BSL-4 Lab Worker - Photo Credit –USAMRIID
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Laureate Professor Peter C. Doherty (who shared the 1996 Nobel Prize for medicine for his work in immunology) divides his time between St Jude Children’s Research Hospital in Memphis and the Department of Microbiology and Immunology at the University of Melbourne.
I’ve profiled a number of Professor Doherty’s articles in the past, including:
Prof. Peter Doherty On Influenza’s Threat
Professor Peter Doherty On Bird Flu
Today Professor Doherty, along with Paul Thomas, PhD. (also from St. Jude Research Center) – have published an open access opinion piece in BMC Biology.
Dangerous for ferrets: lethal for humans?
Peter C Doherty and Paul G Thomas
BMC Biology 2012, 10:10 doi:10.1186/1741-7007-10-10
Of concern to these authors is the idea that H5N1 research should only be conducted in BSL-4 laboratories (a rule already adopted in Canada), which would greatly restrict the number of labs – and researchers – who would have access to the virus.
I’ve excerpted two paragraphs below, but follow the link above to read the whole piece.
While we need to be assured that Taubenberger, Hultin, Fouchier, Kawaoka-type experiments are only done by responsible people working in safe, well-regulated institutions, the problem is that imposing highly restrictive constraints (BSL4 security, in space suits) means that few will be bothered to investigate these pathogens. As a consequence, we will know less about them. The reality is that if scientists want to be funded, they must be productive and publish. It is always easy for a talented researcher to say: 'too hard, too cumbersome, I'll just go on with something else.' Those reviewing the H5N1 situation might ask whether that has indeed happened with the resurrected 1918 virus.
<SNIP>
What must be avoided at all costs is to initiate processes that limit the exchange of information in the influenza field. The overwhelming probability is that any 'human pandemic' H5N1 variant will come out of nature, not a laboratory. The combination of a superbly organized network, first class technology, well-established centers and dedicated professionals means that the global monitoring mechanisms for influenza are the best there can be. The Fouchier and Kawaoka studies identify mutations that these international 'flu detectives' will be watching for. The last thing the influenza surveillance community would want is for their work to become exclusive, especially if that leads to any reluctance to make newly isolated, dangerous H5N1 'field isolates' immediately available for general scrutiny.
