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After nearly two decades of dealing primarily with an HPAI H5N1 threat, in January of 2014 a new bird flu contender - HPAI H5N8 - would appear in South Korea, sparking a massive epizootic that would claim tens of millions of chickens over the next 120 days.
Prior to that time, H5N8 had only been seen in a low pathogenic form (although one HPAI H5N8 sample had been previously described in China).
Within a year, HPAI H5N8 would make a brief appearance in Europe - and then arrive in force in North America, sparking the worst avian epizootic in American history - killing nearly 50 million birds. Eight months later, however, there would be practically no trace of the virus left in the Americas (see PNAS: The Enigma Of Disappearing HPAI H5 In North American Migratory Waterfowl).
While HPAI H5N8 continued to circulate in east Asia, it was a no-show both in Europe and North America over the winter of 2015-2016. But a year later (Oct 2016), a reassorted HPAI H5N8 virus (see EID Journal: Reassorted HPAI H5N8 Clade 2.3.4.4. - Germany 2016) would arrive in Europe, sparking their biggest epizootic on record.
This new H5N8 was not only deadlier in some bird species, it was more easily carried by others, increasing its range and impact dramatically over the next 6 months.
The only saving grace - at least so far - has been that unlike H5N1 and H5N6, we've not seen any human infections with HPAI H5N8, although there are reports of dogs and other small mammals being susceptible to infection (see HPAI H5Nx Clade 2.3.4.4. Shedding In Cottontail Rabbits).
This new H5N8 also spun off several short-lived reassortments, including H5N5, H5N9, and H5N6 as it mingled with local (European) LPAI viruses (see HPAI H5N5 Detected In German Poultry Operation). HPAI H5N5 was considered even more virulent (in poultry) that its parental subtype.
This new virus was a reassortment of the H5N8 virus - which had ravaged Europe the previous winter, and an (unidentified) European HxN6 virus - and was reportedly similar to another H5N6 reassortment briefly reported from Greece the previous spring.
Last winter we began to see signs of a resurgence in HPAI H5N8 in Europe, with reports from Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, and Poland. And in late summer, fresh reports of HPAI H5N8 starting coming out of western Siberia and Kazakhstan, raising concerns across Europe (see ECDC & EFSA Warn Of Avian Flu Risk To Europe).
While our focus has been on H5N8's potential threat to Europe, four days ago South Korea's MAFRA (Ministry of Agriculture) announced the recent arrival of migratory birds (see The arrival of 570,000 winter migratory birds nationwide, strengthening the prevention of avian influenza).
Overnight MAFRA announced the first detection of HPAI H5N8 in environmental samples in 32 months, which will spark additional surveillance, and enhanced biosecurity measures.
Recent reports of HPAI H5N8 popping up in Russia, Kazakhstan, Europe, the Middle East, and now South Korea aren't necessarily an indication of a new wave of avian flu activity on the way, but its simultaneous reappearance in Northern Europe and Eastern Asia after an absence of nearly 3 years make it a story worth following.
(Translated)
(Bonggangcheon), press release (October 25, when distributed)2020.10.25 10:31:12Office of Defense Policy□ The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Livestock (Minister Kim Hyeon-su) said that the results of a close examination by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Livestock Quarantine on the feces of wild birds collected on October 21 in Cheonan-si, Chungcheongnam-do (Bonggangcheon), confirmed that H5N8 type highly pathogenic avian influenza (AI) was confirmed on October 25. Revealed.
○ It is the first time in 2 years and 8 months since February 1, 2018 (Gokgyocheon, H5N6 type, Asan, Chungnam) that highly pathogenic AI has been confirmed in domestic wild birds.○ The Ministry of Agriculture and Food, on October 23, detected H5 type AI antigen in the feces of the wild bird, and controlled access to the feces collection point (antigen detection point) as a preemptive quarantine measure (two members of the first responding team of the Quarantine Headquarters) and within 10 km Movement control has been implemented for the poultry farm (No.188).
□ The Ministry of Agriculture and Food announced that it will implement rapid and strengthened quarantine measures as H5N8-type highly pathogenic AI was confirmed in wild bird feces collected from Bonggangcheon, Cheonan-si, Chungcheongnam-do.
① An order to prohibit entry of persons and vehicles within a 500m radius of the antigen detection point is issued, and the execution is checked through the control post.② Entry of livestock vehicles is prohibited in the access control section of livestock vehicles at migratory birds located in three cities/guns (Cheonan, Asan, Sejong) included in the wild bird quarantine (10km radius).③ Small-scale poultry breeding farms In order to strengthen quarantine prevention, poultry breeding was prohibited nationwide, and small-scale farms in the priority quarantine management zone were not allowed to purchase or sell poultry from other farms.④ In order to strengthen the quarantine of the traditional market, operation of poultry sales offices in the traditional market in Cheonan, where highly pathogenic AI has been confirmed in wild birds, will be suspended until the movement restrictions are lifted.⑤ Distribution of live chosaengchu, jungchu (under 70 days of age) and duck is prohibited in traditional markets and garden-style restaurants across the country.
□ An official from the Ministry of Agriculture and Food said, "It is a very dangerous situation in which highly pathogenic AI can occur at any time in poultry farms, and all poultry farms nationwide should strictly comply with the prevention and prevention rules than ever before."
① Make sure that farm workers do not enter the farmland (field) near the migratory bird arrival area and the farm access road, the surrounding quicklime belt construction, and the inspection and supplementation of the barn, rice husk warehouse, and compost net network② The bell duck farm is outside the farm Thorough prevention of cross-contamination through transshipment and disinfection of transport vehicles③ In the nesting hen cluster, daily disinfection of access roads and internal roads of the complex, thorough disinfection of vehicles and people entering the complex at the control post of the complex④ Traditional market poultry sales offices are closed every week I asked for Junsu.
