BSL-4 Lab Worker - Photo Credit –USAMRIID
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Despite the ending of the H5N1 research moratorium in January (see Scientists Declare End To H5N1 Research Moratorium), the heated debate over biosecurity risks surrounding `Gain of Function’ (GOF) and Dual Use Of Research Concern (DURC) have not abated.
Concerns were raised initially after the 2011 ESWI Influenza Conference in Malta, where Dutch researcher Ron Fouchier revealed that he’d created a more `transmissible’ form of the H5N1 virus (see Debra MacKenzie’s New Scientist: Five Easy Mutations)
That discovery, along with similar news coming from Yoshihiro Kawaoka, a highly respected virologist at the University of Wisconsin-Madison School of Veterinary Medicine, set alarm bells ringing in the biosecurity community.
In a commentary sure to raise the ire of a number of flu researchers - outspoken critic Simon Wain-Hobson, Professor of virology at the Pasteur Institute in Paris – argues in the Journal Nature that":
`H5N1 GOF work — indeed all virological GOF work — should be suspended until virologists open up and engage in public discussion of their work and the issues it raises.’
Follow the link below to read:
H5N1 viral-engineering dangers will not go away
Governments, funders and regulatory authorities must urgently address the risks posed by gain-of-function research, says Simon Wain-Hobson.
