# 5981
The hyperbolic headlines of the past few days would have the casual observer believing that the world’s bird flu researchers are a bunch of crazed scientists about to unleash a plague upon all of humanity.
A few examples taken from the NewsNow feed of the past 72 hours include:
Engineered Avian Flu Could Kill Half the World's Humans [Science] Gizmodo
Man-made deadly flu virus could wipe out humanity New Kerala
Mad Scientists Create H5N1 GM BioTerrorism Virus Conspiracy Planet
Based on the first two headlines, there is apparently some dispute over whether this research will be the death of all of us, or just half of the worlds population.
A minor technical point, I admit. But of interest, I would think, to at least 3.5 billion people.
There are legitimate questions to be asked regarding the safety and wisdom of many avenues of scientific research, but the truth is far less Strangelovian than some in the media would have us believe.
There is frankly little incentive for scientists to unleash a species killing plague, as it would make getting future research grants nearly impossible.
Since some in the media seem intent on pillorying bird flu researchers in general, and Ron Fouchier in particular, I thought it was only fair – for balance, if for no other reason - if I directed my readers to `the other side’ of this story.
My thanks to Gert van der Hoek on FluTrackers for posting the following link to Erasmus University’s Bird Flu Research FAQ.
FAQ Birdflu
Why does Erasmus MC carry out this type of research?
Erasmus MC carries out research to improve public health which is precisely why it is essential to conduct research on these viruses. A pandemic could cost many lives. Only by conducting these studies can we determine the risks caused by viruses and devise strategies to mitigate the risks, for example, by developing vaccines and medication to curtail the spread of the virus and by developing diagnostic tests. If these studies are not carried out as a precaution but once the virus has started to spread, it is too late. Research and the development of tests, vaccines and medication are very time consuming. The outcomes of this study will also be benficial in earlier recognition of dangerous variants of the virus in outbreaks.
You’ll also find their answers to the following questions on this webpage.
How big is the risk that the virus will spread among humans?
Could this dangerous virus escape from a laboratory or fall into the hands of people intending to cause harm, such as bioterrorists?
Can researchers become infected with the virus and then spread it?
Would it not be better to stop this type of research?
While some aspects of the media are unfairly painting bird flu researchers as a bunch of `mad scientists’ with a Gilbert Chemistry set, a sick chicken, and a dream - the reality is that nature continues to work 24/7 to develop more efficient pathogens.
Researchers are trying to stay one step ahead of this process, in order to mitigate, or perhaps even avert, the next pandemic.
There are risks involved, of course.
But those risks are also present in dozens of BSL-3 and BSL-4 labs all over the world, where scores of deadly pathogens are stored and experimented with every day.
According to a CIDRAP report from last night (see Biosecurity panel said to be reviewing another H5N1 transmissions study) another well respected researcher’s work is under scrutiny by the US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), and there are discussions over how (or even whether) to publish the results.
Granted, genuine concerns exist over the wisdom of releasing the full details on these experiments, and some compromise regarding the publication of key elements to this research may well be needed.
But censoring the scientific community is a bad idea in principle, and as history has shown, rarely works in the long run.
Knowledge is a difficult genie, no matter how closely held, to coax back into the bottle.
