BSL-4 Lab Worker - Photo Credit –USAMRIID
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An interesting report appeared yesterday in the journal Nature Biotechnology that describes a potential method to help mitigate the risks of influenza GOF (Gain of Function) research.
Gain of function influenza research involves the creation (in the lab) of flu strains that have increased transmissibility, pathogenicity, or altered host range.
We looked at some of the issues (and controversies) surrounding this type of research last week in H7N9: Reigniting The `Gain Of Function’ Research Debate.
While there are multiple concerns over this type of research, one that has been cited often is the fear an `engineered’ virus could escape the lab and spark an epidemic.
Accidents and serious breaches in laboratory protocols and integrity, while rare, have occurred in the past.
One group of researchers believes that by genetically altering the influenza virus - it can be made less infectious to humans, but still transmit and infect ferrets – allowing for GOF research while reducing the risk of accidental human infection or release.
MicroRNA-based strategy to mitigate the risk of gain-of-function influenza studies
Ryan A Langlois, Randy A Albrecht, Brian Kimble, Troy Sutton, Jillian S Shapiro, Courtney Finch, Matthew Angel, Mark A Chua, Ana Silvia Gonzalez-Reiche, Kemin Xu, Daniel Perez, Adolfo García-Sastre & Benjamin R tenOever
Nature Biotechnology (2013) doi:10.1038/nbt.2666
Recent gain-of-function studies in influenza A virus H5N1 strains revealed that as few as three-amino-acid changes in the hemagglutinin protein confer the capacity for viral transmission between ferrets .
As transmission between ferrets is considered a surrogate indicator of transmissibility between humans, these studies raised concerns about the risks of gain-of-function influenza A virus research.
Here we present an approach to strengthen the biosafety of gain-of-function influenza experiments. We exploit species-specific endogenous small RNAs to restrict influenza A virus tropism. In particular, we found that the microRNA miR-192 was expressed in primary human respiratory tract epithelial cells as well as in mouse lungs but absent from the ferret respiratory tract. Incorporation of miR-192 target sites into influenza A virus did not prevent influenza replication and transmissibility in ferrets, but did attenuate influenza pathogenicity in mice.
This molecular biocontainment approach should be applicable beyond influenza A virus to minimize the risk of experiments involving other pathogenic viruses.
For more on this, The Scientist has a report describing this strategy.
Safe Flu Research Strategy
Researchers develop a new “molecular biocontainment” strategy for safely studying deadly flu viruses.
By Chris Palmer | August 12, 2013
Following a year-long, worldwide moratorium on H5N1 research stemming from fears of a global pandemic after researchers showed that the avian flu virus could be spread among ferrets, scientists have released a new “molecular biocontainment” strategy for the safe study of deadly viruses. The protocol, detailed in a paper published Sunday (August 11) in Nature Biotechnology, involves introducing viruses to be studied to human lung cells, which inactivate the viruses.
All of this is – quite frankly – well above my pay grade, so I pass it on without comment, and will leave it those more qualified to discuss the the merits and feasibility of this approach.
