WDR-2104 World Bank – 362 pages PDF
# 7843
We live in a risky world, one where a momentous event – like Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, or the the 2011 Earthquake & Tsunami in Northern Japan – can shape the lives and livelihoods of millions of people. While we can’t prevent disasters from happening, how well we are prepared to deal with them can determine, and often reduce, their overall impact.
The World Bank has produced a World Development Report every year since 1978, each edition focusing on a different critical issue (e.g. WDR 2013 : Jobs, WDR 2012 : Gender Equality and Development, WDR 2011 : Conflict, Security, and Development, etc.).
The latest edition (WDR-2014 World Bank. 2013. World Development Report 2014: Risk and Opportunity—Managing Risk for Development. Washington, DC: World Bank. doi: 10.1596/978-0-8213-9903–3. License: Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 3.) is now out, and its focus is:
Managing risk for development: From crisis fighting to systematic risk management
Oct 6, 2013, Washington, D.C. -- In recent years, the world has faced multiple risks that have both disrupted the global economy and threatened lives, assets, and social cohesion in many countries.
The latest World Development Report (WDR), Risk and Opportunity: Managing Risk for Development, analyzes risk at many levels and forms and is rich with examples, ranging from job loss and disease to financial crises and natural disasters—often highlighting the costly consequences of mismanaged risk. The 147 banking crises that have struck 116 countries in the past 40 years, for instance, have led to large declines in output and employment.
Poor people in developing countries tend to be hit the hardest by risks because the resources they have to manage risks are often meager or non-existent. More people die from drought in Africa than any other natural hazard whereas virtually no one has died from drought in developed countries in the past four decades. Without improved risk management, the fight to end poverty will be even more elusive, says the report.
Among the top global risks mentioned in this 362 page report is a pandemic, which they highlight in Spotlight #7 (excerpts below).
Diseases without borders: Managing the risk of pandemics
Pandemics such as influenza (flu), AIDS, plague, and smallpox have caused episodes of overwhelming misery and economic and social disruptions throughout history. Today, a pathogen that originates in a chicken flock or a goat herd in a remote village in Asia or Africa and is then transmitted to humans can reach major cities on all continents within 36 hours. Because everyone is vulnerable, management of pandemic risk is the quintessential global public good that can yield benefits for all but can be supplied only through collective action. Any country’s efforts to reduce the risk are of limited benefit unless all other countries take supportive measures.
Sources of pandemics and development implications
Sources of pandemics and development implications Pandemics do not start in a vacuum; their onset is shaped by human action. A staggering 2.3 billion infections by zoonotic (animal-borne) pathogens afflict people in developing countries every year. Some 75 percent of pathogens capable of causing human disease are now animal-borne. This is a major concern because health, nutrition, and food and income security all decline when livestock and people are diseased. The poorest, often living close to livestock or wild animals, are most vulnerable. This disease burden persists because of weak veterinary and human public health systems that fail to detect diseases and allow them to spread.
Adding to the risks, livestock numbers are projected to grow very quickly in developing countries. Some pathogens spread not just across species but also through trade and travel across borders and continents. Even worse, some become capable of easy human-to-human spread and thus have great impact, like AIDS, flu, or severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). Any country’s failure to stop contagion early at its animal source can cause a pandemic. A severe flu pandemic could more than double the total burden of disease. Moreover, economic activity would suffer from worker absenteeism, cascading service disruptions, and human reactions to fear and rumors, which can spread faster than the disease itself. Much of the economic costs would result from avoidance behaviors; these costs could account for as much as 60 percent of total economic costs. Poor countries, especially fragile and conflict-affected states, may be least able to cope.
Preventing a pandemic
To stop contagion, it is essential to act early, at the source, and quickly. Early warning requires cooperation from farmers and communities. If farmers who report disease are punished by having their livestock destroyed without compensation, they will hide disease from the authorities. The main cause of pandemic risk is low capacity of public veterinary and human health systems. Bringing them up to meet minimum international standards requires only modest resources: $3.4 billion a year for all developing countries, compared with the current level of barely $450 million. The expected annual benefits of robust systems are at least $37 billion, more than 10 times the costs. Because public health authorities failed to detect the disease early on—a failure of public health service delivery—AIDS spread unchecked for decades. The costs of this manmade delay are still rising. In contrast, prompt public health action to isolate infected people helped stop the SARS outbreak. Contagion is far less likely to take off in countries that detect disease early and implement effective control measures promptly. To date, no mechanism ensures the strengthening of veterinary and human public health systems in countries that are unable to detect and control diseases, although such “weak links” put all countries at risk.
Mitigating impacts of a pandemic
Contingency planning, and periodic simulation exercises by governments, firms, and communities, as part of disaster risk preparedness, can mitigate impacts. Health sector plans can help cope with surges of patients. Networked industries like power, transport, finance, and food distribution can avoid major disruptions when the main firms have business continuity plans. Likewise, security and other government services need operational continuity plans in the event of high worker absenteeism. Communications incountry and across borders are vital, as the differing degrees of SARS contagion within Canada clearly demonstrated. Advance planning for truthful, complete, coordinated, and timely communications about the disease and government responses can reduce uncertainty and rumors. Too few governments, communities, and firms make and test contingency plans for complex disasters (including pandemics), despite evidence that these activities are highly beneficial.
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There is much more to read on pandemic (and other) risk management, but the key takeaway message can be found in the last sentence of the excerpt:
Too few governments, communities, and firms make and test contingency plans for complex disasters (including pandemics), despite evidence that these activities are highly beneficial.
Earlier today we looked at Hong Kong: Avian Influenza Drill, but sadly, much of the rest of the world is far less proactive than is Hong Kong when it comes to pandemic preparedness.
Prior to 2009, we saw a large flurry of pandemic preparedness activity in the United States, and around the world, but between the relatively mild outcome of the 2009 pandemic and a prolonged economic downturn, pandemic preparedness has been put on the back burner for many agencies and businesses. Many pandemic plans have been tucked away in a bottom drawer for years, largely forgotten, and gathering dust.
At the risk of anthropomorphizing viruses (they really hate that), the next pandemic won’t know or care about our economic woes, or the less-that-devastating impact of the last pandemic. Without malice or even thought, its only `concern’ will be finding the next available suitable host, replicating millions of copies of itself, and then moving on before that host dies.
On Sunday, in Pandemic Preparedness: Taking Our Cue From The Experts, I wrote at some length on the need for families, businesses, and communities to begin planning for the next pandemic.
While we don’t know when the next pandemic will arrive, agencies like the CDC, the ECDC, the World Health Organization and others have expressed genuine concern over H7N9 and the MERS coronavirus. Last week, Dr. Keiji Fukuda briefed delegates from PAHO: On H7N9 & MERS-CoV, noting that both are “unusually pathogenic,” and both are capable of human-to-human transmission.
Given the speed at which a well-adapted virus could spread globally (days or weeks), the time to practice and prepare for the next pandemic is now, not after an outbreak has begun.
For more on pandemic preparedness, you may wish to revisit:
NPM13: Pandemic Planning Assumptions
The Pandemic Preparedness Messaging Dilemma
Pandemic Planning For Business
CDC: Pandemic Planning Tips For Public Health Officials
H7N9 Preparedness: What The CDC Is Doing
