Avian Flu Diary: ECDC Statement On H5N1 Antibodies in Dutch Dairy Cow: ECDC Risk Assessment Remains Unchanged

#19,031

On Saturday (Jan 24th) we learned from the Netherlands: NVWA Announcement on Avian Flu Antibodies Detected In Dairy Cow; which appears to be the first compelling evidence of a spillover of H5N1 to European cattle.

While no active infections have been found, investigations are ongoing.

This detection came as the result of a follow-up on 2 sick barn cats, one of which died from H5N1, rather than from routine surveillance. While this leaves open the possibility that other spillovers may have occurred unnoticed, the lack of human cases thus far is encouraging.

For now, the ECDC states that their risk assessment (on risks to public health) remains unchanged:

The current risk is assessed as low for the general population and low to moderate for people with occupational exposure (e.g. poultry farm workers) or other exposure to infected animals or contaminated environments (e.g. direct contact with infected wild birds).

Hopefully we'll get a more detailed report from the Netherlands or the the ECDC in the days to come. I've reproduced the statement below, and will have a brief postscript after the break.

(Note: The link for the `guide' provided in this article does not work).

Detection of avian flu antibodies in Dutch dairy cow: ECDC risk assessment remains unchanged
News
27 Jan 2026

With avian influenza A(H5N1) widely circulating in wild birds and poultry, and repeatedly detected in mammals, Dutch public health authorities report that antibodies indicating past exposure have been identified in milk from a dairy cow in the Netherlands. No other cows on the affected farm have tested positive for the virus and no exposed people have developed symptoms, but investigations are ongoing.

As yet, there have been no confirmed human cases of A(H5N1) in the EU//EEA and ECDC’s risk assessment remains unchanged. The current risk is assessed as low for the general population and low to moderate for people with occupational exposure (e.g. poultry farm workers) or other exposure to infected animals or contaminated environments (e.g. direct contact with infected wild birds).

Transmission of avian influenza from cattle to humans has only been reported in the United States among farm workers exposed to infected cattle or contaminated environments, and such cases remain sporadic and all developed only mild symptoms.

As highlighted in the ECDC/EFSA Scientific Opinion on preparedness, prevention and control of avian influenza, adherence to biosecurity measures is essential, alongside enforcing proper protective measures for people exposed to potentially infected animals and the early detection of animal-to-human influenza transmission.

ECDC has produced a guide for pre-pandemic zoonotic influenza preparedness and response to help European countries respond to possible animal-to-human influenza threats. This guide sets out practical response actions across a range of scenarios.

ECDC is monitoring the situation together with partner organisations in Europe and will continue to update its assessment of the risk for humans in the EU/EEA as new information becomes available. 
Further information

ECDC regularly monitors zoonotic avian influenza strains through its influenza surveillance programme and epidemic intelligence activities in collaboration with the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) and the EU Reference Laboratory for Avian Influenza to identify significant changes in the virological characteristics and epidemiology of the virus. Together, they produce a quarterly updated report on the avian influenza situation.

The `missing link' above is to an ECDC report from last December - which we looked at in ECDC Pre-pandemic Guidance: Strategies to Fight Avian and Swine flu in Humans - which included 14 scenarios (see chart below) that are:

`. . . based on specific epidemiological and virological factors, including animal origin, characteristics of human cases (number and exposure context), severity signals, that are then further defined based on the presence of virus mammalian adaptation, antiviral resistance and mismatch with available pre-pandemic vaccines and/or candidate vaccine viruses.'