Saturday, September 26, 2026

EID Journal: Comparison of Baloxavir-Based Combinations and Monotherapies for Treating Influenza A(H5N1) Clade 2.3.4.4b Virus Infection in Mice

 

Screenshot: CDC's  Interim Guidance on the Use of Antiviral Medications 
for Treatment of Human Infections with Novel Influenza A Viruses Associated 
with Severe Human Disease - July 2025

#19,349

While newer antivirals have been developed (see FDA Approval Of Xofluza : A New Class Of Influenza Antiviral), oseltamivir (aka `Tamiflu') has remained the `Go to' antiviral for influenza treatment in the United States - and much of the world - for more than 20 years. 

Oseltamivir is our most studied antiviral, nations of the world have stockpiled hundreds of millions of doses, and now that can be acquired as a generic drug, its cost has plummeted. 

While exact numbers have never been disclosed, our National Strategic Stockpile supposedly has somewhere around 50-60 million courses of oseltamivir on hand; sufficient to treat 15-20% of the nation during a severe flu pandemic (assuming a single, standard dose).

Stockpiles of Baloxavir (aka Xofluza) are similarly unknown, but according to a media report in 2024 (see The U.S. strategic drug stockpile is inadequate for a bird flu outbreak) likely numbers only in the hundreds of thousands of doses.

But oseltamivir's track record against novel flu is far from perfect. To be effective, it must be started early in one's infection (1st 48 hrs, ideally), and even then, a good outcome is far from guaranteed. 

The first barrier is getting the drug to the patient in a timely manner, something which we've struggled with, even during normal flu seasons (see Sporadic Tamiflu (Oseltamivir) Shortages Reported In U.S. & Canada).

There is also the problem of resistance, something that can develop spontaneously in 1%-2% of people receiving treatment, or worse - can become `fixed' in circulating strains - such as we saw with H1N1 in 2008. 

Last year, in - in Emerg. Microbes & Inf: Oseltamivir Resistant H5N1 (Genotype D1.1) found On 8 Canadian Poultry Farms - we saw a report on a large outbreak of Oseltamivir resistant H5N1 which emerged over several weeks in the fall of 2024.

While we haven't seen that happen on a large scale, 18 months ago concerns over the effectiveness of our current antiviral armamentarium were raised by St. Jude Researchers: Current Antivirals Likely Less Effective Against Severe Infection Caused by Bird Flu in Cows’ Milk. 

Last January, in Nature Comms: Oseltamivir and Baloxavir Monotherapy and Combination Therapy Efficacy Against Clade 2.3.4.4b A(H5N1) Influenza Virus Infection in Ferrets, we saw a CDC study which looked at both mono and combination therapy with oseltamivir and baloxavir in ferrets infected with H5N1 (genotype D1.1).

In short, they found:

  • Ferrets infected with H5N1 D1.1 and treated with oseltamivir saw little or no clinical or virologic benefit compared to no treatment, with persistent high fevers, weight loss, and systemic viral replication.
  • Ferrets treated with Baloxavir saw significantly less fever, weight loss, and viral replication. Some ferrets, however, saw a late rise in fever (after 4 days) and viral shedding, suggesting a viral rebound. 
  • Ferrets treated with both drugs saw similar clinical protection to baloxavir alone, but did not show signs of rebound. 
Note: Ferrets are a good, but not perfect, proxy for humans in influenza research, so these results may not be 100% applicable to humans.  

A month later, we looked at a study (Nature Comms: Baloxavir outperforms oseltamivir, favipiravir, and amantadine in treating lethal influenza A(H5N1) HA clade 2.3.4.4b infection in mice) by Webby & Jones et al. which suggests that baloxavir outperforms oseltamivir, favipiravir, and amantadine in treating clade 2.3.4.4b (circa 2022) H5N1 avian viruses (in mice).

And last April, in Emerg Microbes & Inf: Antiviral Activities of Multiple Antivirals Against HPAI H5N1 in Vitro and in Mice, the authors reported the existing 5-day course of oseltamivir appears inadequate to treat severe HPAI H5N1 infection (at least, in mice).

The authors reported Baloxavir as being more potent, but even a 5-day B.I.D course (10 times the current dose) only saved 16.7% of treated mice.  Extending treatment to 7 days (14 doses), raised survival to 50%. 

While a 7-day course of Baloxavir (BXM) was the strongest single-drug therapy, extended courses of MNP+BXM and OSP+BXM provided the most effective treatments.

The caveat here being that - due to their higher metabolic rate - the half-life of baloxavir is much shorter in mice than in humans. While it remains to be determined, an equivalent dose in humans might be more like 2 or 3 doses spread out over a week's time.

And mice, and ferrets, and other lab animals - while useful - are never a perfect analog for humans. They don't have the same physiology, metabolism, or past virus and/or vaccine exposures that can modify our immune response. 

Adding to this long and winding narrative, we have a new report from the EID Journal which provides additional support for the baloxavir-based strategy described above. 

As in the previous report, the authors found that baloxavir outperformed both oseltamivir and molnupiravir against clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 in a mouse model, although it should be noted they began treatment just 6 hours after inoculation. 

Combining baloxavir with either oseltamivir or molnupiravir was even more effective in suppressing viral replication and spread beyond the lungs.

The bottom line: both studies suggest oseltamivir monotherapy may be inadequate for severe H5N1, that baloxavir appears more potent, and that combination therapy may prove a more effective regimen - at least in mice. 

How all of this might translate to humans, who would be unlikely to receive antiviral treatment in such short order - remains to be seen. 

I've only posted the abstract and some extended excerpts from the EID dispatch. Follow the link to read it in its entirety.  I'll have a postscript after you return.

Comparison of Baloxavir-Based Combinations and Monotherapies for Treating Influenza A(H5N1) Clade 2.3.4.4b Virus Infection in Mice
 
Seong Cheol Min, Ju Ryeong Lee, Beom Kyu Kim, Ji-Hyun Park, Dong Gyu Lee, Gi Chan Lee, Se Hee An, Santosh Chokkakula, Aman Jain, Young Ki Choi, Yun Hee Baek, and Min-Suk Song
 
 Abstract

Highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b virus continues to cause animal outbreaks and sporadic zoonotic infections. In a mouse model of lethal influenza disease, we compared oseltamivir, baloxavir, and molnupiravir monotherapies with 2-drug combinations.
Baloxavir-based combinations improved survival, reduced lung viral loads, and prevented extrapulmonary dissemination, supporting H5N1 preparedness strategies. 

Highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b virus continues to cause widespread outbreaks and sporadic zoonotic infections, underscoring the need to optimize antiviral strategies (1–3). Licensed influenza antiviral drugs can reduce disease severity but might be compromised in severe infections by high viral burdens, treatment delays, and treatment-emergent resistance, motivating evaluation of combination regimens (4–7). 

Recent H5N1 treatment studies using mouse models suggest antiviral performance can vary by exposure route and disease progression (8–11). To inform preparedness-oriented selection, we compared direct-acting antiviral drugs from distinct classes in a lethal mouse model. We tested monotherapies and 2-drug combinations of 2 licensed influenza antiviral agents, oseltamivir phosphate (OSP; neuraminidase inhibitor) and baloxavir acid (BXA; cap-dependent endonuclease inhibitor), and molnupiravir (MPV; nucleoside analog) to assess whether combinations provided synergistic benefit.

(SNIP)

Conclusions

In a lethal clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 mouse model, monotherapies with OSP, MPV, or BXA improved outcomes in a dose-dependent manner but did not consistently prevent death or extrapulmonary spread. In contrast, 2-drug combinations, particularly those containing BXA, achieved complete survival at both dosing regimens and suppressed pulmonary replication to near LOD while preventing neuroinvasion and cardiac dissemination. 

Those findings are consistent with recent clade 2.3.4.4b A(H5N1) studies showing strong in vivo activity of BXA and BXA-containing regimens and extend those observations by directly comparing BXA/OSP and BXA/MPV with OSP/MPV in a lethal mouse model (8,10,11,14). Our findings extend recent antiviral-combination studies in less virulent influenza models by showing that BXA-containing combinations provided the strongest protection in a lethal clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 model (14,15). 

Together, our findings provide an experimentally grounded rationale to prioritize BXA-based 2-drug regimens as a preparedness-oriented option for emergent H5N1 infections when antiviral treatment is initiated early after infection, particularly where severe disease or resistance risk can compromise single-agent performance.
        (Continue . . . )

Currently, the CDC's guidance is for prompt oseltamivir treatment of suspected or confirmed novel influenza A infections, while allowing clinicians to consider adding baloxavir in selected severe or high-risk cases.
  • Combination antiviral treatment (e.g., oseltamivir and baloxavir) can be considered for hospitalized patients with novel influenza A virus infection because it is possible that some novel influenza A viruses might become resistant to oseltamivir and peramivir during antiviral treatment with one of these agents 36789
  • Oseltamivir resistance has been reported in hospitalized patients with HPAI A(H5N1) virus infection, resulting in fatal outcome 3. If a hospitalized patient treated with oseltamivir or peramivir manifests progressive lower respiratory disease, the presence of a resistant virus should be considered. After consultation with CDC's Influenza Division, investigation for antiviral resistance should be performed.
  • Combination treatment with a neuraminidase inhibitor and baloxavir did not have clinical benefit compared with neuraminidase inhibitor and placebo in a randomized clinical trial in hospitalized patients with seasonal influenza, but the addition of baloxavir reduced duration of infectious viral shedding 10

Added to this are the logistical considerations: The global supply of oseltamivir is far greater than baloxavir, while the cost is far lower.

The reality is, even oseltamivir may be hard to get - at least during the first critical 24-48 hrs of infection - during any global influenza pandemic. It seems likely that `extended' baloxavir or combination therapy will be limited to hospitalized patients with severe disease.

Combine that with an expected wait of at least 6 months before having any large quantities of vaccine, and we will once again have to rely heavily on preventing infection; wearing face masks, hand washing, improved indoor ventilation, staying home while sick, and avoiding crowds.

While I would certainly avail myself of whatever antivirals are available in an influenza pandemic, my primary strategy is always one of prevention. I've already got my supply of masks, hand sanitizer, and OTC meds in the hall closet, and have stayed current with all of my vaccines.

If you aren't similarly prepared, you may want to revisit:

Friday, September 25, 2026

H5N1’s Summer Lull: Getting Shorter?

 
Chart generated by Gemini using USDA Data

#19,348

As the above chart illustrates, for the past few years we've witnessed a similar avian flu pattern; a summer lull followed by a sharp increase in outbreaks starting in either September or October, and running through late spring. 

While the amplitude of poultry outbreaks during the winter has fallen (possibly due to better biosecurity measures) a bit, the number of months with elevated activity has increased. 

Avian flu outbreaks in September 2025 and 2026 have far exceeded outbreaks for the same month in 2023 and 2024, while last spring's avian flu activity extended well into May. 

Our summer lull remains, but appears to be shrinking.  

  • In 2023-2024, the U.S. saw 3 months of strong activity (> 25 outbreaks/mo). 
  • In 2024-2025 that number jumped to 5 months
  • And in 2025-2026 we saw 6 months with > 25 outbreak/mo. 

And while September isn't completely in the books - and there are often delays in reporting - over the past 30 days the United States has already reported 20 poultry outbreaks (18 in September). 


After reporting zero outbreaks during June, July, and August - Canada has reported 6 outbreaks in Manitoba over the past 2 weeks (Sept 10th-24th).  


In 2024, Canada's summer break in avian flu reports ran from April 10th to October 21st (194 days). In 2025, the lull lasted from May 15th to September 9th (117 days).  This year, from May 16th to September 10th (also 117 days).

As we saw yesterday in ECDC/EFSA Quarterly Avian Influenza Overview June-August 2026, Europe saw unprecedented levels of HPAI in wild birds over the 2025-2026 season.


And South Korea reported both increased diversity and infectivity among avian flu viruses which sparked a difficult and lengthy 2025-2026 avian flu season, which began 47 days earlier than the 2024-2025 season. 

These shifts aren't necessarily permanent, nor are they reliable indicators of what this fall and winter avian flu season will look like. But we shouldn't ignore them, either. 

By now most commercial poultry producers are presumably well practiced in implementing biosecurity measures to protect their flocks (despite which, outbreaks still happen). But the APPA estimates `Eleven (11) million U.S. households own backyard chickens (a 28% increase from 2023)'.

A recent survey (see MMWR: Knowledge, Attitudes, and Practices Regarding Avian Influenza Among Owners of Backyard Flocks), found significant gaps in their knowledge of dealing with avian flu.

Although the risks of infection are believed low, we've already seen at least two fatalities (here, and here) in the United States from H5Nx following `. . . exposure to a combination of a non-commercial backyard flock and wild birds.'

In an attempt to avoid future incidents, last year the University of Florida's Extension office (UF/IFAS) released two H5N1 related publications; one for backyard poultry owners, and another for consumers of poultry products and milk.

Given what may be on the horizon, both are recommended reading. 

Thursday, September 24, 2026

Virus Research: Genetic Diversity of Clade 2.3.4.4b H5Nx High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Viruses Detected in Korea During the 2025–2026 Winter Season and Pathogenicity of H5N1 and H5N9 Viruses

 

#19,347

Last December - in addition to reporting numerous biosecurity breaches on farms - South Korea's MAFRA Reported Increased Infectivity & Pathogenicity of This Year's Avian Flu Strains, which - for the first time - included 3 HPAI strains (H5N1, H5N6, and H5N9). 

Of particular concern, their Animal and Plant Quarantine Agency conducted an evaluation of the infectivity and pathogenicity of one highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (serotype H5N1) and found that the infectivity was more than 10 times higher than in previous years.

Details at the time were understandably scant, but today we've a research article which sheds new light on the panoply of viruses behind last year's difficult avian flu season in South Korea. 

While this is a fairly technical report, and the use of regional nomenclature for H5N1 genotypes further complicates matters, the gist is pretty simple. 

Last year South Korea was visited by a diverse panoply of H5Nx genotypes (n=16), with at least two -  H5N9 N9-G2 and H5N1 25G2 - displaying unusually high infectivity in chickens.

H5N1 25G2 was also deadly to ducks, whereas H5N9 N9-G2 spread efficiently in ducks, albeit without producing serious illness. 

H5N1 25G2 was the source of nearly half (n=30) of last year's 62 South Korean poultry outbreaks, but it was only detected in environmental samples once, making its prevalence in wild birds unknown. 

Whether 25G2 (or H5N9 N9-G2) will return to South Korea this fall - or turn up in other regions - remains to be seen.   

Due to its technical nature, I've only provided the link, abstract, and a few excerpts.  Follow the link to read the report in its entirety. 

Genetic Diversity of Clade 2.3.4.4b H5Nx High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Viruses Detected in Korea During the 2025–2026 Winter Season and Pathogenicity of H5N1 and H5N9 Viruses

Yunyueng Jang, Ra Mi Cha, Min-Ji Park, Jong-Min Kim, Eui Hyeon Lim, Gyeong-Beom Heo, Se-Hee An, Bina Lee, Hyun-ji Seo, Kwang-Nyeong Lee, Youn-Jeong Lee, Eun-Kyoung Lee

10.1016/j.virusres.2026.199807

PDF

Highlights

  • During 2025-2026, clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1, H5N6, and H5N9 HPAIVs were detected in Korea, causing 62 H5Nx HPAI outbreaks in poultry, and 63 cases in wild birds.
  • Ten genotypes (24G1, 25G2–25G7, and N9-G1–3) identified in poultry, among which 25G2 was the dominant genotype.
  • Most genotypes were reassortants containing gene segments derived from East Asian clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAIVs since 2022 and LPAIVs from wild birds.
  • The 25G2 and N9-G2 genotype showed high infectivity in chickens with 103.3 and 103.2 EID50 of LD50 values, respectively.
  • The 25G2 caused rapid duck mortality, whereas H5N9 caused asymptomatic infection with efficient transmission.

ABSTRACT

Clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1, H5N6, and H5N9 high pathogenicity avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) were detected in poultry and wild birds during the 2025–2026 winter season in Korea. During this period, 62 H5Nx HPAI outbreaks occurred in poultry, and 63 cases were reported in wild birds.

Genome constellation analysis revealed substantial genotype diversity. Most H5N1 and H5N9 genotypes were reassortants containing gene segments derived from East Asian clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAIVs since 2022 and low-pathogenicity avian influenza viruses from wild birds. 

Notably, the European H5N1 genotype EA-2024-DI.2.1, which spread rapidly across Europe in 2025, and its reassortants were identified in Korea. The novel poultry genotypes were also detected in wild birds, supporting wild bird to poultry spillover, whereas one genotype detected in previous season was identified in small-scale poultry farms.

H5N1 (C588) of major 25G2 genotype in poultry and H5N9 (C722) of N9-G2 genotype showed high infectivity in chickens with 103.3 and 103.2 EID50 of median lethal dose (LD50) values, respectively. The predominance of the 25G2 genotype in poultry may have been influenced by efficient infection and virus introduction into high-density poultry production areas, potentially facilitating horizontal transmission under field conditions.

In young ducks, H5N1 caused rapid mortality, whereas H5N9 induced limited clinical signs without mortality. Both viruses were transmitted to all contact ducks, increasing the risk of transmission to poultry. Despite intensified surveillance and early detection efforts to limit virus spread, H5Nx HPAIV outbreaks occurred during the 2025–2026 winter season. These findings highlight the need for continued surveillance, together with rapid genomic and pathogenic characterization of newly introduced viruses.

(SNIP)

Genotype 25G2 was the predominant genotype detected in poultry during the 2025–2026 season, accounting for 30 outbreaks. However, it was identified in only one environmental sample collected during an epidemiological investigation of migratory bird habitats. This outbreak pattern differed from those observed during previous seasons in Korea, in which the predominant genotypes were generally similar between wild birds and poultry (Cha et al., 2023; Cha et al., 2025; Cha et al., 2026). 

The predominance of genotype 25G2 in poultry may have been influenced by higher infectivity under field conditions, particularly in layer farms located in high-density poultry farming areas where HPAI outbreaks were concentrated. However, introduction through environmental contamination associated with wild birds cannot be excluded, and the potential influence of sampling bias resulting from spatial and temporal variations in bird migration and surveillance should also be considered (Hayes et al., 2025; Llanos-Soto, Yaffy, Pavlak and Ivanek, 2025).

This study revealed multiple introductions of genetically diverse H5 viruses during the 2025–2026 winter season and demonstrated their relatively high infectivity in chickens. Epidemiological investigations of concurrent outbreaks, together with virus detection and genetic analyses, helped identify potential sources of virus introduction in the affected regions and provided evidence of viral contamination in the surrounding environment. Despite enhanced surveillance and early detection efforts to limit virus spread, H5 HPAI outbreaks still occurred in poultry farms. These findings highlight the importance of continued surveillance in wild birds and poultry, coupled with the rapid genomic and pathogenic characterization of newly emerging viruses, to support the implementation of effective avian influenza control disease.

        (Continue . . . )

ECDC/EFSA Quarterly Avian Influenza Overview June-August 2026

 
2025-2026: HPAI's Biggest Surge in Wild Birds to Date (Europe)

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As the above EDC/EFSA chart illustrates, after a couple of lackluster years (2023-2025) avian flu returned to Europe with a vengeance last year. We saw similar upticks in places like South Korea, and North America, but reporting from large swaths of the world - particularly in Asia and Africa - is often lacking (see FAO graphic below).


Every 3 months the ECDC/EFSA publishes a highly detailed avian influenza surveillance report, and while they tend to be EU centric, in its 67 pages you'll find ample coverage of outbreaks and infections from around the world on a wide variety of avian subtypes.

While today's report covers the slowest part (June-August)  of the year, these highly detailed quarterly reports make excellent reference material, and are well worth perusing.

This edition does contain one milestone, however; the long-dreaded arrival of HPAI to Australia/New Zealand, which was first reported in June.  I've posted the Abstract, and a few excerpts below. 

I'll have a brief postscript after the break.



Abstract 

Between 5 June and 28 August 2026, 110 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) virus detections were reported in domestic (7) and wild (103) birds in 12 countries in Europe.The number of detections remained at a seasonal low throughout the summer, continuing the decline observed since spring. In contrast to previous years, fewer colony-breeding seabirds were affected, and the geographical range of detections was more limited. Further sporadic detections of HPAI A(H5) virus were reported in wild terrestrial carnivores and pinnipeds.
Outside Europe, the epidemic continued in the Americas, where also the HPAI A(H7N3) subtype was detected in Mexico. Following its first introduction to mainland Australia, HPAI A(H5N1) virus spread within local wild bird populations and spilled over to terrestrial carnivores and marine mammals. In the US, the number of dairy cattle farms reportedly affected by HPAI A(H5N1) increased, while detections in captive American minks were reported for the first time.
Between 5 June and 31 August 2026, 15 cases of avian influenza virus infection were publicly reported in humans (no fatal cases) in three countries and territories: Bangladesh (one A(H5N1) case), Cambodia (one A(H5N1) case) and China (13 A(H9N2) cases). All human cases reported exposure to poultry or a poultry environment prior to detection or onset of illness. Human infections with avian influenza viruses remain rare and no sustained human-to-human transmission has been documented.
The risk posed by avian influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b viruses currently circulating in Europe remains low for the general public in the European  Union/European Economic Area (EU/EEA) and low-to-moderate for those occupationally or otherwise exposed to infected animals or contaminated environments.
©2026 European Food Safety Authority, European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control,European Union Reference Laboratory for Avian Influenza. EFSA Journal published by Wiley-VCH GmbH on behalf of European Food Safety Authority


        (Continued . . . )


As the chart at the top of this blog indicates, each avian flu season (which runs Oct 1st -Sept 30th) is different, sometimes punctuated by the arrival of new subtypes or genotypes, and often varying in intensity. 

As we go into a new fall season, migratory birds in the Northern Hemisphere are expected to bring with them a new wave of HPAI from their high-latitude breeding grounds (see H5Nx: Reassort & Repeat).

While we can't know what kind of avian flu season lies ahead, now would be a good time to review the things you can do to lower your (currently, low) risk of exposure. 

WHO Interim Guidance to Reduce the Risk of Infection in People Exposed to Avian Influenza Viruses

Backyard Flock Owners: Protect Yourself from Bird Flu (CDC Guidance)

UF/IFAS Extension: What Backyard Flock Owners Need to Know about Bird Flu (Influenza H5N1)

Wednesday, September 23, 2026

EM&I: Limited added benefit of seasonal influenza vaccination before A(H5) vaccination in mice and ferrets challenged with A(H5N1)

 

Credit ACIP/CDC

#19,345

One of the biggest challenges during any future H5Nx pandemic would be the rapid production and timely deployment of a two-dose (given 30 days apart) H5 vaccine to billions of people (see Referral: SCI AM - A Bird Flu Vaccine Might Come Too Late to Save Us from H5N1).  

While it's not a new idea (see 2008's Seasonal Flu Vaccine May Offer Some Protection To H5N1), the notion of using the existing seasonal flu vaccine as either a `stop-gap measure' - or as a `prime-boost' for the first pandemic jab, during the opening months of an H5 pandemic - has persisted. 

An early, encouraging 2010 study in the journal Vaccines (Seasonal influenza vaccine elicits heterosubtypic immunity against H5N1 that can be further boosted by H5N1 vaccination) reported:

Recent findings indicate that seasonal influenza vaccination or infection of healthy humans may contribute to heterosubtypic immunity against new influenza A subtypes, such as H5N1. Here, we investigated whether seasonal influenza vaccination in a mouse model could induce any immunity against the H5N1 subtype.
It could be demonstrated that, largely due to the H1N1 component strain A/NewCaledonia/20/99, parenteral immunization of mice with a trivalent seasonal influenza vaccine elicited heterosubtype H5-reactive antibodies able to confer partial protection against H5N1 influenza virus infection.
Furthermore, the trivalent seasonal influenza vaccine was found to be compatible with a whole virus H5N1 vaccine in a heterologous prime-boost immunization regimen, achieving superior efficacy compared to a single immunization with an equivalent low-dose of the H5N1 vaccine.

More recent evidence remains both mixed and modest - and has often relied on ferret or mouse models (which may not fully apply to humans) -  including:

Nature Comms: Adjuvanted Influenza Vaccination Increases Pre-existing H5N1 Cross-reactive Antibodies

mBio: Low levels of influenza H5N1 HA and NA antibodies in the human population are boosted by seasonal H1N1 infection but not by H3N2 infection or influenza vaccination

EID Journal: Effect of Seasonal Influenza Vaccines on Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Clade 2.3.4.4b Virus Infection in Ferrets

EID Journal: Investigation of Influenza A(H5N1) Virus Neutralization by Quadrivalent Seasonal Vaccines, United Kingdom, 2021–2024

Note: Regardless of whether the seasonal flu vaccine directly protects against H5N1 infection, there are still good reasons to get the jab, prior to - and even during - an H5Nx pandemic.

  1. It still may provide some small boost to your immune response.  Neutralizing antibodies aren't the only immune defense against infection. 
  2. It could help prevent a co-infection with H5N1 and seasonal flu, which has the potential for being more severe.
  3. Co-infections could also help generate a reassorted `hybrid' virus (see Preprint: Intelligent Prediction & Biological Validation of the High Reassortment Potential of Avian H5N1 and Human H3N2 Influenza Viruses).
While it may not be the last word on the topic, today we've a study in EM&I from researchers at the CDC's NCIRD Influenza Division, which frankly, offers little encouragement on the effectiveness of using seasonal flu vaccines as a `prime-boost' for H5N1 vaccines. 

I've only reproduced the abstract and a few excerpts, so follow the link to read the report in its entirety.  I'll have a brief postscript after the break.

Limited added benefit of seasonal influenza vaccination before A(H5) vaccination in mice and ferrets challenged with A(H5N1)

Masato Hatta , Ying Huang , Jeremy A. Duke , Joseph R. Rouse , Chenchen Feng ,
Xudong Lin , show all
Article: 2731495 | Received 29 Jun 2026, Accepted 05 Sep 2026, Published online: 21 Sep 2026
 
https://doi.org/10.1080/22221751.2026.2731495
Limited A(H5)-specific vaccine supply is expected early in a potential A(H5N1) pandemic, raising the question of whether licensed seasonal influenza vaccines could enhance protection when administered before A(H5) vaccination. We evaluated this strategy in mouse and ferret models using clade 2.3.4.4b A(H5N1) viruses.
Seasonal influenza vaccination induced antibodies to seasonal haemagglutinins but did not induce detectable antibodies against A(H5) and did not consistently enhance A(H5)-directed antibody responses after A(H5) vaccination.
In lethal challenge studies, seasonal vaccine priming before A(H5) vaccination was associated with improved outcomes compared with A(H5) vaccination alone in one of three mouse experiments, but this effect was not observed in the other two mouse experiments or in ferrets. These findings suggest that seasonal influenza vaccine priming provides limited added benefit to A(H5) vaccine-mediated protection against A(H5N1) under the conditions tested.
(SNIP)

Accordingly, clinical studies are needed to further evaluate the strategy of administering seasonal influenza vaccine prior to A(H5) vaccination. However, such studies would likely rely on immunological endpoints rather than direct assessment of protection. Evidence of cross-reactivity alone should therefore be interpreted cautiously when informing decision-making, as it may not reliably predict protection against severe or lethal A(H5N1) infection.
In the absence of a clear added benefit, prioritizing seasonal influenza vaccination as a priming strategy to enhance protection against A(H5N1) during the early phase of a pandemic may offer limited value, particularly when resources may need to be directed toward A(H5)-specific vaccination and other countermeasures. Continued efforts to improve the development, availability, and deployment of antigenically similar A(H5) vaccines should remain a priority for pandemic preparedness [13,14].


Although the prospect of using seasonal vaccine as a bridge - or as a primer for a first H5 dose - remains biologically plausible, the evidence of its effectiveness has been both inconsistent and weak. 

Today's CDC study reports that prior seasonal vaccination offered little reproducible improvement over H5 vaccination alone (at least, in mice and ferrets). While disappointing, it is hardly unexpected. 

Which suggests that during the opening months of any novel flu pandemic we will (once again) have to rely on NPIs (Non-pharmaceutical Interventions) like social distancing and face masks - and our limited supply of antivirals -  while a strain-specific vaccine is produced and deployed.

For some specific preparedness advice, you may wish to revisit #Natlprep 2026: Pandemic Planning At Both Ends of the Spectrum. 

Tuesday, September 22, 2026

California Declares State of Emergency to Bolster Statewide El Niño Preparedness


 

#19,344

Earlier this month, in #NPM26: Preparing For An El Niño Winter,  we looked at the potential for weather anomalies across the country due to a strengthening - and possibly historic - El Niño expected this winter. 

Predicting exactly where or when unusual or severe weather will occur due to El Niño is impossible, but typically, during El Niño the jet stream across the United States shifts storm tracks to the southern tier of states.

While that may mean more more snow or ice for the southern tier of states, heavy rains and possible severe weather across the Gulf states, while warmer and drier in the north - for California this often means repeated atmospheric rivers - bringing bringing flooding rains and a heavy Sierra snowpack. 

How bad any of these scenarios will play out is anyone's guess. Weather is complicated - and while this winter's El Niño could be unprecedented - there are no hard and fast rules about its effects.

Yesterday, the Governor of California declared a State of Emergency to aid in statewide preparation for El Niño's arrival later this year.  He also proclaimed a state of emergency in several states due to recent storm activity. 

I've only reproduced a brief excerpt from the announcement. Follow the link to read the statement in its entirety.  

        Sep 21, 2026
Governor Newsom proclaims state of emergency to bolster statewide El Nino preparedness, protect California

Proclaims states of emergency in several counties to support recovery from earlier storm activity and other events
What you need to know: Governor Newsom is taking early action to prepare California for what is shaping up to be a historic El Niño season, which is forecast to be very strong, even the strongest on record. The state of emergency helps California move faster to protect communities, stage critical resources, and strengthen readiness before severe weather intensifies.
SACRAMENTO – As a historic El Niño storm season develops, Governor Newsom is proclaiming a state of emergency today, mobilizing state resources ahead of potential winter storms and other impacts. The emerging El Niño event is already breaking records, and forecasters expect it to continue to strengthen, potentially becoming the strongest in recorded history. Today’s emergency proclamation streamlines measures to help California prepare for this historic event.

The Governor’s action puts California in a stronger position before winter weather intensifies. It directs state agencies to begin protecting vulnerable communities, prepare roads and critical infrastructure, stage emergency supplies, and help local partners reduce flood, landslide, and coastal risks.

Read the full proclamation here.

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Those interested in diving into one of the more extreme (albeit, historic) scenarios of Atmospheric river flooding may wish to revisit 2022's California's ARkStorm Scenario Revisited & National Preparedness Month, but even a far less severe event could be devastating. 

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While California may be first in line to feel El Niño's effects, ill effects, it won't be alone. So, if the power goes out, or flood waters rise, or the ground begins to shake . . . do you already have?
  • A battery operated NWS Emergency Radio to find out what was going on, and to get vital instructions from emergency officials
  • A decent first-aid kit, so that you can treat injuries
  • Enough non-perishable food and water on hand to feed and hydrate your family (including pets) for the duration
  • A way to provide light when the grid is down.
  • A way to cook safely without electricity
  • A way to purify or filter water
  • A way to handle basic sanitation and waste disposal.
  • A way to stay cool (fans) or warm when the power is out.
  • A small supply of cash to use in case credit/debit machines are not working
  • An emergency plan, including meeting places, emergency out-of-state contact numbers, a disaster buddy, and in case you must evacuate, a bug-out bag
  • Spare supply of essential prescription medicines that you or your family may need
  • A way to entertain yourself, or your kids, during a prolonged blackout

If not, you've got some important work to do.

A good place to get started is by visiting Ready.gov, or by hitting this link which will serve up a series of my preparedness blogs.

While being prepared can't guarantee you a good outcome, it can certainly increase your chances.