# 1158
I've listened to all three of this week's senate hearings on Avian flu and have come away with some general impressions, based on what I heard.
The hearings were:
10/04/07
2:30 PM
Forestalling the Coming Pandemic: Infectious Disease Surveillance Overseas
10/03/07
2:30 PM
Pandemic Influenza: State and Local Efforts to Prepare
10/02/07
10:00 AM
Preparing the National Capital Region for a Pandemic
As of this writing, the hearing on October 3rd appears available as an archived webcast, for those interested in watching.
First, it would be very easy to criticize those involved for minor failings.
Senator Akaka's opening statement on Tuesday, for instance, repeated the hoary statistics that between 2 and 7 million people could die worldwide in a pandemic, and that up to 200,000 Americans could perish and 2 million could be sickened. Later, in the same statement, he states that 25% of the nation could be sickened, which would equate to 75 million people. A case of dueling statistics.
I'll confess, when the hearings started, I was less than impressed. The erstwhile testimony on Tuesday seemed intent on reassuring the senate committee that `everything that could be done had been done' to prepare the capital for a pandemic.
I'm sure much has been accomplished, and that these emergency managers are doing what they can with the resources they have available. But I doubt that `everything' that could be done, has been done.
Sorry.
Words were chosen carefully, and phrases you rarely hear outside of the beltway, like `viable methodology' were bandied about. As long as the next pandemic plays by the scenarios envisioned by the panelists, we should be in pretty good shape.
Of course, pandemics don't always play by the rules. And neither do its victims.
When asked how local hospitals would handle the overflow of flu patients, the response was that hospitals would redirect flu victims to more appropriate venues for treatment. Meaning most would be told to go home. Which is great in theory, but may prove difficult to manage in the real world.
Much of the planning is based on the idea that community mitigation strategies (social distancing, closing of schools, etc) would reduce the number of infections by 50%-70%, thereby reducing the burden on emergency operations. Again, great if it happens. But the effectiveness of these mitigation strategies is unknown, as is the long-term compliance by the public.
Despite the feelings that some of the answers on Tuesday were a bit too pat, and relied too heavily on everything going exactly as planned, I did come away with the feeling that these panelists, charged with an exceptionally difficult job, were simply doing the best they could with a largely unknown, and unknowable scenario.
The hearings on Wednesday and Thursday were less imbued with `Washington-speak', and I felt, more accurately depicted the open-endedness of pandemic preparation. We were told that while progress was being made, much was left to be done.
When asked about the sharing of computer data between agencies, after a long pause, panelists admitted they were `working on it'.
What I come away with, after listening to hours of testimony, is that there are some very bright, dedicated, and concerned individuals working on the problems of preparing for a pandemic. While I heard a few missteps this week, I heard no fools.
I'm actually a bit heartened. The questions from Senator Akaka, and others, were (for the most part) pretty knowledgeable. The answers from the panelists, for the most part, seemed on target.
Are we prepared? Are we ready for a pandemic this year, or even next?
I wouldn't go that far.
But I will concede we are better prepared today than we were a year ago.
