WHO: Dr. Tedros Statement On `Plague' Incident In Russia

 

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Two days ago the WHO posted the above statement on the Russian `Lab Leak' Story we've been following for nearly a week.  Since then, we've continued to see denials from the Russian government, which insists they are dealing with a single fatal case of pneumonia of unknown etiology.

They have reported no plague; no laboratory accident; and no epidemiological risk to the public.

At the same time, Rospotrebnadzor reportedly claimed they'd performed  nearly 5,000 `laboratory tests'  since this `non-event' supposedly happened, which seems a rather extreme response. 

While it is fair to say that we don't know exactly what happened - or may still be happening - at that Siberian lab, the Russian's explanations are meeting with a fair amount of international skepticism. 

A little over an hour ago the WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus  posted the following statement (made yesterday, Oct. 7th) on Twitter/X    

Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus

@DrTedros

·

1h

Last Friday, the 2nd of October, the first media reports emerged of a suspected case of pneumonic plague in a laboratory worker at the Irkutsk Antiplague Research Institute in the Russian Federation. The lab worker died after being hospitalized with severe pneumonia. Initial media reports suggested pneumonic plague following an accidental lab exposure.

@WHO

is aware that the Russian government held a meeting on the 2nd of October because they suspected a resident of the Irkutsk oblast had contracted a dangerous infection. On Saturday, WHO asked the Russian Federation for more information, in accordance with the International Health Regulations. On Tuesday, the Russian Federation responded, saying that no case of plague had recently been reported in the Irkutsk oblast, and that they had placed about 200 contacts in quarantine. However, WHO has requested further information on the laboratory tests conducted on the individual who died and the contacts, more detail on what prompted the public health measures, and details about the health status of the contacts. We have also sought verification of media reports of a second employee with pneumonia of undetermined cause. WHO has offered technical support related to plague and lab biosafety and biosecurity. As we don’t yet have the full picture of this event, we are not able to conduct a full risk assessment. Timely, complete and transparent information sharing under the International Health Regulations is essential to clarify conflicting reports and enable an accurate assessment of potential public health risks.

While cloaked in diplomatic prose, it seems pretty clear the WHO isn't fully buying what the Russian government is selling. 

Stay tuned.  This could have legs. 

ECDC Assessment: Zoonotic influenza A(H5) vaccination in humans in the EU/EEA

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In the summer of 2024 , the EU Commission secured access for Member States to purchase 665,000 doses of zoonotic influenza vaccines to prevent avian flu, with the first shipment scheduled to go to Finland, which had recently experienced a prolonged H5 outbreak in fur farms (see Finland: MOH Announcement On Avian Flu Vaccine Availability For People At High Risk).

From the EU 6/24 announcement:

The vaccine is intended for those most exposed to potential transfers of avian influenza from birds or animals, such as poultry farm workers and veterinarians. It aims to prevent the spread or potential outbreaks of avian influenza in Europe, protecting citizens and livelihoods. The vaccine is the only preventive zoonotic avian influenza vaccine currently authorized in the EU.

Fifteen EU and EEA Member States are participating in this voluntary procurement with the company Seqirus UK Ltd. The contract allows each participating country to take into account their public health context and order vaccines depending on national need. The contract will run for a maximum of 4 years.

This initial order was enough to vaccinate 330,000 people (assuming 2 doses each), with an option to buy another 40 million doses if needed. But the EU would need nearly 900 million doses to cover their entire population.

Last May, in Vaccines: Lessons from the 2024 avian influenza vaccination campaign in Finland: a qualitative inquiry, we looked at the disappointingly low uptake of the H5 vaccine by Finland's target groups, with the authors reporting:

In 2024, Finland became a global forerunner to offer H5 vaccine to occupational risk groups, specifically fur and poultry workers, following an extensive HPAI H5N1 outbreak in 2023 in fur-farmed minks and foxes. Despite targeted efforts to reach the people at increased risk, only 8,6% of the target population received the first dose and 7,5% completed both doses.

While disappointing, this uptake is not unexpected, given the hurdles public health has faced getting poultry, swine, and fur farmers to get the seasonal flu vaccine to try to prevent reverse zoonosis. 

And, as we've seen previously (see Two Surveys (UK & U.S.) Illustrating The Public's Lack of Concern Over Avian Flu) - in addition to growing vaccine hesitancy - the public appears largely unconvinced over the HPAI threat. 

Last December in ECDC Pre-pandemic Guidance: Strategies to Fight Avian and Swine flu in Humans we looked at a  71-page operations framework for European countries to use when dealing with outbreaks of novel swine or avian influenza. 

One of the topics covered was potential pre-pandemic vaccination of high-risk individuals with a zoonotic influenza A(H5) vaccine.

Yesterday the ECDC published the results of a survey of 30 EU/EEA member nations on their plans for current or future H5 vaccination of humans, of which 27 responded. 

This is a fairly brief report (9 pages), which finds 5 (19%) of reporting countries have begun limited vaccination of high-risk individuals, another 11% plan to begin offering the vaccine in the next year, and the remaining 70% have no plans in place at this time. 

While there are sizable gaps in the data, uptake of the vaccine - as we saw in Finland - appears to have been quite limited.   

All of this is self-reported data, of course - and since there is no standardized reporting format - making comparisons between countries is extremely difficult. 

Follow the link to read the report in its entirety.  I'll have a brief postscript after the break. 

Zoonotic influenza A(H5) vaccination in humans in the EU/EEA

Assessment

7 October 2026

Highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) continues to circulate widely in wild birds and cause outbreaks in poultry and other animals across Europe. Despite extensive circulation, human infections remain rare and no human cases have been confirmed in the EU/EEA to date.

Considering this, ECDC assesses the risk from A(H5N1) viruses circulating in Europe as low for the general population and low to moderate for people occupationally or otherwise exposed to infected animals or contaminated environments.

Key findings

• Twenty-seven of 30 EU/EEA countries responded to the survey on influenza A(H5) vaccination in humans – national plans and implementation status in EU/EEA. Eight countries reported having national A(H5) vaccination recommendations in place, eight were currently developing them, and 11 had no plans at the time of the survey.

• Implementation of the plans remained limited: five countries had started vaccination campaigns (Austria, Finland, Lithuania, the Netherlands and Portugal) and three planned to do so within one year. Priority groups most commonly included in the cohort to be vaccinated were veterinarians and animal-health staff, culling teams, laboratory staff and workers in farming and the poultry sector.

• Most countries reported that they are monitoring or planning to monitor vaccine uptake; the majority through immunisation registries.

• Reported vaccine uptake in reporting countries was generally low outside laboratory settings, but data were incomplete and not comparable across countries.

• Overall, results were heterogeneous in the EU/EEA due to variation in national recommendations, implementation plans, delivery arrangements and uptake monitoring. For preparedness purposes, countries would benefit from clearly defined programme objectives and scenario-based triggers, tested delivery pathways, targeted communication and uptake-monitoring plans. 

Publication file

Zoonotic influenza A(H5) vaccination in humans in the EU/EEA English (735.12 KB - PDF)

In addition to the EU's purchase, over the past 3 years we've seen a number of other countries announced their intention to stockpile limited supplies of a pre-pandemic H5N1 vaccine, including: 

• In 2025 Canada's PHAC Announced Plans To Purchase 500,000 doses Of H5N1 Vaccine 
• The United States ordered  4.8 million doses in 2024
• The UK has ordered 5 million doses 
• and Japan has stockpiled 10 million doses 

All are quantities that might help protect those occupationally most at risk during an H5Nx outbreak, but the general population would likely have to wait 6 months or longer before large quantities of vaccine would be made available (see Referral: SCI AM - A Bird Flu Vaccine Might Come Too Late to Save Us from H5N1).

At least that's the theory.  

Whether we'll be ready to react to an actual human outbreak remains to be seen. 

 

NHC: Isaias Now A Tropical Storm - Forecast to Threaten Northern Gulf Coast As A Strong Hurricane

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October storms born in the Bay of Campeche have a reputation for spinning up rapidly as they approach a landfall.  Although that doesn't always happen, it occurs often enough to take these late season storms seriously.

While conditions in the gulf were described as `only marginally conducive for development' just 24 hours ago, the NHC is now forecasting Isaias to ramp up to a strong CAT 2 hurricane by the end of the week.

Estimated wind speeds and positions from today's (Oct 7th) NHC discussion:

Watches and warnings have not been raised yet, but the NHC will probably do so later today. For now the NHC's key messages to the public are:

 

Currently, it appears that anywhere from the western panhandle of Florida to central Louisiana are in the cone, but high winds, surge tides, and heavy rains are likely to impact well beyond those limits. 

Inland flooding could occur hundreds of miles inland, and spin-off tornadoes are possible across much of the southeast. Widespread power outages are likely. 

 

If this is your first hurricane season - or you are just in need of a refresher - you'll find a number of short videos on hurricane prepareded at this NOAA website:

Hurricane Prep: social media (English)

The Hurricane Preparedness Week Social Media Plan

2026 SOCIAL MEDIA PLANS AND VIDEOS English: May 3 - May 9, 2026

En español: 3 de mayo - 9 de mayo de 2026

Chinese: 年5月3日 - 2025年5月9日

Vietnamese: Ngày 3 Tháng 5, Năm - Ngày 9 Tháng 5, Năm 2026

English: Videos

En español: Videos

#HurricaneStrong #HurricanePrep

Please help the NWS spread the word about Hurricane Preparedness Week (May 3-May 9, 2026) on social media! Everyone is welcome to use the text and images provided below to help the NWS build a Weather-Ready Nation.

May 3, 2026 — Know Your Risk: Wind & Water

May 4, 2026 — Prepare Before Hurricane Season

May 5, 2026 — Understand Forecast Information

May 6, 2026 — Get Moving When a Storm Threatens

May 7, 2026 — Stay Protected During Storms

May 8, 2026 — Use Caution After Storms

May 9, 2026 —Take Action Today

While this blog, and many other internet sources (I follow Mark Sudduth's Hurricane Track, and Mike's Weather page), will cover this year's hurricane season. your primary source of forecast information should always be the National Hurricane Center in Miami, Florida.

These are the real experts, and the only ones you should rely on to track and forecast the storm.

If you are on Twitter, you should also follow @FEMA, @NHC_Atlantic, @NHC_Pacific and @ReadyGov and of course take direction from your local Emergency Management Office.

Referral Preprint: The mammalian-adaptive PB2-E627K substitution preserves viral fitness of clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAIV in birds.

 
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While worrisome, HPAI H5Nx remains primarily an avian-adapted virus, despite increasingly spilling over into mammalian species (including humans).  These spillovers, however, provide opportunities for the virus to adapt - through amino acid substitutions (mutations) - to mammals. 

Without changes the virus remains optimized for avian physiology.  Mammalian infection remains possible, but is less likely to spread efficiently through a population.  

While there are a number of these adaptive mutations, one we watch for carefully is PB2-E627K, which increases the ability of avian flu viruses to replicate in a mammalian host. 

This mutation is rarely seen in birds, but can appear in mammals after they are infected by birds (see Mammalian Adaptation in the PB2 Gene of Avian H5N1 Influenza Virus).

It has always been a bit of a mystery why this 627K mutation hasn't become `fixed' in avian hosts during this current panzootic, with some researchers suggesting it may impose some kind of  `fitness penalty' in birds. 

While found in about 1% of avian H5N1 sequences, it is reportedly more common (based on limited surveillance) in avian hosts infected with H5N5. 

In 2024, however, we looked at a slightly different mutation at the same location in the PB2 gene (E627V), which has emerged in poultry viruses (see Preprint: An Emerging PB2-627 Polymorphism Increases the Pandemic Potential of Avian Influenza).

The authors report that the PB2-627V mutation not only maintains viral fitness in poultry, it facilitates the respiratory transmission of AIVs between ferrets. The concern was this mutation could go a long way in overcoming the `species barrier' between avian and mammalian-adapted influenza viruses.

This 627V mutation has also appeared in other avian viruses (H9N2, H7N9, H5N6, etc.) with zoonotic potential (see Vet. Research: E627V Mutation in PB2 Protein Promotes the Mammalian Adaptation of Novel H10N3 Avian Influenza Virus).

All of which brings us to a preprint, authored by a number of well known UK researchers, which investigates whether the PB2 E627K mutation exacts a fitness penalty in birds.

They report finding no `measurable fitness cost in chickens and ducks', which suggests there may be other `ecological and epidemiological constraints' at work.

This, they suggest, means that mammalian-adaptive mutations acquired during spillover could spread and persist in avian populations, potentially raising zoonotic risk. 

They go on to stress the value of surveillance for such mutations in birds.

Due to copyright issues, I can't do my regular deep dissection of the paper, but I can refer you to the preprint, which is very much worth reading. 

The mammalian-adaptive PB2-E627K substitution preserves viral fitness of clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAIV in birds.

Elizabeth Billington, Sofia Riccio, Maryn D. Brown, Benjamin Mollett, Jessica L. Quantrill, Simon Johnson, Cecilia Di Genova, Jiayun Yang, Jean-Remy Sadeyen, Audra-Lynne Schlachter, Kelly J. Roper, Jafar Hassan, Benjamin Clifton, Kajal Ralh, Caroline Janet Warren, Georgina Ward, Dilhani De Silva, Alejandro Nunez, Holly A. Coombes, Marek J Slomka, Munir Iqbal, Wendy S. Barclay, Thomas Peacock, Ashley C Banyard, Joe James
doi: https://doi.org/10.64898/2026.10.06.757006 

It isn't known what mutation - or series of mutations - would be needed to turn H5Nx into a genuine pandemic threat. What we know is 1) these viruses continue to evolve, 2) they have spread globally, and 3) in recent years they have expanded both their avian and mammalian host ranges. 

H5Nx continues to surprise, but whether that will lead to a global health crisis is anyone's guess. But just because it hasn't yet, doesn't mean it can't. 

 Which is reason enough to remain vigilant.  

NHC Monitoring Gulf Disturbance with 80% Chance of Development

 

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As a hurricane weary Floridian (see 2024's Hurricane Watches Raised For Most of Florida's West Coast), our El Niño dampened 2026 Atlantic Hurricane season has been a happy respite.  The last time there were no hurricanes this late into  October was 1914 (albeit, well before satellite coverage). 

There are still nearly 2 months left to the season (ends Nov 30th), so we may not get away completely unscathed.  

While conditions are only marginally conducive, the National Hurricane Center has given an area off the Mexican gulf coast an 80% chance of developing into a tropical system. 

If that happens, it will be named Isaias.

 

While it is too early to predict its strength or where it might head, residents along the northern Gulf coast should keep tabs on its development. The overnight forecast from the NWS NHC reads:

Tropical Weather Outlook

NWS National Hurricane Center Miami FL

200 AM EDT Tue Oct 6 2026

For the North Atlantic...Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of America:

1. Southwestern Gulf of America (AL92):

A trough of low pressure over the southwestern Gulf of America is

producing disorganized showers and thunderstorms. Although

environmental conditions appear only marginally conducive for

development, a tropical depression is likely to form within the next

couple of days. The system is expected to drift east-northeastward

through the middle portion of the week before turning northward. It

is too early to determine specific impacts to the northern Gulf

Coast, but interests there should closely monitor the progress of

this system.

* Formation chance through 48 hours...high...80 percent.

* Formation chance through 7 days...high...80 percent.

Our summer reprieve due to El Niño may be short-lived, as this phenomenon often brings wet and stormy winters to the gulf coast, and can batter California with repeated torrential rains (see California Declares State of Emergency to Bolster Statewide El Niño Preparedness).

As we discussed a month ago, in #NPM26: Preparing For An El Niño Winter, many parts of our country - and the world - may experience wild or unusual weather patterns over the next few months. 

Some areas may see floods, or ice storms, or blizzards, while others may see drought, or other weather anomalies.  While not everyone will be affected, this winter, it is a good idea to expect the unexpected. 

Follow-up on The Russian `Lab Leak' Story

 

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Two days ago, in About that Russian `Lab Leak' Story, we looked at admittedly sparse details on a purported lab accident at a Russian plague research institute in Irkutsk, Siberia which supposedly caused the death of a 28-year-old female lab worker. 

While this story has been making headlines around the world, nothing appears to have been confirmed. The WHO has been quoted as saying `it was aware of reports' and `it had offered support to Russia', but no cause of death had been determined.

The Interfax News Agency, which often reflects the Kremlin's position, reported on Sunday:

        (Translated)

Rospotrebnadzor reported a stable situation in the Irkutsk region. 

Moscow. October 4. INTERFAX.RU - Rospotrebnadzor reported that the sanitary and epidemiological situation in the Irkutsk region and the cities of Irkutsk and Shelekhov is stable.

"The sanitary and epidemiological situation in the Irkutsk region and the cities of Irkutsk and Shelekhov is stable. A special set of measures has been organized and implemented in response to the case of an employee of the Irkutsk Anti-Plague Institute of Siberia and the Far East who has been diagnosed with pneumonia of unknown etiology," the Rospotrebnadzor press service said in a statement on Sunday.

Based on the results of extensive testing, no microorganisms associated with the patient's professional activities were detected in the patient's sample, the department noted.

All my attempts to access the Rospotrebnadzor website (including via VPN) over the past few days have failed, and I'm seeing others are having similar difficulties.

 Today Taiwan's CDC addressed the reports in a statement on their website. 

In response to the suspected plague deaths reported in Russia, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) has inquired about the incident through the International Health Regulations mechanism and is continuously monitoring the domestic and international epidemic situation and strengthening border quarantine measures.

        (Translated Excerpt)

The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) stated on October 6, 2026, regarding recent international media reports of a death from pneumonia of unknown cause reported on October 2, 2026, in Irkutsk Oblast, Siberia, Russia. The patient was a 28-year-old female laboratory technician at the Irkutsk Institute of Epidemiology and Microbiology, who died on October 2 after developing severe pneumonia.

According to an official statement issued by the Rospotrebnadzor (Russian official infectious disease management agency), as reported by local Russian media, expanded testing of the infected employee's samples revealed no special microorganisms related to her job duties. The country's biosafety expert committee also confirmed that no pathogen leakage occurred at the laboratory.

 

Furthermore, Russia has conducted extensive testing and hospitalized isolation observation on all contacts. Currently, only two cases of COVID-19 and two cases of rhinovirus infection have been detected, with no other special infectious disease pathogens found, and the relevant contacts have no abnormal symptoms. The incidence of respiratory diseases among the general population in the region remains within the normal seasonal range. Further information is still pending clarification. A WHO spokesperson stated that the public health risk posed by this event to the general public is low.

To monitor the situation, the Taiwan Centers for Disease Control (CDC) inquired with the International Health Regulations (IHR) window in Russia on October 5th for detailed information regarding the event to clarify the local epidemic situation and the risk of cross-border transmission. The CDC also sent a letter to the WHO today (October 6th) requesting information related to this case.

       (Continue . . . )

This press release appears to be mostly geared towards reassuring Taiwan's people that their CDC is aware of reports, and is making inquiries, but thus far there  appears to be no imminent threat. 

Exactly what happened - or may still be happening - in Irkutsk, Siberia remains unknown.  And frankly, there are no guarantees we'll ever get the full story.

Despite the reporting requirements of the IHR (International Health Regulations), many countries hold outbreak information close to their vest for political, societal, or economic reasons, since there are few downsides to doing so  (see From Here to Impunity).  

If there are any big developments I'll cover it, but if you want to keep up with the day-to-day developments, this FluTrackers thread should keep you well informed.