#19,000
Last August we speculated over what kind of fall avian flu season we might see (H5Nx: Reassort & Repeat), following the previous year's introduction of a bovine B3.13 strain, and a new D1.1 genotype, both of which contributed to the 70+ human infections in the United States since March of 2024.
Despite these recent developments, global avian flu activity had actually declined since the 2022-2023 season (see ECDC/EFSA chart below).
While both the FAO and ECDC/EFSA data haven't been updated since November, we've already seen evidence that this year's wave of avian flu is the strongest in several years.
We are less than 3 months into the 2025-2025 season, and already:- Canada has reported almost 200 outbreaks, nearly matching the previous year's total in less than 90 days.
- The UK has already reported 77 HPAI outbreaks, compared to just 87 over the previous 24 months.
- And as of mid-November, Europe has reported (see graphic below) unprecedented surge in reports.
Asia is also struggling with avian flu, with Japan reporting 10 outbreaks, and South Korea now reporting 22. China, however, almost never reports outbreaks, and reporting from other Asian nations can be spotty.
Two days ago, in South Korean City (Naju) Orders Extraordinary Emergency Measures Due to HPAI, we looked at an unusually robust civic response to 2 outbreaks of HPAI in South Jeolla Province in recent days, which included the cancellation of outdoor holiday activities.
This followed previous reports of biosecurity failures on many South Korean farms this fall (see South Korea: MAFRA Identifies Biosecurity Breaches On HPAI Infected Poultry Farms), and South Korea's first report of 3 different subtypes of HPAI (H5N1, H5N5, H5N9) in wild birds.
Overnight MAFRA released a lengthy report describing a sharp escalation in highly HPAI H5 activity this winter - along with test results showing increased infectivity and pathogenicity this year - which has prompted orders for greatly increased biosecurity.
Normally I wouldn't post an entire report of this size, but since it is only available in Korean - and it is highly illuminating - I've posted the full translation. For those who don't want to wade through the entire text, the short version is; they appear to be dealing with a much more challenging set of HPAI viruses this fall.
Since we don't have uniform test results from all of the affected countries, it is difficult to make direct comparisons to what South Korea is reporting, and what is occurring globally.
But compared to the past couple of seasons, globally this year's HPAI appears far more formidable.
And while increased pathogenicity and/or infectivity in poultry doesn't necessarily translate to increased health risks to humans, it does increase the opportunities, intensity, and duration of exposure for those who must work with or are exposed to birds.
First, the full (translated) report, after which I'll have a brief postscript.
This winter, the highly pathogenic avian influenza virus is highly contagious, requiring further strengthening of quarantine management2025.12.25 19:27:00 Avian Influenza Prevention Division, Quarantine Policy Bureau
The Central Disaster and Safety Countermeasures Headquarters for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza ( Chief: Song Mei-ryeong, Minister of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs , hereinafter referred to as the Central Disaster and Safety Countermeasures Headquarters ) announced that as the risk of additional outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza (AI) has increased recently, an emergency quarantine meeting was held on Thursday, December 25 , chaired by Kim Jeong-wook, Director of the Agricultural Innovation Policy Office , to review the situation of highly pathogenic avian influenza outbreaks and quarantine measures and to further strengthen quarantine management .
1. Increased risk and occurrence situation
Today, an outbreak was confirmed at a laying hen farm in Pyeongtaek (the 22nd time ) , bringing the total number of highly pathogenic avian influenza cases to 22 in poultry farms and 21 in wild birds this winter ('25/'26 season ) .
* Poultry farm outbreak status ( total 22 cases ): Gyeonggi 9 cases ( Anseong 3, Paju 1, Hwaseong 2, Pyeongtaek 3), Chungbuk 4 cases ( Goesan 1, Yeongdong 1, Jincheon 1, Eumseong 1), Chungnam 3 cases ( Boryeong 1, Cheonan 2), Jeollabuk-do 2 cases ( Gochang 1, Namwon 1), Jeollanam-do 3 cases ( Naju 2, Yeongam 1), Gwangju Metropolitan City 1 case
** Status of wild bird detection ( total 21 cases ): Gyeonggi 1, Chungbuk 1, Chungnam 5, Jeonbuk 3, Jeonnam 4, Gyeongbuk 3, Gyeongnam 1, Busan 1, Gwangju 1, Seoul 1
This winter, for the first time in Korea, three types of viruses ( serotypes : H5N1, H5N6, H5N9) were detected in wild birds and poultry farms, raising the risk of further outbreaks .
In particular , the Animal and Plant Quarantine Agency conducted an evaluation of the infectivity and pathogenicity of the highly pathogenic avian influenza virus ( serotype H5N1) confirmed domestically this winter , and found that the infectivity was more than 10 times higher than in previous years .
This means that the disease can easily spread in poultry farms with a quantity of the virus that is more than 10 times smaller, so more thorough quarantine measures such as disinfection and access control are necessary than ever before .
* ( Infectious power ) The lethal dose ( LD50 : lethal dose, AI virus concentration when half of the infected chickens die ) this time is 103.3 , which is more than 10 times higher than 104.4 in the '23/'24 season and 104.6 in the '24/ '25 season .
* ( Pathogenic ) 100% mortality in case of natural infection in chickens , the average time from infection to death is 2.4 days this time, the shortest since the '20/'21 season (2.6 to 4.3 days )
In addition , looking at past outbreaks , highly pathogenic avian influenza has been occurring frequently * in December and January , and considering the current situation in various regions and with various livestock species ** , there is a risk of additional outbreaks in any region of the country, so more thorough quarantine management than ever is needed .
* 48.1% occurred in December and January ( 669 cases out of 1,389 cases since 2003 )
** Occurred in wild bird and poultry farms ( layer hens , meat breeders , native chickens , ducklings , meat ducks , quail, etc. ) in 30 cities and counties in 10 provinces and cities.
2. Results of epidemiological investigation and quarantine inspection of the outbreak farm
The Central Disaster and Safety Countermeasures Headquarters has confirmed that 16 poultry farms with confirmed outbreaks to date were not complying with basic quarantine guidelines through interim epidemiological investigations . Accordingly, the Central Disaster and Safety Countermeasures Headquarters plans to strictly enforce administrative sanctions, such as fines, and reductions in culling compensation , in accordance with the Livestock Infectious Disease Prevention Act, on farms that violate relevant regulations .
* According to the “ Standards for Payment and Reduction of Compensation in Appendix 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the Livestock Infectious Disease Prevention Act ,” the basic amount equivalent to 20/100 of the livestock appraisal value is reduced , and if any insufficient quarantine measures are identified, the compensation is additionally reduced for each applicable item.
During the special quarantine period for highly pathogenic avian influenza (AI), the Central Disaster and Safety Countermeasures Headquarters mobilized the on-site inspection team (20 teams, 40 people ) of the Animal and Plant Quarantine Agency to inspect violations of administrative orders ('25.10. 1 - 12. 22). As a result , a total of 43 farms were found to have violated the order and were issued with certificates. Of these , 30 farms (69.8%) were laying hen farms, accounting for more than two-thirds .
* 43 violating farms : 30 laying hens , 3 each of meat ducks , meat breeders , and broilers , 2 laying hens , 1 each of hatchery and livestock vehicle
The total number of violations was 58 ( including duplicates by farm ) , of which 23 cases (39.7%) were violations of administrative orders and public notices, such as insufficient disinfection of vehicles entering and exiting the farm and entry of illegal vehicles into the farm , followed by insufficient CCTV management with 11 cases ( 16.7 % ) .
* 14 cases of failure to perform level 2 disinfection of vehicles entering and exiting the farm , 9 cases of violation of farm entry by vehicles prohibited from entering ( egg transport , vaccination team , loading/unloading team )
In particular , the number of violations confirmed in laying hens (30 farms ) was 40 , and 19 cases * (40%) of them were found to be violations of the “ Administrative Order and Notice Details , ” and many violations of the ban on entry into farms by specific livestock vehicles , such as egg transport vehicles and vaccination team vehicles, were confirmed .
* 11 cases of non-implementation of two- stage disinfection (1st stage disinfection of vehicle with disinfectant → 2nd stage disinfection of vehicle wheels, etc. with high-pressure sprayer ) upon entry of livestock vehicles into farms, 8 cases of violation of prohibition of entry into farms by egg transport vehicles , vaccination team vehicles , and poultry loading/unloading crew personnel transport vehicles
In addition , as a result of an inspection of farms within the quarantine zone of Cheonan, South Chungcheong Province and Anseong , Gyeonggi Province ( within 10km ) , it was confirmed that five laying hen farms were in violation of the “ administrative order and public notice details ” and quarantine compliance matters .
* 1 case of failure to perform 2- stage disinfection when entering a livestock vehicle on the farm , 1 case of violation of the ban on entry of egg transport vehicles into the farm , 2 cases of failure to store CCTV ( closed-circuit television ) video records for more than 30 days , 1 case of failure to disinfect a forklift used for loading eggs
Accordingly , we plan to strictly enforce fines and penalties in accordance with relevant laws and regulations in cooperation with local governments , and reduce compensation for culling by up to 80% in the event of an outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza .
* In case of violation of quarantine -related administrative orders , imprisonment of up to 1 year or a fine of up to 10 million won is imposed , and in case of violation of public notices, a penalty of up to 10 million won is imposed.
The Central Disaster and Safety Countermeasures Headquarters plans to continue to inspect the quarantine status of poultry farms to prevent further spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza .
In particular, during this quarantine inspection, we will focus on cracking down on violations of the ban on entry into farms by specific livestock vehicles * , which were identified as major violations , and whether livestock vehicles that can enter farms are implementing the second- stage disinfection . We plan to strictly enforce the zero-tolerance principle and take administrative action not only against farms that violate related regulations but also against owners ( or drivers ) of vehicles entering livestock- related facilities .
* ( No entry into the farm ) Livestock vehicles such as eggs , egg trays , animal medicine , loading and unloading trucks , and delivery vehicles
3. Strengthening quarantine measures
The Central Disaster and Safety Countermeasures Headquarters is implementing the following strengthened quarantine measures to prevent further outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza .
First , from December 24, the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs will form a “Special Response Team (TF) for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Quarantine Response” in addition to the existing Central Disaster and Safety Countermeasures Headquarters for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza, and will respond with all - out efforts , including daily situation review meetings, on-site inspections of risk areas , and guidance and publicity for livestock industry officials .
* 3 teams : General response team ( intensive management of laying hens ), field inspection team ( inspection of outbreak areas, etc. ), media response team ( public relations, etc. )
Second , starting December 26, we will dispatch section chiefs and others from the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs to high-risk areas (11 cities and counties) where there is concern about additional outbreaks, including Gyeonggi , South Chungcheong , North Chungcheong , North Jeolla , and Sejong , to conduct special inspections
* Gyeonggi Pyeongtaek and Anseong , Chungnam Cheonan , Chungbuk Eumseong , Jincheon and Cheongju , Sejong , Jeollabuk Buan and Gimje
Third, laying hen farms within the quarantine zone (~10km) of four regions with a high risk of laying hen outbreaks ( Hwaseong , Pyeongtaek , Anseong , and Cheonan ) will be specially inspected and managed for 7 days ( from December 26 to January 1 of the following year ) .
* Livestock vehicles carrying livestock manure , egg deposits , and vaccinations are prohibited from entering the farm . Vehicles transporting eggs and feed that must enter are subject to special inspection and management through prior registration and conditional entry with the presence of a quarantine officer.
Fourth , to raise awareness of quarantine rules compliance among all poultry farm workers, including foreigners, we will cooperate with local governments and producer groups to strengthen guidance and promotion of quarantine rules for poultry farm workers using quarantine rule videos and promotional posters (in 8 languages * ) , and we will continue to broadcast disaster subtitles to the public in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and Safety .
* Korean , English , Thai , Nepali , Cambodian , Indian , Vietnamese , Chinese
4. Requests
Kim Jeong-wook, Director of the Agricultural Innovation Policy Office at the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs, said , “ This winter, three types of viruses ( H5N1, H5N6, H5N9) were detected in wild birds and poultry farms , and the virus’s infectious power was confirmed to be stronger than in the past. Therefore, all poultry farm workers and local government officials and quarantine agency officials across the country are requested to further strengthen quarantine measures such as controlling the entry and exit of people and vehicles and disinfection and implement them thoroughly . ”
In particular , he emphasized , “ In Gyeonggi and Chungnam , where the recent outbreak of laying hens has been concentrated, we will respond by mobilizing all quarantine personnel and resources, such as controlling the entry and exit of livestock vehicles and disinfecting them, focusing on quarantine areas to prevent the spread to surrounding areas . ”
In addition , he emphasized, “ Recently, there have been many cases where egg transport vehicles were prohibited from entering the farm and the second stage of disinfection was not carried out on the farm. Therefore , it is most important to have the mindset that I protect my own farm and to follow basic quarantine rules such as controlling the entry of people and vehicles and disinfecting them .” He also repeatedly requested, “ Manage dangerous livestock vehicles such as egg transport vehicles from entering the farm and thoroughly carry out the second stage of disinfection on vehicles entering the farm . ”
We rarely see this level of detail published by other governments, which makes it difficult to know how much of an outlier South Korea's current avian flu season might be compared to the rest of the world.
But even if South Korea is somehow the first beachhead for a new HPAI threat, history has shown that what happens to South Korean poultry rarely stays in South Korean poultry.
Which suggests we should be taking lessons from what South Korea is currently dealing with, and using them to prepare our own strategies for containment should conditions here follow suit.
