The groundswell of concern over controversial `gain of function’ laboratory experiments, and recent high-profile lapses in biosecurity at the nation’s top labs, continues to grow with a scathing editorial appearing yesterday in the Annals of Internal Medicine penned by Deputy Editor Deborah Cotton, MD, MPH.
While much of the editorial is behind a pay wall, you can find a readable scan of the first page at the link below. Fortunately, Medscape Medical News published a detailed summary, and interview with the author, yesterday (more on that after you return).
Editorials | 29 July 2014
Biocontainment Laboratories: Addressing the Terror Within
Deborah Cotton, MD, MPH, Deputy Editor
Ann Intern Med. Published online 29 July 2014 doi:10.7326/M14-1668
Recently revealed safety lapses in U.S. government facilities that work with deadly pathogens suggest that, despite efforts to protect us from bioterrorism as well as naturally occurring infectious diseases, there is another grave bioterror threat: the risk emanating from biocontainment laboratories themselves. This commentary discusses possible factors contributing to the safety lapses and strategies to prevent future incidents.
(Continue . . . )
The following lengthy report from Medscape provides more detail on the above editorial, along with comments from the author, and additional input from by Nancy Kingsbury, PhD, of the Government Accountability Office and by Richard H. Ebright, PhD, professor of chemistry and chemical biology at Rutgers University (see House Subcommittee Hearing on Biosafety for their recent testimony). .
Janis C. Kelly
July 29, 2014
( UPDATED July 29, 2014 ) Management of US government bioterrorism research facilities is so lax that work in biosafety level (BSL) 4 laboratories (which house deadly organisms for which there are no effective treatments or vaccines) should be suspended pending a complete safety overhaul, Annals of Internal Medicine deputy editor Deborah Cotton, MD, MPH, writes in an editorial published online July 28 in the journal
Beyond suspension of work pending a a safety overhaul, experts are calling for a dramatic scale back in the number of BSL-3 and BSL-4 labs in the county that are allowed to work on the most dangerous pathogens. Currently, there isn’t even a good count on the number of BSL-3 labs in operation, and there is no one single regulatory agency in charge of monitoring their operations.
While we continue to get bland assurances from researchers that their work is both safe and essential (“We’re scientists . . . trust us” ) we are also hearing from others – like the Director of the CDC - that there remains an insufficient `culture of safety’ among research scientists.
We are also seeing reports that the number of laboratory `incidents’ may be far higher than is reported.
While many researchers will be justifiably dismayed by the draconian recommendations made in the above editorial, and I doubt that we’ll see anything close to the reduction in BSL-3 labs they are calling for, it is obvious that serious changes are needed.
For the past ten years – spurred on in part by national security concerns – there’s been an `anything goes’ attitude when it comes to biomedical research. Since the 9/11 attack, the number of BSL-4 labs in the United States has jumped from 2 to 14, and the number of BSL-3 labs has grown from around 400 to over 1400 (although the exact number is murky).
Although BSL-3 and BSL-4 labs are essential parts of national security, biomedical research, and the testing of pathogens - the more of them that are in operation - the better the chance of a seeing a serious accident.
How many are too many, will be one of the major decisions facing regulators.
Given the money, power, and prestige at stake, I don’t expect to see many BSL-3 labs voluntarily sacrifice themselves on the altar of public safety. So we should expect more than a little resistance to any reductions.
For more on this growing debate, you may wish to revisit: