Wednesday, November 30, 2016

OIE: HPAI H5 Reported In Ukrainian Poultry
















#11,961


The subtype is not yet determined, but the OIE is reporting that HPAI H5 has been detected in a backyard flock in Southern Ukraine.



The first clinical signs of the disease appeared about two weeks ago in a backyard holding in the village Novooleksandrivka. After two weeks the veterinary service was informed on the increase of the mortality of birds in the village. Samples were taken from the dead birds and a positive result was found for highly pathogenic avian influenza. As a preliminary data there are 2500 birds in the outbreak zone. A stamping-out is ongoing.

OIE Notification: H5N8 Detected in Egyptian Wild Birds

Credit Wikipedia













#11,960


Last September, in in FAO/EMPRES: H5N8 Clade 2.3.4.4 Detected Over Summer In Russia, we looked at a follow up on reports from earlier in the summer that H5N8 had been detected in Russia, which prompted the FAO to warn:


Countries and places in Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Middle East, Europe and West Africa – especially those that have experienced outbreaks in 2005/06, 2009/10 and/or 2014/15 (as shown in Maps 2, 3 and 4) – should be on alert over the next 6 to 12 months, as westward and southern spread of the H5N8 virus is likely. If the virus enters Egypt or West Africa, where H5N1 HPAI viruses are already present or even entrenched in poultry populations it would further complicate disease control.

We've already seen the virus arrive in Israel, and make a sizable impact in Iran, so today's OIE announcement that the H5N8 virus has been detected in wild birds on the northern coast of Egypt is not terribly surprising.




The big concern will come if the virus makes it into Egypt poultry, which is currently rife with HPAI H5N1 and LPAI H9N2.

Korean CDC Statement: Low Risk Of Human Infection From H5N6


CREDIT - MAFF


















#11,959

The headline from the English edition of today's JoongAng Daily reassuringly states Avian flu strain won’t infect humans says KCDC - and while that may well prove true - based on the actual press release from the Korean CDC, all of the evidence isn't in. 

Four paragraphs into the report, the news article states:
The KCDC announced Wednesday it will carry out artificial infection experiments to evaluate health risks associated with the avian flu, which will be completed in March.

As of now, a total of 1,549 individuals, mostly owners of affected farms, are at the highest risk of infection. Local health authorities will monitor them during the 10-day incubation period.

What the Korean CDC actually said (the full translated report follows) is that genetic analysis didn't turn up any obvious red flags; amino acid changes in the virus that are known (or suspected) to increase the risk to mammals.

Given the thousands of people likely exposed to H5N6 infected birds in China and Vietnam over the past couple of years - and only 16 known human infections - its pretty much a given that the risk of infection is low.

As you'll see, the standard cautions with regard to exposure to H5N6 are still very much in place. 

 The public is urged to avoid livestock farms and migratory birds, `completely follow personal hygiene regulations', and report any flu-like illnesses to public health officials that appear within 10 days of possible contact with wild or infected birds.

Additionally, the CDC has established a  'Central H5N6 AI Human Infection Response Team'  and have developed procedures for dealing with any suspected human infection.


Domestic outbreak of H5N6 AI virus, very low possibility of human infection

◈ Domestic outbreak of H5N6 AI virus,
① Pathogenic gene similar to existing virus and human infection
② No antiretroviral resistance gene is available
◈ Strengthening local government response and high risk management in accordance with AI spread
□ The Disease Control Headquarters (Head of the Division) and the National Institute of Health (Director Park Do Joon) compared the H5N6 avian influenza virus genome * confirmed in Korea with viruses identified in other countries, There is no mutation, and it is said that an animal infection experiment is under way to directly evaluate the risk of human infection such as the virulence of the virus.
* Domestic H5N6 virus full-length genes (4 cases) were received from the Agriculture, Forestry and Livestock Quarantine Headquarters and the College of Veterinary Medicine of Konkuk University (Professor Song Chang-sun)


□ The National Institutes of Health has not observed any further changes related to human infection and pathogenicity compared to isolated viral genes in China, Vietnam, Laos and Hong Kong so far from the H5N6 AI virus genome * isolated from poultry and wild migratory feces At the gene level,

In particular, the virus isolated from the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Livestock has been found to contain a PA gene * derived from Eurasian pathogenic AI, but the major genes associated with increased pathogenicity in mammals have not changed.
* The PA gene is involved in the replication and proliferation of viruses, and certain mutations in this gene affect the pathogenicity of mammals

He also explained that there is no genetic mutation in the case of resistance to antiviral agents * used for AI prevention and treatment.
* Oseltamivir (Tamiflu, etc.), Zanamivir (Relena etc.) and Amantadine

○ In order to directly evaluate the pathogenicity and the risk of human infection of avian influenza virus with frequent gene mutation, we are conducting an infection experiment using mammals such as mice and weasel in the biological safety facility (BL-3) .
□ In order to respond quickly to AI human infectious diseases, the Disease Control Headquarters is operating the 'Central H5N6 AI Human Infection Response Team' from November 11th, and dispatches epidemiological investigators to the 24-hour emergency room operation and disposal site, And provides expert technical support for preventive management of infection countermeasures.

○ As a result of the recent spread of AI spreads, the total number of 1,549 persons *, including the disposal participant and the farm worker, classified as high risk * as of November 29, and the relevant public health center has applied antiviral prophylactic medication, Day) 5th, 10th day Active monitoring monitors the occurrence of symptoms such as fever,

* 197 farmers, 1,021 livelihoods, 228 respondents, 103 forclains, etc.
○ In response to suspected cases, we have established a response system such as a rapid epidemiological survey and prepared and responded to the country's designated sound pressure bed by region for isolation treatment.


□ The Disease Control Headquarters recommends that cities and provinces, municipalities, and counties continue to strengthen their management and supervision in order to ensure that preventive measures against AI infection are thoroughly implemented in the field,

* Tuesday, November 29 10:30. Holding of AI countermeasure meeting
* On November 29 (Tue), 15:30, city and provincial epidemiological investigator and officials in charge, AI response to infectious disease management headquarters

○ AI In order to prevent human infection, it is important to actively cooperate with the public.

- Do not visit livestock farmers or migratory birds,
- Completely follow personal hygiene regulations such as hand washing for more than 30 seconds,
- If you have contact with wild birds or have respiratory symptoms such as fever, muscular pain, coughing, sore throat within 10 days after participating in the work related to disposal of flesh, you should immediately report to the Public Health Center or the 1339 (24 hours working Disease Control Center call center).

□ According to the AI ​​situation, the Disease Control Headquarters will work closely with the livestock sanitary authorities and local governments to prevent AI human infection and to prepare for the occurrence of the disease.

Iran MOH: H5N8 Spreads, 500K Birds Culled

















#11,958


Ten Days ago, in OIE Notification: HPAI H5N8 Reaches Iran, we learned that two farms near Tehran had been infected with the H5N8 virus, and five days later, in a follow up report, Iran reported a 3rd farm infected as well.

Today, Iran's Ministry of Agriculture has announced a ban on the movement of poultry in the affected regions, and the culling of over 500,000 birds.
The translated statement, which is a combination of Arabic and Persian, is a bit dodgy in the syntax department, although the gist is fairly obvious.
 
ban on movement of poultry veterinary native province without coordination
Head of shift bans poultry veterinary native country without coordinating veterinary provinces and said: So far, more than 513 thousand hens in four centers of Tehran Province were identified and destroyed.

According to the news website of the Ministry of Agriculture quoted by IRNA, Mehdi Khalaj in a press conference Tuesday afternoon H5N8 avian influenza disease situation in the country, said the death toll in four single layer farms in the region, according to Malard Tehran Province, veterinary experts sampling took place and it was found in the centers of H5N8 avian influenza disease is common.

He added that a total of over 513 thousand hens in these units were dismantled.


Khalaj stressed that, in case of disease in poultry farms within 3 km after obtaining laboratory samples are transported to the slaughterhouse.
       (Continue . . .)


Whether this is an additional 500K birds culled, on top of the 300K already reported last week, or simply 200K more is difficult to tell from the report.

Overnight the media in neighboring Turkey, which has previously dealt with large outbreaks of H5N1, has begun sounding the alarm. The following (translated) report from SOZ is fairly typical.

ATTENTION! Bird drop on the border, will enter the country
 
Diyarbakirsoz.com 30.11.2016, 11:31 Turkey


ATTENTION! Bird drop on the border, will enter the country
It was announced that the birdie is about to enter the country

It is announced that bird flu, which marks its winter season every year, is about to enter the country.

Currently the H5N8 virus is seen from Japan to Europe all over the world.

In Turkey's eastern neighbor, Iran, birdwatch cases exploded. The Tehran government, which announced last week that it had been infected with H5N8 virus, announced today that hundreds of thousands of chickens have been culled.

Mehdi Halac, President of the Iranian Veterinary Institute, said bird flu was detected in four farms in Melard province east of Tehran. According to Halac's knowledge, more than 513,000 chickens were culled because of the high-level H5N8 virus.

Iran has also banned the transfer of poultry from one place to another without veterinary oversight.

JAPAN PROMOTES FARM

Birdball emerged in Russia at the end of the summer, finally emerged in Japan with high infectious risk. The Japanese health authorities have divided 310,000 animals to be culled after the H5 virus found on Niigata farms killed 40 chickens. In Aomori, ducks are found to have bird flu and 165 thousand animals will be culled.

Korea: Epidemiological Investigation Committee Meeting On H5N6

H5N6 In Korea - Credit Japan's MAFF



















#11,957


Korea's Ministry of Agriculture (MAFRA) has published notes from yesterday's meeting of their AI ​​Subcommittee which met to discuss the epidemiology and changing genetics of their rapidly spreading H5N6 virus, and their response to it.

The committee concluded that the virus was introduced to South Korea via migratory birds - likely from China - bringing in a reassorted virus.
As we've discussed previously, Korea's H5N6 virus HA and NA genes are most similar to those previously detected in a wild bird in Hong Kong, but its internal genes have evolved - likely through reassortment. 

The AI committee also makes note of the high mortality observed in both ducks and chickens, characterized by `rapid clinical symptoms including sudden death and neurological symptoms'.

While ducks haven't been totally immune to H5N6 in the past, we have seen multiple reports of asymptomatic carriage of the virus, including:
Many of Korea's recent detections have been in dead, or dying, waterfowl, including multiple varieties of ducks.  Whether this signifies a change in the pathogenicity of the virus, or simply varied susceptibility between different types of aquatic birds, is uncertain. 

The committee also warns of the `possibility of continuous propagation among wild birds' of the virus, and the high risk of spreading the virus via the movement of people, poultry, or vehicles between farms.  

"The outbreak of this highly pathogenic AI (H5N6 type), estimation of influx from migratory birds, and prompt response to strong initial action"

 Date 2016-11-30 10:00:00


On November 29th, the AI ​​Subcommittee of the Epidemiological Investigation Committee (Chairman Kim Jae-Hong, Vice President of the College of Veterinary Medicine, Seoul National University) was held on the 29th of November in connection with the highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI H5N6 strain) .

* Epidemiological Investigation Committee (AI Committee): A total of 32 persons, including professors from veterinary schools and medical schools, related ministries such as the Ministry of Environment,
The Epidemiologic Investigation Committee has been investigating the occurrence, epidemiology, viral genetic analysis results, etc. of the situation that occurred since Nov. 16 on Nov. 16 in Chonnam Hainan (laying hens) and Chungbuk Voice (duck duck) There was intensive discussion of
The Epidemiologic Investigation Committee estimated that this highly virulent AI (H5N6 type) occurred for the first time in Korea, and that viruses originating from overseas countries such as China were introduced through migratory birds and recombinant in the process of domestic influx.

Genetic analysis of H5N6 virus (6 cases *) isolated from domestic wild birds and poultry showed similar to H5N6 virus which was popular in Guangdong province, Hong Kong, China

  • * Cheonan wild algae feces (2), Iksan Mangyeong river white cheek duck duck, voice duck duck, Haenam laying hen,
  • ** Genetic analysis of six highly pathogenic AI (H5N6) viruses showed that H5 and N6 genes had the highest homology with the virus isolated from Hong Kong wild bird
  • *** The Chinese H5N6 virus and the wild-type AI virus have been reassembled into a genetically engineered virus
  • **** So far, some internal genes (PA, NS) are different from each other in isolate viral genome comparison. In theory, up to 6 different viruses can be detected, and 11.29. (5), and (5)

In addition, it is estimated that the first occurrence of the farms occurred in the vicinity of the farms due to the migration of migratory birds and farmland around the farms, and the influx of wild birds such as wild birds, .

* A number of migratory birds were observed around the first farms such as Chonnam Hainan, Chungbuk Province, Muan, Jeonbuk Gimje, and the farmers cultivated in farmland around farms.

It was judged that there was a possibility of nearby radio propagation and mechanical propagation when the occurrence situation of the farms occurred in the concentrated farming area and some areas.

- However, it was suggested that the occurrence of some areas in the context of mechanical propagation needs to be confirmed through future gene analysis.

* Voice Vigorous duck farm near the first report farm densely populated farmers nearby, it is estimated to be easily propagated to neighboring farms by nearby radio (within the 500m to No. 8, 500m to 3km within the 25th duck farmhouse location)
The Epidemiologic Investigation Committee noted that the incidence of this highly pathogenic AI is occurring at the same time in various regions, and most of the chicken and ducks are showing rapid clinical symptoms including sudden death and neurological symptoms, and the occurrence of the disease is continuing.
* (Duck) Rapid increase of mortality, nervous symptoms such as turning and quadriceps, abrupt decrease of egg production rate, (chicken)
In addition, the Epidemiologic Investigation Committee emphasized the possibility of continuous propagation among wild birds and the risk of mechanical propagation such as people and facilities related to livestock.
① There is a possibility of sustainable occurrence due to wild birds. In order to prevent the blocking of wild birds, autonomous disinfection of farmers,

② Because the risk of horizontal propagation by contaminated person and vehicle is very high, it is necessary to promptly control disruption and early discovery of emergent farms and epidemiological farms for strong interception response measures. Dispossession

③ Preventive measures such as more thorough monitoring and management of poultry such as live chickens and ducks in the garden type, small farm and traditional market in the area where they occur

In addition, the quarantine headquarters held the Epidemiological Investigation Committee meeting from time to time in consideration of the occurrence situation, and consulted and consulted about the matters necessary for the promotion of epidemiological investigation and analysis.

Japan: 2nd Suspected H5N6 Outbreak in Niigata Prefecture















#11,956


On Monday (see Japan: MAFF Reports 2 Suspected Outbreaks Of H5N6 In Poultry) - after numerous detections of H5N6 in wild birds - Japan's Ministry of Agriculture announced outbreaks of AI in two poultry farms in Aomori and Niigata Prefectures.
Yesterday, we saw confirmation from the FAO that the virus was HPAI H5 - but it's N-type had not yet been identified. More than 300,000 birds were ordered culled.
Today, Japan's MAFF reports a second suspected outbreak in Niigata Prefecture - roughly 140 km from the first one  - involving a farm with roughly 230,000 birds.
While the exact subtype and genetic signature of these outbreaks have yet to be determined, Japan sits in the same migratory flyway as South Korea, which has identified a reassorted H5N6 virus in multiple locations. 

This (translated) report from MAFF.


Confirmation of cases suspected of highly pathogenic avian influenza in Niigata Prefecture and holding of "Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Against Avian Influenza Preparedness Measures Headquarters"


November 30, Heisei 28


Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries


A case was confirmed today that a highly pathogenic avian influenza, a domestic animal infectious disease, is suspected at an egg-picking chicken farm in Niigata Prefecture (a place 140 km away from the farm where the day before yesterday occurred). In response to this, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries today held "Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Against Avian Influenza Preparedness Measures Headquarters" and decided on future response policy.
The farm refrains from moving farmers etc. from the time the farmer reports.
In Japan, there have been no reported cases of human infection with avian influenza virus by eating poultry meat and poultry eggs.
Since coverage at the work site may cause spread of the disease and it may invade the privacy of the farmers, we ask for your cooperation in order to refrain seriously.
 1. Outline of farm

Location: Joetsu City, Niigata Prefecture
Feeding situation: Hatching chickens (about 230,000 birds)


2. Background


(1) Today, in Niigata prefecture, in response to a report to the effect that dead hatching chickens have increased, ask the farms to refrain from moving and carry out on-site inspection on the farm.
(2) For the egg-laying hens, a simple influenza test was performed and positive.
(3) Currently, genetic testing for the egg-laying hens is in progress.
3. Future response

Based on the result of the genetic test, if it is confirmed that it is a pseudo-affected animal of highly pathogenic avian influenza, the following measures are taken based on the "Guideline on Specific Animal Infectious Disease Control for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza and Low Pathogenic Avian Influenza" We will carry out.

1. (1) killing and embedding breeding houses of the farm,
   (2) setting movement restricted areas for the area within 3 km radius from the farm,
   (3) Implementing necessary epidemic measures, such as the setting of discharge restricted areas, for areas within a radius of 3 km to 10 km quickly and accurately.
2. Immediately conducted checking of occurrence status on the farm within the movement restricted area.
3. To prevent the spread of infection, strengthen the disinfection around the farm and place disinfection points on the main road.
4. Food, Agriculture, Rural Policy Council Animal Health Subcommittee Organizing the Animal Health Subcommittee Substitute Disease Subcommittee to hold around, and obtain technical advice necessary for anti-epidemic measures.
5. Dispatch experts from the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries and veterinary universities to the site in order to accurately grasp the infection situation, the route of infection and so on, and to examine appropriate precautionary policy.
6. We dispatch an "Emergency Support Team" from animal quarantine stations, livestock breeding centers, etc. in various places, as necessary, to support the prevention of Niigata prefecture cessation, burial and other epidemic measures.
7. Dispatch epidemiological survey team.
8. Notify all prefectures of early detection of this disease and thoroughness of early notification.
9. We will strive to provide accurate information to producers, consumers, distributors, etc while fully working with related ministries and agencies.

Tuesday, November 29, 2016

CDC COCA Call Today : Assessment and Evidence-based Treatments for Opioid Use Disorder














#11,955


Later today the CDC will hold a COCA call for clinicians on the Assessment and Evidence-based treatments for Opioid Use Disorder. 

Although primarily of interest to clinicians, the CDC holds frequent COCA (Clinician Outreach Communication Activity) calls which are designed to ensure that practitioners have up-to-date information for their practices.

Recorded materials from earlier COCA calls may be accessed at this linkFor those unable to attend this live presentation, it ought to be archived on the website within a few days.
This is the fifth webinar in a COCA Call series about CDC Guideline for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain. To view a list of other webinars in the series, visit the opioid call series overview webpage


Date:Tuesday, November 29, 2016

Time: 2:00-3:00 pm (Eastern Time)

Call-In: 
1-800-779-0686 (U.S.Callers)
1-312-470-0194 (International Callers)

Passcode: 3377346 Webinar:https://www.mymeetings.com/nc/join.php?i=PW1897448&p=3377346&t=c

Presenter(s)

Deborah Dowell, MD, MPH
Senior Medical Advisor
Division of Unintentional Injury Prevention
National Center for Injury Control and Prevention
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention



Joseph O. Merrill, MD, MPH
Associate Professor
Department of Medicine
University of Washington
Harborview Medical Center



Mark Sullivan, MD, PhD
Professor
Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences
Anesthesiology and Pain Medicine
Bioethics and Humanities
University of Washington



Overview


One substantial risk associated with prescribing opioids for chronic pain is opioid use disorder (OUD). This disorder is associated with specific criteria, such as unsuccessful efforts to cut down or control opioid use, as well as use resulting in social problems and a failure to fulfill obligations at work, school, or home. During this COCA Call, clinicians will learn about OUD diagnosis criteria, evidence-based treatment options, and patient education techniques. Presenters will use actual case studies to illustrate how clinicians can use recommendations from the CDC Guideline for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain to select OUD evidence-based treatment options such as medication-assisted treatment with buprenorphine or methadone in combination with behavioral therapies.

Objectives

  • Describe Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-5) assessment criteria for opioid use disorder.
  • Discuss the evidence for opioid use disorder medication-assisted treatment.
  • List types of medications and settings used in medication-assisted therapy.
  • Review considerations for buprenorphine, methadone, and naltrexone use for opioid use disorder.
  • Outline the opioid taper process used when opioid harms exceed opioid benefits but opioid use disorder DSM-5 criteria are not met.

Call Materials

Waiting For The Next Flu To Drop














#11,954


As the month of November winds down much of Europe, South Korea, and Japan continue to battle the spread of two remarkably robust bird flu viruses (H5N8 and H5N6).
Both viruses have evolved genetically since their previous appearances (see Korea: H5N6 A New Reassortant Virus - MAFRA and EID Journal: HPAI A(H5Nx) Viruses With Altered H5 Receptor-Binding Specificity), and both are showing signs of increased host adaptation and/or  virulence. 

While human infections have not (yet) been a part of either story, millions of birds have already been culled, and the prospects are for a long winter's fight ahead for poultry interests in both regions.

Meanwhile, we've yet to hear from any of the `usual suspects'  that - most years - provide most of our winter flu news. 

Despite the legitimate concerns (and occasional hype) over avian flu, seasonal flu remains the biggest year-to-year influenza threat, killing tens of thousands of Americans every year, and hundreds of thousands globally.

So far, seasonal influenza activity in the Northern Hemisphere has been low, although media reports out of China suggest increasing activity (see Nov 29th WHO Flu Report below).


Influenza activity in the temperate zone of the northern hemisphere has not yet picked up and remained at inter-seasonal levels.


This year, H3N2 is expected to predominate, and that often yields a more severe flu season than does H1N1. Seasonal flu often doesn't get started until January, so there is a lot of flu season left ahead. 

I get my shot every year, and urge others to consider doing so as well (see #NatlPrep: Giving Preparedness A Shot In The Arm).

While the vaccine can’t promise 100% protection, it – along with practicing good flu hygiene (washing hands, covering coughs, & staying home if sick) – remains your best strategy for avoiding the flu and staying healthy this winter.


Absent - at least so far this fall - have been reports of human H5N1 infections in Egypt, and we've only seen 1 H5N6 and 2 H7N9 cases reported from China. These two countries have contributed more than 90% of the novel flu infections reported around the world in recent years and can be expected to produce more this winter.
Both nations reported a decline in human cases last year, although there are serious questions over just how robust their surveillance and reporting really is.

Perhaps the biggest question is where do HPAI H5 clade 2.3.4.4 viruses turn up next?  Both H5N6 and H5N8 have demonstrated a remarkable ability to spread rapidly via migratory birds, and it is still  early in avian migration season.



The world's migratory flyways could conceivably funnel either H5N8 or H5N6 into North America, H5N6 could yet turn up in Europe or Southern Asia, and H5N8 could very well make it into West Africa.


Scenarios we looked at three weeks ago the in the FAO On HPAI H5's 4th Intercontinental Wave, which examined the rapid expansion of H5N8 in eastern Europe and warned  that other areas could see encroachment of the virus as well. The FAO specifically mentioned:

Places at Risk:

Countries in the Middle East;
Countries in the EU;
West Africa;
Countries in the former Soviet Union;
Countries in South Asia.

While making predictions about influenza is always ill-advised, given that it isn't even December yet, and we are already deluged in bird flu reports, it is fair to say there is a lot more ahead.

Stay tuned.


Saudi MOH Announces 3 Primary MERS Cases
















#11,953


After going 6 days without a case, Saudi Arabia has now reported six new MERS Cases over the past three days, with half of those coming in today's report

Today's 3 cases all hail from different cities (Riyadh, Yanbu & Rijal Alma), are all male, and all are listed as primary cases without a known risk exposure. 

Two of the three cases are already listed in critical condition, while the third is listed as stable.



So far in the month of November the Saudi MOH has reported 20 MERS cases, 7 with camel exposure, 1 as a secondary household contact, and 12 listed as `primary cases' without a known source of infection.


Monday, November 28, 2016

Texas DSHS Announces 1st Locally Acquired Zika Case

Credit Wikipedia

















#11,952


On the last Day of May of this year, the Texas DSHS Announced the 1st Locally Acquired Chikungunya Case in Cameron County, which lies on the border with Mexico. Fast forward almost exactly 6 months, and Cameron County is now reporting the first locally acquired Zika Case in the state of Texas.

While a first, this was not unexpected, and occurred in precisely the region the Texas DSHS predicted in early October (see Texas DSHS Calls For Enhanced Zika Surveillance In The Rio Grande Valley).

This press release comes from the Texas Department of State Health Services.



 

News Release
November 28, 2016


Response Underway; Will Include Increased Surveillance
 
The Texas Department of State Health Services and Cameron County Department of Health and Human Services today announced the first case of Zika virus disease likely transmitted by a mosquito in Texas. DSHS is supporting Cameron County’s response to the case and to the ongoing risk of Zika in the community.


The patient is a Cameron County resident who is not pregnant and who was confirmed last week by lab test to have been infected. She reported no recent travel to Mexico or anywhere else with ongoing Zika virus transmission and no other risk factors. Laboratory testing found genetic material from the Zika virus in the patient’s urine, but a blood test was negative, indicating that the virus can no longer be spread from her by a mosquito. There are no other cases of suspected local transmission at this time, but health officials continue to conduct disease surveillance activities as part of the state's ongoing Zika response.

“We knew it was only a matter of time before we saw a Zika case spread by a mosquito in Texas,” said Dr. John Hellerstedt, DSHS commissioner. “We still don’t believe the virus will become widespread in Texas, but there could be more cases, so people need to protect themselves from mosquito bites, especially in parts of the state that stay relatively warm in the fall and winter.”

Cameron County, DSHS and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention are working together to investigate and respond to the case. Further investigation will be necessary to attempt to pinpoint how and where the infection occurred, and health officials are also responding in a number of other ways. DSHS has activated the State Medical Operations Center to support the response and is providing expertise, personnel and equipment for activities from disease investigation to mosquito surveillance to public education.

With DSHS support, Cameron County and the City of Brownsville have conducted an environmental assessment at the patient’s home and have been trapping and testing mosquitoes to learn more about activity in the area. Brownsville has recently sprayed for mosquitoes in the area and will continue to take action to reduce the mosquito population. Health workers from Cameron County and DSHS will be going door to door in the area around where the case lived beginning this evening to educate the public about Zika, help people reduce potential mosquito breeding habitat on their property, and collect voluntary urine samples to determine whether other infections are present. The samples collected will be tested at the DSHS laboratory in Austin. The DSHS regional office in Harlingen has delivered laboratory supplies, boxes of educational materials and mosquito traps to Cameron County and will continue to assist in the response. Additionally, state and local public health has been in communication with CDC, which is providing additional assistance and expertise.

Travel back-and-forth across the border is a way of life in the Valley, and news reports from Mexico indicate Zika transmission by mosquitoes in multiple communities on the Mexican side of the border. Due to the risk of birth defects associated with Zika, pregnant women should avoid traveling to Mexico and should avoid sexual contact or use condoms with partners who have traveled there. Other precautions include:
  • Using EPA-approved insect repellent.
  • Wearing long pants and long-sleeved shirts that cover exposed skin.
  • Using air conditioning or window and door screens that are in good repair to keep mosquitoes out of homes.
  • Removing standing water in and around homes, including water in trash cans, toys, tires, flower pots and any other container that can hold water.
Zika virus is transmitted to people primarily through the bite of an infected mosquito, though sexual transmission can occur. The four most common symptoms are fever, itchy rash, joint pain and eye redness. While symptoms are usually minor, Zika can also cause severe birth defects, including microcephaly, and other poor birth outcomes in some women infected during pregnancy.

DSHS is again asking health care providers to consider Zika virus infection in their patients and order the appropriate testing. DSHS recommends testing all pregnant women who have traveled to areas with active Zika transmission during their pregnancy. DSHS also recommends testing pregnant women who have two or more of the typical Zika symptoms in Cameron, Hidalgo, Starr, Webb, Willacy or Zapata counties without travel history, and anyone with at least three symptoms statewide. Providers can find additional information at www.texaszika.org/healthcareprof.htm.

Through last week, Texas has had 257 confirmed cases of Zika virus disease. Until now, all cases had been associated with travel, including two infants born to women who had traveled during their pregnancy and two people who had sexual contact with infected travelers. Additional information on cases and for the public is available at www.texaszika.org.
-30-
(News Media Contact: Chris Van Deusen, DSHS Press Officer, 512-776-7753)

CDC FluView Week 46: 1 Novel H1N2v Infection In Iowa

















#11,951


Last week's FluView report was delayed until today due to the Thanksgiving Holiday. For the most part, influenza activity remains low in the United States and H3N2 remains the most commonly reported influenza strain reported this fall.

The CDC does report, however, on the detection of the 23rd novel swine variant infection of 2016, involving the H1N2v virus in a patient in Iowa. 

Reports of human infection with novel swine variant influenza (H1N1v, H1N2v & H3N2v) are fairly rare, due to their (often) unremarkable presentation and limited laboratory testing, but likely occur more often than we know.


The H3N2v strain is by far the most common, making up 94% of all reported cases (n=372) in the United States over the past 11 years.  H1N1v comes in 2nd, with 20 cases (4%).


H1N2v is the least common, with just 8 cases reported (the last one was in Wisconsin last June) up until today.

Today's case - the 9th since 2005 - is described by the FluView as:

Novel Influenza A Virus:

One human infection with a novel influenza A virus was reported by the state of Iowa. The person was infected with an influenza A (H1N2) variant (H1N2v) virus. The patient was not hospitalized, and has fully recovered from their illness. No human-to-human transmission has been identified and the case reported close contact with swine in the week prior to illness onset.
Early identification and investigation of human infections with novel influenza A viruses are critical so that the risk of infection can be more fully appreciated and appropriate public health measures can be taken. Additional information on influenza in swine, variant influenza infection in humans, and strategies to interact safely with swine can be found at http://www.cdc.gov/flu/swineflu/index.htm.

While we’ve not seen sustained or efficient spread of these swine variant viruses in humans - like all flu viruses - swine variant viruses are capable of evolving, reassorting, and adapting to their hosts.


Since the influenza subtypes that commonly circulate in swine (H1, H2 & H3) are also the same that have caused all of the human pandemics going back 130 years (see Are Influenza Pandemic Viruses Members Of An Exclusive Club?), they are generally regarded as having less far to `jump’ to humans than many avian viruses.


Which is precisely how the H1N1 pandemic virus emerged in 2009, after kicking around (and reassorting in) swine herds for a decade or longer.

Last October, in MMWR: Investigation Into H3N2v Outbreak In Ohio & Michigan - Summer 2016,  we looked at the CDC's investigation into a cluster of 18 H3N2v cases across two states during the month of August. This was the biggest outbreak of swine variant infections we'd seen since 2012, when more than 300 cases were reported across 10 states. 
The `headline' in that report was that 16 of the 18 cases analyzed belonged to a new genotype not previously detected in humans. 

As with avian influenza, swine flu viruses are constantly evolving, which is why we watch reports like today's with particular interest. For more on swine variant viruses, both in the United States and around the world, you may wish to revisit:


PNAS: The Pandemic Potential Of Eurasian Avian-like H1N1 (EAH1N1) Swine Influenza
Front. Microbiol.: A Novel H1N2 Reassorted Influenza Virus In Chinese Pigs
Sci Rpts: Transmission & Pathogenicity Of Novel Swine Flu Reassortant Viruses
Eurosurveillance: Seroprevalence Of Cross-Reactive Antibodies To Swine H3N2v – Germany

Saudi MOH Announces 2 New MERS Cases















#11,950



The Saudi MOH reports two more MERS cases today, with 1 (in Taif) linked to direct contact with a camel, with the other - in Riyadh - is listed as a household contact of a MERS case.

Going back through the cases, the last Riyadh MERS case I can find reported was in mid-October, making it unlikely to be the source of this infection.  

There have been several infections reported from surrounding cities, and it is possible the patient has been transferred to Riyadh.  It is also possible, I supposed, that we haven't seen the report on the contact case yet

Since the Saudi MOH no long publishes their CCC weekly monitor,
we'll probably have to wait for a WHO update before we can figure out this particular chain of infection.



H5N8: France & Romania Report Detections In Wild Birds





#11,949


France, which has been beleaguered by more than 80 outbreaks of HPAI and LPAI bird flu - all of European lineage - over the past 12 months, has - until today - avoided the rapidly spreading HPAI H5N8 virus.

On November 17th, with the virus very near their border with  Switzerland, the French MOA Issued A Precautionary H5N8 Alert.

Today, France's MOA posted the following announcement on their avian flu page. 

Location to 26 November 2016: a detected event.

On November 26, a first case H5N8 was confirmed in the municipality of Marck (Pas de Calais) on 20 wild ducks used as decoys for hunting waterfowl. Management measures were immediately implemented

 Marck (Pas de Calais) is very close to Dunkirk, and only about 20 miles across the English Channel to the UK.


Meanwhile, the FAO reports that Romania has detected the H5N8 virus in a dead swan.




Japan: MAFF Reports 2 Suspected Outbreaks Of H5N6 In Poultry




#11,948


Unlike in South Korea, Japan's detections of HPAI H5N6 this month have been limited to wild birds and environmental samples.

Today, however, that status may have changed, as two farms in different prefectures have tested positive for avian influenza via rapid tests, and further genetic tests are underway to determine the subtype.
This (translated) report from Japan's  MAFF (Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries).



Confirmation of cases suspected of highly pathogenic avian influenza in Aomori prefecture and Niigata prefecture and establishment of "Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Agency for Disease Control and Prevention"

November 28, Heisei 28
Ministry of Agriculture

Today, at a duck farm in Aomori prefecture and an egg collection chicken farm in Niigata prefecture, a case was suspected of highly pathogenic avian influenza, which is a domestic animal infectious disease. In response to this, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries today set up the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Against Avian Influenza Preparedness Headquarters, and decided on the future response policy.


The farm refrains from moving farmers etc. from the time the farmer reports.


In Japan, there have been no reported cases of human infection with avian influenza virus by eating poultry meat and poultry eggs.
Since coverage at the work site may cause spread of the disease and it may invade the privacy of the farmers, we ask for your cooperation in order to refrain seriously.


1. Outline of farm

· Farm in Aomori Prefecture
   Location: Aomori Prefecture Aomori city
   Feeding situation: duck (French duck) (about 16,500 birds)

· Farms in Niigata Prefecture
   Location: Sekigawa village, Niigata prefecture (Seikakumumori)
   Feeding situation: egg laying chickens (about 310 thousand)
 

2. Background

(1) Today, in Aomori Prefecture and Niigata Prefecture, in response to a report that death ducks and dead eggs have increased, they asked the farms to refrain from moving and conducted an on-site inspection on the farm.
(2) The influenza simplified test was conducted for the relevant duck and egg-laying hens and it was positive.
(3) Genetic testing is currently underway for said duck and egg-laying hens.
3. Future response

Based on the result of the genetic test, if it is confirmed that it is a pseudo-affected animal of highly pathogenic avian influenza, the following measures are taken based on the "Guideline on Specific Animal Infectious Disease Control for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza and Low Pathogenic Avian Influenza" We will carry out.

1. (1) killing and embedding breeding houses of the farm,
   (2) setting movement restricted areas for the area within 3 km radius from the farm,
   (3) Implementing necessary epidemic measures, such as the setting of discharge restricted areas, for areas within a radius of 3 km to 10 km quickly and accurately.
2. Immediately conducted checking of occurrence status on the farm within the movement restricted area.
3. To prevent the spread of infection, strengthen the disinfection around the farm and place disinfection points on the main road.
4. Food, Agriculture, Rural Policy Council Animal Health Subcommittee Meet the Subcommittee on Disease of Iceration and obtain technical advice necessary for anti-epidemic measures.
5. Dispatch experts from the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries and the Agricultural Organization Animal Health Research Division to the site to accurately grasp the infection situation, infection route, etc. and to examine appropriate precautionary policy.
6. We dispatch an "Emergency Support Team" from various animal quarantine stations, livestock breeding center, etc. as necessary to support epidemic measures such as killing and embedding in Aomori Prefecture and Niigata Prefecture.
7. Dispatch epidemiological survey team.
8. Notify all prefectures of early detection of this disease and thoroughness of early notification.
9. We will strive to provide accurate information to producers, consumers, distributors, etc while fully working with related ministries and agencies.
      (Continue. . . )
 

Korea: H5N6 A New Reassortant Virus - MAFRA



















#11,947


Korea's Ministry of Agriculture (MAFRA) today released a preliminary genetic analysis of four recently obtained H5N6 virus samples from South Korea, and compares them to the same virus subtypes collected previously from Mainland China and Hong Kong
.
What they found is that the Korean H5N6 virus has changed internally from its predecessors, and that - as we've seen previously - its genetic evolution continues.

Like all influenza viruses, avian H5N6 is constantly changing.  This evolution is driven by two different processes. Antigenic drift & Antigenic Shift (reassortment).
  • Antigenic drift causes small, incremental changes in the virus over time. Drift is the standard evolutionary process of influenza viruses, and often come about due to replication errors that are common with single-strand RNA viruses (see NIAID Video: Antigenic Drift).
  • Shift occurs when one virus swap out chunks of their genetic code with gene segments from another virus. This is known as reassortment. While far less common than drift, shift can sometimes produce abrupt, dramatic changes to the virus (see NIAID Video: How Influenza Pandemics Occur).
 
Six months ago, in EID Journal: Novel Reassortant H5N6 Viruses In Humans, Guangdong China, we looked at an analysis of 3 viruses collected last December in Guangdong Province, which found H5N6 had reassorted with both H9N2 and H6N6 since it emerged in 2014.

Two of the three isolates examined also appear to have picked up genes for amantadine (an older antiviral) resistance, that were not present in 2014.

The authors suggested there may be other - as yet undetected - H5N6 reassortants in the wild and others may yet emerge.

Today's announcement indicates that while Korea's H5N6 HA and NA genes are roughly a 99% match to earlier samples, some if its internal genes have changed - likely through reassortment - and at least one (PA gene) is only about a 92% match to previous samples. 

Exactly how these genetic changes might affect the behavior of the virus (if at all) isn't yet known, although Korea's CDC is conducting tests to determine its potential pathogenicity in humans. 

It seems likely that the virus picked up these changes as it circulated among birds in their summer breeding areas of Siberia and Northern China, a process we looked at last August in Sci Repts.: Southward Autumn Migration Of Waterfowl Facilitates Transmission Of HPAI H5N1.


First the (translated) report, then I'll return with a bit more.

H5N6 type AI virus gene analysis Intermediate results 


Entry date 2016-11-28 14:00:00

□ Genetic analysis of 4 cases of highly pathogenic AI (H5N6) virus in Korea,
* Cheonan wild bird feces, Iksan Mangyeong River white cheek duck, Haenam laying hen,
○ It was analyzed as similar to H5N6 virus which was popular in Guangdong province, Hong Kong, China
- H5 and N6 genes have the highest homology with the virus isolated from Hong Kong wild bird
* H5 gene (98.94-99.24%), N6 gene (99.06-99.13%) However, the four isolated viruses differ from each other in some internal genes.
* H5, 6 genes (over 99%), PA gene (91.77-99.81%), NS gene (96.84-99.64%),

○ Domestic isolation When compared with the H5N6 virus, which was prevalent in Guangdong province, Hong Kong and China, one of the internal genes was analyzed to be a low-pathogenic AI virus gene in wild birds,

- It is presumed that the virus is generated by recombination of Chinese H5N6 virus and low-pathogenic AI virus in wild birds,
- The process of recombination seems to have been made in the course of the arrival of wild birds infected with H5N6 in China, Guangdong Province and Hong Kong to breeding sites in Siberia and northeastern China,

□ We plan to continue the genetic analysis and pathogenicity investigation of additional AI viruses in the future.
□ In order to evaluate the harmfulness of the influenza H5N6 virus, the virus was provided to the Disease Control Headquarters of the Ministry of Health and Welfare on November 24, and the disease management headquarters will conduct an analysis on the human health risks.


Clade 2.3.4.4 viruses (which include both H5N8 and H5N6) have demonstrated an enhanced ability to reassort with other - mostly LPAI - viruses, and continue to evolve and occasionally churn out viable novel subtypes.

A recent study published in the Journal Science, called the Role for migratory wild birds in the global spread of avian influenza H5N8, stated:

Further, we found that the hemagglutinin of clade 2.3.4.4 virus was remarkably promiscuous, creating reassortants with multiple neuraminidase subtypes.
We looked at one possible explanation for these changes early last week in EID Journal: HPAI A(H5Nx) Viruses With Altered H5 Receptor-Binding Specificity, where researchers suggested:

`Altered receptor-binding properties might affect the balance between HA and NA, enable the virus to acquire different NA subtypes, and might result in altered host range and spreading.'

Regardless of the exact mechanism behind it, the genetic makeup of H5N6 clade 2.3.4.4 continues to evolve (see Continuing Reassortant of H5N6 Subtype Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus in Guangdong), making it a particularly unpredictable foe.


We will hopefully see additional, and more detailed, genetic analysis of Korea's H5N6 virus in the days to come.

Sunday, November 27, 2016

Saudi MOH Announces 1 Primary MERS Case

http://www.moh.gov.sa/en/CCC/PressReleases/Pages/statistics-2016-11-27-001.aspx
'














#11,946


After six days without reporting a new MERS case, the Saudi MOH has announced a primary case (unknown exposure) in Hafar Al-Batin in the Eastern Province, that of a 56 y.o. male in stable condition.

Two other recoveries are also reported.


Saturday, November 26, 2016

Korea: H5N6 Outbreaks Expand, Threaten Largest Chicken Producing Region




#11,945

Halfway through South Korea's mandatory 48 hour standstill of poultry, poultry products, vehicles and personnel, we continue to get new reports of outbreaks of the highly virulent H5N6 virus.


The OIE's most recent update (see below) more than doubles the number of confirmed H5N6 outbreaks - bringing that total to 14 - while fresh media reports indicate the virus has been detected in Pocheon, in the heart of Korea's chicken and egg producing region. 

First a link to the OIE Report.


Meanwhile, media reports this morning indicate that a quarter of a million chickens have been culled in Pocheon (Gyeonggi Province) in an attempt to contain the virus, which threatens the largest poultry region in the country.

Pocheon is home to 225 chicken farms, which raise more than 10 million birds, while Gyneonggi Province produces more than 20% of the nation's chicken. 

This from KBS World Radio News.  

Detection of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N6 in the region's largest chicken Korea

Published: 2016-11-26 16:20:23 updated: 2016-11-26 16:23:50

At 5 pm Monday 22/11, to declare farm on epidemic prevention agencies about 65 chickens died of unknown causes, suspected infection of bird flu virus. Test results show that the number of chickens on positive reaction to the virus highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N6. Epidemic prevention agencies conducted immediately slaughter all 240,000 chickens at a farm.

Earlier in the day 20/11, 240 chickens at a farm in the commune Baekseok cities Yangju, Gyeonggi Province, also died unexplained series. Then this is the conclusion of chickens have been infected with avian influenza virus H5N6 highly pathogenic.

In addition, room service agencies is currently receiving a report of two suspected avian influenza virus virulence high in the city of Icheon and Anseong city. So far, Gyeonggi Province had two cases be concluded that the virus infection of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N6 and two suspected cases.  


(Continue . . .)
 
Given the biosecurity lessons learned from Korea's devastating H5N8 outbreaks of 2014 and early 2015 - and the relatively few HPAI outbreaks reported last winter and spring - the rapidity with which H5N6 is spreading through Korea's poultry industry is a bit surprising. 

While the virus is presumed spread primarily by migratory birds, exactly how the virus is making direct contact with housed poultry is less well defined.
 
After the 2015 H5N8 epizootic here in the United States, APHIS Released An Updated HPAI Epidemiology Report that was unable to find one - or even a group - of factors that satisfactorily explained the spread of the virus from birds to poultry.
Some of the factors under consideration included movement of poultry, poultry products, equipment and personnel between farms, but no conclusions were reached. 

Another possibility, often discussed in this blog, is that the virus may be carried into farms by small peridomestic animals such as mice, voles, cats, or dogs that could pick up the virus from the outside environment and bring it inside.
Although it seems likely that there are multiple ways the virus is getting past farm biosecurity, identifying these holes and plugging them is a top priority.  

While HPAI hasn't returned to North America they fall, that possibility still exists, and so poultry owners - whether large commercial operations or hobby farmers - should be doing what they can to protect their flocks. 

For more on this you may wish to revisit HPAI: Battening Down The Biosecurity Hatches.