Texas: New World Screwworm (NWS) Now Reported in 10 Counties

 

#19,223

The spread of the New World Screwworm (NWS) in Texas continues to accelerate with 10 counties now reporting detections in livestock. Thus far, we've not seen any reports in wildlife, although they must certainly exist. 

Currently Edwards county has reported the most detections (n=6), followed closely by Crockett County (n=5).

Given the life cycle of the NWS can be as short as 21 days (see below) we are likely already well into the second generation in Texas, which may account for the doubling of cases reported over the past 7 days.  

Note: The NWS is extremely cold intolerant, and can only successfully overwinter in extreme south Texas and Southern Florida (and then, only during mild winters).

While the return of cold weather in the fall should kill off the NWS population in the United States, we could see 5 or 6 more generations emerge before then, each likely larger than the last. 

At least, until the release of sterile flies begins to have an effect. 

 Reportedly, the USDA is able to disperse between 4 and 8 million sterile screwworm flies per week into the known infested counties of Texas.

New production facilities are being constructed, including a massive sterile fly production facility at Moore Air Base in South Texas, which is expected to produce 100 million sterile flies per week by November 2027 (increasing to 300 million a week by the end of 2028).

If we start seeing a decline in cases later in the summer, it could be an early indication the program is having an impact. Until then, Texas (and potentially other states) have a long hot battle ahead. 

Australia: DAFF Confirms 4th H5N1 Positive Wild Bird

 

#19,222

A week ago Australia reported its first 2 detections of HPAI H5N1, both in migratory birds (Brown Skua & Giant Petrel) in Western Australia (see Australia: 2nd H5N1 Infected Bird Confirmed), followed last Wednesday by a 3rd confirmed detection in South Australia - roughly 1,000 miles east - on the Fleurieu Peninsula, very near Adelaide. 

While detections remain sporadic, the overriding message from the Australian government is to avoid close contact with sick birds (or wildlife), record the incident details, and report sightings to the the Emergency Animal Disease Hotline.

Today we've have the following brief confirmation from Australia's DAFF of a 4th positive case - again in Western Australia - which also reports a presumed 5th case, also in WA.

H5 bird flu testing update
 
27 June 2026

Attributable to Australian Chief Veterinary Officer, Dr Beth Cookson:

Testing at CSIRO’s Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness (ACDP) has confirmed H5 high pathogenicity avian influenza (bird flu) in a giant petrel in Western Australia.

This detection marks the fourth wild migratory seabird in Australia to return a positive result for H5 bird flu, with two others confirmed in Western Australia and one in South Australia.

Western Australian has also reported a further suspect positive detection, in a giant petrel found at Roses Beach, west of Esperance, with samples sent for confirmatory testing at CSIRO’s ACDP. At this stage, there have only been detections in vagrant migratory seabirds that occasionally visit southern Australia. There remains no evidence of any mass mortality events and there are no detections in poultry or in our agricultural production system.

The risk to human health remains low.

You can help to determine if H5 bird flu has spread. If you see multiple sick or dead birds or other animals, do not touch them. Avoid contact. Record what you see. Report it to the Emergency Animal Disease Hotline on 1800 675 888 from anywhere in Australia.

For more information visit: birdflu.gov.au

Eurosurveillance: Detection of antibodies against avian influenza in European dairy cattle, the Netherlands, January 2026

 

#19,221

Last January (see Netherlands: NVWA Announcement on Avian Flu Antibodies Detected In Dairy Cow) we learned of the detection of H5N1 antibodies in a European cow on a Dutch farm following an investigation into 2 sick barn cats, one of which died from H5N1. 

A week later, we saw a cryptic report from NOS (Nederlandse Omroep Stichting) - the Netherland's Public Broadcasting Network - indicating that a total of 5 Dairy Cows Had Tested Positive for H5N1 antibodies. 

None of the cows were reported sick, and none tested positive by PCR, suggesting these were past infections, not current (see ECDC Statement On H5N1 Antibodies in Dutch Dairy Cow: ECDC Risk Assessment Remains Unchanged).

Since then, we've heard very little about this apparent outbreak.  

Yesterday, the ECDC Journal Eurosurveillance published the first detailed account of the investigation, where we learn that - on this one farm - there were literally scores of animals with detectable H5N1 antibodies, not five. 

Reassuringly, `oropharyngeal swabs collected from members of the farmer's family tested negative for avian influenza virus', but there is only a narrow window (which had likely passed) where PCR tests would be useful in detecting the virus. 

If antibody testing was performed on the family, it wasn't reported in this study. Notably, there is also no mention of testing of livestock on any surrounding farms.  Hopefully there are other studies in the pipeline.

The bottom line is that more than half the livestock tested on this one farm carried antibodies for H5N1, and the source of their infection, and the mode of in-farm transmission, remain murky. 

I've only posted the link, and some excerpts, from the study. Follow the link to read it in its entirety. 

Detection of antibodies against avian influenza in European dairy cattle, the Netherlands, January 2026

Monika Z Ballmann1 , Luca Bordes1 , Kim M Bouwman1 , Marc Y Engelsma1 , Sandra Venema-Kemper1 , Sylvia BE Pritz-Verschuren1 , Rene Heutink1 , Marit Roose1 , Marcel AH Spierenburg2 , Arco van der Spek2 , Hendrik IJ Roest3 , Evelien A Germeraad1

Since March 2024, a large-scale outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 virus has affected dairy cattle in the United States (US) [1]. In contrast, no evidence of HPAI H5N1 infection in dairy cattle associated with the European genotype DI.2.1 has been reported up to date. Here we describe a case investigation and a farm-level survey that resulted in the first reported detection of antibodies against HPAI H5N1 in dairy cattle in Europe.

Case description and virological investigation of the cat
 
On 24 December 2025, nasal, rectal and conjunctival swabs were collected and submitted for diagnostic testing from a 4-month-old domestic cat living on a dairy cattle farm and exhibiting clinical signs, lethargic and respiratory signs, consistent with HPAI virus infection. The cat died 2 days later. All three swab samples tested positive for influenza A virus by RT-qPCR [2], and the virus was identified as HPAI H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b genotype DI.2.1 using Illumina whole genome sequencing [3]. Phylogenetic analysis demonstrated that the virus clustered with HPAI H5N1 viruses associated with outbreaks among wild and domestic birds across Europe since October 2025 (Figure 1).

The HPAI H5N1 virus detected in the cat did not contain the PB2 M631L substitution that has been frequently reported in the B3.13 genotype in the US, infecting dairy cattle. The PB2 E627K substitution, a well-characterised marker of mammalian adaptation, was present. Furthermore, the PB2 I292V substitution, which was rarely observed in earlier European HPAI H5N1 viruses, but now predominantly identified in the DI genotypes, was detected. No other previously identified genetic markers known to influence virulence, host specificity or binding of host proteins were identified in the cat sequence.

Investigation of dairy cattle and milk 

Following the detection of HPAI H5N1 virus in the cat, dairy cattle from the same farm were tested for avian influenza viruses and antibodies as part of an epidemiological investigation. On 15 January 2026, 20 individual milk samples (midstream milk from all four udder quarters in a single tube) and a bulk tank milk sample were collected. No viral RNA was detected in any of the milk samples by RT-qPCR targeting the matrix gene (M-PCR) [2]. However, antibodies against influenza A virus were detected in nine individual milk samples and the bulk tank milk sample with nucleoprotein (NP)-ELISA (ID Screen Influenza A Antibody Competition Multispecies, Innovative Diagnostics (ID), Grabels, France).

The farm was revisited on 22 January 2026: individual milk (n = 70) and serum (n = 72) samples were obtained from all lactating dairy cows and serum samples from the 38 youngstock (aged 1–2 years)

(SNIP)

Discussion

Since March 2024, a large-scale outbreak of HPAI H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b viruses belonging to the B3.13 and D1.1 genotypes has been reported in dairy cattle in the US [1]. While Eurasian-lineage HPAI H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b viruses have infected multiple mammalian species [6], including cattle under experimental conditions [7,8], to our knowledge, we report the first detection of H5N1-specific antibodies in European dairy cattle.

In the US, HPAI virus infection in dairy cattle appeared to be mostly asymptomatic or associated with non-specific clinical signs, mastitis, a rapid decline in milk production, reduced feed intake and rumination, lethargy and mild elevation in body temperature [9]. In our report, one lactating cow had clinical mastitis in all four udder quarters. Although the observed clinical signs were consistent with HPAI virus infection, no samples from the symptomatic animal at the time of clinical manifestation were available for testing for influenza virus; therefore, the involvement of other pathogens cannot be excluded.

During the investigation, antibodies were detected in more than 50% of the animals suggesting a predominantly subclinical presentation and highlights that infection in dairy cattle may remain undetected without targeted surveillance. While milk is a sensitive matrix for detecting HPAI virus during acute infection in dairy cattle [10], our results indicate that serum could be more suitable for serological surveillance, as antibody titres were higher in serum (VNT titres > 2,048 and up to 40 by HI) than in milk (VNT titres up to 128 and HI titres 0) from the same individual. This finding is consistent with findings from a previous study indicating VNT titres up to 813 in serum and up to 512 in milk [7]. Antibody waning may occur at different rates in serum and milk over time, which may explain the relatively large difference in VNT and HI titres observed in this investigation, but longitudinal studies assessing antibody waning in both serum and milk are currently lacking.

The exact source and route of virus introduction in the cat and cattle remain unclear. The farm is in an area frequented by overwintering birds that grazed on the same grasslands as the cattle. Increased wild bird mortality was observed in the area during October and November 2025. Bird carcasses were removed from the grassed pastures by the farmer but not submitted for virological testing. Around the last weekend of November 2025, dairy cattle and youngstock were moved indoors for the winter, while the cat continued to have access to the fields. The cat may have acquired the virus through consumption of an infected bird or contaminated milk from infected cattle. Cattle exposure may have occurred via contaminated environment, feed or direct contact with wild birds.

The high proportion of dairy cows and youngstock with antibodies suggests either a high level of primary exposure or the possibility of cow-to-cow transmission. Further investigation is required to clarify transmission dynamics.

In this study, oropharyngeal swabs collected from members of the farmer's family tested negative for avian influenza virus. Although, since the onset of the outbreak of HPAI H5N1 virus in cattle in the US, occasional human infections have been reported. To date, no sustained human-to-human transmission has been documented. Current public health assessments consider the risk of clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 viruses to the general population to be low, with human cases limited to sporadic infections following close contact with infected poultry or dairy cattle [11,12]. Consumption of raw milk or unpasteurised dairy products may also pose a risk of virus exposure [13].

Conclusion

We report detection of antibodies in Europe against the Eurasian lineage of H5N1 virus in dairy cattle, identified after a cat living on the same farm tested positive. Infection of a mammalian livestock species with frequent human contact warrants continuous attention, as it increases opportunities for virus transmission and subsequent adaptation and underscores the importance of integrated surveillance on the animal-human interface.

        (Continue . . . ) 

 

Despite the aggressive spread of H5N1 in dairy cattle in the United States since 2024, livestock surveillance in Europe remains limited, based (in part) on the belief that the B3.13 genotype in North America was somehow unique in its ability to infect cattle (see DEFRA Risk Assessment Of HPAI H5N1 Occurring in Cattle In the UK).

This, despite the fact that over the summer of 2024 the FLI successfully infected cattle with a contemporary European H5N1 virus, finding it replicated efficiently in bovine mammary tissue and could produce adaptive mutations (PB2 E627K) during replication, and the 2025 discovery that genotype D1.1 could also infect cattle.

Last October - more than 18 months after the first detection of HPAI H5 in U.S. cattle - OFFLU released an 11-page statement (see OFFLU Guidelines for High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Virus Risk Mitigation in Cattle) which called for sweeping changes, including:

• Implementing risk-based bulk milk surveillance

• Enforcing pasteurization and safe disposal of waste milk

• Applying flexible movement controls with testing and quarantines

• Improved biosecurity & milking practices

• Protecting workers with PPE  

A few weeks later, WOAH issued their own statement (see WOAH Statement (Oct 22nd): High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza (HPAI) in Cattle), which closely aligned with the earlier OFFLU report.

How diligently these guidelines are now being followed in Europe - and the rest of the world - is unknown.

This report should be (another) wake up call that livestock outside of the United States can no longer be assumed to be somehow immune to H5N1, and that bulk milk testing may not be sensitive enough to reliably detect the virus in dairy cows.

Assuming anyone is listening, that is. 

Emergency Solar Power: Revisited

 
My older (circa 2019) basic $200 kit

#19,220

Last summer the U.S. Department of Energy published a 73-page report that warned that if current schedules for retirement of reliable power generation (especially baseload) continue, without enough firm replacement, the risk of blackouts in 2030 could increase by 100× over current levels.

Number one on their Key Takeaways is:

Status Quo is Unsustainable. The status quo of more generation retirements and less dependable replacement generation is neither consistent with winning the AI race and ensuring affordable energy for all Americans, nor with continued grid reliability (ensuring “resource adequacy”). 

Absent intervention, it is impossible for the nation’s bulk power system to meet the AI growth requirements while maintaining a reliable power grid and keeping energy costs low for our citizens.

Six months ago, in NERC: Long-Term Reliability Assessment (Jan 2026), we looked at a 181-page NERC Long-Term Reliability Report which similarly warned that our power grid is facing a growing risk of electrical shortfalls over the next decade.

 As a native Floridian, I've grown used to power outages. Usually, they last an hour or three, but when they are caused by hurricanes, we can be talking days (sometimes weeks), usually during the hottest part of the year. 

Last week my power went out for an hour when the temperature was 95 degrees. A friend of mine who lives an hour away, was without power overnight earlier this month.  

Fortunately, we have both invested in modest solar backup power systems, and were able to power fans, radios, cell phone, and lights. While neither of us could run our air conditioners, we were both far more comfortable than many others in the same predicament. 

Over the years we've looked at some of my homebrew solar power setups, a journey which began in 1990 aboard my sailboat. Luckily, like personal computers, the price of solar has plummeted since then. 

My first `solar blog' was more than 20 years ago (see BASIC PREPS : SOLAR POWER), but there are far better options today.  Small, foldable solar panels (30-100 watt) are about a dollar a watt now, and rechargeable USB battery packs are getting bigger and cheaper every year. 

It is now possible to put together a basic emergency solar power kit for under $100.   

While I'm not recommending specific brands or suppliers, these are all typical of items I've purchased and used myself (2025 Prices)

Yesterday I ordered a 50,000 mAh USB battery bank for $29 and a 33 watt solar panel (USB charging) for $33. Add in couple of USB corded fans ($15) and a couple of rechargeable LED lanterns ($8), and you have a basic (albeit limited) system.

Not only are theses newer USB batteries 3x more powerful than my old rig (see above), the solar panel is 50% stronger, and they cost less than what I paid 7 years ago.

The beauty of these plug and play systems is there is no assembly. No technical knowledge required. No, they won't run your fridge, or big screen TV, but they will keep your phone charged, fans running, and lights on for days or even weeks (assuming you have any decent sun exposure). 

These are my `Go' bag power options, but less mobile and more powerful options are available for only a few hundred dollars. Some will even run those`big ticket' items, like refrigerators and small freezers, at least for a few hours. 

Prices have dropped enough that you can buy a `Solar Generator' system (battery/inverter & panel) for under $500 that will substantially expand your capabilities; not enough to run an air conditioner, but many smaller appliances. 

Since I like to tinker, and appreciate the benefits of being able to repair/upgrade my own equipment even during a power outage, I tend to build my own systems. 

Eighteen months ago, I detailed my home build of (3) USB power banks (see Post-Milton Improvements To My Power Preps). By building my own, I saved some money, and if one breaks, I have a decent chance of being able to repair it (I have spare parts for major components).

Weighing in at less than 15 lbs, this 50 amp/hr (600 watt/hour) setup is self contained, with storage for cables, a wall charger, and a small 110v inverter. All you need to add is a solar panel (100 watts or better).

While weather related emergencies used to be the primary threat to our electrical grid, between spiralling demand, power plant retirements, and potential cyber attacks, the odds are only increasing that you'll experience a prolonged outage in the future. 

For more on preparing for that eventuality, you may wish to revisit:

The Gift of Preparedness 2025

 #NatlPrep: Prolonged Grid Down Preparedness

How Not To Swelter In Place

France MOH: First Ebola Case Identified In a Humanitarian Doctor Returning the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

 

#19,219

Note quite a week ago, in ECDC: Preparedness and response for imported cases of Ebola disease into an EU/EEA country, we looked at ECDC guidance for EU/EEA countries in the handling of imported Ebola cases. 

Given the estimate size, and trajectory, of the outbreak in the DRC and Uganda (see ECDC Assessment), exported cases are not unexpected.

Last May Germany received a patient for treatment, and today France reports their first imported case of the Bundibugyo virus, in a doctor returning from the region. This (translated) statement comes from the French MOH. 

Ebola: First case identified in a humanitarian doctor returning from a mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

Published on 24.06.26 

The Ministry of Health, Families, Autonomy, and Persons with Disabilities today confirmed the identification of the first positive case of Ebola virus disease in the country. The patient, who had returned from a humanitarian mission in one of the areas where the virus is circulating in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), was immediately admitted to a specialized facility and is in stable condition.

France has specialized capabilities for managing highly transmissible infectious diseases. Patients are treated in a designated healthcare facility, following strict biosafety protocols (negative pressure room, dedicated equipment and protocols). Health authorities are fully mobilized and the situation is being continuously monitored.

All precautionary measures, including the patient's isolation, were taken upon his arrival in the country, with transfer to the hospital under secure conditions to prevent any risk of contamination.

A thorough epidemiological investigation is underway to identify individuals who may have been in contact with the patient. These individuals will be contacted without delay by the regional health agency, will undergo 21 days of home isolation, and will be closely monitored during this period. Following the Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) declared by the World Health Organization (WHO) on May 17 in response to the active circulation of the Ebola virus in Ituri Province, DRC, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) has assessed the risk of infection as low for European residents and travelers to areas of active transmission, and very low for the general European population.

A dedicated monitoring system is in place for the return of French aid workers to the national territory.

 

While many people are understandably unnerved by reports of imported cases, in most places - including the United States, Canada, and much of Europe - the conditions are not particularly conducive for seeing large outbreaks.  

In 2014, we saw 2 imported cases to the United States (Texas & NYC), which involved roughly 380 potential contacts.  Yet, out of all of those interactions, only 2 people (both nurses) were infected.  

None of which is to suggest that imported Ebola cases aren't a serious threat, only that with proper public health interventions, they can usually be managed. 

For a more detailed look at the contact tracing and epidemiological investigation into the first, and only, cluster of Ebola in the United States you may wish to revisit:

Active Tracing and Monitoring of Contacts Associated With the First Cluster of Ebola in the United States 

Authors: Wendy M. Chung, MD, Jessica C. Smith, MPH, Lauren M. Weil, PhD, MPH, Sonya M. Hughes, MPH, Sibeso N. Joyner, MPH, Emily M. Hall, MPH, Julia Ritch, … Show All … , and Stephanie J. Schrag, DPhilAuthor, Article, & Disclosure Information
Publication: Annals of Internal Medicine
Volume 163, Number 3
https://doi.org/10.7326/M15-0968

USDA Reports 4 More Screwworm Detections in Texas (n=19)

 

#19,218

After going more than a week without any new reports, since the weekend the USDA has announced 7 new detections of the New World Screwworm in Texas. 

So far, 8 Texas counties have reported infections in cattle, sheep, and goats. While no wildlife detections have been reported, it is highly likely that many more infections have occurred in non-farm environments. 

The Texas Department of Agriculture has their own dashboard, and reporting form, which can be accessed at: https://screwworm.texasagriculture.gov/map