Tuesday, October 18, 2022

The COVID Preprint Heard `Round the World


BSL-4 Lab Worker - Photo Credit –USAMRIID

#17,070

Over the past 24 hours a preprint from researchers at Boston University on their creation of a lab-made COVID hybrid that combines the original Wuhan strain with the newer Omicron strain has rocked the internet, generated hyperbolic headlines around the globe, and has revitalized conspiracy theories surrounding the emergence of SARS-CoV-2 in 2019. 

The tabloid headlines - screaming that scientists had created a new COVID strain with an 80% kill rate - are admittedly designed to generate clicks, and inflame, more than inform. 
 
But any research that smacks of being GOF (Gain of Function) or DURC (Dual Use Research of Concern), is bound to be received badly by a weary public as we approach the 3rd anniversary of our deadly, and life-changing pandemic.  

Whether or not COVID emerged from a Wuhan (or other) laboratory is debatable (note: I still fall on the side of it being a naturally evolved virus, but admit the possibility exists), the fact is, we've seen serious lab accidents and escapes before (see CDC Announces Another Serious Biosecurity Incident).

The debate over the dangers of Gain of Function experimentation reached a peak about a decade ago after two scientists - working independently half a world apart - announced their creation of an `enhanced' H5N1 virus (see Science Publishes The Fouchier Ferret Study).

A brief moratorium on GOF experimentation was ordered in 2012, but was lifted in 2013 after the Office of Science Policy at the NIH released a 4 page set of guidelines for DURC (Duel Use Research of Concern) projects, and ordered a review of all current life sciences projects (see U.S. Issues new DURC Oversight Rules).

GOF experimentation is no longer strictly prohibited in the United States, but there are oversight rules that must be followed.  These `rules' are often vague, ambiguous, or subject to interpretation, making it sometimes easier to ask forgiveness than permission.

While I don't deny there may be scientific value to some of these types of research projects, it can be a dangerous pursuit.  One where a small miscalculation can be truly disastrous. 

I'll have more on that after the break, but first, the innocuously titled preprint's abstract, followed by an excerpt from Boston University's defense of the project.
Role of spike in the pathogenic and antigenic behavior of SARS-CoV-2 BA.1 Omicron

Da-Yuan Chen, Devin Kenney, Chue Vin Chin, Alexander H. Tavares, Nazimuddin Khan, Hasahn L. Conway, GuanQun Liu, Manish C. Choudhary, Hans P. Gertje, Aoife K. O’Connell, Darrell N. Kotton, Alexandra Herrmann, View ORCID ProfileArmin Ensser, John H. Connor, Markus Bosmann, Jonathan Z. Li, Michaela U. Gack, Susan C. Baker, Robert N. Kirchdoerfer, Yachana Kataria, Nicholas A. Crossland, Florian Douam, Mohsan Saeed

doi: https://doi.org/10.1101/2022.10.13.512134

Preview PDF

Abstract

The recently identified, globally predominant SARS-CoV-2 Omicron variant (BA.1) is highly transmissible, even in fully vaccinated individuals, and causes attenuated disease compared with other major viral variants recognized to date17. The Omicron spike (S) protein, with an unusually large number of mutations, is considered the major driver of these phenotypes3,8.
We generated chimeric recombinant SARS-CoV-2 encoding the S gene of Omicron in the backbone of an ancestral SARS-CoV-2 isolate and compared this virus with the naturally circulating Omicron variant.
The Omicron S-bearing virus robustly escapes vaccine-induced humoral immunity, mainly due to mutations in the receptor-binding motif (RBM), yet unlike naturally occurring Omicron, efficiently replicates in cell lines and primary-like distal lung cells. In K18-hACE2 mice, while Omicron causes mild, non-fatal infection, the Omicron S-carrying virus inflicts severe disease with a mortality rate of 80%. This indicates that while the vaccine escape of Omicron is defined by mutations in S, major determinants of viral pathogenicity reside outside of S.


BU calls the reporting “false and inaccurate,” and says it misrepresents what researchers actually found
Boston University is refuting a series of misleading claims about research at the University’s National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories (NEIDL). The reports, which first appeared on Monday in the United Kingdom’s Daily Mail, claimed researchers at the lab had “created a new deadly COVID strain.” In a statement Monday afternoon, BU called the reporting, which was picked up by other outlets, including Fox News, “false and inaccurate,” and said, “this research made the virus replicate less dangerous.”

The University also noted that the research was reviewed and approved by the Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC), which consists of scientists as well as local community members, and that the Boston Public Health Commission had approved the research.

“They’ve sensationalized the message, they misrepresent the study and its goals in its entirety,” says Ronald B. Corley, NEIDL director and BU Chobanian & Avedisian School of Medicine chair of microbiology, of the news reports.

The study set out to examine the spike proteins on the SARS-CoV-2 Omicron variant (BA.1). Researchers were interested in comparing the variant with the original virus strain, known as the Washington strain. They wanted to find out if the virus was truly less virulent, says Corley, “simply because it wasn’t infecting the same cells as the initial strain.” They were “interested in what part of the virus dictates how serious of a disease a person will get.”
         (Continue . . . )


For more on this story, I'd suggest skipping the tabloid journalism, but can heartily recommend Helen Branswell's even-handed reporting for STAT (see Boston University researchers’ testing of lab-made version of Covid virus draws government scrutiny). 

And for some more background on GOF and DURC research, Nature's 2021 news feature The shifting sands of ‘gain-of-function’ research.

A little over a decade ago, in Science At The Crossroads, I wrote about the public's growing mistrust of `science' - and while it may not be completely deserved - the scientific community hasn't exactly helped themselves. 

  • In a 2010 article appearing in the Journal of Medical Ethics, researcher R. Grant Sheen found hundreds of examples of research paper retractions over the past decade due to what he deemed to be `deliberate fraud’.
  • In a presentation made in March 2012 (see Dysfunctional Science) before a committee of the National Academy of Sciences, journal editors Arturo Casadevall and Ferric C. Fang warned that the number of retraction notices for scientific journals has increased more than 10-fold over the last decade, while the number of journals articles published has only increased by 44%.
  • And in early 2013, in mBio: Gender Analysis Of Scientific Misconduct, we looked at an analysis written by written Joan W. Bennett, Ferric C. Fang, and Arturo Casadevall, that examined the rise of Scientific misconduct - which includes fabrication, falsification or plagiarism – over the past decade.
Over the course of the pandemic we've also seen a number of serious missteps, including the failure to recognize that COVID was primarily an airborne pathogen (see COVID-19: The Airborne Division), and the US Surgeon General's infamous Feb 29th, 2000 tweet seeking to discourage the use of masks by the general public.
 

I'll let the officials at NIAID and the Boston University argue over whether today's preprint meets the definition of Gain of Function.  My guess is there is enough `wiggle room' in the definition of GOF to provide arguments for both sides. 
 
The negative visceral reaction to this preprint was entirely predictable, given we are nearly 3 years into the worst pandemic in a century, and many still question the origins of this virus.  
 
Regardless of its scientific value - and whether it actually endangered the public (likely not) - this study comes off as both arrogant and risky, and only reinforces the public's increasingly skeptical view of science. 

A reputation that scientists - and society - can ill afford given the technological challenges that lie ahead.