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#19,420
Eight days ago, in HK CHP Reports 6 H9N2 Cases over the past 4 Reporting Periods, we looked at the latest batch of H9N2 reported from the Chinese mainland. Again this week, in what it getting to be almost a weekly occurrence, WHO WPRO announced yet another case, this time in Hunan Province.
Human infection with avian influenza A(H9N2) virus
From 6 to 12 November 2026, one new case of human infection with avian influenza A(H9N2) virus was reported from China to WHO in the Western Pacific Region. The case is a paediatric patient from Hunan Province, with symptom onset on 20 October 2026. The case had exposure to household poultry, and one of the environmental samples tested positive for influenza A(H9). All close contacts of the case have tested negative for influenza A. The case has now recovered.
Since 2015, a total of 190 cases of human infection with avian influenza A(H9N2), including two deaths (both with underlying conditions), have been reported to WHO in the Western Pacific Region. Of these, 187 were reported from China, two were from Cambodia, and one was from Viet Nam.
Most human infections with avian influenza A(H9N2) have been associated with exposure to infected poultry or contaminated poultry environments, and the majority of cases have been mild. Sporadic human infections continue to be expected in areas where H9N2 viruses circulate in poultry populations. Current evidence indicates that H9N2 viruses have not acquired the ability for sustained human-to-human transmission, and the risk of further community-level spread remains low.
While most reported cases have been in children, China is more likely to detect pediatric cases - particularly those hospitalized in major urban centers - as those cohorts are often prioritized for testing for novel flu.
Adult cases, many of whom are unlikely to seek medical care, are believed more likely to go undetected.
H9N2 is ubiquitous in Chinese poultry, and attempts to control the disease via largely ineffective vaccines has led to silent transmission (see NPJ Vaccines: Impact of Inactivated Vaccine on Transmission and Evolution of H9N2 Avian Influenza Virus in Chickens).
Complicating matters, as an LPAI (low path avian influenza), H9N2 is not considered a `reportable' disease by WOAH (formerly the OIE), even though it is zoonotic. We've seen seroprevalence studies which suggest people with exposure to infected poultry often develop H9 antibodies, suggesting mild or asymptomatic infection.
As a result we are probably only seeing the tip of the H9N2 pyramid, as is true with most infectious diseases in the community.

It detected both bacterial and H9 viral infection.
- HA Q226L (human-type receptor binding).
- PB2 L89V and I292V (increased polymerase activity; I292V also dampens the interferon response).
Jingjing Zhang a 1, Weijia Wang b 1, Dan Xia a 1, Yifan Pan c, Yiyun Chen a, Peiwen Liu a, Yuqian Wu a, Anna Wang a, Tengfei Zhou a, Xia Tao a, Shuiping Hou a, Pingting Zhu a, Yanhui Liu a, Xinwei Wu a, Pengzhe Qin a 2, Zhoubin Zhang a 2, Lan Cao a c 2
Under a Creative Commons license Open access
Highlights
• Severe human H9N2 infection detected without known poultry exposure.
• Phylogenetic analysis clusters virus with local strains and a recent human case.
• Key molecular markers linked to human adaptation of H9N2 identified.
• Highlights gaps in current surveillance for sporadic or atypical H9N2 infections
Abstract
Objectives
To describe a severe human infection with avian influenza A(H9N2) virus in a hospitalized patient without recognized poultry exposure and to evaluate implications for surveillance and public health preparedness.
Methods
Unbiased metagenomic next-generation sequencing (mNGS) was performed on bronchoalveolar lavage fluid for initial pathogen detection, and influenza A(H9N2) virus infection was subsequently confirmed by H9N2-specific real-time RT-PCR. Whole-genome sequencing was performed on H9N2-positive respiratory specimens with sufficient viral RNA, followed by phylogenetic analyses to determine the virus genotype and its genetic relationship with local environmental H9N2 viruses and previously reported human H9N2 viruses.
Results
The virus, A/Guangzhou/23127/2025 (H9N2), belonged to the G57 genotype, with its HA gene classified within lineage B, clade B4.7, according to the recently proposed global A/H9 classification system. Phylogenetic analysis revealed close genetic relationships with local environmental strains.
Conclusion
Severe H9N2 infection can occur in individuals without known poultry exposure. These findings underscore the need for NGS-based surveillance among hospitalized patients with severe respiratory disease and highlight the importance of strengthening public health strategies to detect sporadic or atypical zoonotic influenza infections.
(SNIP)
. . . These findings suggest that H9/H9N2 viruses continued to circulate in local poultry-related environments and that human exposure risk persisted during the study period. However, no human H9N2 infections were identified through routine sentinel surveillance in either hospital-based or occupational monitoring programs during the same period.
This discrepancy suggests that current surveillance strategies may not be sufficiently sensitive for detecting sporadic human H9N2 infections, especially among patients without recognized poultry exposure or typical influenza-like illness.
(SNIP)
In conclusion, this severe human H9N2 infection occurred against a background of continued local environmental circulation and occupational exposure risk. These observations also emphasize the public health importance of sustained environmental surveillance, serological monitoring of occupationally exposed populations, and long-term molecular surveillance of H9N2 viruses. Continued genomic monitoring is particularly important for detecting viral genetic changes associated with mammalian adaptation, including mutations that may affect receptor-binding properties or replication in mammalian hosts.
In 2024 the ECDC issued guidance for member nations on Enhanced Influenza Surveillance to Detect Avian Influenza Virus Infections in the EU/EEA During the Inter-Seasonal Period., which cautioned:
Sentinel surveillance systems are important for the monitoring of respiratory viruses in the EU/EEA, but these systems are not designed and are not sufficiently sensitive to identify a newly emerging virus such as avian influenza in the general population early enough for the purpose of implementing control measures in a timely way.
In early 2025, the CDC issued a HAN: Accelerated Subtyping of Influenza A in Hospitalized Patients, requesting that all hospitalized patients with suspected influenza should be subtyped within 24 hours.
How rigorously this is followed isn't known.
Last month's Washington State: Updated guidance for novel influenza screening and influenza subtyping focused primarily on testing those with known risk exposures.
A sobering reminder that, while we comfort ourselves with our current low number of human novel flu detections, we are probably seeing something less than the whole picture.











