Australia: Bird Flu Detection in Birds Rises (n=175) - Victoria Releases Poultry Housing Requirements

 

#19,282

While there are still no reports of HPAI H5N1 in poultry in Australia, the number of wild (local & migratory) birds confirmed infected continues to rise (n=175), with South Australia and Victoria leading the pack. 

Overnight Victoria has announced an initial 14-day mandatory housing order for poultry in specified regions of the state.  From their Agriculture Facebook page:

A housing requirement is now in place for poultry flocks of 50 or more birds along the south of the state for an initial 14 days following recent detections of H5 bird flu.

Poultry owners in these areas must house their birds or otherwise prevent contact with wild birds wherever practical.

Housing poultry is an additional risk mitigation option aimed at reducing exposure of poultry to infected wildlife. Wild birds are a known source of H5 bird flu.

Stringent biosecurity practices remain essential. If you notice unexplained illness or deaths in your birds, report it immediately to the Emergency Animal Disease Hotline on 1800 675 888.

Find out more about the housing requirement: agriculture.vic.gov.au/birdflu

This comes after 2 announcements from Australian Chief Veterinary Officer, Dr Beth Cookson, which increased the number of wildlife detections nationally by 40% over the past 24 hours.

7 August 2026

Attributable to Australian Chief Veterinary Officer, Dr Beth Cookson:

Testing at CSIRO’s Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness (ACDP) has confirmed a further 20 positive detections in Victoria, all in greater crested terns from the Portland and Nelson area.

There have now been 175 confirmed or presumed positive detections of H5 bird flu in Australia, based on samples tested.

There remain no detections in poultry or in our agricultural production system.

The risk to human health remains low.

7 August 2026

Attributable to Australian Chief Veterinary Officer, Dr Beth Cookson:

Testing at CSIRO’s Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness (ACDP) has confirmed a further 32 positive detections in South Australia, 29 greater crested terns (12 at Port MacDonnell, 10 at Beachport, 1 at Robe, 1 at Carpenter Rocks, 1 at Cape Jaffa, 3 at Seal Bay on Kangaroo Island, and 1 at Port Elliot) and 3 silver gulls at Southend on the Limestone Coast.

There have now been 155 confirmed or presumed positive detections of H5 bird flu in Australia, based on samples tested.

There remain no detections in poultry or in our agricultural production system.

The risk to human health remains low.

 
Due to growing concerns, the Royal Adelaide Show - which is similar to a State Fair here in the U.S. - has announced the cancelation of all poultry, pigeon, and birds  exhibits in their upcoming 9-day run (5–13 Sep).

Ten days ago we looked at a preprint by Raina MacIntyre et al. (HPAI H5N1 risk in Australia: a model for the prediction of poultry outbreaks) which included a map showing current HPAI H5 detections overlaying poultry production zones.

 

You can view an updated interactive map at EPIWATCH, which shows the continued encroachment of HPAI in wild birds to these sensitive regions.

While enhanced biosecurity can help reduce these risks, even countries with decades of experience dealing with HPAI continue to struggle to keep this deadly virus out of commercial and backyard poultry (see Front. Vet. Sci: Biosecurity deficiencies in HPAI-affected poultry farms in Korea, 2020/2021–2024/2025 seasons).

Stay tuned.

Eurosurveillance: A cohort study of persons exposed to HPAI A(H5N1) at premises with infected animals, England, 2023 to 2025

 

#19,281

Despite being of the same subclade (2.3.4.4b) the HPAI H5N1 viruses circulating in the UK (and Europe) during the 2023-2025 were (and remain) genetically distinct from those circulating in North America.

While cattle-associated genotype B3.13 and a newly emerged genotype D1.1 both emerged in North America in 2024, the UK and Europe were dealing with a combination of EA-2024-DI and DI.2/D1.2 genotypes. 

This matters because even minor differences in HPAI strains (subtypes, genotypes, Amino Acid changes) can alter the transmissibility, host range, and virulence of the virus.

With that in mind, today we have a research report published yesterday in Eurosurveillance that finds relatively limited evidence of infection of  workers exposed to infected poultry in the UK. 

The time period covered (Apr 2023 - Mar 2025) saw 60 outbreaks in England (see chart below), but recruitment was done only at 34 premises (57%), and was confined to England (excluding Scotland, Wales & Northern Ireland).

Out of 862 potentially exposed individuals from these 34 premises, roughly half (n=428) were enrolled in the study. Of those, 3 were determined to have been infected, while three others had positive tests that were most likely due to contamination and not infection. 

This provides a substantial - albeit incomplete - occupational sample, but it likely only captures a fraction of those exposed in the UK during this time. 

And in the 16 months since this survey ended, the UK has reported a surge of roughly 115 additional HPAI outbreaks (note: 15 cases were reported over the summer of 2025).

While this study provides a useful snapshot of the risks of the H5N1 viruses circulating in England during the 2023-2025 study period - given HPAI's continued evolution - it isn't necessarily predictive of the risks going forward.  

It does, however, illustrate the value of PPE use and other biosecurity measures in contaminated environments. 

Due to its length I've just posted the link and some extended excerpts from the study. Follow the link to read it in its entirety. 

A cohort study of persons exposed to highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) at premises with infected animals, England, 2023 to 2025   
Florence Halford1 , Paula B Blomquist1 , Neil Bray1 , Chloe Byers1 , Carmellie Inzoungou-Massanga1 , Carys Rees1 , Maria Waghorn1 , Motolani Awokoya1 , Rachel Lunt1 , Neil Cunningham1 , Michelle Chapman1 , Philippa Jones1 , Nicholas Machin1 , Georgios Chalikias1 , Alan Lord1 , Rachel Benee2 , Sophia Makki1 , Beatrix Kele1 , Andre Charlett1 , Katja Hoschler1 , Anika Singanayagam1 , Maria Zambon1 , Oluwakemi Olufon1 , Obaghe Edeghere1 , Meera Chand1 , Susan Hopkins1 , Deepti Kumar1 , Richard Puleston1 
 
Key public health message

What did you want to address in this study and why?

Following an increase in the number of avian influenza outbreaks in England, we wanted to understand the risk of human infection among people who work closely with birds on farms where outbreaks had occurred. We were interested in whether any individuals with positive tests had any symptoms, and if any steps that were taken to reduce their exposure had an effect on their illness (such as vaccination or use of protective equipment).

What have we learnt from this study?

Less than 1% of participants in this study had an avian influenza infection after working closely with infected animals. None of the participants who had a positive test were vaccinated against seasonal influenza, none had severe symptoms, but the majority reported wearing protective equipment. Although there were some practical challenges, we found recruitment to be more achievable when undertaken in person at the outbreak sites.

What are the implications of your findings for public health?

Being able to better understand the risk of avian influenza infection among farm workers on sites with outbreaks is important for forming public health recommendations and better preparing for future outbreaks. Based on our findings, we recommend continuing proper use of protective equipment and resuming testing of workers at outbreak sites if the risk of human infection increases, to strengthen public health response to future outbreaks.

Discussion
 
This 2-year surveillance study of avian influenza A(H5N1) among persons exposed at IPs in England identified three cases meeting the criteria for infection (two confirmed, one unclear) and three cases with uncertain significance, deemed likely to have transient mucosal contamination. The low < 1% PCR positivity rate and mild symptoms in cases suggest that there is a low risk of bird-to-human transmission of the 2.3.4.4b clade and of severe disease in humans in the UK, even when exposed by touch, where PPE compliance is robust among most individuals. Comparable studies in the US and elsewhere have reported similarly low rates of human infection, but with varying severity [16,17].

The direct nature of exposure among cases in this study aligns with that of a confirmed human case of influenza A(H5N1) in the UK in January 2022 [18], reinforcing the importance of maintaining distance from infected birds and the critical use of correct PPE, which should be communicated through public health messaging [19]. Four of the six cases in this study reported wearing full PPE when exposed; therefore, it is unclear where the potential exposure occurred for these individuals. This suggests difficulty in ensuring proper PPE donning/doffing and compliance in these environments. The possibility of PPE breaches/not recognising when breaches have occurred or inaccuracies due to recall bias cannot be ruled out, as this information was self-reported via questionnaire. Our findings are consistent with cases in the US, where positivity among exposed persons was low, although occasional transmission events were observed among those with close contact and suboptimal PPE use [16].

Our study had some limitations. The study was stopped before reaching the 1,000 participant target sample size because of resource constraints. Although recruitment uptake was significantly higher when undertaken in person, this was not always feasible because of occasional unavailability of the study team at short notice, limited space on site to undertake safe recruitment as determined by the APHA, or unsuitable conditions such as extreme weather. This highlights a need for substantial resource allocation in future surveillance to increase the recruitment of eligible individuals, and thus the precision of findings. Recruitment on site also proved challenging, as eligible persons raised concerns regarding the security of their data, time requirements, and isolation should they test positive. The latter issue was more common among contractors, where sick pay was not offered and daily government compensation was insufficient to cover loss of earnings, suggestive of unequal participation due to financial insecurity. Language barriers further hindered recruitment among contractors, although translated documents were prepared ahead of time, highlighting that future surveillance programmes need to include more inclusive communication strategies.

Demographic details were not gathered for all eligible persons; thus, we were unable to calculate recruitment uptake by occupation or IMD, which limits the generalisability of our results. However, of those recruited to the study, socioeconomic differences were apparent between the two main occupational groups: the majority of the contractors resided in the lowest IMD quintile, while the majority of APHA staff resided in the three least deprived quintiles. Although all recruited participants were within the biosecurity area at some point during their exposure period, the contractors had the highest proportion exposed by touch (88.8%) and frequently spent long periods of time in sheds containing infected birds, possibly putting them at a higher risk of exposure than others. With this increased risk in mind, extra care should be dedicated to ensuring that risk and control measures (such as PPE policies and symptom awareness) are effectively communicated to all and that all workers comply with them; simple language versions as well as translated materials should be available.

        (SNIP)

Conclusions

 Our findings suggest that the influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b viruses circulating in the UK during the period 2023 to 2025 pose a low risk of zoonotic infection in exposed individuals, under present conditions.

However, the detection of mucosal contamination among people self-reporting full PPE usage highlights the need for continued vigilance, and potential challenges with fomites. Surveillance within a One Health framework remains essential for detecting emerging variants with pandemic potential and reducing inequalities in surveillance accessibility through innovative and targeted approaches is imperative to ensure populations are not overlooked.

While there are limitations surrounding chemoprophylaxis, PPE use as per guidance can be an effective barrier to transmission; however, care must be taken to ensure compliance. The combination of these preventative measures, continued biosecurity vigilance, and resumed enhanced surveillance following identification of an increased risk of animal-to-human transmission, are required for mitigating the risks posed by influenza A(H5N1) in poultry outbreak settings.

        (Continue. . . )
 

Australia: H5 Positive Bird Count Rises (n=123) - Victoria Reports 1st Land bird Infection & Investigating Dead Seal

 

#19,280

While not unexpected, overnight CSIRO has reported the first Australian land bird - a Magpie from Victoria - has been confirmed infected with HPAI H5N1. This is their first non-seabird report since the virus was confirmed in June. 

6 August 2026

Attributable to Acting Australian Chief Veterinary Officer, Dr Sam Hamilton:

Testing at CSIRO’s Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness (ACDP) has confirmed a further 16 positive detections in Victoria, 14 greater crested terns, one silver gull and one magpie. All of these birds were found in the vicinity of Portland and Nelson.

There have also been 6 further confirmed positive detections in South Australia, all in greater crested terns. This includes 1 in Beachport, 1 in Port Vincent, 1 at Pullen Island Port Elliott, 1 in Kangaroo Island,1 in Southend, and 1 in Pelican Point in the lower south east.

There have now been 123 confirmed or presumed positive detections of H5 bird flu in Australia, based on samples tested.

There remain no detections in poultry or in our agricultural production system.

The risk to human health remains low.

While tests are pending, local media is also reporting on a dead seal pup which washed up on the beaches of Warrnambool on Victoria's Southwest coast.   

There are, of course, other possible causes of death, but recent events make H5N1 a distinct possibility. 

The most recent national tally from the Australian Agriculture Dept.

Detection of H5 bird flu

As of 11am AEST, 6 August 2026, Australia has 123 confirmed detections of H5 bird flu in wild birds.

• 10 in Western Australia (WA)
• 87 in South Australia (SA)
• 2 in New South Wales (NSW)
• 1 in Queensland (QLD)
• 23 in Victoria (VIC).

This is the serious H5 bird flu strain that has been circulating globally.

There have been no detections in poultry or the wider agriculture industry.

The Consultative Committee for Emergency Animal Disease (CCEAD) has reviewed its previous advice and endorsed a framework on national poultry biosecurity measures that will commence from 31 July. Under this framework, state and territory governments are responsible for issuing advice on biosecurity measures using a risk-based approach.

State and territory governments are responsible for surveillance and response activities on the ground. They are actively working with industry to provide guidance on implementation of enhanced biosecurity measures, as appropriate. Find out more about bird flu in your state or territory.

National coordination is being led by the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF).

The risk to human health remains low.

Australia is well prepared to respond quickly.

Update: FLI Detects Novel Orthobunyavirus in German/Swiss Dairy Cattle

Biting Midge after blood meal

 #19,279

Four days ago we looked at a statement from the Swiss FSVO (Federal Office for Food Safety and Veterinary Affairs) on their Investigation into an Unidentified Bovine Disease which produced fevers, diarrhea, and substantial milk drop in dairy cows. 

Since then, Germany's FLI (Friedrich Loeffler Institute) has announced the results of their own investigation, which had discovered high levels of a novel orthobunyavirus of the Simbu serogroup present in affected cattle.

Orthobunyaviruses are a large and growing family `arboviruses' - viruses carried and spread by biting insects (mosquitoes, ticks & midges) - that mostly infect animals, but are sometimes zoonotic.  

The virus in question is reportedly similar to viruses that are found in Africa, Asia, and Australia. These types of viruses are not usually zoonotic, but additional studies will be needed to determine its actual risk. 

I've posted the FLI press release below: 

FLI detects a new orthobunyavirus of the Simbu serogroup (“Shamonda-like”) in cattle in Germany


08/03/2026 Press Releases

The Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut (FLI) has detected a previously uncharacterised orthobunyavirus of the Simbu serogroup in samples from affected cattle in southern Germany. Following the first appearance of the Schmallenberg virus in 2011, this once again provides reliable evidence that a new virus from this group has been introduced into Germany. The newly detected virus shows the closest relationship to the Shamonda virus in all three segments. Viruses of the Simbu serogroup are found primarily in Africa, Asia and Australia. Like bluetongue virus and Schmallenberg virus, they are transmitted by blood-sucking midges of the genus Culicoides. The animals most commonly infected are ruminants, particularly cattle, sheep and goats.

Cases were first detected in cattle in Switzerland, France and southern Germany, particularly in Baden-Württemberg. The affected animals showed signs of fever and diarrhoea. In dairy cows, a decline in milk yield – in some cases significant – was also observed. These clinical signs have been observed in numerous animals and herds since July. The clinical signs were initially consistent with infection by the Schmallenberg virus. However, tests for Schmallenberg virus, as well as for other known pathogens such as bluetongue virus or epizootic haemorrhagic disease virus, proved negative.

Samples from four affected cattle herds were submitted to the FLI by the local state veterinary laboratory (Chemisches und Veterinäruntersuchungsamt Freiburg). Within 48 hours, the samples had been analysed and the pathogen further characterised. A Pan-Simbuvirus PCR revealed clear positive signals in several serum and blood samples from different farms, with Ct values of up to around 20. This indicates high viral loads at the time of sampling. Further PCR tests for viruses in this group also yielded positive results.

Whole-genome sequencing revealed that all three genome segments showed the highest sequence similarity to Shamonda viruses (at the amino acid level: S: 99 %; M: 95 %; L: 97 %). Whilst the S and L segments are also closely related to Schmallenberg virus, the M segment – which is particularly relevant for antigenicity and the immune response – shows a significantly lower degree of similarity (<50 %). The final taxonomic classification of the virus is currently pending.

Infections with viruses of the Simbu serogroup generally lead to a brief period of viraemia and only mild to moderate clinical signs in adult animals. Of particular significance, however, is the potential transmission to the foetus during pregnancy. Depending on the timing of the infection, abortions, stillbirths and severe congenital malformations may occur. In the case of e Schmallenberg virus, sheep were particularly affected by this. In some flocks, malformation was observed in up to 50 % of the offspring. In cattle, foetal malformations were less pronounced.

As regards the newly identified ‘Shamonda-like’ virus, it is not yet possible to assess whether, and to what extent, infections in pregnant animals may lead to malformation in the foetuses. Abortions, stillbirths and malformed calves or lambs from herds that may be affected should therefore be examined.

Depending on the weather, the midge season in Germany lasts until around the end of November. Midge activity is usually at its peak between July and October. Given the generally efficient transmission by midges, a further and potentially rapid spread of the virus within susceptible herds is therefore anticipated.

Viruses of the Simbu serogroup are not generally considered to be zoonotic agents and, based on current knowledge, do not pose a significant risk of infection to humans. However, in the case of newly emerging and insufficiently characterised viruses in this group, their potential zoonotic risk should be investigated as a precautionary measure and closely monitored as the situation develops.

The FLI is giving high priority to the complete characterisation of the pathogen, the epidemiological tracing of cases, and the adaptation and development of specific diagnostic methods. “Following the 2011 Schmallenberg virus outbreak, an exotic orthobunyavirus has once again been introduced into Central Europe.

Investigations over the coming weeks will reveal how rapidly it is spreading, which animal species are particularly affected, and what clinical consequences can be expected. Of crucial importance is the question of whether infections during pregnancy lead to foetal malformation,” said Prof. Dr. Martin Beer, Vice-President of the Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut. In principle, vaccines can be developed against orthobunyaviruses. However, this requires sufficient lead time. The necessity and urgency of vaccine development will depend largely on the clinical and, in particular, reproductive significance of the newly introduced virus.

Database access to sequence information on the new ‘Shamonda-like virus’:
ASSEMBLY_NAME | ASSEMBLY_ACC | STUDY_ID | SAMPLE_ID | CONTIG_ACC | SCAFFOLD_ACC | CHROMOSOME_ACC amp07736 | GCA_987215895 | PRJEB123174 | ERS3

 

EM&I: Genetic evolution, phylodynamics, geographic spread of H9N2 avian influenza viruses in China from 2014 to 2025: an increasing potential zoonotic risk

   

Geographic distribution of of 1,583 H9N2 AIVs in China in 2014‒2025.

#19,278

Although pandemics are often known for their abrupt appearance and rapid spread, our understanding of how long each pandemic virus simmered - either ignored or largely unobserved - remains limited. 

• Precursors to the 2009 H1N1 pandemic virus, which emerged from North American pigs, appear to have been circulating for at least a decade before it began its world tour. 
• It has been estimated that ancestral strains of COVID-19 may have been circulating for 4 to 7 decades in bats before spilling over into humans. 

We've been watching HPAI H5Nx for 3 decades, and while it continues to improve its game, it has yet to adapt well enough to human physiology to spread efficiently.

The same could be said for many other novel viruses, including both swine and avian flu, henipaviruses like Nipah, scores of other coronaviruses, and of course `Disease X'; the placeholder for those threats yet to be discovered. 

One of the `usual suspects' we keep coming back to is LPAI H9N2, which is ubiquitous in Asian poultry, has spread to both Africa and the Middle East, and just recently turned up in Europe. 

While roughly 200 human (mostly mild) cases have been reported over the past 30 years - mostly from China - recently we've seen an uptick in cases, with 9 reported in China/Hong Kong over the past 2 months (see WHO WPRO Reporting 4 More H9N2 Cases on Chinese Mainland).

Several recent studies have found signs that LPAI H9N2 is becoming better adapted to mammals, warning of its pandemic potential; including:

• Two months ago, in Viruses: Epidemiological and Virological Characteristics of H9N2 Avian Influenza Virus in Jiangsu Province, China, 2024, researchers warned that that Jiangsu’s circulating H9N2 viruses have acquired human receptor preference and mammalian adaptation, posing silent infection and pandemic risks

• Last October, in China CDC Weekly: Epidemiological and Genetic Characterization of Three H9N2 Viruses Causing Human Infections, investigators reported a number of indicators of increased mammalian adaptation within the virus, including an enhanced ability to infect upper respiratory (α2,6-sialic acid) tract receptors, and a number of HA protein mutations, including; H191N, A198V, Q226L, and Q234L.

• The Asian Y280/G57 lineages have shown increasing signs of mammalian adaptation (see EM&I: Enhanced Replication of a Contemporary Avian Influenza A H9N2 Virus in Human Respiratory Organoids)), while the African and Middle Eastern Lineages (mostly European G1-like) are older and less evolved.

• Last summer, in Nature: Genetic diversity of H9N2 avian influenza viruses in poultry across China and implications for zoonotic transmission, researchers reported rising prevalence of key mutations associated with increased infectivity and pathogenicity in mammals.

Despite being clearly zoonotic - LPAI H9N2 is considered a `non-reportable' disease in poultry or wild birds by WOAH (see Terrestrial Animal Code). As a result, there are huge gaps in surveillance and reporting around the world.

Complicating matters, China's attempts to control LPAI H9N2 through vaccines have been less than successful. 

In 2025's NPJ Vaccines: Impact of Inactivated Vaccine on Transmission and Evolution of H9N2 Avian Influenza Virus in Chickens, we saw evidence that inactivated vaccines failed to prevent - or even reduce - H9N2 in China's poultry, and may have driven viral evolution (including mammalian adaptations).

All of which brings us to yet another Chinese study which - once again - finds that China's LPAI H9N2 continues to diversify and accrue worrisome mammalian adaptations, which they suggest increase its zoonotic risk. 

Due to its length and technical nature, I've only posted some excerpts from the abstract and narrative.  Those looking for a deeper dive will want to follow the link to read it in its entirety. 

I'll have a brief postscript after the break.

Genetic evolution, phylodynamics, geographic spread of H9N2 avian influenza viruses in China from 2014 to 2025: an increasing potential zoonotic risk

Zifeng Pang ,Peiting Zhong ,Cuishan Mai ,Junkun Fan ,Yejia Wu ,Yao Zhang , show all

Article: 2713320 | Accepted author version posted online: 03 Aug 2026
Cite this article https://doi.org/10.1080/22221751.2026.2713320 

Abstract

Subtype H9N2 of the avian influenza virus (AIV) poses a growing threat to the poultry industry and public health. However, since 2014, there has been no systematic study of its genetic evolution, genotype, spatial dynamics, and pathogenicity in China. Therefore, we performed a large-scale sequence analysis of the genome of Chinese H9N2 viruses from 2014 to 2025 using public databases and laboratory isolates. We identified 52 different genotypes in 1,591 H9N2 viruses, including 4 previously recognized genotypes (G6, G57, G58, and G68) and 48 newly defined genotypes (G118–G163) in this study. G57 and G118 were the main epidemic genotypes in China from 2014 to 2025. 

Bayesian phylogeographic analysis showed that there were 12 obvious migration paths for the spread of H9N2 AIVs in China from 2017 to 2022. In particular, the South China region was the main transmission centre. H9N2 AIV continues to circulate in chickens and ducks in China and spreads to other hosts. 

The H9N2 AIVs with the G57 and G118 genotypes could effectively replicate in MDCK, CEF, A549, and HBE cells with titres of 0.97–8.5 lgTCID50/mL. The G57 and G118 genotypes H9N2 viruses preferentially bound to α–2,6–linked sialic acid glycopolymers (human receptors), and effectively replicate in multiple organs of mice and chickens and cause pathological changes in the lungs. Thus, it is necessary to strengthen the monitoring and prevention of H9N2 AIVs in China.

        (SNIP)

These mutations can increase the replication of H9N2 virus in mammalian cells and enhance the pathogenicity of the virus to mammals. In vitro replication experiments showed that the current H9N2 virus could replicate efficiently in MDCK, A549 and HBE cells, and the titer of CK225/22 was higher than that of the other strains.

In vivo experiments showed that the current G57 and G118 genotype H9N2 viruses replicated effectively in the turbinate and lungs of mice and caused body weight loss.

In summary, our results showed that the current H9N2 virus has obtained some mutations adapted to mammals, increasing the potential threat to public health.

       (Continue . . . )
 

Trying to predict the source of the next pandemic is a mug's game, but H9N2 constantly ranks in the top 10 zoonotic influenza A viruses the CDC has pegged as having some pandemic potential.

And many will be surprised to see that, in terms of risk of emergence, the H9N2 Y280 lineage is ranked higher than H5N1, while the G1 lineage is ranked only slightly lower.

Given the paucity of day-to-day news coming out of China regarding avian flu, it is difficult to gauge just how much of threat H9N2 currently poses.  

But based on the frequency of Chinese studies published on LPAI H9 over the past couple of years, they quite obviously take its threat seriously.

 Which suggests we should, as well.

Australia: H5N1 Positive Bird Detections (n=102) Continue to Rise

 

#19,277

The number of confirmed H5N1 detections in wild birds in Australia has more than quintupled in a little over a week, rising from 20 on July 27th to 102 today (Aug 4th). 

Most of this increase has come from the state of South Australia, where the first mass mortality event (in birds) has been confirmed.

Two quick updates this morning from the Australian Authorities, first this from DAFF.

Attributable to Australian Chief Veterinary Officer, Dr Beth Cookson:

Testing at CSIRO’s Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness (ACDP) has confirmed further positive results in South Australia, bringing the total to 81 in South Australia. This includes detections in Limestone Coast (Southend, Robe and Baudin Rocks), Kangaroo Island (Harriet River, Seal Bay, Vivonne Bay and D’Estrees Bay), Coorong, Glenelg, Troubridge Island and The Pages Islands. It also includes 6 from Baudin Rocks, comprising 5 greater crested terns and 1 silver gull.

The Baudin Rocks detection follows an investigation into over 80 sick or dead wild birds, and is the first confirmed mass mortality event in wildlife in Australia due to H5 bird flu.

In line with overseas experience and recent events within Australia, a mass mortality event is not unexpected. It follows evidence of some local transmission between a smaller number of wild birds in South Australia.

There has also been one further positive result from Portland in Victoria at this stage, through testing at its state laboratory.

There have now been 102 confirmed or presumed positive detections of H5 bird flu in Australia, based on samples tested. With the mass mortality event at Baudin Rocks, not all sick or dead wild birds were sampled as this is not necessary to determine whether the event was due to H5 bird flu.

There remain no detections in poultry or in our agricultural production system.

The risk to human health remains low.

And from SA state authorities we get:

Current bird flu detections

South Australia’s first confirmed detection of H5 bird flu was in a wild migratory bird (southern giant petrel) on Wednesday, 24 June at Knights Beach at Port Elliot on the Fleurieu Peninsula.

Further confirmed detections include: 

• a giant petrel (8 July at Hardwicke Bay, Yorke Peninsula)
• a southern giant petrel (10 July at Emu Bay, Kangaroo Island)
• a northern giant petrel (10 July at Port Vincent, Yorke Peninsula)
• three greater crested terns (10 July at Robe, Limestone Coast; 26 July at Semaphore, metro Adelaide; and 26 July at Robe, Limestone Coast)
• seven greater crested terns (28 July at Cape Jaffa, Port MacDonnell and Southend, Limestone Coast)
• a giant petrel (30 July at Port Lincoln, Eyre Peninsula)
• a silver gull (1 August at Robe, Limestone Coast)
• 19 greater crested terns (1 August at Beachport (3), Cape Jaffa (1), Southend (1), Port MacDonnell (2), Robe (7), Limestone Coast; and Seal Bay (5), Kangaroo Island)
• two silver gulls (2 August at Robe (1) and South End (1), Limestone Coast)
• a greater crested tern (2 August at Monarto)
• a petrel (3 August, Coorong)
• one silver gull (3 August, Glenelg)
• two greater crested terns (3 August, Troubridge Island)
• one silver gull (3 August, Southend)
• one greater crested tern (3 August, Monarto)
• six greater crested terns (3 August, Pages Island)
• five greater crested terns (3 August, Baudin Rocks)
• one silver gull (3 August, Baudin Rocks).
• 23 greater crested terns (4 August, Limestone Coast, Southend (5) and Robe (7), and Kangaroo Island, Harriet River (1), Seal Bay (4), Vivonne Bay (5) and D’Estrees Bay (1)

A further 28 suspected H5 bird flu detections are undergoing further confirmatory testing at the Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness in Victoria.

Up-to-date national information is available at birdflu.gov.au.

Given the limits of surveillance and testing, the real number is likely much higher, potentially in the thousands by now.  For now, all detections have been in migratory or native seabirds, but how long that status quo can continue remains to be seen.