Friday, September 02, 2011

MMWR: Swine-Origin Influenza A (H3N2) Virus Infection in Two Children

 

 

# 5808

 

 

Earlier today in MMWR: Two Novel trH3N2 Flu Infections I wrote about a bare-bones entry in this week’s MMWR Notifiable Diseases and Mortality Tables on two recently detected novel trH3N2 infections – and expressed the hope that we’d soon see more details on these cases.

 

Well, my hopes were answered this afternoon with the release of a detailed report from the CDC

 

Two patients, children from different states, contracted similar swine flu viruses without any apparent epidemiological connection. Only one child had exposure to swine in the weeks prior to falling ill.

 

While similar to eight previously identified swine H3N2 viruses, these two isolates are `reassortants’ – a product of the swine trH2N2 virus with a gene segment taken from the 2009 H1N1 pandemic virus.

 

I’ve posted some excerpts, but this entire report is a fascinating read, and I would encourage you to follow the link to read it in its entirety.

 

 

 

Swine-Origin Influenza A (H3N2) Virus Infection in Two Children --- Indiana and Pennsylvania, July--August 2011

Early Release

September 2, 2011 / 60(Early Release);1-4

Influenza A viruses are endemic in many animal species, including humans, swine, and wild birds, and sporadic cases of transmission of influenza A viruses between humans and animals do occur, including human infections with avian-origin influenza A viruses (i.e., H5N1 and H7N7) and swine-origin influenza A viruses (i.e., H1N1, H1N2, and H3N2) (1). Genetic analysis can distinguish animal origin influenza viruses from the seasonal human influenza viruses that circulate widely and cause annual epidemics. This report describes two cases of febrile respiratory illness caused by swine-origin influenza A (H3N2) viruses identified on August 19 and August 26, 2011, and the current investigations.

 

No epidemiologic link between the two cases has been identified, and although investigations are ongoing, no additional confirmed human infections with this virus have been detected.

 

These viruses are similar to eight other swine-origin influenza A (H3N2) viruses identified from previous human infections over the past 2 years, but are unique in that one of the eight gene segments (matrix [M] gene) is from the 2009 influenza A (H1N1) virus.

 

The acquisition of the M gene in these two swine-origin influenza A (H3N2) viruses indicates that they are "reassortants" because they contain genes of the swine-origin influenza A (H3N2) virus circulating in North American pigs since 1998 (2) and the 2009 influenza A (H1N1) virus that might have been transmitted to pigs from humans during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic.

 

However, reassortments of the 2009 influenza A (H1N1) virus with other swine influenza A viruses have been reported previously in swine (3). Clinicians who suspect influenza virus infection in humans with recent exposure to swine should obtain a nasopharyngeal swab from the patient for timely diagnosis at a state public health laboratory and consider empiric neuraminidase inhibitor antiviral treatment to quickly limit potential human transmission (4).

(Continue . . . )

 

The Summary offered by the MMWR report reads:

What is already known on this topic?

During December 2005--November 2010, 21 cases of human infection with swine-origin influenza were reported, including 12 cases with swine-origin influenza A (H1N1) virus infection, eight cases with swine-origin influenza A (H3N2) virus infection, and one case with swine-origin influenza A (H1N2) virus infection.

What is added by this report?

This report describes two cases of febrile respiratory illness caused by swine-origin influenza A (H3N2) viruses identified on August 19 and August 26, 2011. The viruses identified in these cases are unique in that one of the eight gene segments (matrix [M] gene) is from the 2009 influenza A (H1N1) virus.

What are the implications for public health practice?

Non-human influenza virus infections rarely result in human-to-human transmission, but the implications of sustained ongoing transmission between humans is potentially severe; therefore, prompt and thorough identification and investigation of these sporadic human infections with non-human influenza viruses are needed to reduce the risk for sustained transmission.