BSL-4 Lab Worker - Photo Credit –USAMRIID
# 6123
While historically politics, religion, or sporting contests can be counted on as being the most divisive of subjects, over the past few months we’ve seen rise to a different bitter line of debate;
Under what circumstances should potentially dangerous life or bioscience research be conducted and/or published?
Although it has been simmering in the background for years, this issue came to the forefront several months ago when Ron Fouchier announced at a scientific conference in Malta that he’d successfully `mutated the hell’ out of the H5N1 virus and turned it into a highly transmissible (and still lethal) virus in ferrets.
At the same time, in a different lab half a world away, virologist Yoshihiro Kawaoka accomplished very nearly the same feat, albeit without the high lethality seen in Fouchier’s ferrets.
In November alarm bells were raised by bio-terrorism experts, who warned that this information in the wrong hands could be catastrophic (see NPR: Bio-Terrorism Concerns Over Bird Flu Research).
Last December, the NSABB - after reviewing the papers from both of these projects - recommended unanimously that key details on how they were conducted be redacted from the publically available journals.
And that has unleashed a firestorm of controversy.
You can find a nice recap of all of this by Debra MacKenzie in this morning’s edition of New Scientist (Doomsday flu decision time: The story so far).
Later this month, in a closed-door meeting in Geneva, a small, select group of scientists will gather to discuss this controversy. The hope is they will forward some recommendations on how to proceed for consideration by the greater international scientific community.
In the meantime, the media is filled with diverse opinions on this subject.
One of the more extreme views comes this morning via John Horgan writing for Scientific American. He gives his list of available options, and finds all of them lacking. He proposes that the `least bad’ option is:
Let’s Ban Research That Makes the Bird-Flu Virus and Other Pathogens Deadlier
By John Horgan | February 6, 2012 |
While at the far end of the spectrum in this debate, Horgan echoes many of the same sentiments as Tom Inglesby, Director of the Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center.
In a letter to the Editor of the New York Times, Inglesby recently argued:
The potential benefits of the research do not justify the potential dangers, so the research should be discontinued. While in almost all circumstances basic research should be fully disseminated in the science community, in this case the results should not be published in a way that allows them to be replicated by others. If allowed to continue, the research should be performed only in pursuit of concrete, urgent goals under international approval and the greatest possible safety conditions.
TOM INGLESBY
Baltimore, Jan. 24, 2012
The Director of Australia's National Centre for Biosecurity, Professor Ian Ramshaw, warned in an article yesterday in The Canberra Times that potentially dangerous H5N1 research is being conducted in labs with insufficient biosecurity measures, and even states that these mutated viruses should not have been created to begin with.
Killer bug in the system
BY PHILLIP THOMSON
05 Feb, 2012 01:00 AM
THE CANBERRA scientist who argued against details of a new strain of potentially apocalyptic bird flu being published has warned of inadequate security at the lab where the virus was developed and says the virus should not have been developed at all.
A bit ironic, as Professor Ramshaw gained considerable notoriety a decade ago when he and his research team published details on how they created a new, and highly pathogenic form of mousepox.
Comparatively speaking, the above views make the recommendations of the NSABB appear almost centrist, as they only called for the redaction of key elements from two scientific papers, not for a ban into this type of research.
Surprisingly, an opinion published last week by none other than Robert G. Webster, considered to be one of the world’s foremost authorities on influenza, got very little mention in the press.
Mammalian-Transmissible H5N1 Influenza: the Dilemma of Dual-Use Research
While conceding that the details of how these two H5N1 experiments were conducted will likely leak out at some point, he nonetheless believes the details on how to create a transmissible H5N1 virus should not be published.
Webster believes this type of research must continue, but also worries that the lower biosecurity level labs (BSL-3) may not have adequate safety measures for containing H5N1.
He has a lot more to say, so by all means follow this link to read it in its entirety.
Last week, in an apparent response to the BSL-3 / BSL-4 debate, the Public Health Agency of Canada issued a Biosafety Advisory for working with transmissible strains of the H5N1 virus, relegating such work to their highest containment (CL-4) labs.
On the other end of the spectrum are researchers and scientists who believe that concerns over the biosafety aspects of these experiments are overblown, and that work on these viruses must continue and the results should be published in their entirety.
Virologist and blogger Professor Vincent Racaniello argues strenuously for this position in his recent mBio article:
Science Should Be in the Public Domain
Department of Microbiology and Immunology, Columbia University College of Physicians and Surgeons, New York, New York, USA
ABSTRACT
Variants of avian influenza H5N1 virus that are transmitted by the airborne route among ferrets have been identified. The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity has advised against publication of the details of the methods used to obtain these viruses and the amino acid changes that lead to transmission in ferrets. This decision is not based on sound scientific principles and risks setting a precedent that will make it easier to put in place highly restrictive regulations on scientific research and publication.
And similarly, noted microbiologist Peter Palese, in an opinion piece recently published in PNAS – argued:
H5N1 influenza viruses: Facts, not fear
Abstract
The ongoing controversy over publication of two studies involving the transmission in ferrets of H5N1 (H5) subtype influenza viruses and the recommendations of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity to redact key details in the manuscripts call for an examination of relevant scientific facts. In addition, there are calls in the media to destroy the viruses, curtail future research in this area, and protect the public from such “frightening” research efforts. Fear needs to be put to rest with solid science and not speculation.
As a non-scientist, I must rely on the opinions and judgments of scientists I trust.
Here, that proves exceedingly difficult, as the range of opinion from people I highly respect covers the gamut – from preserving the ideals of scientific and intellectual freedom . . . to an outright ban on conducting this type of research.
In this issue we have an honest disagreement among experts, and all sides have at least some solid ground to stand on. And no matter how diverse, I believe these opinions to be heartfelt and sincere.
We are on the cusp of a new era of life sciences, where scientists can manipulate and even create life forms in the laboratory. Although the potential for good that this research offers is immense, there is also the possibility of serious mishap as well.
While we are focused today on the fate of two H5N1 research papers, the real problem runs far deeper;
Our failure to anticipate and deal with the numerous ethical and practical issues that these new bioengineering sciences presents.
The Fouchier and Kawaoka papers have merely brought this issue to a head.
Whether these papers end up published in their entirety or not, the bigger issue is that the international scientific community must come up with a consensus over rules and guidelines for life sciences research.
Otherwise, these bitter debates will form an ongoing rift between scientists, and over time, further erode the public’s confidence in the scientific establishment.
