UK National Risk Register 2026 - Urges Citizen Preparedness

 

#19,311

In August of 2008 we looked at the first UK National Risk Register - which ran just 52 pages - and cited pandemic flu as the #1 threat facing the nation.  It's prep advice to the public was fairly limited, essentially urging:

Creating a core stock of essential supplies. This could include bottled water, a battery powered radio, torch, tinned food and alternative heating sources.

Four years later, a slightly larger (58 page) 2012 update was released, which kept pandemic flu at the top of their threat board, but added coastal flooding, terrorist attacks, severe space weather, prolonged power or gas outages, and even volcanic threats to the list.

The last time we looked at the UK Risk Register was in August of 2023, which by that time has expanded to nearly 200 pages. That edition of the NRR detailed 89 risks, within 9 risk themes:

• Terrorism
• Cyber
• State threats
• Geographic and diplomatic
• Accidents and systems failures

• Natural and environmental hazards

• Human, animal and plant health

• Societal

• Conflict and instability

Since then the world has changed radically, with the rise of A.I. and cyber threats, increasing global tensions in Europe and the Middle East, climate change and a record setting El Nino on the horizon, aging infrastructures, and growing economic threats. 

The 2026 edition of the NRR has expanded to a daunting 223 pages - so large that it is accompanied by a 27-page `Guide to the 2026 Risk Register' - which will hopefully provide a more palatable gateway for casual reader. 

 Admittedly, the NRR isn't geared to the general public, as explained below:

This edition of the NRR is available to all but not targeted at the general public. Advice for individuals, households and communities on preparing for a wide range of risks can be found on the Prepare website.

In recent years we've seen a growing willingness of European nations to ask citizens to prepare for emergencies, including 2025's Denk Vooruit: The Netherlands National Citizen Preparedness Drive and last year's EU Commission call for all households to prepare for a wide array of disasters.  

The NRR guide goes on to say:

The risks outlined in the 2026 NRR are significant, but they are not inevitable. Resilience is a national endeavour that relies on a combination of robust government coordination and the proactive responsibility of every individual, business, and community. It is particularly important for owners and operators of CNI to ensure continued delivery of the essential services that underpin UK society and way of life.This “whole-of-society” approach is built on deep partnerships, where we recognise our vital roles in preparing for, responding to, and recovering from emergencies.

The power of collective readiness

When communities take steps to prepare, they act as a force multiplier for national resilience. By managing what they can at home and with those around them, those in a position to do so reduce the immediate demand on frontline services. This ensures that emergency responders and limited resources can be prioritised for those who may need more support or who are in the greatest need. This collective effort is vital to ensure that the national resilience system remains strong enough to protect everyone when it matters most.For further guidance, resources, and advice on bolstering personal and household readiness, visit the Prepare website.

While the full 2026 NRR provides a remarkably detailed UK-centric disaster reference guide, it isn't exactly light reading. Most will find the Guide to the NRR - which still puts a `Disease X' pandemic at the top of their threats list - far more accessible. 

Since it is impossible to summary a 223 page document here, I'll simply provide the links and recommend you download, and peruse, both. 

Documents

National Risk Register 2026

PDF, 22.6 MB, 223 pages

A Guide to the National Risk Register 2026

PDF, 4.75 MB, 27 pages

Next month is National Preparedness Month, and - as we've done every year for nearly 2 decades - AFD will focus a good deal on individual, community, and national preparedness.

Having survived more than a few hurricanes, my personal recommendations include:

• A battery operated NWS Emergency Radio to find out what was going on, and to get vital instructions from emergency officials
• A decent first-aid kit, so that you can treat injuries
• Enough non-perishable food and water on hand to feed and hydrate your family (including pets) for the duration
• A way to provide light when the grid is down.
• A way to cook safely without electricity
• A way to purify or filter water
• A way to handle basic sanitation and waste disposal.
• A way to stay cool (fans) or warm when the power is out.
• A small supply of cash to use in case credit/debit machines are not working
• An emergency plan, including meeting places, emergency out-of-state contact numbers, a disaster buddy, and in case you must evacuate, a bug-out bag
• Spare supply of essential prescription medicines that you or your family may need
• A way to entertain yourself, or your kids, during a prolonged blackout

Being prepared doesn't guarantee you and your loved ones will come through a major disaster unscathed. But it is relatively cheap insurance, and when things do go sideways, it can substantially improve your chances. 

Norwegian Veterinary Institute Reports Another HPAI H5N5 Infected Polar Bear on Svalbard Island

 

 

Credit: Multiple transatlantic incursions of HPAI 

clade 2.3.4.4b A(H5N5) virus into North America 

and spillover to mammals

#19,310

Although most of the world is primarily concerned with HPAI H5N1, in northern Europe, Iceland, and parts of Canada, a different avian flu subtype - HPAI H5N5 - has been making inroads as well. 

Additionally, here in the United States HPAI H5N5 infected and killed a resident of Washington State last November, following contact with backyard birds.

In the summer of 2022, the Norwegian Veterinary Institute reported both H5N1 and H5N5 for the first time in wild birds on Svalbard, which lies above the Arctic circle (see More HPAI (H5N5 & H5N1) Detected In Arctic (Svalbard).

Last May, in Norway Veterinary Institute Reports HPAI H5N5 In Polar Bears on Svalbard Island, we looked at a report of the recent detection of HPAI H5N5 virus in both a dead walrus and a polar bear on Svalbard Island.

Although no other animals were confirmed infected during this investigation, there were eye witness accounts of two other polar bears exhibiting potential neurological symptoms.

Five weeks ago, in Preprint: HPAI H5N5 in a Polar Bear and Atlantic Walrus, Svalbard, 2026, with Widespread Seroconversion in Polar Bears, we saw a report indicating that H5N5 exposure is far more common among polar bears on Svalbard island than previously thought.

Somewhat surprisingly, most polar bears appear to survive H5N5 infection, although severe (and likely neurotropic) illness can occur.

Yesterday the Norwegian Veterinary Institute reported on a second polar bear - recovered in June some 23 km distant from the one found in May - has tested positive for H5N5. 

(translation)
Bird flu detected in another polar bear in Svalbard
Published 25.08.2026

The Norwegian Veterinary Institute has detected avian influenza in a young polar bear found dead on the northern tip of Spitsbergen. This is the second time the virus has been detected in polar bears in Norway and Europe.

The detected highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus is of the subtype H5N5, a type of the virus that has been previously detected in Svalbard: In wild birds for the first time in 2022 , in a walrus in 2023 , in arctic foxes in 2025 , and in a polar bear and walrus in the spring of 2026. This latest detection is the second in polar bears in Norway and Europe.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses have also previously been detected in carnivorous mammals such as red foxes, otters and lynxes on mainland Norway after infection from wild birds.

Sampled in the field by the District Governor

The polar bear, a young individual, was found dead on Æøya, near Virgohamna. The animal was sampled by the Governor in June 2026, after avian influenza virus was detected in a dead polar bear and a dead walrus in Raudfjorden in May 2026. The distance between the two findings of dead animals is approximately 23 kilometers.

- After the findings on the polar bear and walrus in Raudfjorden, we also recommended sampling the polar bear that was on Æøya, says veterinarian and wildlife health specialist at the Veterinary Institute Knut Madslien.

The samples from the polar bear were then sent to the Norwegian Veterinary Institute and tested for avian influenza virus and rabies. Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus was detected in samples from both the brain and nose. Rabies virus was not detected.

Bird flu virus is circulating in the highlands

"The findings are part of a trend where highly pathogenic avian influenza virus is increasingly being detected in mammals in Europe. At the same time, the virus has spread to new areas in recent years, including the Arctic, where it may have consequences for vulnerable populations and ecosystems," explains Ragnhild Tønnessen, avian influenza coordinator at the Norwegian Veterinary Institute.

- Our researchers, in close collaboration with the Norwegian Polar Institute and other partners, have found that a large proportion of the polar bears examined in Svalbard after 2022 have been exposed to previous avian influenza infection. Although we currently have limited knowledge of the consequences this has for the polar bears, the results indicate that the virus is circulating in the population and that exposure is more widespread than detections in dead animals alone would indicate, says Tønnessen.

Increased infection pressure in mammals

Most avian influenza viruses are best adapted to be transmitted between birds. However, mammals can sometimes be infected through direct contact with sick or dead birds or other mammals infected with the virus.

The Veterinary Institute will conduct further investigations of the detected virus to characterize it more closely and clarify whether it shows signs of being specifically adapted to mammals.

Second detection in polar bears in Europe

In other predators, such as red foxes and lynxes, avian influenza can cause clinical signs of brain disease. Neurological signs such as circling gait, tilted head position, paralysis and reduced shyness towards humans are common.

Avian influenza virus in polar bears has been scientifically published twice previously: In a young male polar bear found dead in Alaska in August 2023 and in a young male polar bear found dead in Raudfjorden on Svalbard in May 2026. However, it is not known how the virus affects individual individuals or the population of polar bears.

– This finding strengthens the indications that highly pathogenic avian influenza virus can also affect polar bears, and that young individuals are particularly vulnerable. This is also consistent with findings in other carnivorous mammals, where the virus mainly affects younger individuals. However, the knowledge base is still very limited and it is important to gain more knowledge about how the virus can affect polar bears, says Madslien.

Report if you observe dead or sick animals and birds

Both highly pathogenic avian influenza and rabies are serious diseases found in Svalbard and can be transmitted to humans. Contact with sick and dead animals should therefore be avoided.

If sick or dead animals are observed on Svalbard, it is important that the findings are reported to the Governor . This is important to obtain an overview of disease incidence and mortality, although it does not always trigger sampling. If avian influenza is suspected in birds and other animals on the mainland, the Norwegian Food Safety Authority must be notified .

The Norwegian Veterinary Institute is the national reference laboratory for avian influenza and has molecular methods for the detection and characterization of avian influenza viruses.

Admittedly, HPAI H5N5 remains a minor player in the world of avian flu, but it has shown remarkable tenacity, persisting and even thriving in some high latitude regions of the Northern Hemisphere. 

A recent study (see J. Virology: Risk assessment of avian influenza A(H5N5) virus from the first human case using the ferret model) found that while the Washington State isolate replicated robustly in mammalian cells and caused severe disease, it still lacked adaptations supporting efficient airborne spread. 

Six years ago HPAI H5N8 subtype dominated the world's avian flyways, only to be abruptly supplanted by a new and improved H5N1 in 2021. 

A reminder of just how quickly the avian flu-scape can change, and why we continue to watch this subtype with interest. 

Australia H5N1 Update: CSIRO Testing 1st Land Mammal (Red Fox) For Suspected Infection

 

#19,309

Our almost daily dose of increasingly bad H5N1 news from Australia continues with an announcement today that their first suspected HPAI infection in a land mammal (a red fox recovered in Osborne) - a suburb of Adelaide - has been forwarded to their national testing lab for confirmation. 

Their progression of the virus moving from migratory birds to local birds to marine mammals and now potentially to land mammals (and likely on to poultry and/or livestock in the future) mirrors what we've seen in other regions of the world following the arrival of HPAI. 

South Australia continues to be the nation's hotspot for HPAI detections, although only a small fraction of the more than 29,000 citizen hotline reports have been investigated across the nation.  

As we saw 2 weeks ago, in Australia Changes How They Report H5N1- Australia now only counts `events' - not individual confirmed infections.  So one event could represent multiple bird/animal deaths.  

H5 bird flu testing update 26 August

Wednesday 26 August 2026 BiosecurityMedia release

There are five new suspect H5 bird flu events in South Australia since yesterday’s update.

The new suspect events include:

1. Australian raven Limestone Coast – Robe
2. Little penguin Limestone Coast – Southend
3. Greater crested tern Murray and Mallee – Coonalpyn
4. Pacific gull Kangaroo Island – Baudin Beach
5. Red fox Metropolitan – Osborne

Samples from these events have been sent to ACDP for confirmatory testing, with results expected to be known in the coming days.

This brings the current number of suspect H5 bird flu events in South Australia to 41.

The CSIRO’s Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness (ACDP) has no new confirmed H5 bird flu events in South Australia since yesterday’s update.

There are 195 confirmed H5 bird flu events in South Australia.

In line with national protocols, the South Australian Government recently changed how we report on H5 bird flu detections.

Reporting is now based on events, rather than individual animal detections, where an event may involve one or more animals. The number of positive events captures all previously reported individual confirmed detections.

An interactive map is available on the H5 bird flu website with up-to-date information on event locations: see current situation

There remains no H5 bird flu detections in poultry or other livestock. The risk to human health of H5 bird flu remains low.

Engagement with primary industries, the wildlife sector, and the broader South Australian community continues as part of the South Australian Government’s commitment to deliver the most comprehensive and effective wildlife and industry surveillance, reporting and preparedness efforts possible.

South Australians are encouraged to continue being vigilant in reporting sick and dead birds and other wildlife.

Avoid touching sick or dead birds and other wildlife. Record what you see. Report it to the Emergency Animal Disease Hotline on 1800 675 888.

For the latest updates, information and advice about H5 bird flu in South Australia, including how to register for upcoming community forums, including tomorrow night (27 August) at Port MacDonnell, visit birdflu.sa.gov.au.

Yesterday South Australia also announced the approval of bird flu vaccinations for a limited number of endangered native birds residing at Cleland Wildlife Park has been approved. 

Bird flu vaccination program approved for Cleland Wildlife Park

Native birds at Cleland Wildlife Park − including critically endangered species such as orange-bellied parrots and regent honeyeaters – have been approved for vaccination as part of the South Australian Government’s response to H5 bird flu.

The vaccination program has also been approved for a range of other native bird species at Cleland Wildlife Park, including:

• Magpie geese
• Australian pelicans
• Regent parrots
• Red-tailed black cockatoos

Developed by the South Australian Government, the vaccination program at Cleland will initially see up to 100 native birds vaccinated across over 30 different species.

The program has received the relevant approvals in line with the national framework that supports targeted vaccination of priority native bird species that are captive or managed.

A range of factors are considered when identifying priority species for vaccination, including the conservation status and value of the species, the likelihood of catching bird flu, and whether vaccination can be delivered safely and effectively, according to
regulatory requirements.

There remains no H5 bird flu detections in poultry or other livestock. The risk to human health of H5 bird flu remains low.

South Australians are encouraged to continue being vigilant in reporting sick and dead birds and other wildlife. Avoid touching sick or dead birds and other wildlife.

Record what you see. Report it to the Emergency Animal Disease Hotline on 1800 675 888.

For the latest updates, information and advice about H5 bird flu in South Australia visit birdflu.sa.gov.au.

For now, H5N1 has not been detected in Australian poultry or livestock, but that could be short-lived. Four weeks ago we looked at a preprint by Raina MacIntyre et al. (HPAI H5N1 risk in Australia: a model for the prediction of poultry outbreaks) which included a map showing (then) current HPAI H5 detections overlaying poultry production zones.

As we've discussed often, even countries with long experience dealing with HPAI (see Front. Vet. Sci: Biosecurity deficiencies in HPAI-affected poultry farms in Korea, 2020/2021–2024/2025 seasons) have found it difficult to keep avian flu out of the henhouse.

And while things remain relatively quiet in the Northern Hemisphere, fall is just around the corner, and the expectation is avian flu will return once more with a vengeance. 

Stay tuned. 

Transb. & Emerg. Dis.: Genomic and Clinicopathological Characterization of a Reassortant HPAI H5N1 (Clade 2.3.4.4b) in an Endangered Cinereous Vulture (Aegypius monachus) in South Korea, 2026

 
Transboundary and Emerging Diseases, Volume: 2026, Issue: 1,
First published: 18 August 2026, DOI: (10.1155/tbed/2623621)

#19,308

Yesterday, in Conservation Bio: Emerging threat of avian influenza to the world's vultures, we looked - in broad terms - at the current and potential future impact of HPAI H5N1 on raptors and other scavenger birds. 

Today we've a study - published last week in Transboundary and Emerging Diseases - which looks at one specific investigation into an H5N1-infected endangered Cinereous Vulture recovered in South Korea earlier this year.

While hardly a new finding (see Cell: The Neuropathogenesis of HPAI H5Nx Viruses in Mammalian Species Including Humans), once again we see strong evidence of neurological involvement in this recovered vulture; in clinical presentation, histopathological findings, and in high titers of the virus found in brain tissue. 

This is a topic we've looked at often, most recently last month in Viruses: First Ecuadorian Pediatric Case of Multisystem and Neurological Involvement Associated with Influenza A—H5N1 Virus—Case Report, and before that, in last May's  QJM: Avian Influenza in Humans: Virology, Transmission, and Clinical Priorities.

This study also found that the HPAI H5N1 virus recovered from the vulture was a reassortant (see graphic at top of blog). Its HA, NA, and M gene segments closely resembled a G10-like East Asian H5N1 virus which circulated circa 2022–2023, while its internal genes appear derived from multiple regional and flyway HPAI and LPAI viruses.  

While much of this study is fairly technical, and will be primarily of interest to researchers, it is an excellent reminder of just how much hidden diversity there is in HPAI H5Nx in the wild, and that their evolution never stops.

I've only posted some excerpts. Those wishing a deeper dive will want to follow the link to read it in its entirety. 

Genomic and Clinicopathological Characterization of a Reassortant HPAI H5N1 (Clade 2.3.4.4b) in an Endangered Cinereous Vulture (Aegypius monachus) in South Korea, 2026

Chang-Gi Jeong, Seongwon Hwang, Taeyeong Jung, Su-Beom Chae, Tae-Nam Kim, Nchimunya Siamulonga, Serin Sim, Geonwoo Baek … See all authors
First published: 18 August 2026 https://doi.org/10.1155/tbed/2623621Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

Academic Editor: Fabian Lean

 Abstract

Clade 2.3.4.4b highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) continue to circulate widely in East Asia and undergo frequent reassortment in wild birds. Raptors are regarded as spillover hosts that may be exposed through predation or scavenging, yet integrated clinicopathologic and genomic investigations in cinereous vultures remain limited. 

Here, we describe a fatal H5N1 HPAIV infection in a cinereous vulture (Aegypius monachus) found in South Korea on January 17, 2026. On presentation, the cinereous vulture showed severe neurologic dysfunction, including inability to stand, right-sided head tilt with pathologic nystagmus, reduced oculocephalic and palpebral reflexes, and intermittent bilateral leg tremors. The cinereous vulture died within 2 days after rescue, and a complete necropsy was performed. 

Hematologic and biochemical testing revealed marked heterophil predominance, severe lymphopenia, mild monocytosis, and globulin values near the upper end of the reference interval. An oropharyngeal swab tested positive for influenza A virus, and a virus isolate, designated A/Cinereous_Vulture/Korea/26-JBN47/2026(H5N1), was recovered in embryonated chicken eggs. Histopathology showed nonsuppurative encephalitis and necrotizing myocarditis, and influenza A nucleoprotein was detected immunohistochemically in neurons and cardiomyocytes.

Tissue real-time RT-PCR showed the lowest cycle threshold value in the brain. Whole-genome sequencing demonstrated that 26-JBN47 belonged to clade 2.3.4.4b and contained a polybasic HA cleavage site (PLREKRRKR/GLF). Segment-level phylogenetic analysis revealed a reassortant genome constellation comprising a maintained H5N1 backbone in HA, NA, and M; low PAIV (LPAIV)-associated but H5N1-incorporated PA and NP segments; flyway-associated PB2 and NS segments; and a PB1 segment phylogenetically linked to regional LPAIV lineages. 

Molecular marker analysis identified multiple substitutions previously reported to be associated with receptor-binding properties, polymerase-related fitness, virulence, and host-response modulation, whereas canonical PB2 mammalian-adaptive markers were absent. These findings show that 26-JBN47 was a reassortant clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAIV associated with systemic disease and clinicopathological findings consistent with neurotropic and cardiotropic infection in a cinereous vulture. They also support the potential value of scavenging raptors as sentinels of local or regional HPAIV circulation involving reassortant viruses in East Asia.

        (SNIP)

5. Conclusion

This study documents a fatal clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAIV infection in a cinereous vulture in South Korea and links severe clinicopathologic disease with a reassortant viral genome. The affected cinereous vulture developed marked neurologic dysfunction and showed nonsuppurative encephalitis, necrotizing myocarditis, and viral antigen distribution in the brain and heart, with the highest viral RNA burden detected in the brain.

Together, these findings are consistent with neurotropic and cardiotropic infections in this case. Genomic analyses showed that 26-JBN47 retained an East Asian H5N1 backbone in the HA, NA, and M segments, which clustered with G10-like viruses, whereas the internal genes reflected multiple reassortment histories involving regional AIV gene pools. The molecular marker profile was broadly consistent with contemporary avian-origin clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 viruses and did not indicate advanced mammalian adaptation.

These findings show that cinereous vultures can develop severe fatal diseases after HPAIV infection and support their potential utility as sentinels of local or regional HPAIV circulation involving reassortant viruses near wildlife interfaces in East Asia.

       (Continue . . . )

Conservation Bio: Emerging threat of avian influenza to the world's vultures

 
Black Vulture - Credit Wikipedia

#19,307

Of the 19,631 entries in the USDA's Detections of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in Wild Birds - which has only been intermittently updated in 2026  - 1215 (6.2%) are listed as vultures. 

Other raptors and scavenger birds on the list include eagles (n=990), hawks (n=1010), Owls (n=764) and California Condors (n=22). But these lists are far from complete

Three and a half years ago, (Apr 8th, 2023) the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service issued a statement stating that HPAI Was Confirmed As Cause Of Death For 3 California Condors found in Northern Arizona.

Considered a critically endangered species with a population of  ≈ 560 birds today -  the California Condor nearly went the way of of the dodo in the early 1980s, when its population declined to just over 20 (in the wild) due to the combined effects of DDT, lead poisoning and a loss of habitat.

As scavengers, Condors feed almost exclusively on carrion, which increasingly runs the risk of being infected with HPAI H5 (see USDA Mammalian HPAI Infection List). Within days, the number of Condor deaths rose sharply. 

HPAI UPDATE

(Excerpt)

As of April 17, 2023, 20 condors have died in the Arizona-Utah flock; HPAI has been confirmed for 10 of those condors. Eight birds were captured and brought in for supportive care. Four of those condors died shortly thereafter and are included in the total of 20 deceased birds. Four condors are still receiving supportive care and have shown improvement. Learn more about HPAI.

While an emergency vaccination program was initiated in the fall of 2023, and more than 200 birds were eventually vaccinated, the carnage visited upon scavenger birds by H5N1 has continued. 

While not every bird that gets infected dies (see Preprint: Exposure & Survival of Wild Raptors During the 2022-2023 Highly Pathogenic Influenza A Virus Outbreak), the virus's toll on avian populations around the world has been enormous. 

Over the past few years we've looked at a number of papers from the tag-team of Pablo Plaza & Sergio A. Lambertucci (often in collaboration with Andrea Santangeli), including:

ISIRV: Update on H5N1 Panzootic: Infected Mammal Species Increase by Almost 50% in Just Over a Year

Travel Medicine & Inf. Dis.: Differences Between Influenza H5N1, A/H1N1 2009, and SARS-CoV-2 in a Pandemic Risk Scenario

Nature Reviews: The Threat of Avian Influenza H5N1 Looms Over Global Biodiversity

Travel Med. & Inf. Dis.: Pacific and Atlantic Sea Lion Mortality Caused by HPAI A(H5N1) in South America

EID Journal: Recent Changes in Patterns of Mammal Infection with Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Virus Worldwide

Last week they published the following letter (excerpts below) in Conservation  Biology.  Follow the link to read it in its entirety. 

Emerging threat of avian influenza to the world's vultures

Jon Morant, Andrea Santangeli, Pablo Plaza, Sergio A. Lambertucci
First published: 19 August 2026
https://doi.org/10.1111/cobi.70372Digital Object Identifier (DOI)
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Article impact statement: Five action areas need to be implemented across continents to address the potential impact of H5N1 on world's vulture populations.

Vultures are among the most threatened bird groups globally (Buechley & Şekercioğlu, 2016), yet they provide invaluable ecosystem services that support human well-being (Santangeli et al., 2024). At least 16 of 23 vulture species are of conservation concern worldwide, largely owing to toxicosis and other anthropogenic threats (Buechley & Şekercioğlu, 2016). The current panzootic caused by highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (H5N1) (hereafter H5N1) (Lambertucci et al., 2025) could represent a catastrophic addition to this threat mix, magnifying already steep population declines. In fact, globally, several important vulture hotspots are under threat from the intensive spread of this pathogen (Figure 1).

(SNIP)

 

 

We call upon conservationists and wildlife managers to adopt a comprehensive, multilayered approach to mitigating H5N1 risks in vultures, prioritizing five key action areas that balance immediate fieldwork situations with broader population resilience.

First, there is an urgent need for intensive medium- to long-term population monitoring in geographic regions impacted by the current H5N1 panzootic (Figure 1); this monitoring should be coupled with targeted epidemiological surveillance and seroprevalence studies in vulture communities to evaluate immunological status and improve knowledge of how H5N1 affects their populations beyond acute mortality events. This action is especially relevant for sites where information on vulture mortality due to H5N1 remains limited. Second, we advocate for the continuous evaluation of the potential need for vaccination campaigns for specific and emerging cases where populations face severe risk and logistical conditions allow (Katzner et al., 2025; Larson 2026).

Third, carcass management must be carefully adapted to local socioeconomic contexts; managers should prioritize preventing the use of suspected or H5N1-infected carcasses at feeding stations, mirroring existing safe carcass protocols used to exclude toxic pharmaceuticals in vulture safe zones (VSZs). Ensuring the provision of H5N1-free carcasses from both domestic and wild sources is crucial to reducing viral transmission at supplementary feeding stations (i.e., vulture restaurants) (Santangeli et al., 2025), which often attract large aggregations of obligate and facultative scavengers (Brink et al., 2020; Cortés-Avizanda et al., 2016). Rapid molecular testing protocols (such as rRT-PCR using freeze-dried reagents; Takekawa et al., 2011) and the systematic removal of infected carcasses (Gold et al., 2026) could be valuable interventions, although we recognize that their availability, cost, and sensitivity may represent important barriers to their implementation in many regions.

Fourth, we recommend strictly following handling protocols for vultures during fieldwork (e.g., tagging, morphometry, and health surveys) in accordance with H5N1 biosecurity guidelines to minimize transmission risk among individuals and species. Finally, given the diversity of socioeconomic and governance contexts in the countries across the vulture's range, we urge regional conservation and health bodies, such as the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH), to develop and promote context-specific action plans that prioritize these feasible, locally adapted interventions.

This pathogen could represent the final threat to some vulture populations; therefore, tackling the five action areas outlined above is urgent. Crucially, these measures must not be pursued in isolation; their integration into coordinated, transboundary frameworks is essential to address the full geographic and ecological scope of the crisis.

The current H5N1 panzootic is occurring across all continents where vultures occur, concomitantly with other threats affecting these species. Coordinated and transboundary plans that embed these actions into shared governance structures are urgently needed to address this dangerous epidemiological scenario, which could decimate vulture populations, as has occurred with other avian groups globally.

(Continue . . . )

In early 2025, in Nature Reviews: The Threat of Avian Influenza H5N1 Looms Over Global Biodiversity, we looked at the massive, and often underappreciated, impact of HPAI H5 on both avian and mammalian wildlife around the globe.

While I can't tell you precisely what negative impacts the loss of a Billion+ wild and captive birds, hundreds of thousands of marine mammals - or unfathomable numbers of peridomestic mammals - might have on our human society, one thing is certain.

We are well on our way towards finding out.

Australia: SA Reports 1st H5N1 Detection in a Marine Mammal (long-nosed fur seal)

 

#19,306

Less than a year ago HPAI H5N1 was detected on Heard Island - an Australian external possession 4000 km south west of Perth - resulting in the the deaths of thousands of marine mammals and seabirds (see Preprint: Mass mortality of southern elephant seals during multi-species outbreak of HPAI H5N1 on sub-Antarctic Heard Island).

Drone surveys revealed mass mortality in southern elephant seals, with 8,573 pups (62%) recorded dead across Heard Island by the final surveys. Mortality increased at an average rate of 5.6% per day in a subset of harems, and the highest observed mortality in a harem was 97%. Based on the average (76%) mortality in the final surveys, total estimated pup mortality at Heard Island was 13,359 (from a total population of 17,364 pups), though this may be an underestimate as mortality was ongoing at this time. 

Just over 2 months ago HPAI H5N1 arrived - via migratory birds - to the Australian mainland. Since then we've been watching as thousands of birds - both migratory and local - have succumbed to the virus.  

While all previous detections have been limited to birds, overnight Australia confirmed HPAI finding in a first mammalian casualty in the following brief announcement. 

23 August 2026

Attributable to Australian Chief Veterinary Officer, Dr Beth Cookson:

Testing at CSIRO’s Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness (ACDP) has confirmed H5 high pathogenicity avian influenza (bird flu) in a long-nosed fur seal, found at Beachport in South Australia. This is the first detection of H5 bird flu in a mammal species in Australia.

Although this is a concerning development, it is not unexpected that H5 bird flu has been detected in other wildlife, particularly marine mammals, in areas where there are high levels of infection in wild birds.

From 12 August 2026, we have changed how we report on H5 bird flu detections. Reporting will be based on events, rather than individual detections. See birdflu.gov.au for the latest information.

There remain no detections in poultry or in our agricultural production system.

The risk to human health remains low.

We get a few more details from the SA August 23rd update, which reads in part:

The long-nosed fur seal was found dead with no signs of injury and reported to the EAD hotline by a member of the public on Wednesday, 19 August. It was not reported as a suspect detection initially as state-based testing was inconclusive. However, samples were dispatched to ACDP for urgent testing which confirmed the H5 bird flu detection.

Based on the HPAI carnage we've seen among marine mammals elsewhere in the world (see UC Davis: High pathogenicity Avian Influenza in Pinniped conservation), today's announcement likely only heralds a much larger impact. 

And while the Australian government still reminds the public that poultry and agricultural livestock remain unaffected, how long that happy status quo will stand is anyone's guess.