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#13,522
Ten days ago, in Japan: MAFF Confirms Classical Swine Fever Outbreak, we saw the first detection of CSF in Japan in 26 years. Much like African Swine Fever, CSF causes a high mortality in pigs, but does not infect humans.
Last Saturday, in Japan: NARO Genetic Analysis Of Classical Swine Fever In Gifu Prefecture, I mentioned a Japanese media report citing the discovery of a dead wild boar within 8km of Japan's CSF affected farm that has also tested positive for the virus, raising concerns the virus is spreading in that population.Overnight the OIE posted the following notification, along with some epidemiological comments, on that finding. I'll also have some excerpts from a Japan Ministry of Agriculture (MAFF) statement on this recent development.
Source of the outbreak(s) or origin of infection
Unknown or inconclusive
Epidemiological comments
1. Affected farm
(1)Stamping out All pigs in the farm were culled by 10th September 2018.
(2)Disposal of dead animals All bodies were buried by 10th September Disinfection Disinfection for contaminated materials and tools as well as inside of the farm was completed by 11th September 2018
2. Monitoring and survey of farms, etc.
(1)Farms to be intensively monitored (13 farms) Thirteen farms are designated for intensive monitoring, which have epidemiological relationship (*) with the affected farm. Clinical test, ELISA and PCR were carried out on 13 farms, and all results were negative to classical swine fever.(*) Epidemiological relationship with the affected farm: -Shipping out to the same slaughterhouse -Using the same compost facility -Visited by the same veterinarian
3. Surveillance of wildlife (the wild boar reported in this follow up report)
Gifu prefecture started the survey from 13th September 2018. On 13th September, a dead wild boar was found in the zone within 3 to 10 km radius from the affected farm (shipment restriction zone). On 14th September the dead wild boar was confirmed positive to CSF by sequencing at National Institute of Animal Health (NIAH).
4. Epidemiological investigation
(1)Since 9th September 2018, the National Epidemiological Investigation Team has been dispatched.
(2)In order to facilitate the identification of cause and route of infection as well as to prevent the spread of the disease by increasing the experts of team members, Intensified Epidemiological Investigation Team for the CSF case has been established on 12th September 2018. An expert for wildlife joined on 14th September.
(3) NIAH published the result of gene analysis of the CSFV of the case. NIAH considered that the virus was likely to be introduced from overseas as the virus belongs to subgenotype 2.15. Communication to producers
(1) On 9 September 2018, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries re-ordered all prefectures that any farm should comply with Biosecurity Standard and Guidelines for CSF such as adequate disinfection against invasion of CSF virus, early notification, and prevention of wild animals, etc.
A second CSF detection in a wild boar is obviously a big concern to Japan's pork industry, since that will make it far more difficult to stamp out the virus. Japan's MOA (see below), has issued new steps in an attempt to quantify the extent of this viral incursion, to try to find its source, and to prevent it from spreading to other farms.
(Translated)
For additional information about the corresponding policy in the "Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries swine fever epidemic prevention headquarters."
2018. September 18,
the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
In the wild boar of Gifu Prefecture, response to the fact that infection of swine fever is a domestic animal infectious disease has been confirmed, today, to hold a "Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries swine fever epidemic prevention headquarters", so far the response policy, newly 3 we add an item.
1. corresponding situation
(1) September 9, pig cholera affected animals have been confirmed in a pig farm in Gifu, Gifu Prefecture, held a "Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries swine fever epidemic prevention headquarters", we determine the corresponding policy for the future of the epidemic prevention measures .2. Policy Newly added item
(2) September 10, to complete the culling and burial of corpses for pigs are fed the the farm, next September 11, also completed for disinfection processes and barns contaminated article, We have completed the quarantine measures in the farm.
(3) September 9 and later, to monitor the 13-related farm, which has been using the same slaughterhouse and co-composting field with the generation farm, we are continuing the epidemiological investigation. At the moment abnormality has not been verified.
(4) September 14, from the fact that death was swine fever virus from wild boar was (first case) has been confirmed, immediately, intrusion prevention such as thorough and wild boar of disinfection, to comply strictly Standards of Rearing Hygiene Management as, through the beginning nationwide prefectures Gifu Prefecture, and guidance to farmers.
(5) In addition, in the Gifu Prefecture, with the focus on implementing the infection confirmation inspection of the occurrence farms and dead wild boar around 10km distance of co-composting field and capture the wild boar, in the nation, pig for the wild boar who died we have requested the implementation of these inspection.
(6) in Gifu Prefecture, also on September 16, we have confirmed the positive reaction of classical swine fever from the wild boar that died (second case).
(7) In response to this, today held the "Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries swine fever epidemic prevention headquarters", we have added a new response policy to the corresponding policies of the past.
(1) generating farm and relevant 13 farm monitoring and to ensure the infection confirmatory test wildlife.(Continue . . . . )
(2) Ensuring that guidance on compliance with feeding hygiene management standards intrusion prevention at the farm farm disinfection and wildlife.
(3) For the investigation and spread prevention of such infection routes, assuming all the possibilities investigate it.
