Wednesday, November 18, 2026

One Health: Severe H9N2 virus infection in a hospitalized patient without recognized poultry exposure

 
Credit Wikipedia

#19,420

Eight days ago, in  HK CHP Reports 6 H9N2 Cases over the past 4 Reporting Periods, we looked at the latest batch of H9N2 reported from the Chinese mainland. Again this week, in what it getting to be almost a weekly occurrence, WHO WPRO announced yet another case, this time in Hunan Province. 

Human infection with avian influenza A(H9N2) virus

From 6 to 12 November 2026, one new case of human infection with avian influenza A(H9N2) virus was reported from China to WHO in the Western Pacific Region. The case is a paediatric patient from Hunan Province, with symptom onset on 20 October 2026. The case had exposure to household poultry, and one of the environmental samples tested positive for influenza A(H9). All close contacts of the case have tested negative for influenza A. The case has now recovered. 

Since 2015, a total of 190 cases of human infection with avian influenza A(H9N2), including two deaths (both with underlying conditions), have been reported to WHO in the Western Pacific Region. Of these, 187 were reported from China, two were from Cambodia, and one was from Viet Nam.

Most human infections with avian influenza A(H9N2) have been associated with exposure to infected poultry or contaminated poultry environments, and the majority of cases have been mild. Sporadic human infections continue to be expected in areas where H9N2 viruses circulate in poultry populations. Current evidence indicates that H9N2 viruses have not acquired the ability for sustained human-to-human transmission, and the risk of further community-level spread remains low.

While most reported cases have been in children, China is more likely to detect pediatric cases - particularly those hospitalized in major urban centers - as those cohorts are often prioritized for testing for novel flu.

Adult cases, many of whom are unlikely to seek medical care, are believed more likely to go undetected.  

H9N2 is ubiquitous in Chinese poultry, and attempts to control the disease via largely ineffective vaccines has led to silent transmission (see NPJ Vaccines: Impact of Inactivated Vaccine on Transmission and Evolution of H9N2 Avian Influenza Virus in Chickens).

Complicating matters, as an LPAI (low path avian influenza), H9N2 is not considered a `reportable' disease by WOAH (formerly the OIE), even though it is zoonotic. We've seen seroprevalence studies which suggest people with exposure to infected poultry often develop H9 antibodies, suggesting mild or asymptomatic infection.

As a result we are probably only seeing the tip of the H9N2 pyramid, as is true with most infectious diseases in the community.  


All of which brings us to a new report in One Health, which describes the unexpected finding of an H9N2 infection in an elderly patient already hospitalized for 10 days in Guangzhou for complications from chemotherapy (see timeline below).  


The patient reportedly had no exposure to poultry, and was only diagnosed because worsening pulmonary function led doctors to order metagenomic next-generation sequencing (mNGS) of a bronchial lavage sample.  

It detected both bacterial and H9 viral infection. 

Of note, subsequent whole gene sequencing (WGS) found several markers linked to mammalian adaptation, including:
  • HA Q226L (human-type receptor binding).
  • PB2 L89V and I292V (increased polymerase activity; I292V also dampens the interferon response).

Beyond these findings, this is a reminder of how easily cases can fly under the radar, even those who are already hospitalized for unrelated conditions.

First some excerpts from this report, after which I'll have a brief postscript.

Jingjing Zhang a 1, Weijia Wang b 1, Dan Xia a 1, Yifan Pan c, Yiyun Chen a, Peiwen Liu a, Yuqian Wu a, Anna Wang a, Tengfei Zhou a, Xia Tao a, Shuiping Hou a, Pingting Zhu a, Yanhui Liu a, Xinwei Wu a, Pengzhe Qin a 2, Zhoubin Zhang a 2, Lan Cao a c 2  

Under a Creative Commons license Open access

Highlights

•  Severe human H9N2 infection detected without known poultry exposure.

•  Phylogenetic analysis clusters virus with local strains and a recent human case.

•  Key molecular markers linked to human adaptation of H9N2 identified.

•  Highlights gaps in current surveillance for sporadic or atypical H9N2 infections

Abstract

Objectives

To describe a severe human infection with avian influenza A(H9N2) virus in a hospitalized patient without recognized poultry exposure and to evaluate implications for surveillance and public health preparedness.

Methods

Unbiased metagenomic next-generation sequencing (mNGS) was performed on bronchoalveolar lavage fluid for initial pathogen detection, and influenza A(H9N2) virus infection was subsequently confirmed by H9N2-specific real-time RT-PCR. Whole-genome sequencing was performed on H9N2-positive respiratory specimens with sufficient viral RNA, followed by phylogenetic analyses to determine the virus genotype and its genetic relationship with local environmental H9N2 viruses and previously reported human H9N2 viruses.

Results

The virus, A/Guangzhou/23127/2025 (H9N2), belonged to the G57 genotype, with its HA gene classified within lineage B, clade B4.7, according to the recently proposed global A/H9 classification system. Phylogenetic analysis revealed close genetic relationships with local environmental strains.

Conclusion

Severe H9N2 infection can occur in individuals without known poultry exposure. These findings underscore the need for NGS-based surveillance among hospitalized patients with severe respiratory disease and highlight the importance of strengthening public health strategies to detect sporadic or atypical zoonotic influenza infections.

       (SNIP)

. . .   These findings suggest that H9/H9N2 viruses continued to circulate in local poultry-related environments and that human exposure risk persisted during the study period. However, no human H9N2 infections were identified through routine sentinel surveillance in either hospital-based or occupational monitoring programs during the same period.
 
This discrepancy suggests that current surveillance strategies may not be sufficiently sensitive for detecting sporadic human H9N2 infections, especially among patients without recognized poultry exposure or typical influenza-like illness.   

(SNIP)

In conclusion, this severe human H9N2 infection occurred against a background of continued local environmental circulation and occupational exposure risk. These observations also emphasize the public health importance of sustained environmental surveillance, serological monitoring of occupationally exposed populations, and long-term molecular surveillance of H9N2 viruses. Continued genomic monitoring is particularly important for detecting viral genetic changes associated with mammalian adaptation, including mutations that may affect receptor-binding properties or replication in mammalian hosts.

       (Continue . . . )


In 2024 the ECDC issued guidance for member nations on Enhanced Influenza Surveillance to Detect Avian Influenza Virus Infections in the EU/EEA During the Inter-Seasonal Period., which cautioned:
Sentinel surveillance systems are important for the monitoring of respiratory viruses in the EU/EEA, but these systems are not designed and are not sufficiently sensitive to identify a newly emerging virus such as avian influenza in the general population early enough for the purpose of implementing control measures in a timely way.

In early 2025, the CDC issued a HAN: Accelerated Subtyping of Influenza A in Hospitalized Patients, requesting that all hospitalized patients with suspected influenza should be subtyped within 24 hours. 

How rigorously this is followed isn't known. 

Last month's Washington State: Updated guidance for novel influenza screening and influenza subtyping focused primarily on testing those with known risk exposures.  

A sobering reminder that, while we comfort ourselves with our current low number of  human novel flu detections, we are probably seeing something less than the  whole picture.

Tuesday, November 17, 2026

Kentucky: Louisville Zoo Closes Some Bird Exhibits After Stork Dies From Avian Flu

Credit Wikipedia

#19,419

Over the past 2 months we've seen a steady increase in avian flu reports across the country (and the world), reminding us that levels of environmental HPAI H5 virus are rising, and of our need to take the threat seriously. 

Canada: CFIA Statement on H5N1 Outbreak At Saskatchewan Poultry Show

Oregon ODA Reports Its First Outbreak of HPAI H5 In Dairy Cattle

Washington: Hospitalized Avian Flu Case Died - 3rd Case Reported

On October 22nd the Louisville Zoo announced the discovery of a sick wild  Canada goose on their grounds (see below), which tested presumptively positive for HPAI (H5 assumed, but not specified).

It isn't clear from this announcement exactly where on the zoo grounds this goose was found, or even when.  

First the Zoo's announcement, followed by reports from other sources.

Louisville Zoo implements precautionary measures to protect birds from avian influenza

October 22, 2026

CONTACT:

Kyle Shepherd; 502-744-5639; Kyle.shepherd@louisvilleky.gov

The Louisville Zoo is temporarily closing select bird areas as a precautionary measure after a wild Canada goose found sick on Zoo grounds tested positive for avian influenza. Confirmatory testing at a federal lab is pending. None of the Zoo’s birds are currently showing clinical signs of the disease. The Zoo remains open, with temporary closures limited to a handful of bird habitats.

Beginning today, public walk-through aviaries will be temporarily closed, including the Forest Bird Trail and African penguin exhibits in the Islands Pavilion, Steller’s Sea Eagle Aviary in Glacier Run, Lorikeet Landing in Australia, and some areas around the Zoo’s lake. These sections will remain closed for the next several weeks until the threat has subsided.
Eight days later (Oct 30th) the Kentucky Department of Fish and Wildlife Services published this alert on HPAI detected at the zoo and in local waterfowl.
​Wildlife Health Alert
RECENT DETECTIONS OF HIGHLY PATHOGENIC AVIAN INFLUENZA IN WATERFOWL

The Kentucky Department of Fish and Wildlife Resources would like to inform the public of a recent outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) in Kentucky. The Department has recently received notification of HPAI detections in two Canada geese in Jefferson County, one found in a residential neighborhood and the other on Louisville Zoo property. Both detections were confirmed at a regional laboratory and mark the first HPAI detections in wild waterfowl reported this fall. These detections in wild birds follow the recent confirmation of HPAI in a backyard flock of domestic ducks and geese in Jefferson County.

The USDA's Wild Bird Dashboard (see below) indicates 2 HPAI detections in Jefferson County in October, with collection dates either the 14th or 17th.

While it isn't clear which one is from the zoo, and which is from the residential neighborhood, this appears to start the clock between 5 and 8 days prior to the zoo's first announcement.  

Yesterday the Louisville Zoo released the following update, announcing the death (on November 11th) of a captive European white stork from HPAI, and the apparent infection of its (now-euthanized) enclosure mate. 

Avian Influenza Update

Updated Nov. 16, 2026

Overview

The health and well-being of the animals in our care is always a top priority at the Louisville Zoo. Following the discovery of a wild Canada goose on Zoo grounds that tested presumptively positive for avian influenza, on November 7, we took several precautionary steps to help protect our animals.

On Nov. 11, the Zoo’s 28-year-old female European white stork, Awan, was found deceased inside her exhibit and has tested positive for avian influenza. Her enclosure mate, a 27-year-old male named Cain, showed clinical signs of avian influenza and was euthanized Sunday, Nov. 15. This is the first time an animal in the Zoo’s collection has tested positive for avian influenza. In response to this new case, the Zoo is re-implementing temporary closures and adding biosecurity measures.

       (SNIP)

What does this mean for my visit?

The Louisville Zoo remains open, and the vast majority of the Zoo is available for guests to enjoy. Public walk-through aviaries, including Lorikeet Landing in Australia, the Forest Bird Trail and African penguin exhibits in the Islands Pavilion, the Steller’s Sea Eagle Aviary in Glacier Run, and areas around the Zoo lake will remain closed until the threat has cleared. Select birds will also be moved indoors as a precaution, including the flamingo flock, two American bald eagles, the little penguins and others. Other animal schedules will remain flexible while the Zoo follows its current biosecurity protocols, and some behind-the-scenes bird experiences may be temporarily modified or unavailable. The Zoo remains open daily, and now through March 19, 2027, hours are 10 a.m. to 4 p.m.

        (Continue . . . )


Whether there is a direct epidemiological link between the Canada goose that died in mid-October and the first captive stork is unknown, since we don't know where on the zoo's 134 acres its carcass was found.  

Additionally, the nearly 4 weeks between the goose's discovery and the first stork far exceeds the expected incubation period for H5N1 (2 to 14 days) in birds.

So whether there have been other introductions of the virus, silent spread among captive birds, fomite transfer, or some other vector is unknown.  

This does illustrate, however, how difficult it can be to prevent the spread of H5N1, even in a zoo with biosecurity measures in place.

Which means, if you raise backyard birds, now would be a good time to familiarize yourselves with the risks of avian flu, and the things you can do to reduce those risks to you, your flock, and your families.

Monday, November 16, 2026

South Korea APQA Issues HPAI Alert

 

#19,418

While H5N1 remains the primary global HPAI threat, since 2022 we've watched a divergent subtype - H5N5 - establish itself and persist in high latitude regions of the Northern Hemisphere, and last year we followed the first incursion of an H5N9 subtype into South Korea (see South Korea: H5N9 Rising).

South Korea's MAFRA reported 62 outbreaks in poultry over the 2025-2026 avian flu season, and of those, 57 were H5N1 while only 5 (8%) were H5N9. 

Nine days ago, in South Korea: MAFRA Reports 2 Outbreaks of HPAI H5N9 in Poultry & Ducks, we looked at early season reports indicating 2 of the first 3 poultry outbreaks this fall were H5N9. 

Since then 3 more poultry farm outbreaks have been reported (Ganghwa, Jincheon, Paju ), which MAFRA has described as a `mix' of H5N9 and H5N1.   

Yesterday, MAFRA reported a non-farm `ornamental bird' operation was positive for HPAI H5, with NA typing pending. Today, local media is reporting it to be H5N9, but again, I haven't found official confirmation. 

This year South Korean avian flu reports (which are already hampered by machine translation) seem less detailed.  Below, you'll find their Risk Alert lists 6 poultry outbreaks, and 10 wild bird detections, but doesn't provide a breakdown by subtype. 

It would appear that somewhere between 3 and 5 of the first 7 outbreaks in South Korea this fall are due to H5N9.  Even assuming the lowest number, that would represent a significant shift from the 8% reported last year.

First the AQPA statement, after which I'll have a bit more.

Animal Quarantine Agency Issues Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (AI) Risk Alert
Department in charge Animal and Plant Quarantine Agency
Author Lee Hyun-jik 82 2026-11-14


The Animal and Plant Quarantine Agency ( Acting Director Jeong Seung-gyo , hereinafter the Agency ) issued a “ Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (AI ) Risk Advisory ” on November 13 as the risk of highly pathogenic avian influenza (AI ) outbreaks in domestic poultry farms increased , and simultaneously disseminated the quarantine measures to poultry farms , livestock facilities , and vehicle drivers nationwide through text messages , notifications , etc.

Measures to raise awareness among livestock stakeholders and strengthen disease control measures in accordance with the Avian Influenza Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) when warning signs, such as the detection of multiple AI antigens in wild birds, occur.

Since highly pathogenic avian influenza (AI) antigens were detected in wild bird droppings collected at Suncheon Bay in Gwangju, Jeollanam-do (October 12 ), a total of 10 cases of highly pathogenic avian influenza (AI) have been detected to date. In poultry farms as well, following the outbreak at a laying hen farm in Yeoncheon, Gyeonggi-do (November 3), a total of 6 cases of highly pathogenic avian influenza (AI) have occurred at a broiler duck farm in Jangheung, Gwangju, Jeollanam-do (November 5 ) , a laying hen farm in Yeoju , Gyeonggi -do (November 6 ), a laying hen farm in Ganghwa, Incheon (November 11), a breeding duck farm in Jincheon, Chungcheongbuk-do (November 12), and a quail farm in Paju, Gyeonggi-do ( November 12 ) . In particular , during this winter season, two serotypes, H5N1 and H5N9 , have been identified and are occurring frequently in a short period , making thorough disease control management necessary .

* ( Wild Birds ) 10 cases ( Suncheon Suncheon Bay 1, Gimpo Lower Han River 2, Yongin Cheongmicheon 1, Hongcheon Yangdeokwoncheon 2, Jeonnam Gwangju Gwangsan-gu Hwangnyonggang 1, Yeoju Namhangang 1, Nonsan Yeonsancheon 1, Jeongeup Dongjingang 1)

* ( Poultry Farms ) 6 cases ( Yeoncheon Laying Hen 1, Jangheung Broiler Duck 1, Yeoju Laying Hen 1, Ganghwa Laying Hen 1, Jincheon Breeding Duck 1, Paju Quail 1)


In addition , monitoring of the movement of migratory birds equipped with GPS trackers revealed that the southward migration of birds appears to be in full swing, as evidenced by the confirmation that mallards residing in Baiqing, Jilin Province, China, migrated south to Korea on November 6 and were inhabiting Uljin, North Gyeongsang Province , on November 7. In particular , the risk is increasing, as highly pathogenic AI was detected in Mandarin ducks captured in the Hwangryong River in Gwangju , South Jeolla Province, and Eurasian wigeon captured in Yeonsan Stream in Nonsan, South Chungcheong Province .

Meanwhile , in Japan , after highly pathogenic AI antigens were detected in wild birds and the environment ( water ) in Akita, Hokkaido , and Kagoshima prefectures on November 2 , suspected cases of highly pathogenic AI were reported at a laying hen farm in Kyoto Prefecture (200,000 birds ) and laying hens in Chiba Prefecture (40,000 birds ) .

* Japan Outbreak Status : 3 cases of wild birds ( including environment ) ( 2 H5N1 , 1 H5 ) , 2 cases reported from poultry farms

Given the current status of wild bird arrivals in Korea, antigen detection, and outbreaks in neighboring countries , there is a very high risk of transmission of highly pathogenic avian influenza (AI) virus from wild birds to poultry farms this winter .

Accordingly , the Animal and Plant Quarantine Agency has issued a “ Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (AI) Risk Advisory ” to raise awareness among livestock industry stakeholders and strengthen disease control measures . It has urged poultry farms to comply with disease control rules , including: △ two- stage disinfection of vehicles entering the farm ; △ wearing protective clothing and dedicated shoes and thorough personal disinfection for those entering the farm ; △ closing secondary entrances and back doors of barns without anterooms ; and △ changing into dedicated boots and disinfecting hands in the anteroom when entering the barn. At the same time , the agency plans to further strengthen inspections through the central inspection team of the Animal Disease Control Center regarding whether livestock vehicles are entering farms and whether disinfection is being carried out at designated disinfection facilities .

Jeong Seung-kyo, Acting Head of the Animal and Plant Quarantine Agency, stated , “ With the recent increase in farm outbreaks and the expected arrival of migratory birds starting in November , we are in a grave situation where outbreaks could occur anywhere in the country, ” and urged poultry farmers to “ thoroughly implement farm-level quarantine measures, taking into account that virus contamination levels around farms and outside livestock barns are also rising significantly . ”

In early 2014, an upstart H5N8 subtype abruptly appeared in South Korea, rapidly decimated their poultry industry, and then spread globally via migratory birds. Over the next 6 years it became the dominant global HPAI subtype, and sparked massive epizootics in Europe, the United States, and the Middle East. 

Its saving grace was that - unlike older H5N1 strains - it appeared less likely to infect humans.  It wasn't until 2021 that the first human infections were reported (see Russian Media Reports 7 Human Infections With Avian H5N8), and by then H5N1 was on the upswing.

While the significance or ultimate impact of this apparent rise in H5N9 is far from clear, it does remind us that HPAI is constantly changing. 

And that what first appears in South Korea, doesn't always stay in South Korea.

Sunday, November 15, 2026

Canada: CFIA Statement on H5N1 Outbreak At Saskatchewan Poultry Show

Posted on Saskatchewan Poultry Association Group Facebook page

#19,417

Yesterday, CBC News reported Avian flu outbreak at national poultry show spreads to other provinces: CFIA, citing receipt of a CFIA statement. I was unable to find it on the CFIA website, but did locate a copy on the Saskatchewan Poultry Association Group Facebook page (above).

The text reads:

Canadian Food Inspection Agency

November 13, 2026

Important Notice: Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) Exposure

In Canada, Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) is a federally reportable disease under the Health of Animals Act for all animals, meaning any suspected or confirmed case must be reported immediately to the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA).

The CFIA has detected a case of highly pathogenic avian influenza associated with a poultry show held on November 07, 2026 by the American Poultry Association for District 11 in Moose Jaw, Saskatchewan. If you showed birds at the event, or purchased or sold birds at the event, please immediately contact the CFIA's sick bird call line at 1-403-338-5225 if the CFIA has not already contacted you.

If you attended the event without showing, purchasing, or selling birds, but you have birds of your own at home, please monitor them for any signs of illness. The incubation period of HPAL ranges from 2 to 14 days and it can be transmitted to other birds in multiple ways, such as birds having direct or indirect contact with infected birds, or through the movement of contaminated clothing/footwear to other groups of birds. If your own birds display any clinical signs which could be associated with highly pathogenic avian influenza (ex. lethargic, not eating, swollen cyes/wattles/combs, respiratory signs, unexpected decrease in egg production, or deaths), immediately contact the CFIA's sick bird call line at 1-403-338-5225 to report this suspicion of

Thank you for your cooperation in helping to control this outbreak. For more information regarding highly pathogenic avian influenza, visit:

https://inspection.canada.ca/en/animal-health/terrestrial-animals/diseases/reportable/avian-influenza

 
CFIA reported their first outbreak in poultry of the fall on September 10th, followed by a slow ramping up of cases through the rest of September (n=8) and October (n=13).  Over the past 5 days, however, the number of outbreaks has risen sharply (n=11). 


Poultry exhibitions tend to be held in the fall, since adult birds molt in the summer and typically regain peak appearance in October and November, chicks hatched in the spring reach full adult size by autumn, and transport of birds is easier during cooler weather (less heat stress). 

Unfortunately, this also corresponds with the fall bird migration and increased risk of HPAI. 

While this Saskatchewan event appears to be one of the last big events this year in Canada, the American Poultry Association still lists a number of large events scheduled over the next two months. 

HPAI outbreaks traced to poultry exhibitions in North America have been rare thus far due to biosecurity measures in place and a willingness to cancel events, but we have seen numerous outbreaks linked to live bird markets (see USDA Reports Another H5N1 Outbreak at a Live Bird Market (Pennsylvania)).

Each year it seems to get a little bit harder to prevent and/or contain HPAI.  While fortuitous evolution might someday attenuate those risks, so far, we've seen little sign of that happening. 


Saturday, November 14, 2026

For When The Bough Breaks


CDC Infographic

#19,416

Over the past 20 years the secondary focus of this blog has been on personal preparedness, and the growing fragility our our increasingly high-tech dependent infrastructure. 

Much of this comes from my 15 years of living aboard boats, and constantly thinking about what could fail (usually at the worst possible moment), and how to limit its impact. 

The events of the past few days (Microsoft outage, FAA 4-hour emergency groundstop, and several very large cyber-heists) remind us how fragile or vulnerable our systems are.  

Last January, in NERC: Long-Term Reliability Assessment (Jan 2026), we looked (again) at growing concerns over the stability of the nation's electrical grid, followed last May by NERC Issues Level 3 Alert As Grid Faces `Unprecedented Challenges' Due to Surge In Large Power Consumers.

Every four years the ASCE (American Society of Civil Engineers) releases a report card on America’s infrastructure, and their most recent report (2025) warns that our cumulative GPA for infrastructure sits at only a C, and one of our most vulnerable infrastructures is the electrical grid (D+). 


This D+ rating is shared by Aviation, Dams, Roads, Levees, Wastewater, and Schools, while Stormwater and Transit are rated even lower.  And every day that passes without addressing these problems only increases the risks. 

Regardless of what conspires to bring these systems down (age, neglect, deliberate sabotage, etc.), the impact will often first fall upon the American public.  

I was in New Orleans 5 weeks after Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and there was still no electricity, or running water, across most of the city.  The streets were lined with debris and dead refrigerators filled with rotting food, pharmacies were still boarded up, and any semblance of normalcy was still months away.

In 2014's Water, Water, Everywhere But Not A Drop To Drink we saw hundreds of thousands of Ohio residents without  potable water for days due to harmful toxins produced by a microcystis algae bloom.  This was neither the first or last such event. 

A similar emergency was declared in Oregon in 2018 (see Tapping Into Your Preps).  

(2018 advisory)

Eight years ago, in NIAC: Surviving A Catastrophic Power Outage, we looked at a presidential commission's report on the risks of a major, prolonged, grid collapse.

This 92-page report was released a little more than a year after hurricane ravaged Puerto Rico suffered the longest (11-month) grid failure in American History  and a year following another report - DHS: NIAC Cyber Threat Report - August 2017 - that warned of growing cyber threats to our critical infrastructure and called for `bold, decisive actions'.

Over the past 10 years I've gone through 2 hurricane-induced extended (4-7 day) power outages, and one prolonged community well failure, that had me relying on my personal preps for food, water, and power for days. 

Yet I've been lucky.  Many others have had to deal with far worse. 

In recent months we've seen increased calls by governments around the world for increased personal preparedness (see UK National Risk Register 2026 - Urges Citizen Preparedness). While the reasons given are often vague, concerns over natural or man-made disasters appear to be rising. 

California and the Pacific Northwest are bracing for what could be an unprecedented winter El Nino (see California Declares State of Emergency to Bolster Statewide El Niño Preparedness), while Florida has just completed its first El Nino Awareness week.

This year, I've beefed up my solar preps, adding a second solar panel, and additional battery capacity (see #NPM26: It's a 12 Volt Life).  I've added a battery operated camp shower, a better shortwave radio, and have recently gone through and thrown out long out-of-date canned food from my pantry. 

None of which guarantees I'll come away unscathed from an emergency, but I firmly believe it greatly increases my chances. 

While I'm far from a luddite (I love my gadgets), I know that things break. And as a (former) computer programer I know the more complicated a system becomes, the more likely it is to fail and the harder it will be to fix.

Given the complexities of our aging infrastructure, it follows that more failures can be expected.  Whether due to natural disasters, failed upgrades, `bad actors', or simply bad luck . . . the odds increase a little each day that you will be adversely affected.

The question isn't whether another emergency will arise, it is whether you and your family will be ready to deal with it.  How you should prepare will depend upon where you live, the likely threats you will face, and logistical, physical, or financial limitations. 

I'm unlikely to freeze to death here in Florida, but heat-related deaths are relatively common.  And while Southern California doesn't worry about hurricanes, they do have a significant seismic threat. 

How you go about preparing may be different, but your goals are pretty similar. So if the power goes out today - and stays out for a week - do you have?

  • A battery operated NWS Emergency Radio to find out what was going on, and to get vital instructions from emergency officials
  • A decent first-aid kit, so that you can treat injuries
  • Enough non-perishable food and water on hand to feed and hydrate your family (including pets) for the duration
  • A way to provide light when the grid is down.
  • A way to cook safely without electricity
  • A way to purify or filter water
  • A way to handle basic sanitation and waste disposal.
  • A way to stay cool (fans) or warm when the power is out.
  • A small supply of cash to use in case credit/debit machines are not working
  • An emergency plan, including meeting places, emergency out-of-state contact numbers, a disaster buddy, and in case you must evacuate, a bug-out bag
  • Spare supply of essential prescription medicines that you or your family may need
  • A way to entertain yourself, or your kids, during a prolonged blackout
A good place to get started is by visiting Ready.gov, or by hitting this link which will serve up a series of my preparedness blogs.

While you may go years without needing it, with emergency preparedness it is better to be ready 5 years too soon than 5 minutes too late.

WHO DON: Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus - Qatar

 

#19,415

Although reports of human infection with MERS-CoV have dwindled in recent years, this family of coronaviruses still circulates (and evolves) in dromedary camels both in the Middle East and Africa, and still poses a zoonotic threat.

A month ago - in WHO DON: Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus - Kingdom of Saudi Arabia - we looked at the WHO's first Saudi MERS update of 2026, which chronicled  8 cases reported by KSA since last December.

Last August, in WHO: Risk assessment of the introduction, spread, and zoonotic spillover of MERS-CoV Clade B in camel populations of the Nile Basin and Across Africa, we looked at concerns over the cryptic spread of MERS in Africa. 

But whether in Africa or the Arabian peninsula, MERS-CoV spillover to humans is viewed as likely underreported (see (Referral) Nature: Human MERS-CoV cases are falling but pose an ongoing pandemic threat).

While some of this decline is likely due to difficulties in identifying cases, at the same time some Middle Eastern countries have shown past reluctance to report cases.

Yesterday the WHO published a DON (Disease Outbreak News) on two (apparently unrelated) MERS cases from Qatar which occurred in August, but were only recently (Oct 29th) reported to the WHO. 

Of particularly note, the first case fell ill on July 22nd - was hospitalized on July 25th, but not diagnosed with MERS-CoV until the 5th of August - a delay which may help explain the large number of contacts (73), including 62 healthcare workers. 

The second case was identified relatively quickly, but 22 HCWs were identified as close contacts.   In both instances, no secondary infections were reported. 

Due to its length, I've only posted excerpts from the WHO DON report. Follow the link to read it in its entirety.  I'll have a brief postscript after the break.

Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) – Qatar
13 November 2026

Situation at a glance

On 29 October 2026, the National International Health Regulations (IHR) Focal Point of the State of Qatar notified the World Health Organization (WHO) of two laboratory-confirmed cases of Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS). The cases were confirmed on 5 and 25 August 2026 and are the first MERS cases reported from Qatar since 2022. MERS is a viral zoonotic infection, principally transmitted to humans through direct or indirect contact with infected dromedary camels. Both patients were men aged over 50 years with underlying medical conditions and occupational exposure to dromedary camels. Both were hospitalized and subsequently discharged in a stable condition. A total of 99 contacts from both cases were identified, tested, and monitored for 14 days following their last exposure. All contacts tested negative for MERS-CoV, and no secondary cases were identified. The two cases reported exposure to dromedary camels at geographically separate farms, with no epidemiological link identified between them. The cases appear to represent sporadic infections associated with zoonotic transmission from dromedary camels rather than human-to-human transmission.

Description of the situation

On 29 October 2026, the National IHR Focal Point of Qatar notified WHO of two laboratory-confirmed cases of Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS). The cases were confirmed on 5 and 25 August 2026. These are the first MERS-CoV cases reported by the State of Qatar since 2022.

The first case was a man aged over 50 years who worked with dromedary camels and had chronic medical conditions. He developed symptoms on 22 July 2026 and was admitted to hospital on 25 July. Real-time reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) on an upper-respiratory tract specimen initially tested negative for MERS-CoV. A subsequent lower-respiratory tract specimen tested positive by RT-PCR, and infection was laboratory-confirmed on 5 August. He reported longstanding occupational exposure to dromedary camels, including during the 14 days before symptom onset. He did not report consuming raw camel milk or any recent travel. He recovered and was discharged in a stable condition after two consecutive negative PCR test results.

A total of 73 contacts were identified for this case, comprising 11 close contacts and 62 health and care workers. All contacts were tested and monitored for 14 days following their last exposure. All tested negative for MERS-CoV, and no secondary cases were identified.

The second case was a man aged over 50 years who was involved in camel breeding and rearing and had underlying chronic medical conditions. He developed symptoms on 23 August 2026. Two nasopharyngeal specimens tested positive for MERS-CoV by RT-PCR on 25 August. He reported sustained occupational exposure to dromedary camels, including directly caring for recently ill young camels during the 14 days preceding symptom onset. He also reported consuming raw camel milk during this period but had no recent travel history.

He developed severe MERS-CoV pneumonia complicated by acute hypoxemic respiratory failure and required high-flow nasal oxygen and non-invasive ventilatory support. He subsequently recovered and was discharged in a stable condition after two consecutive negative PCR test results.

A total of 26 contacts were identified for this case, comprising four close contacts and 22 health and care workers. All contacts were tested and monitored for 14 days following their last exposure and tested negative for MERS-CoV. One high-risk contact who was a health and care worker developed respiratory symptoms but tested negative for MERS-CoV on two specimens. No secondary cases were identified.

The two cases reported occupational exposure at geographically separate camel farms, with no epidemiological link identified between the farms or the cases. The precise sources of infection remain undetermined. However, their sustained occupational exposure to dromedary camels, including direct contact with recently ill camels in one case and the consumption of raw camel milk by the same case, suggest probable zoonotic acquisition.
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These are the first MERS cases reported from Qatar since 2022. Both cases had occupational exposure to dromedary camels, and one reported tending to sick camels and consuming raw camel milk during the 14 days before symptom onset. The cases were exposed at geographically separate farms, with no epidemiological link identified between them. All 99 identified contacts tested negative for MERS-CoV, and no secondary cases were identified. The available information therefore suggests that these were sporadic infections associated with zoonotic transmission rather than human-to-human transmission.

The occurrence of two apparently unlinked cases highlights the continued risk of zoonotic spillover among people with frequent or occupational exposure to dromedary camels, particularly those with underlying medical conditions.

As per WHO’s rapid risk assessment of 29 January 2026, the overall risk associated with MERS-CoV remains moderate at both the regional and global levels. This assessment reflects continued sporadic zoonotic spillover into the human population and the potential for subsequent health care-associated transmission and international importation into countries where the disease is not endemic.

Based on the information reported by the State of Qatar, there is no evidence of sustained human-to-human transmission associated with these cases. Continued surveillance and animal health investigations remain important to detect and assess any potential further transmission.
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Prior to COVID's emergence in late 2019, MERS-CoV was the top contender for sparking a coronavirus pandemic, sporting a high mortality rate (>30%), and spreading easily through hospitals in the Middle East (and South Korea) (see Ziad Memish: Two MERS-CoV Hospital Super Spreading Studies).

In the summer of 2025 we looked at an editorial in Journal of Epidemiology & Global Health on the importance of continued healthcare preparedness and surveillance (see Al-Tawfiq & Memish On Recurrent MERS-CoV Transmission in Saudi Arabia), with an emphasis on identifying asymptomatic carriers.

Whether MERS-CoV will re-emerge as a global health threat remains unknown, but it continues to circulate and evolve - largely out of our view - on both the Arabian Peninsula and in Africa.

Which makes it very much worth our attention.