Colorado: CDA Statement on Large HPAI Outbreak in Commercial Egg-Layer Facility in Weld County

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After several months of relatively low numbers of commercial poultry affected by HPAI H5N1 in the United States, in the last week of January two major outbreaks (in Colorado and Pennsylvania) were reported to the USDA. 

While there were vague reports on the Weld County outbreak over the weekend, yesterday the Colorado Department of Agriculture (CDA) released the following statement.

Avian Influenza Detected in Commercial Egg-Layer Facility in Weld County

Monday, February 2, 2026

This January, the Colorado Department of Agriculture (CDA) has confirmed three new detections of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) in backyard flocks in Larimer and Logan Counties and one detection in a commercial egg layer operation in Weld County. All premises are currently under quarantine orders and control areas have been set up in Weld and Logan counties.

“The confirmation of these new HPAI cases is a reminder that the virus is actively circulating in our state,” said Dr. Maggie Baldwin, Colorado State Veterinarian. “We urge all flock owners to remain highly vigilant, monitor their birds closely for any signs of illness, and, most critically, to immediately reinforce and practice strict biosecurity measures to protect their flocks.”

Summary of New Cases

Larimer 07: On January 5, 2026, CDA was notified of death losses in a backyard mixed species flock of 16 birds in Larimer County. Samples tested presumptive positive on January 6 and were confirmed by USDA's National Veterinary Services Laboratory on January 7.

Logan 01: On January 8, 2026, USDA was notified of a poultry chicken flock in Logan County experiencing increased death rates. Samples tested presumptive positive on January 9 and were confirmed on January 14. A total of 55 birds were lost. An area quarantine has been established for this premise and poultry owners within the quarantine area are asked to report the status of their flocks through an online self-reporting form.

Larimer 08: On January 9, 2026, CDA was notified of increased death losses in a backyard facility in Larimer County. The flock lost 18 birds (chickens and ducks). Samples tested presumptive positive on January 9 and were confirmed on January 14.

Weld 18: On January 28, CDA received notification of a mortality event in a commercial egg laying facility in Weld County which houses 1.33 million chickens. Samples tested presumptive positive on January 29 at the Colorado State University Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory and were confirmed late on Friday, January 30, by the USDA’s National Veterinary Services Laboratory (NVSL).

A control area has been established for this premise (which is under a quarantine order) and poultry owners within the quarantine area are asked to report the status of their flocks through an online self-reporting form. The response for this facility is ongoing and is currently in the depopulation and disposal phase.

An updated Situation Report (#82 from January 30, 2026), which summarizes all HPAI detections in Colorado, can be found on the CDA landing page at ag.colorado.gov/HPAIresponse.

 
General Information on HPAI

HPAI is a viral disease that can cause severe illness and death in poultry. The recent detections signal that the virus is circulating, often carried by migrating wild birds which act as a reservoir for the disease. Colorado has been working proactively on HPAI response and testing, which has been incredibly successful at slowing the spread of avian influenza in the state. Since the summer of 2024, Colorado has not had any human cases of HPAI.

What Flock Owners Can Do: Biosecurity and Vigilance

The Colorado Department of Agriculture urges all livestock and poultry owners to remain vigilant and monitor their animals for symptoms of disease. The most critical step poultry owners can take is to implement strict biosecurity measures to protect their flocks.

Flock owners should:

Implement Biosecurity: Review and implement strong biosecurity measures, such as securing the flock from wild birds, especially waterfowl. The CDA has additional guidance available on their website at ag.colorado.gov/animal-health/biosecurity-101.

Monitor Animals: Watch for symptoms of illness, including sudden death, a drop in egg production, decreased food/water consumption, and lethargy.

Suspected HPAI Reporting

A delay in reporting can lead to a delay in necessary response measures which can compromise human and animal health.Poultry and Livestock: HPAI in poultry, dairy cattle, or other livestock species must be reported directly to the State Veterinarian’s Office. Information can be found on the CDA Reportable Diseases page.

Feline Cases: Suspected HPAI feline cases can be reported to the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (CDPHE) at 303-692-2700, and they will share that information with CDA.
Wild Birds: The public is urged to avoid contact with sick or dead wildlife without proper personal protective equipment (PPE) and to contact their local CPW office to report suspect cases of sick or dying wild birds.

For more information on HPAI, please see the CDA HPAI landing page.

Although the recent reduction in large commercial outbreaks may be a testament to better biosecurity practices, it may also have something to do with recent changes to the clade 2.3.4.4b virus.  

Recent studies have indicated a shift in the N1 Neuraminidase stalk domain of  H5N1 since 2022 which may decrease its transmissibility and virulence in poultry (see mBio Clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 neuraminidase has a long stalk, which is in contrast to most highly pathogenic H5N1 viruses circulating between 2002 and 2020 by Enikő Hermann & Florian Krammer.)

The authors of the above report explain:

While the truncated version of the N1 neuraminidase stalk domain may be associated with increased virulence in poultry, the long version of the stalk domain has been associated with increased transmissibility in mammals.

The vast majority of highly pathogenic H5N1 of clade 2.3.4.4b that is currently circulating globally features the long stalk version of the neuraminidase, which may increase the risk for these viruses to become human-to-human transmissible.

While somewhat encouraging for the poultry industry, this change may prove less so the mammalian set, who could find themselves more susceptible to infection. 

A reminder that HPAI H5N1 continues to change, and what we say about it today may not hold true tomorrow.

Taiwan: Another Avian Flu `Incident'

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Taiwan, which is positioned roughly 100 miles off the Chinese Mainland and beneath one of the most active migratory (East Asian-Australian) bird flyways, has a long and checkered history of dealing with both HPAI and LPAI avian flu. 

With more than 23 million people and 6,000 poultry farms crammed into an area the size of the state of Maryland, they are forced to take farm biosecurity very seriously. 

Over the years we've seen multiple HPAI subtypes turn up on this island nation, including H5N1, H5N2, H5N5, H5N6, H5N8, and H5N9, along with the co-circulation of LPAI H6N1 and H9N2 (both of which are zoonotic threats). 

Taiwan's pig industry has also been threatened by ASF (African Swine Fever), both from floating pig carcasses dumped on the Mainland, and by the smuggling of  contaminated pork products from China. 

Taiwan's APHIA (Animal and Plant Health Inspection and Quarantine Administration) - formerly BAPHIQ - is the lead agency on biosecurity, and in the past we've seen them deal with a variety of threats (see here, here, here, here, and here). 

Those with long memories will recall that in January of 2015 HPAI H5N8 arrived in the island nation of Taiwan - immediately spun off several reassorted HPAI H5 subtypes - and together infected more than 1,000 farms over the next 12 months.

That fall, as desperate poultry farmers lobbied for vaccines, Taiwan's Council Of Agriculture strongly Warned Against the Importation & Use Of AI Vaccines.

Beyond the illegalities, the HPAI H5 viruses in Taiwan originated from Korea, and were expected to be a poor match to the Chinese R5 vaccine.

In 2017, we learned of a smuggling operation, which was caught trying to bring in hundreds of `wine bottles' filled with an illegal (and `sketchy') poultry vaccine (see BAPHIQ photo below) from the Mainland.

At the same time that was going on (see Taiwan's Counterfeit AI Vaccine Trade), Taiwanese police arrested 9 people accused of making and selling counterfeit pig vaccines. At least 7,800 vials of this fake porcine vaccine had been sold to 32 farmers, and nearly 400,000 pigs had been injected.

Not only were these vaccines diluted to the point of being useless to prevent porcine circovirus (PCV), they were also contaminated with bacteria, and many of the vaccinated pigs died.

This story gets worse, as it was also revealed that those arrests lead to an even larger investigation into counterfeit poultry vaccines. According to multiple reports (see here, here, and here), the scheme involved the illicit collection of blood from (supposedly) previously infected and recovered poultry at a slaughterhouse.

The harvested blood was reportedly `centrifuged', and the serum collected - and after adding antibiotics and `other drugs' - injected as a vaccine.

It isn't clear how many birds already received this fake vaccine, but enough of this witch's brew to vaccinate 500,000 birds was recovered by authorities. 

According to this YouTube video of the premises, this operation was conducted under absolutely squalid and primitive conditions, and the resultant `vaccine' appears to have undergone absolutely no testing for purity, contents, or strength.

Once again, in December of 2018, we saw Taiwan: Arrests In Another Counterfeit Avian Flu Vaccine Scheme, where Taiwan's media reported on the arrest of several college professors who are accused of manufacturing, and selling, illicit AI poultry vaccines.

This (translated) report from the China Times.

Private bird flu vaccine sold, 6 professors of Jiada University were accused

December 21, 2018 19:11 Zhongshi Hong Rongzhi

Professor Zhang Xing, Assistant Professor of the Department of Bio-Agricultural Science and Technology of Chiayi University, and Professor Guo Xing, from the Department of Veterinary Medicine, were accused of illegally manufacturing avian flu and other vaccines in cooperation with the biotechnology industry in the absence of the approval of the Council of Agriculture. Duck farmers and other duck farmers are playing.

After the investigation by the Tainan District Inspection Office, on the 21st, in accordance with the Law on the Administration of Animal Drugs, a total of 6 people from Zhang, Guo, biotechnology and large duck farmers were prosecuted.

This sordid history serves as prelude to the following (translated) report from APHIA today on the seizure of a large quantity of illegal Chinese poultry vaccines, which were (reportedly) purchased from a Chinese online shopping website.

The Agency for Animal and Plant Health Inspection and Quarantine (AAPHIQ) has seized illegal avian influenza vaccines and urges poultry farmers not to illegally sell, transfer, or use them.
115-02-02

The Animal and Plant Health Inspection and Quarantine Administration (APHIA) of the Ministry of Agriculture stated that on July 24, 2025, the APHIA, in cooperation with the Yunlin District Prosecutors Office, directed the Changhua Investigation Team of the Coast Guard Administration, Ocean Affairs Council, and the Yunlin County Animal and Plant Disease Control Center to conduct an operation to seize illegal animal drugs. Searches were conducted at the residences and cargo terminals of suspected individuals in Yunlin County, resulting in the seizure of 1,356 bottles of suspected illegally imported avian influenza (avian influenza) vaccines and waterfowl parvovirus vaccines, among other prohibited animal drugs.

The individuals involved were taken in for questioning. On February 20 of the same year, the Keelung Customs Office of the Ministry of Finance and the Keelung Branch of the APHIA intercepted a shipment of 530 bottles of suspected avian influenza vaccines, which were about to be imported. The suspects admitted to importing them from mainland China. The investigation into the source of the aforementioned illegal avian influenza vaccines and waterfowl parvovirus vaccines, among other prohibited animal drugs, will continue. The Yunlin District Prosecutors Office has filed charges against the suspects in accordance with the law.

(Continue . . . )

Media reports indicate that twice last year the accused placed orders on Taobao to purchase H5N1 poultry vaccines, and had them disguised as `floor cleaner' and `drain cleaner' to evade customs checks.  

And perhaps more importantly, it is far from clear whether these were current, quality-controlled, Chinese state-sanctioned products.  Nor is it clear how many doses (if any) were sold or used in Taiwanese poultry.

 The investigation is apparently ongoing.   

Sadly, the world is awash with counterfeit drugs and medical devices, many of which are sold no-questions-asked by online retailers (see The Lancet: WHO Estimates That 50% Of Drugs For Sale Online Are Fake).

These products aren't just ripping off billions of dollars from consumers each year, they contribute to rising antimicrobial resistance (AMR), they may leave some people inadequately treated for potentially serious diseases, and they may even be lethal in their own right.

But of greatest concern, illegal poultry vaccines may be contributing to the evolution and spread of emerging viruses, like H5N1. 

And that's a dangerous gain of function experiment that could impact every single one of us.  

South Korea: MAFRA Warns on Risks From HPAI, ASF & FMD During Upcoming Lunar New Year

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For many Asian cultures it is a long held tradition that people return home to attend a reunion dinner with their families on the eve of the lunar New Year, which this year falls on February 17th. 

In China, it is known as Chinese New Year or Chunyun; The Spring Festival. In South Korea, it is called Seollal.

But by whatever name, the lunar new year sparks the largest yearly human migration on the planet. This year, China alone expects to see > 9 Billion domestic passenger trips undertaken during the 40 day `travel season'. 

Like with the Hajj, the Super Bowl, the Olympics, and other mass gathering events, there are always potential epidemiological impacts (see The Lancet: Proactive Surveillance for Avian Influenza H5N1 and Other Priority Pathogens at Mass Gathering Events).

First and foremost, there are concerns over the carriage and spread of infectious diseases by travellers, but there are other, less apparent risks; including the transport of potentially contaminated/infected food products or agricultural diseases via physical contamination.

In 2018, in South Korea Detects ASF Gene In Chinese Food Products, we saw the first of several discoveries of the ASF gene (via preliminary PCR testing) in food products brought into that country by travelers returning from China.

In addition to seeing a very active HPAI season, South Korea has also reported 4 outbreaks of ASF (African Swine Fever) and one of FMD (Foot & Mouth Disease) in the first month of 2026.  

This triple whammy of livestock diseases on the eve of the Spring Travel Season has MAFRA on full alert. Today, they released a lengthy summary of these threats, and an action plan to deal with them.  

Due to its length, I've only posted some (translated) excerpts.  I'll return with a postscript after the break.

The Minister of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs is taking all-out measures to combat livestock infectious diseases in preparation for the Lunar New Year holiday.

2026.02.02 15:50:42 Foot-and-Mouth Disease Prevention Division, Quarantine Policy Bureau

The Central Disaster and Safety Countermeasures Headquarters for Livestock Infectious Diseases ( Director Song Mei-ryeong , Minister of Agriculture , Food and Rural Affairs, hereinafter referred to as the Central Disaster and Safety Countermeasures Headquarters ) held a meeting of the Headquarters on Monday, February 2 with the participation of livestock quarantine-related organizations and local governments to review the response to foot-and- mouth disease , African swine fever , and highly pathogenic avian influenza , and comprehensively discuss measures to prevent further spread .

1. Situation

Foot-and-mouth disease was first reported this year on Friday, January 30th at a small farm in Ganghwa-gun, Incheon Metropolitan City. Quarantine measures are being implemented to prevent further spread, including a temporary halt to movement , emergency vaccinations ( January 31st - February 8th ), surveillance , testing, and disinfection. There have been no further outbreaks .

* Past occurrences : 19 cases in 2025 ( Yeongam and Muan ), 11 cases in 2023 ( Cheongju and Jeungpyeong ), 3 cases in 2019 ( Anseong and Chungju )

African swine fever has occurred sporadically across the country with a total of 4 cases in January this year: Gangneung , Gangwon-do (1.16.), Anseong, Gyeonggi-do (1.23 .), Pocheon , Gyeonggi- do (1.24.), and Yeonggwang, Jeollanam-do (1.26.). As a result, quarantine measures such as movement restrictions and disinfection are being implemented . In addition, an additional case was confirmed (2.1.) at a farm related to the outbreak farm in Yeonggwang, Jeollanam- do ( Gochang , Jeollabuk-do , raising about 17,000 pigs ) , and measures such as culling, surveillance , and inspection are being taken .

* Past occurrences : 14 cases in 2019 , 2 cases in 2020 , 5 cases in 2021 , 7 cases in 2022 , 10 cases in 2023 , 11 cases in 2024 , 6 cases in 2025

Highly pathogenic avian influenza has occurred in 38 cases in poultry farms so far this winter ( '25 / '26 season ) , and 41 cases have been detected in wild birds ** .

* Status of outbreaks at poultry farms ( total of 38 cases ): 9 cases in Gyeonggi , 9 cases in North Chungcheong , 8 cases in South Chungcheong , 3 cases in North Jeolla , 8 cases in South Jeolla , 1 case in Gwangju

** Status of wild bird detection ( total 41 cases ): 3 cases in Gyeonggi , 3 cases in Gangwon , 1 case in North Chungcheong , 10 cases in South Chungcheong , 6 cases in North Jeolla , 6 cases in South Jeolla , 3 cases in North Gyeongsang , 2 cases in South Gyeongsang , 4 cases in Jeju , 1 case in Seoul , 1 case in Busan , 1 case in Gwangju

Recently, the number of cases of highly pathogenic avian influenza detected in wild birds has been increasing * , and the results of a survey on winter migratory bird habitats also showed that the population increased by approximately 8% ** compared to the previous month .

* Monthly detection status of wild birds (41 cases ): (October ) 2 cases → (November ) 11 cases → (December ) 10 cases → ( January ) 18 cases

** Status of wild bird population ( Ministry of Climate ): (December ) 1.25 million → ( January ) 1.35 million (8% increase )

In particular , considering the fact that damage was significant in farms and laying hen farms within the quarantine area (10km) in past outbreaks and this winter outbreak, there is a possibility that the outbreak will continue until February , so thorough quarantine management is required until February , the special quarantine period .

As the movement of people and vehicles is expected to increase around the Lunar New Year holidays (February 14-18) , there is concern that the risk of outbreaks of livestock infectious diseases will increase , especially in farms where quarantine management such as disinfection and vaccination is inadequate . Therefore , it is necessary to comprehensively inspect the response situation and strengthen on-site quarantine management to prevent additional outbreaks in advance .

(SNIP)

5. Requests

Minister of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs Song Mei-ryung emphasized , “ Given the grave situation, thorough quarantine is more important than anything else in order to prevent further outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease, African swine fever , and highly pathogenic avian influenza ,” and “ Related ministries and local governments will closely inspect farms for foot-and-mouth disease vaccination , disinfection of livestock vehicles , entry and exit management , and compliance with quarantine rules through special inspections of farms and operation of dedicated officers . They will also be thorough in surveillance and inspection . ”

In addition, “ as an increase in the movement of people and vehicles is expected ahead of the Lunar New Year holiday , livestock farms and livestock officials are requested to thoroughly follow basic quarantine rules such as two- stage disinfection of vehicles entering and exiting , wearing quarantine suits inside livestock sheds, and changing boots . ”

While there are always concerns that the Lunar New Year, the Hajj, Olympics, or some other mass gathering event could help catapult an exotic virus onto the world stage, they are far more likely to exacerbate an existing threat, such as seasonal flu, COVID, or Measles. 

Two weeks ago, in Public Health Ontario: Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (HIRA) For the FIFA World Cup 2026 Games in Toronto, we saw the biggest concerns for this summer's FIFA World Cup were COVID, Measles, and Food and Waterborne diseases. 

This month, in addition to the Lunar New Year, there will be at least 4 other major mass gathering events:

• the Super Bowl in Santa Clara, CA,
• the 2026 Winter Olympics in Milan Cortina, Italy
• Carnival in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
• Mardi Gras in New Orleans

While the odds are we'll get through these events without a major outbreak, the potential for spreading human or agricultural diseases is ever present. Which is why public health agencies around the globe will be on heightened alert for the next 6 weeks or so. 

Nature: An Outbreak of HPAI H5N1 Could Impact the Dairy Cattle Sector and the Broader Economy in the United States

 
Credit FAO

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While HPAI H5N1 has yet to escalate into a human pandemic, it is most assuredly an epizootic in the animal world - and by some estimations - a Panzootic (see ISIRV: Update on H5N1 Panzootic: Infected Mammal Species Increase by Almost 50% in Just Over a Year).

The FAO map (above) of outbreaks reported since Oct 1st 2025 doesn't even come close to depicting the true extent of HPAI's impact. Many countries simply do not test extensively - or are unwilling to report outbreaks - often for political or economic reasons. 

Blind spots include all of Russia, Central Asia, much of Africa, Northern Canada, and the interior of South America (note: Australia/NZ are testing, but the virus has not shown up yet).

Tens of thousands of mammalian deaths (aquatic, foxes, rodents, cats, etc.) have been reported (see Nature Reviews: The Threat of Avian Influenza H5N1 Looms Over Global Biodiversity), but they likely only scratch the surface. 

In the United States, nearly 1,100 herds of dairy cattle have been confirmed infected with HPAI H5N1, although many studies suggest this is likely an undercount (see Nature: A Mathematical Model of H5N1 Influenza Transmission in US Dairy Cattle).

This week Europe has seen evidence of the first spillover of HPAI to dairy cattle - but given their passive surveillance methods - it would not be surprising if others have been missed. 

While the worst case scenario is arguably another severe pandemic, a runner-up would be a high impact panzootic, affecting cattle, pigs, poultry, or other high-value livestock. 

In the past we've looked at the devastating effects of ASF (African Swine Fever) in China (see ASF In China: Epizootic or An EpicZootic?), Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) in South Korea), BSE in Great Britain, and even the great Equine Epizootic of 1872. 

The USDA lists 8 Animal Diseases of Concern (and 51 diseases of crops), with both HPAI and some LPAI viruses on their list. This list is a `living document' and could be revised if new threats emerge.

All of which brings us to a review article published in Nature Comms which looks at the economic impact of three different scenarios of an HPAI H5 cattle epizootic in the United States; ranging from:

• S1 (the current situation)

• S2 (a realistic expansion)

• S3 (reasonable worst case)

Using these arbitrary scenarios, economic losses (in the short term) range from the current $11B  to costing the U.S. economy tens or even hundreds of billions of dollars (Est. $179B).  

While not as costly as a human pandemic, any increase in cattle transmission and/or morbidity & mortality would likely also increase the chances of a spillover to humans. 

By necessity, a great many assumptions are made in modeling these scenarios. Since I'm not an economist or a statistician, I'll leave it to others to opine on their merits.  I view this study more as a cautionary assessment of our economic vulnerability to HPAI in livestock, than a specific forecast.

The bottom line, however, seems pretty obvious.  

If we continue to dither, and allow HPAI H5N1 to spread in cattle, we risk a range of potential bad outcomes. Some worse than others, but all worth avoiding if possible.

Due to its length, I've only posted the link, the abstract, and brief excerpt. Click the link to read it in its entirety.  

An outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 could impact the dairy cattle sector and the broader economy in the United States

Guillaume Morel, Anh Pham, Christian Morgenstern, Joseph T. Hicks, Thomas Rawson, Victoria Y. Fan, W. John Edmunds, Giovanni Forchini & Katharina Hauck
Communications Earth & Environment , Article number: (2026) Cite this article

We are providing an unedited version of this manuscript to give early access to its findings. Before final publication, the manuscript will undergo further editing. Please note there may be errors present which affect the content, and all legal disclaimers apply.

Abstract

The outbreak of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1 in U.S. dairy cattle poses substantial risks to public health, economic sustainability of farming, and global food systems. Using a Computable General Equilibrium model, we simulate its short- to medium-term impacts on Gross Domestic Product and other macro-economic outcomes for the US and its main trading partners. 

We simulate impacts under the current situation and realistic and reasonable worst-case scenarios. We estimate domestic economic losses ranging between 0.06% and 0.9% of US GDP, with losses to the dairy sector ranging between 3.4% and 20.6%. Trading partners increase dairy production to compensate for the loss.

Current government subsidies are about 1.2% (95% HDI: 1% to 1.4%) of output losses, and likely insufficient to incentivise farmers to step up surveillance and biosecurity for mitigating the possible emergence of H5N1 strains with pandemic potential into human populations.

       (SNIP)

Despite the limitations, this study provides insight into the potential economic impacts of an H5N1 outbreak for the US and its trading partners. These economic impacts would pale in comparison to the health and economic impacts of an H5N1 outbreak among humans. 

Recent research suggests that the virus has gained genetic mutations in the months since it was first detected in cattle, increasing the risk of zoonotic spillover 5 ,34 . Compared with ten months ago, the virus now has more opportunities to adapt to its new mammalian hosts because of insufficiently controlled transmission, resulting in increasing numbers of infections amongst cows and other animals across the United States 4  .  

Considering the high potential economic losses, and the potential risk to human health, the currently introduced measures are disproportionately lax given the scale of the potential impact. We estimate that the current subsidies for enhanced testing and biosecurity (around $98m) are covering about 1.2% of the aggregate output loss of the dairy, cattle, and raw  milk sector due to the outbreak. There is robust research evidence on the economic benefits of animal tracing systems. 

The European Commission mandates that for the purpose of outbreak control, all bovine animal movements, births and deaths must be electronically registered within 7 days to the authorities. There is no such nationwide tracing system in the USA, although some states have introduced them. Animal tracking, combined with enhanced monitoring and biosecurity, should help reduce the risk of the current outbreak from escalating, reduce economic costs to farmers, and mitigate the potential emergence of highly virulent H5N1 strains with pandemic potential into human populations.

(Continue . . . .)

Netherlands: Avian Flu Outbreak at a `Mixed Species' Pet Shop in Wadenoijen

 

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While we wait for more details on the (now 5) dairy cows with antibodies to HPAI H5N1 in the Netherlands, over the past week the Netherland's National Government website (Rijksoverheid.nl) has reported a number of other outbreaks, including the following of an outbreak in a pet store in Wadenoijen:

Bird flu detected in Wadenoijen

News item | January 30, 2026 | 1:31 PM

In Wadenoijen (municipality of Tiel, province of Gelderland), avian influenza has been detected at a pet trade involving approximately 325 birds and several other mammals. To prevent the spread of the virus, the infected animals are being culled at the site by the Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (NVWA).

A large number of bird species are kept at the site. European regulations allow for an exception to the requirement to cull all birds at an infected site if the birds in question are of high genetic, cultural, or educational value, or if animals are kept that are threatened with extinction. Culling all the birds present would be disproportionate in this case. Therefore, careful consideration is given to which animals are and are not culled. Birds that are not culled are kept separately and retested at a later date.

A restricted zone will be established around the infected location. Within the entire 10-km restricted zone around the infected location are 10 commercial poultry farms. Several of these farms are also located in the restricted zone around Kesteren (January 2026).

Transport ban

A transport ban applies immediately within the entire 10-kilometre zone.

This means that no birds, hatching eggs, or eggs for consumption may be transported from bird-keeping locations in this zone. The disposal of bird manure and used litter is also prohibited. These measures are necessary to prevent the spread to other parts of the country. Animals other than birds and their products may be transported to and from bird-keeping locations, provided that this is done in accordance with the strict hygiene protocol .

Earlier this week (Jan 26th) the Netherlands reported an outbreak at a petting zoo in Alphen aan den Rijn. 

Bird flu detected in Alphen aan den Rijn

News item | January 26, 2026 | 4:06 PM

In Alphen aan den Rijn (province of South Holland), bird flu has been confirmed at a petting zoo with 73 birds. To prevent the spread of the virus, the infected birds are being culled from the site by the Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (NVWA).

A variety of birds are present at the site. Under European regulations, it is possible to deviate from the requirement to cull all birds at an infected site if they are birds of high genetic, cultural, or educational value. Twenty-six chickens of a rare breed are present; they will not be culled. These chickens are housed separately and will be retested at a later date. Culling all the birds present would be disproportionate in this case.

There are no poultry farms within the 1-km and 3-km restricted zones around this infected location. There are two commercial poultry farms within the 10-km restricted zone.

Also on January 26th, the Netherlands announced the culling of 70,000 broilers at a farm in Bornerbroek, while on the 25th they announced the culling of 44,000 breeding hens in Kesteren.

The Netherlands, like much of the rest of the world, is seeing a robust 2025-2026 avian flu season.  So much so, that it has become impractical to try to blog on every outbreak. 

You can find a partial list of outbreak in the Netherlands since October at the following  Wageningen University Research webpage. 

Netherlands: NOS.NL Reports 5 Dairy Cows Have Now Tested Positive for H5N1

 

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Although I have yet to find any official statement posted on a NL government website, NOS (Nederlandse Omroep Stichting) - the Netherland's Public Broadcasting Network - is reporting that last night Agriculture Minister Femke Wiersma notified the House of Representatives that testing now reveals Five cows with antibodies against bird flu in Northeast Friesland. 

This story has also been picked up by AgriHolland and BoerderiJ. 

The last official statement I can find was on January 23rd (see Netherlands: NVWA Announcement on Avian Flu Antibodies Detected In Dairy Cow), after an investigation into 2 sick barn cats (1 died from H5N1) led to the detection of a single dairy cow with antibodies to HPAI. 

Initial reports strongly suggested this was an isolated incident, stating `No evidence of active viral circulation of avian influenza among the dairy cows on this farm has been found. There are also no signs of avian influenza spreading to other dairy farms.'

Despite this reassuring report, a separate letter to Parliament indicated that 5 tests came back with `errors', and would be repeated (see excerpt below).

All but five samples tested negative for individual PCR tests. The bulk milk was also PCR negative. The five remaining individual milk samples resulted in a test error in the laboratory and will be retested this weekend. Based on the PCR results available so far, from last week and today, there is no indication of active avian influenza virus circulation among the dairy cattle on the farm. The final five PCR results will be available this weekend. If these unexpectedly result in a positive outcome, I will inform Parliament immediately. 

NOS  quotes Minister Femke Wiersma as stating during a debate on zoonoses last night at the House of Representatives; "It now appears, and this is new information, that antibodies have been found in five different cows." 

Hopefully we'll get more information in the hours ahead.