the United States. Record keeping was a mess in 1918, and so we will never know the full extent of that pandemic.


If the world's population was roughly 2 billion in 1918, and 33% contracted the flu, then that means roughly 660 million people were sickened. The estimates of deaths run anywhere between 20 and 100 million, with 40 to 60 million being the most favored range.


40 Million deaths would work out to be a 6% CFR

60 Million deaths would work out to a 9% CFR.


To get down to that 2% number, the 1918 pandemic would have had to of claimed only 13 million lives, which is far below the most conservative estimates.


Trying to extrapolate the future based on a past event is generally folly.


After all, if you've seen one pandemic, you've seen one pandemic.


The next pandemic may turn out looking nothing like we expect, or fear. It may not even stem from the H5N1 virus. Hopefully record keeping will be better when the next one rolls around, and future generations will have that data to help them prepare in the future.


But until we know, we must use the best data we have available, no matter how imperfect, to base our preparations on. And right now, those numbers are dismal.


This virus likes kids, and young adults. Our emphasis must be on protecting the most vulnerable of our population.


That means closing schools early in a pandemic, and keeping them closed, for months if need be.


Kids can make up a lost year.


But only if they survive the pandemic.


Beyond being a tragedy beyond comprehension, the loss of millions of young adults and children would cripple our economy, bankrupt social security, and inflict a psychological blow on the survivors unlike anything we've ever experienced.


It must be avoided if humanly possible.


While the CDC has urged that schools be closed early in a pandemic, I keep hearing `hedging' from local officials. Talk of waiting until a certain percentage of students are out with the flu during a pandemic, before closing down.


Waiting to see how bad it really is, out of fear of over-reacting.


Frankly, that kind of thinking will get kids killed. And probably their families, too.


Once pandemic influenza has been reported anywhere in this country, all schools should be preparing to shut down. Parents, if they are smart, will pull their kids out of any school that doesn't close when the first case is reported in their state. It's that serious.


Officials aren't going to get a second chance to get this right.

Monday, October 29, 2007

Part III of CIDRAP Vaccine Puzzle Series Now Online

 

# 1203

 

 

 

The tour de force by Maryn McKenna on the CIDRAP website; her 7-part series on the pandemic vaccine puzzle, continues tonight with part III.   I won't post anything more than the tantalizing opening paragraph. 

 

Follow the link, and read the entire article.  It is worth the time.

 

 

THE PANDEMIC VACCINE PUZZLE Part 3: H5N1 poses major immunologic challenges

Maryn McKenna * Contributing Writer

Editor's note: This is the third in a seven-part series investigating the prospects for development of vaccines to head off the threat of an influenza pandemic posed by the H5N1 avian influenza virus. The series puts promising advances in vaccine technology in perspective by illuminating the formidable barriers to producing large amounts of an effective and widely usable vaccine in a short time frame. Part 2 discussed the huge gap between current global vaccine production capacity and the likely demand for vaccine in the event of a pandemic.

Oct 29, 2007 (CIDRAP News) – Many of the difficulties facing achievement of a pandemic influenza vaccine could not have been anticipated before the pandemic threat arose: They are intrinsic to the H5N1 virus itself.

(Click To Follow Link)

The Role Of Optimism In Pandemic Planning

# 1202


Last week the WHO (World Health Organization) put out what could charitably be called an optimistic forecast for future vaccine production. By 2012, they hope to be able to inoculate the entire population of the planet within 6 months of a pandemic outbreak.


My response was one of unbridled skepticism.


From time to time, a politician, or a local health official will come out and make some vague assurance that their state, or their agency, is `ready for a pandemic'.


Balderdash!


I'm sorry, but there isn't a city, or a state, or a Federal agency that is truly ready for a severe pandemic. I doubt anyone can truly be ready for an event of that magnitude. It's like saying you are ready for a Tsunami.


Running a drill where you prove you can vaccinate 200 people an hour is a worthwhile undertaking, but it must be tempered with the knowledge that it may be 6 months or longer before a vaccine is available. Often officials make it sound as if, by running these drills, we have everything in place to avert a disaster.


We don't.

While a defeatist attitude never solved a problem, I wonder what is served by issuing these irrationally optimistic assessments. It is hard to believe that those making these pronouncements really believe them.


Federal and State officials, on one hand, seem to want individuals to prepare for a pandemic. They urge between 2-weeks and 90-days of food, water, and medicines in every home. Yet the counter message is they have everything under control.


The result is a confused and bewildered citizenry. Most people simply aren't preparing, despite the advice to do so, because they don't believe the threat is genuine. And they believe the government has everything handled.

If the point is to keep the population calm, with their money in the bank and the stock market, and buying on credit for this year's Christmas season, then I suppose these mixed messages are working.


But if the goal is to make our society pandemic aware and prepared, we are going about it the wrong way.


As a child of the 1950's I grew up with Conelrad (This is a test. This is only a test. Had this been a real emergency . . . ), Civil Defense handouts in school, and designated bomb shelters in dozens of locations in my home town.


We learned from Bert the Turtle how to duck and cover, and why we should never look at the flash. As an 8 year old, I knew the different level of shielding needed to protect between Alpha, Beta, and Gamma Rays.











The cold war was, if nothing else, educational.


But no one freaked. People went about their lives even with the specter of atomic incineration in the background. We were informed, and frankly, better prepared in the late 1950s than we appear to be today. We had an operational civil defense, and people were given an unflinching look at the threat.


A far cry from today, where the main concern is apparently not to upset anyone.


While there are voices out there, in the private sector, and in Federal agencies (HHS & CDC come to mind) urging pandemic preparedness, we need national politicians and local officials to become vocal about this issue. So far, the silence from these sectors has been deafening.


We need honesty, not faux optimism.


Believe it or not, the people can handle the truth.


It's lies they can't abide.

The Return of SophiaZoe

 

# 1201

 

 

The flu watching community is fortunate to have so many talented and well respected bloggers.  Each day I marvel at the combined output of Flublogia, and consider myself lucky to be a small part of it.

 

One of our best bloggers, SophiaZoe of A Journey Through The World of Pandemic Influenza,  has resumed blogging after a month long hiatus due to a family health issue.  

 

SophiaZoe's latest blog can be read hereWelcome back, SZ!

 

It is only fair to disclose that SZ and I have become fast friends over the past year or so, and have been lucky enough to meet face-to-face a couple of times.  

 

That notwithstanding, SZ is a force to behold when it comes to her knowledge of avian flu issues, and a great writer to boot.   I marvel at her ability to remember obscure information that may have been released months (or even years) before, and her ability to link it to current events. 

 

The remarkable thing is, she is not alone.

 

The dedication and steadiness of Crawford Kilian of Crofsblog is legend in the flu community.  His site is not only resource rich, it contains a wealth of sober analysis.  It belongs on everyone's daily stop.

 

My buddy Scott McPherson, although relatively new to Flublogia, is no stranger to pandemic issues.  He has been heavily involved at the state and federal level with pandemic planning, and talks to the `heavy hitters' with regularity.

 

He is also a helluva writer.   Knowledgeable and entertaining.  A killer combination.

 

The Revere's of Effect Measure manage to make the science of virology, and public health policy, understandable to the layperson. And that is no easy job.   Much of what I know about the science of pandemic  influenza, I owe to the Reveres. 

 

We also have a few really good newspaper reporters covering the pandemic influenza story, and they deserve mention (and praise) as well.  Helen Branswell of the Canadian Press is perhaps the best known writer on avian flu, and for good reason. She never fails to impress with her ability to cogently present the facts, and her inexhaustible number of contacts in the field.

 

Maryn Mckenna, recently doing a lot of writing for CIDRAP, but formerly the CDC reporter for the Atlanta-Journal Constitution, and the author of  Beating Back The Devil, the story of the Epidemic Intelligence Service of the CDC, is another equally bright and sane voice in the media.

 

There are others of course.  Jason Gale of Bloomberg, Maggie Fox of Reuters, and Patrick Thibodeaux of Computerworld are making significant contributions in the mainstream media.  Apologies to anyone I've left out.

 

The point is, we are blessed with a good many rational voices writing on this subject, and while we sometimes all cover the same story, we somehow manage to find different perspectives.  And that's important.  None of us are going to be able to cover all the angles of any story. 

 

When you blog, you basically need to find one or two points and try to drive them home.  Most stories have dozens of facets.  By having multiple bloggers, we end up with better coverage of an issue. 

 

A day doesn't go by when I don't write a blog, then visit Scott or Crof or SZ or the Revere's and find that they are covering the same story but from a different angle.  Instead of kicking myself for not thinking of it the way they did, I consider how lucky it is to have so many takes on the same subject.

 

If the news is slow, and you have the time, go back through some of the older articles by these wonderful writers.  Their insight on events months ago are just as valuable today as they were when they were written.  

 

And be glad, as I am, that we  have them. 

Indonesian Toddler Tests Positive For H5N1

 

 

# 1200

 

 

Another Monday, another report of a child with bird flu in Indonesia.  It's beginning to feel like a pattern.   Of late, we seem to start each week with this sort of news.

 

This time its a 3-year-old boy, initials S.A.,  in Tanggerang near the outskirts of Jakarta, and officials report the child is in good condition.  

 

Two other children have died in Tanggerang this month from H5N1. The last one, a 5-year-old girl, succumbed last week.  A report carried by Antara News denies any direct contact between the two children.

 

This from Xinhua news.

 

Indonesian toddler infected by bird flu

www.chinaview.cn 2007-10-29 14:46:49

 

    JAKARTA, Oct. 29 (Xinhua) -- A 3-year-old Indonesian boy from Tanggerang in outskirts of Jakarta was contracted by avian influenza, Health Ministry said here on Monday.

 

    The boy has been treating in a bird-flu designed hospital of Sulianti Suroso in Jakarta since Saturday, Director of Disease Control of the ministry Nyoman Kandun said here.

 

    He was on a good condition, he said.

 

    "Two laboratory tests showed today that the boy is positive of avian influenza," Kandun told Xinhua.

 

    He said that the boy had historical contact with dead fowls around his resident.

 

    But, Kandun said that there was no family links between the boy and the his neighbor girl who died last week on bird flu.

 

    The boy first felt the germs of the disease on Oct. 22 and admitted to the hospital five days later, Suharda Ningrum an official of anti-bird flu center of the ministry told Xinhua.

Sunday, October 28, 2007

CIDRAP Series on Pandemic Vaccines

 

# 1199

 

 

After a 2-day trip which ended up taking 5 days (Murphy was an optimist), I'm back at my homebase and should resume my regular blogging in the morning.  The last 3 entries were made using someone else's kludgy laptop, and without my usual tools.  It's good to be home.

 

 

In my absence one of the best writers on emerging infectious diseases in general, and avian flu in particular; Maryn Mckenna, has begun a 7-part series on pandemic vaccine issues on the CIDRAP website.

 

Part I: Flu research: a legacy of neglect  was published on Oct. 25th.

 

Part II: Vaccine production capacity falls far short appeared on Oct. 26th.

 

Additional entries will appear over the coming days. 

 

Thus far, this series has been about as clear and concise as one can get when wrapping one's head around the complex issues of vaccine production and distribution.  

 

The picture it paints isn't as rosy as the one the WHO announced last week regarding the future ability to produce enough vaccine to inoculate the world during a pandemic.

 

These are `must-read' articles for anyone interested in pandemic vaccine production, and the problems that industry will face in providing a vaccine early in any pandemic.

 

Kudos to CIDRAP and Ms. Mckenna for a great series.   I know I'm looking forward to reading the rest of these articles.

Saturday, October 27, 2007

An Abridgement Too Far?


#1198


This article, from Scotland's Dundee Courier, outlines proposed changes in that country's health enforcement laws designed to enhance their ability to deal with large scale medical disasters like pandemic flu. They refer to these changes as draconian measures.


Perhaps they are.


Abridgements of rights are never viewed positively, particularly by those who's rights have been infringed.


Granted, any law can be unfairly implemented, and even innocuous legislation's can go awry. How these laws are used (or abused) by the people they empower will tell the tale. Could they be used unfairly and to the detriment of the general population?


Absolutely.


Are these laws a power grab and an abridgement of people's rights?


Not necessarily.


During a pandemic, officials, and those on the front lines (cops, national guard troops, doctors, nurses, etc.) are going to be overworked, overstressed, and dealing with impossible situations at every turn. The public will clamor to be protected, particularly when they start seeing their friends and loved ones stricken, and perhaps dying.


It won't be pretty, and along the way I've no doubt that some people's rights are going to be trampled. And the level of those transgressions will probably vary considerably from one country, or locality, to another.


I suspect those abuses will occur, with or without the color of law. Having a law just makes it easier.


Admittedly, I'm always wary whenever a government tries to increase the power they wield over their citizens. All too often these laws have a life of their own, increasing in scope and intrusiveness with time. The record for most governments in this regard has been poor.


I also know that during a severe pandemic, where millions of people are dying, some special powers will be needed by local, state, and federal governments to deal with the crisis. Most people will demand that the welfare of the many outweigh the rights of a few.


At least until they find themselves on the receiving end of some draconian order.


These laws are not likely to go away. All we can hope is that they are applied with a bit of common sense, and that decisions are made by public health officials, and not politicians.





Health bill proposes draconian powers

By Marjory Inglis, health reporter

PEOPLE WILL be banned from schools and workplaces and could be forced to have medical treatment against their will in a bid to protect the wider public, under legislation outlined yesterday.


Draconian measures are being proposed to tackle a range of modern threats, such as pandemic flu and bio-terrorism, set out in a bill to modernise Scotland’s public health legislation published yesterday.


Current legislation dates back to 1889 but the new bill aims to ensure that organisations responsible for protecting public health are better equipped to protect Scotland from the threat of infectious diseases and contamination.


Dr Harry Burns, Scotland’s chief medical officer, said, “Our public health legislation needs to be modernised to address the threats we face in a modern day world. That could be from issues as wide-ranging as pandemic flu to bio-terrorism.


“Our preparedness to protect the public will be strengthened by this legislation. It gives clear and transparent roles and responsibilities for health protection.”


Key provisions in the bill include:



Updating and strengthening existing powers of health boards to extend the exclusion of people from school and work, where there is a risk to public health, to a wider range of settings.


Introducing new powers to quarantine people in defined circumstances and, where there is significant risk to public health, on order from a sheriff, while maintaining personal safeguards.


Updating existing powers to remove and detain in hospital a person suffering from a serious infectious disease or who has been contaminated, where there is a significant risk to public health, on order from a sheriff.


Updating existing powers to require a person to have the least intrusive or invasive medical examination possible to achieve the public health outcome, without consent, in defined circumstances and where there is significant risk to public health, on order from a sheriff.


A new power to require a person to be disinfected, disinfested or decontaminated, in defined circumstances and where there is significant risk to public health, on order from a sheriff.


Minister for Public Health Shona Robison said, “The provisions in this bill are vital for the future protection of the health of the people of Scotland.


“This is a major piece of legislation which will ensure that appropriate measures are in place to safeguard the public from existing and emerging threats to public health.


“In a world that is increasingly accessible, largely ue to the ease of overseas travel, this is an issue facing every country. We must endeavour to ensure that modern day Scotland has the necessary legislative powers in place to deal with the wide ranging threats and challenges we face in the 21st century.”



Friday, October 26, 2007

World Not Ready For Bird Flu


#1197


No one who has been following the avian flu story should be surprised at this assessment, provided by David Nabarro of the United Nations.


Despite much hard work by dedicated professionals, the world is only slightly more prepared for a pandemic than it was two years ago. While some agencies have been very proactive in preparing, many others are doing little or nothing. And worse, the private sector is doing even less. For most small businesses and private individuals, the issue isn't even on their radar screen.


The problem is, too few people see pandemic flu as a genuine, and possibly imminent, threat. If they worry about it at all, they don't think it will happen anytime soon. That it may be a threat someday . . . .


But you wait long enough, and someday does eventually come.


Ready or not.







Not if but when, United Nations official warns


By Mark Huffman
ConsumerAffairs.Com
October 25, 2007


Despite three years of massive preparation efforts, the world is not ready to deal with a potential Avian, or “bird” flu pandemic that could kill millions of people world-wide. That’s the assessment of David Nabarro, a senior United Nations official in charge of bird flu prevention efforts.

Nabarro says most countries have made some progress on a preparedness plan, but that progress is spotty. And while some have actually been able to stockpile anti-viral vaccines, they have yet to plan for the enormous societal and economic impact a pandemic would bring.


"Unfortunately, only a relatively small number are adequately prepared to keep going in the event that the pandemic has massive absenteeism associated with it, Nabarro said. We need hard work for at least two or three years more to make sure that the whole world is properly pandemic ready.”


Not if, but when


And a bird flu pandemic is coming, says Nabarro.


To date the handful of humans who have contracted the disease have gotten the virus from infected birds. But once the deadly H5N1 virus mutates so that it is easily transmitted from one person to the next, Nabarro and other heath experts say it will spread quickly around the globe.


That’s what happened in 1918, when an animal virus mutated and began to quickly spread from person to person. Before it ran its course in 1919, the “Spanish Flu” killed an estimated 40 billion people – more than died in the just completed World War. Health experts call it the most devastating epidemic in recorded history. So far.


Nabarro says no one knows when the H5N1 virus will jump from birds to humans or how severe the resulting outbreak will be. But he says nations should be prepared for the worst, both in terms of human suffering and economic devastation.


Vietnam: Poultry Outbreaks On The Rise


#1196


Last June, during the height of the B2B (bird-to-bird) H5N1 outbreaks in Vietnam, 18 provinces reported poultry die-offs. By the end of the summer, that number had been beaten back to just 1 province. Now, according to news reports, we are beginning to see a resurgence of reports again.



Bird flu-hit localities in Vietnam rise to three

HANOI, Oct. 26 (Xinhua) -- Bird flu outbreaks have occurred in Vietnam's northern Cao Bang Province since Oct. 10, raising the total number of localities currently affected by the disease to three.

The disease has killed or infected 480 ducks and 80 chickens raised by 13 households in Trung Khanh district, the Department of Animal Health under the Vietnamese Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development said Friday, noting that samples from the fowls have been tested positive to bird flu virus strain H5N1.To prevent bird flu spread, local veterinary agencies have culled all ill poultry and isolated the affected areas.

Now, bird flu is hitting Cao Bang, central Quang Tri Province and southern Tra Vinh Province.Bird flu outbreaks in Vietnam, starting in December 2003, have killed and led to the forced culling of dozens of millions of fowls in the country, according to the department.

Tuesday, October 23, 2007

Away From My Postings

 


AFD won't be updated again until late on Thursday, as I have to be out of town for the next two days.

 

Crof at Crofsblog, and Scott McPherson's blog are both great resources for keeping current on breaking bird flu news. 

 

Quite often the Reveres at Effect Measure weigh in on bird flu, and so they are always worth a look.  Their non-avian flu blogging is always interesting, as well.

 

And The Coming Influenza Pandemic? offers an excellent roundup of the day's news.

WHO: Vaccine Production Projections Increase

 

# 1195

 

Today, in a press release from the WHO (World Health Organization) we are told that the amount of pandemic vaccine that we could produce will be dramatically greater in the coming years.   That's the good news. 

 

 The bad news is that capacity is still 3 years away.

 

Right now, we have the global capacity to produce 500 million doses of trivalent vaccine, or theoretically  as much as 1.5 billion doses of mono-valent vaccine.  That assumes that EVERYTHING goes perfectly.     Some years, we have problems just producing the standard seasonal flu vaccine in sufficient quantity. 

 

First, the WHO Press Release, then some discussion:

 

 

Projected supply of pandemic influenza vaccine sharply increases

23 OCTOBER 2007 | GENEVA -- Recent scientific advances and increased vaccine manufacturing capacity have prompted experts to increase their projections of how many pandemic influenza vaccine courses can be made available in the coming years.

Related links

:: Global pandemic influenza action plan to increase vaccine supply [pdf 510kb]

 

Last spring, the World Health Organization (WHO) and vaccine manufacturers said that about 100 million courses of pandemic influenza vaccine based on the H5N1 avian influenza strain could be produced immediately with standard technology. Experts now anticipate that global production capacity will rise to 4.5 billion pandemic immunization courses per year in 2010.

 

"With influenza vaccine production capacity on the rise, we are beginning to be in a much better position vis-à-vis the threat of an influenza pandemic," Dr Marie-Paule Kieny, Director of the Initiative for Vaccine Research at WHO, said today. "However, although this is significant progress, it is still far from the 6.7 billion immunization courses that would be needed in a six month period to protect the whole world."

 

"Accelerated preparedness activities must continue, backed by political impetus and financial support, to further bridge the still substantial gap between supply and demand," she said.

 

This year, manufacturers have been able to step up production capacity of trivalent (three viral strains) seasonal influenza vaccines to an estimated 565 million doses, from 350 million doses produced in 2006, according to the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers & Associations. According to experts working in this field, the yearly production capacity for seasonal influenza vaccine is expected to rise to 1 billion doses in 2010, provided corresponding demand exists.

 

This would help manufacturers to be able to deliver around 4.5 billion pandemic influenza vaccine courses because a pandemic vaccine would need about eight times less antigen, the substance that stimulates an immune response. Vaccine production capacity is linked to the amount of antigen that has to be used to make each dose of the vaccine. Scientists have recently discovered they can reduce the amount of antigen used to produce pandemic influenza vaccines by using water-in-oil substances that enhance the immune response.

 

The progress was reported Friday at the first meeting of a WHO Advisory Group on pandemic influenza vaccine production and supply.

 

The Global Action Plan Advisory Group, an independent, international committee of 10 members, met at WHO headquarters one year after eight new strategies to increase pandemic influenza vaccine were identified and published in the WHO Global pandemic influenza action plan to increase vaccine supply.

 

At the Advisory Group meeting, other progress on the Global Action Plan was discussed. WHO reported it is setting up a training hub that would serve as a source of technology transfer to developing countries.

 

The Advisory Group also discussed a new business plan which assessed options for further increasing vaccine production capacity and reviewed priority next steps. The three most valuable options include continuing to promote seasonal influenza vaccine programmes, supporting the industry to sustain production capacity beyond seasonal demand and enabling some vaccine production facilities to change, at the onset of a pandemic, from producing inactivated vaccines to live attenuated vaccines. Due to the higher yields obtained with live attenuated influenza vaccine technology, facility conversion could, by 2012, bridge the expected supply-demand gap and produce enough vaccine to protect the global population within six months of the declaration of a pandemic.

 
For further information, please contact:

Hayatee Hasan
Department of Immunization, Vaccines and Biologicals
WHO, Geneva

 

 

Admittedly, if these projections come to fruition, this is good news. 

 

The ability to create 4.5 billion doses of vaccine depend, however, on the use of an oil-and-water adjuvant to increase the recipient's immune response.  While generally considered safe, there are some people who worry about its long-term effects on the immune system.

 

But even if the adjuvant is proved safe, it isn't a panacea for a pandemic.   The ability to produce billions of doses of vaccine, and the ability to dispense it to billions of people, are two decidedly different things.

 

There are logistical problems, including the packaging and shipping of billions of doses around the world.  There will be political and cultural barriers.   Immunizing the world's 6-plus billion people in six months time, as alluded to as being possible by 2012, would require more than just having the vaccine available.

 

While I welcome any advance in our vaccine manufacturing technology, I'll have to see a vaccine produced and 6.6 billion people inoculated in six months time (during, btw, a raging pandemic) before I'll believe it's possible.

 

Color me skeptical.

The Plot Thickens In Riau

 

 

# 1194

 

Riau, Indonesia has been a hotbed of bird flu activity in recent months.  Several deaths have been attributed to the H5N1 virus in that province, along with numerous reports of poultry die-offs.   Yesterday's controversy over whether 10-year old Gozi, and her 17-year old aunt, died of bird flu makes it impossible to know the exact number of human cases.

 

Today, Xinhua news is reporting on 7 children suspected of having bird flu.  Tests have yet to be run, and until confirmed, these are only suspected cases.

 

 

 

 

7 children suspected with bird flu in Indonesia's Riau

www.chinaview.cn 2007-10-23 19:27:12

 

    JAKARTA, Oct. 23 (Xinhua) -- Seven children aged between one and 10 years old have been suspected of having bird flu in Indonesia's Riau province, where four people have died of the virus in recent months, an official said Tuesday.

 

    "It is only suspicion but we are serious to handle the case," local head office head Hasanul Irbai was quoted by leading news website Detikcom as saying.

 

    The seven children live in Merampi Hulu village, Siak regency in the province on Sumatra island.

 

    "The Siak government will immediately send the children to the Arifin Achmad Hospital in (provincial capital) Pekanbaru," he said.

 

    Earlier this week, the government confirmed that bird flu was the cause of the death of a 10-year-old girl in Riau, bringing the total of national casualties to 89, the highest among other bird-flu affected countries in the world.

Monday, October 22, 2007

Secretary Leavitt On The Strategic National Stockpile

 

# 1193

 

 

 

Secretary of Health and Human Services, Michael Leavitt, has been blogging for about 3 months now.   This has been an interesting, and refreshing, look inside the beltway on topics relating to public health.

 

I'm very pleased that Secretary Leavitt has elected to share his thoughts via a blog, and equally impressed that he does it so well.    This is a level of openness we are unaccustomed to seeing from cabinet level officials.

 

Today Secretary Leavitt gives his thoughts on the Strategic National Stockpile.  While there are no bombshells, it is a good overview of the problems involved in maintaining an emergency reserve of medicines.

 

 

The main page for the Secretary's blog is HERE.   Additionally, Secretary Leavitt blogged in the 2007 Pandemic Leadership blog, along with a handful of other bloggers, and those may be viewed  HERE.

 

 

 

Strategic National Stockpiles

 

Strategic National Stockpiles have had my focus the last few weeks.  Each year Congress appropriates money (just under $600 million last year) so we can maintain stockpiles of medical supplies that would be needed in a national emergency. We have organized the system with the objective of being able to deliver basic supplies to the scene of an emergency within 12 hours.

 

The stockpile system became a serious undertaking following September 11, 2001. Our level of sophistication continues to increase. The procedures for prioritizing and executing the purchases are improving.  We have a ways to go in my view.

 

It is easy to underestimate the challenge of keeping supplies current and ready to deploy. It involves advanced logistics and it is not inexpensive.  In many cases, buying the item is a minor part of the cost. Warehousing has to be paid every year. Another challenge is shelf life.  Most medical products have to be constantly monitored for currency and after an appropriate period they are no longer usable. 

 

(Cont.)

Dueling Press Releases

 

# 1192

 

 

 

After reports this morning where Indonesia's Health Minister is reported to have confirmed the death of a 10-year-old girl in Riau to  have been a result of H5N1, we get this:

 

 

 

 

Indonesian girl did not die of bird flu: official

 

JAKARTA (AFP) - A young Indonesian girl who died at the weekend on the island of Sumatra was not infected with bird flu, a health ministry official said Monday.

The 10-year-old was admitted to hospital on Saturday suffering symptoms that led doctors to suspect she could be carrying the H5N1 virus, which has killed 88 people in Indonesia, the highest number anywhere in the world.

 

"The test result is negative," said Haris Sugiantoro, an official at the health ministry's bird flu information centre.

 

If the ministry result is positive, a second test is carried out at a separate laboratory before a patient is confirmed as infected with bird flu in Indonesia.

 

The H5N1 strain of bird flu is endemic in birds across nearly all of Indonesia. Scientists worry that the virus could mutate into a form more easily transmissible between humans, triggering a global pandemic.

 

Indonesia, the world's fourth most populous nation, reporded its first human case of bird flu in July 2005.

 

 

I have no way of knowing which report is correct. 

 

Regardless of any official announcements, given the fact that this girl's 17 year-old aunt also died from similar symptoms a little more than a week ago, I wouldn't be quick to dismiss the possibility of bird flu.

Indonesian Confirmation And A Surprise

 

# 1191

 

 

The death on Saturday of a 10-year old girl in Indonesia has now been confirmed to have been the result of H5N1.   The surprise is the announcement that the girl's aunt died earlier,  now suspected (but no laboratory confirmation) of bird flu.

 

 

 

Indonesia confirms 89th bird flu death

www.chinaview.cn 2007-10-22 14:35:55

 

    JAKARTA, Oct. 22 (Xinhua) -- Indonesian Health Minister Siti Fadilah Supari confirmed Monday that the death of a 10-year-old girl in Riau Province was caused by bird flu, bringing the total death toll to 89.

 

    "Yes, it was positive (of bird flu)," she told reporters at the State Palace here.

 

    The girl's aunt had died earlier of suspected bird flu, she added.

 

    "But we are not certain about her aunt because we didn't take her blood sample," the minister said.

Covering Our Assets

 

 

# 1190

 

 

Granted, there is a good deal of breathless hyperbole in this article in The Sun, but then as a tabloid, they aren't generally known for being representative of traditional British reserve.

 

The UK, which in some areas of pandemic preparation appear to be far ahead of other countries, has yet to procure a central stockpile of masks for NHS (National Health Service) workers.   As this article points out, individual hospitals have some stockpiles, although no quantities are given.

 

 

 

 

 

 

'NHS risk as epidemic looms'

By GRAEME WILSON
Deputy Political Editor

Published: Today

 

BRITAIN is dangerously exposed to a global flu pandemic because ministers have not bought life-saving face masks for NHS staff, it was claimed last night.

 

The Government has not acted despite pledging to start buying them for doctors and nurses TWO YEARS ago.

 

Meanwhile countries like America, Australia and France have stockpiled tens of millions.

 

The Tories last night accused ministers of taking risks with the lives of thousands of health workers.

 

Experts fear a deadly worldwide outbreak of influenza is imminent.

 

With bird flu a growing threat, they say there is up to a 60 per cent chance of a pandemic within the next five years.

 

The Department of Health has said a global outbreak could lead to between 50,000 and 750,000 people dying in this country.

 

Masks are vital in protecting doctors and nurses treating flu victims – and preventing it spreading between patients.

 

In 2005, then Health Secretary Patricia Hewitt told MPs she was “taking steps” to make sure there were enough masks for the NHS.

 

Last year the Government said it was still considering how to buy and stockpile them. But health minister Dawn Primarolo admitted recently: “No decision has been taken whether to procure and stockpile face masks centrally.”

 

Shadow Health Secretary Andrew Lansley said the US has stockpiled at least 152million masks, Australia has 42million and France has ordered 200million.

 

Mr Lansley said he was alarmed that ministers had failed to act.

 

He added: “Other countries have millions of masks but we haven’t anything like enough to cope with a pandemic. After two years of delays, ministers need to take decisions now.

 

“This kind of bureaucratic delay and indecision is unacceptable. It is vital our doctors and nurses have enough face masks if there is a flu pandemic. Ministers must not take risks with people’s lives.”

 

The Department of Health dismissed the criticism last night. A spokesman said: “NHS hospitals around the country already have a supply of protective equipment. The department is considering whether to centrally purchase and stockpile additional supplies of respirators and face masks for health workers. A decision will be reached as soon as possible.”

 

 

 

 

 

While other countries, like the United States, have stockpiled millions of masks, even their supplies appear to be woefully inadequate.

 

Assuming we have 8 million healthcare workers and emergency personnel, and that at best an N95 respirator might be worn for 6 hours (more likely 4), each worker would need at least two per 12 hour shift.  That's 16 million masks a day. 

 

A pandemic wave is expected to last 90 days, or more.  That would mean  United States front line personnel would need 1.44 Billion masks, just for the first wave.   

 

The Federal government has stockpiled 1/10th as many.  Of course, local hospitals and ambulances are stockpiling, too.  But probably nowhere near the 1 Billion masks that would be needed during the first 90 days.

 

And as far as a 2nd or 3rd wave are concerned, the prospects of resupplying in between waves aren't particularly good.

 

Masks, gloves, and gowns are going to be the only protection most HCW's (health care workers) will have.  How protective they will be is an open question.  Already they've been told not to expect prophylactic anti-virals.   All of these items will be in short supply early on in a pandemic. 

 

We don't ask firefighters to run into burning buildings without bunker gear, it is hard to believe we will expect HCW's to work without basic PPE's (Personal Protective Equipment).  Yet, the alternative when we run out is to abandon patients. 

 

A tough call, because either way, someone is going to die. Perhaps a lot of someone's.

 

Stockpiling PPE's is expensive.  Storing them in bulk can be problematic. 

 

As difficult as it might seem, however, stockpiling PPE's is a cheaper alternative than losing a good many healthcare workers unnecessarily during a pandemic.