Canada: CFIA Reports 1st HPAI Poultry Outbreak SInce May

Screenshot CFIA

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While HPAI H5 no longer completely retreats each summer, the warmer months of the year usually see far less activity than the fall and winter.  And each fall, as we await the arrival of the annual southbound migration of birds, we ponder what changes that might bring (see H5Nx: Reassort & Repeat).

In the 2023-2024 avian flu season, we famously saw the emergence of a `bovine' H5N1 genotype B3.13, which has since infected (at least) 1,179 cattle herds across 20 states. 

Avian flu's return in the fall of 2024 brought with it a far more aggressive poultry/wild bird strain (D1.1) (which can also infects humans), along with a spate of oseltamivir resistant outbreaks in Canada. 

Abrupt Shift in H5N1 Genotypes in Wild Birds in US/Canada

Nature https://www.nature.com/articles/s41591-026-04300-1

Last fall - while both D1.1 and B3.13 continued to dominate - we saw the first known human infection with HPAI H5N5 in a backyard bird keeper in Washington State.  

While each fall doesn't guarantee a new wrinkle in the avian flu story, we often first notice big changes in the makeup and behavior of avian flu when migratory birds return from their high latitude roosting spots (see Sci Repts.: Southward Autumn Migration Of Waterfowl Facilitates Transmission Of HPAI H5N1).

We've already witnessed a noticeable uptick in outbreaks in commercial and backyard poultry in the United States over the past couple of weeks (see USDA dashboard below).

To this we can add Canada's first poultry outbreak since May 16th, a poultry farm in the rural municipality of De Salaberry, in Manitoba.  

Canada's first poultry outbreak of the new season comes at roughly the same time as last year (Sept 9th), and considerably earlier than the first Canadian outbreak of fall 2024 (Oct 21st).

Whether this fall brings anything substantially different remains to be seen, and unfortunately, we probably won't learn about any genetic changes for several months. As we saw last year, in Nature: Lengthy Delays in H5N1 Genome Submissions to GISAID, the average delay in submitting sequences to GISAID was 7 months (228 days), with some countries taking nearly 2 years.

  

And genetic sequences - even when they are submitted to GISAID - are often devoid of crucial metadata (i.e. collection date, exact location, host-specific information, etc.), limiting their value to the scientific community.

For now, we'll have to content ourselves with less specific data; where, when, the size, and the type of outbreak (commercial poultry, backyard flocks, livestock, peridomestic mammals, or even humans). 

In the meantime, if you raise backyard birds, or frequent live markets, now is a good time to familiarize yourselves with the risks of avian flu, and the things you can do to reduce those risks.

UF/IFAS Extension: What Backyard Flock Owners Need to Know about Bird Flu (Influenza H5N1)

Eurosurveillance: Emergence and spread of NA-I223V and NA-S247N double-mutant A(H1N1)pdm09 influenza viruses with reduced oseltamivir susceptibility in the Netherlands and beyond, 2023 to 2026

 

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Regular readers know that we've been following an uptick in reports of  `reduced susceptibility' of the seasonal H1N1 flu virus to the antiviral drug oseltamivir (aka `Tamiflu') around the globe for the past 3 years.

In March 2024 The Lancet published - Global Emergence of Neuraminidase Inhibitor-Resistant Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 Viruses with I223V and S247N Mutations - which reported a much higher incidence of oseltamivir resistance among samples tested in Hong Kong in 2023. 

Instead of the H275Y mutation which caused nearly total resistance in 2008, these viruses carried dual I223V/S247N mutations which together produced a ≈ 10-fold reduced inhibition by oseltamivir.  

Concerning, but not enough of a hit to invalidate the clinical use of the drug. 

This was followed up 3 months later by EID Journal: Multicountry Spread of Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 Viruses with Reduced Oseltamivir Inhibition, May 2023–February 2024 which reported a ≈ 13-fold reduced inhibition by oseltamivir

In July of 2025, Virus Research: A 15-year Study of Neuraminidase Mutations and the Increasing of S247N Mutation in Spain, we looked at a study that found a sharp increase in detections of the NA:S247N mutation beginning in 2024, but not including I223V.

Last December, in Eurosurveillance: Expansion of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 NA:S247N Viruses with Reduced Susceptibility to Oseltamivir, Catalonia, Spain, and in Europe, July to October 2025. a Rapid Communications reported on another dramatic surge in H1N1 viruses carrying the NA:S247N mutation in Catalonia Spain, and other parts of Europe.

Abrupt rise in resistance in Catalonia, Spain - fall 2025

Some weeks (see above graphic), as many as 100% of viruses tested showed this NA:S247N mutation. 

The good news, however, was that once again, a second permissive mutation - NA:I223V - was not detected in these recent Catalonia isolates. 

As for detections in the United States (see Feb 2026 blog), over the entire 2024-2025 flu season - out of 1697 H1N1 viruses tested - only one carried the NA-I223V and NA-S247N amino acid substitutions.

And reassuringly, during the first 13 weeks of the 2025-2026 flu season (Oct - Dec) the CDC reported zero elevated resistance among the first 193 H1N1 viruses tested (see FluView Wk 53).  

But shortly after the New Year we began to seen an uptick in reduced inhibition detections in the United States. By late February (FluView week 7) - based on 517 H1N1 isolates tested since October - the CDC reported 10 isolates with reduced inhibition and 4 with highly reduced inhibition (due to NA:H275Y).

In early June we looked at the last full FluView report of the 2025-2026 flu season, which reported a total 20 reduced inhibition results, and 11 highly reduced results:

Nine A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses had NA-H275Y amino acid substitution conferring highly reduced inhibition by oseltamivir and peramivir. Nineteen A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses had amino acid substitutions NA-I223V and NA-S247N and showed reduced inhibition by oseltamivir. One A(H1N1)pdm09 virus had amino acid substitutions NA-I223T and NA-S247N and showed reduced inhibition by oseltamivir. Two A(H3N2) viruses had amino acid substitution NA-E119V conferring highly reduced inhibition by oseltamivir. Three B viruses had amino acid substitution NA-M464T and showed reduced inhibition by peramivir.

While the number of S247N+I223V mutations remains low (2.1%), this was more than a 35-fold increase over the previous year. And equally concerning - after an extended absence - the tag team of S247N+I223V was being reported again in a newer NA-clade H1N1 virus.

All of which brings us to this week's Eurosurveillance dispatch, which reports on a similar rise of S247N+I223V in the Netherlands; first in 2024 and then - after a brief absence - again in 2026.

Due to its technical nature, I've only posted some excerpts. Those seeking a deeper dive will want to follow the link to read it in its entirety.   I'll have a postscript after the break.

Emergence and spread of NA-I223V and NA-S247N double-mutant A(H1N1)pdm09 influenza viruses with reduced oseltamivir susceptibility in the Netherlands and beyond, 2023 to 2026 

Zandra Felix Garza1 , Dirk Eggink1 , Mariam Bagheri1 , Sharon van den Brink1 , Gabriel Goderski1 , Mark Pronk2 , Pascal Lexmond2 , Mariëtte Hooiveld3 , Rianne van Gageldonk-Lafeber1 , Björn Koel2 , Ron Fouchier2 , Adam Meijer1

In 2023/24, a neuraminidase (NA)-clade of A(H1N1)pdm09 influenza viruses carrying the NA-I223V amino-acid substitution emerged, followed by acquisition of NA-S247N [1-3]. Both substitutions individually increase the 50 per cent inhibitory concentration (IC50) by oseltamivir but the resulting IC50-fold-increase remains below the threshold for reduced inhibition (RI) (IC50-fold-change > 10 compared with median IC50 of wildtype (WT) viruses [4]). In double-mutant viruses, the substitutions act synergistically, causing phenotypically RI by oseltamivir, but not by zanamivir [1,2].

In late 2025, Saubi et al. [5] reported re-emergence of A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses carrying NA-S247N in Spain and elsewhere in Europe. Here, we show the re-emergence of A(H1N1)pdm09 NA-I223V and NA-S247N double-mutant viruses in 2025/26 in the Netherlands and assess their phenotypic susceptibility, global spread and evolution from 2023 to 2026.

Discussion

The recent expansion of A(H1N1)pdm09 influenza virus clusters carrying either NA-I223V (2023/24) or NA-S247N (2025/26) was followed in both seasons by the emergence and spread of double-mutant viruses combining these substitutions, causing RI by oseltamivir. This pattern suggests a fitness advantage of single and double mutants [2], although they have not become permanently dominant. The appearance of double mutants is likely independent of antiviral selection, as NA inhibitors are only sporadically used in several countries reporting high proportions of these viruses and such viruses have not been reported from Japan, where NA inhibitor use by capita is highest [14,15], in publicly available GISAID data.

NA-I223V and NA-S247N, alone or in combination, have been proposed as changes that compensate for the fitness cost of NA-H275Y, which confers highly RI by oseltamivir [16]. Both substitutions individually, and especially together, further drastically reduce inhibition by oseltamivir in NA-H275Y mutants [16,17].

During the study period, NA-S247N together with NA-H275Y was detected 33 times and once as a triple mutant including NA-I223V, confirming that such variants showing very high RI can arise and are of concern. Phenotypic data for Dutch viruses show that the 2025/26 NA-I223V combined with NA-S247N double mutant display oseltamivir RI while retaining normal inhibition by zanamivir, similar to the 2023/24 double-mutant and reports elsewhere [1,2,17]. The shown impact of different reference IC50 values on fold-change calculations highlights the need for caution in using WT data and interpreting IC50 values near the 10-fold RI threshold, given the arbitrary nature of the defined threshold values [11]. Synergistic IC50 increases in double mutants should nonetheless be carefully monitored and reported. The impact of these double mutants on clinical management of influenza patients is unknown and should be part of future studies.

Dominance of double mutants within defined HA/NA-subclusters, with gradual accumulation of additional changes, suggests global dissemination from one or several initial emergence(s) or introduction(s), although occasional detection of double mutants in other NA-clades indicates that parallel evolution of similar A(H1N1)pdm09 variants showing oseltamivir RI is also possible. Awareness is therefore warranted whenever NA-I223V or NA-S247N become fixed in spreading subclusters. The recent emergence and spread of NA-S247N in NA-clade D.1 on an HA-clade D.3.1.1 background should be closely monitored during the progressing 2026 southern hemisphere and coming 2026/27 northern hemisphere seasons. Similar to the abundancy of NA-clade D.3 with NA-S247N in HA-clade D.3.1.1 background, HA-clade D.3.1.1 viruses could provide a favourable context for the expansion of such viruses carrying NA of clade D.1 with NA-S247N.

Our global assessment is limited by reliance on non‑embargoed sequences and metadata in GISAID. Country and regional representativeness depends on local laboratory capacity to sequence at least the HA and NA gene segments, and on whether data are submitted to GISAID or other databases (e.g. GenBank, Pathoplexus). While WHO Collaborating Centres partly compensate for gaps at NICs by sequencing of representative viruses shared by NICs and submitting these sequence data to GISAID, our analysis may still over‑estimate mutant presence in some regions and under‑estimate it in others. Our study outcomes should therefore be interpreted in light of these sampling and database‑related limitations.

Conclusion

Our findings highlight the need for continued surveillance on the evolution of A(H1N1)pdm09 influenza viruses and the possible emergence of mutants, especially double and triple ones, with antiviral (highly) RI. The capacity to phenotypically evaluate the impact of individual and combinations of amino-acid substitutions associated with antiviral (highly) RI remains a critical component of this surveillance.

        (Continue . . . )

In 2024 we saw sporadic reports of I223V+S247N in H1N1 NA-Clade C.5.3.3 viruses which produced a 12-13 fold reduction in oseltamivir susceptibility. By 2025 they had largely disappeared, replaced by reports of less impactful single S247N mutations spreading in Europe.

Fast forward to 2026 and we find that the I223V+S247N combo has reappeared in a genetically different NA-clade (D.3) H1N1 virus, suggesting the earlier appearance was more than just a fluke. 

Where this story goes from here is anyone's guess, but should the I223V+S247N combo team up with additional permissive mutations (including H275Y) - and also become more prevalent in seasonal H1N1 - it could compromise the clinical effectiveness of our primary influenza antiviral drug; oseltamivir.   

A lot of `ifs', but given the stakes, this is a story very much worth following. 

The CDC should resume reporting on antiviral mutations in October, and hopefully we'll be getting similar reports out of Europe later this fall.  

South Korean CDC Issues Early Seasonal Flu Epidemic Advisory

Proportion of Suspected Influenza Cases in Clinics
( As of Sep 5, 2026 ; Persons / 1,000 Persons )

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Typically, nations in the Northern Hemisphere don't even begin tracking seasonal  influenza seriously until October 1st; the assumed start of each year's flu season.  Our own CDC only publishes an abbreviated  FluView report during the summer months (see Week 20 2026 notice below).

Two weeks ago (Aug 28th), however, Japan announced the earliest start since the 2009 H1N1 pandemic for their flu season (see Japan MHLW Reports Unusually Early Start to the Fall Flu Season), while Taiwan reported this week `. . . emergency room visits reached 11.2%, exceeding the epidemic threshold (11.0%), indicating the start of the epidemic period.'

Hong Kong - which often reports a biphasic flu season - continues to report a strong summer wave of influenza, and China reports elevated flu activity in their southern provinces for week 36. 

This unusual wave of early flu continues, as today South Korea's CDC issued an early seasonal flu advisory, citing a 4x higher rate of ILI (Influenza-like Illness)  consultations this week than a year ago. 

        (translation)

Influenza Epidemic Advisory Issued for 2026-2027 Season; Early Outbreak Compared to Previous Years, Response Strengthened for Students and High-Risk Groups (Fri, Sept. 11)

Date written 2026.09.11
Last modified date 2026.09.11
Department in charge Infectious Disease Control Division
contact 043-719-7141

Influenza Epidemic Advisory Issued for 2026-2027 Season; Early-than-usual Outbreak, Response Strengthened for Students and High-Risk Groups

- With the start of the season, “2026-2027 Season Influenza Epidemic Advisory Issued” starting September 11 (Fri)

- Although COVID-19 levels are lower than the same period last year, the number of hospitalized patients continues to increase

- Conducted a review of the epidemic status and response measures together with experts and relevant ministries

Emphasize wearing a mask when experiencing respiratory symptoms and urge adherence to preventive measures against respiratory infections, such as covering the mouth and nose with a tissue or sleeve when coughing; high-risk groups need to visit a medical institution early for appropriate treatment if they experience fever or respiratory symptoms.

The Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency (Director Lim Seung-kwan) announced that, as the incidence of influenza is higher than in previous years, it held the "9th Meeting of the Inter-Ministerial Joint Task Force on Respiratory Infectious Diseases" with medical experts and relevant ministries (Ministry of Health and Welfare, Ministry of Food and Drug Safety, Ministry of Education) to review the current status of influenza and COVID-19 outbreaks and response measures, and issued an "Influenza Epidemic Advisory" starting at 00:00 on September 11 (Fri).

(Criteria for issuing an epidemic advisory for the '26-'27 season) Issued following expert consultation when the proportion of suspected influenza (ILI) cases exceeds the epidemic threshold for the relevant season and the influenza virus detection rate is 5% or higher.

※ Influenza-like illness (ILI): Cases where a cough or sore throat is present along with a fever of 38°C or higher

【 Current Status of Influenza and COVID-19 Outbreaks 】

According to the results of the sample surveillance of influenza-like illness (ILI) at clinics, the proportion of influenza-like illness cases in the 36th week of 2026 (Aug. 30–Sept. 5) was 25.3 per 1,000 outpatients, exceeding the epidemic threshold for this season (12.9) and rapidly increasing to a high level compared to the same period last year (6.6).

* (ILI rate over the last 4 weeks) Week 33 7.5 → Week 34 9.2 → Week 35 13.3 → Week 36 25.3

※ The influenza surveillance system operates from week 36 to week 35 of the following year (September to August of the following year) as a single season.

Incidence is increasing across all age groups, with a relatively high and rapid increase observed in the school-age and infant/child age groups, in the order of 7-12 years (75.1 people), 1-6 years (49.8 people), and 13-18 years (31.3 people).

* 7-12 years (75.1 people) > 1-6 years (49.8 people) > 13-18 years (31.3 people) > 0 years (24.0 people) > 19-49 years (23.5 people) > 50-64 years (11.8 people) > 65 years and older (8.8 people)

The number of inpatients at sample medical institutions at the hospital level in week 36 was 300, which is about double the number from last week (166) and shows a higher incidence compared to the same period last year (23 in week 36 of '25), and the age group of inpatients aged 65 or older accounts for the largest proportion at 60.0%.

* (Number of hospitalized patients in the last 4 weeks) Week 33: 78 → Week 34: 89 → Week 35: 166 → Week 36: 300

The detection rate of influenza viruses is also showing an increasing trend*, and the influenza virus currently in circulation is Type A (H1N1) pdm09, which is similar to the vaccine strain for this season** and has been confirmed to have no mutations affecting resistance to treatment.

* (Detection rate over the last 4 weeks) Week 33 5.4% → Week 34 10.0% → Week 35 12.3% → Week 36 16.3%
**The virus used to produce the influenza vaccine recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO)

(SNIP)

The Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency plans to sequentially implement the national influenza vaccination program starting Monday, September 21, but it also plans to review measures to adjust the vaccination schedule, focusing on high-risk groups including immunocompromised individuals, by comprehensively considering the epidemic situation and vaccine supply schedule.

(Continue . . . )

Many countries won't begin to ramp up their fall flu vaccination campaigns until October (see UKHSA blog), and as cited above, South Korea's target date is still 10 days away. 

 

Given that this year's fall flu vaccines have been updated to reflect recent antigenic changes observed in all 3 seasonal flu types (see WHO Recommendations for Influenza Vaccine Composition), community immunity against this fall's array of circulating flu viruses may be low.  

Complicating matters, South Korea is also reporting low, but rising, rates of COVID infection:

In addition, the number of COVID-19 inpatients at hospital-level sample surveillance medical institutions in the 36th week of 2026 (Aug. 30–September 5) was 193, which is lower than the same period of the previous year (433 in the 36th week of 2025), but has been continuously increasing since August, and by age group, the elderly aged 65 or older accounted for the largest proportion at 65.3% of the total.

* (Number of hospitalized patients in the last 4 weeks) Week 33: 57 → Week 34: 61 → Week 35: 115 → Week 36: 193

COVID wastewater surveillance (see chart below) shows increasing detection in sewage.

While none of this tells us much about the severity of this year's flu season, it does suggest that it may be upon us sooner than we expect.  Of course, what happens in Asia isn't necessarily a harbinger for what we see in North America or Europe, but it is definitely worthy of our attention. 

The U.S. CDC should publish their updated Respiratory Virus Activity Levels report later today, but last week's report showed very little flu, and low, but rising COVID activity. 

 

Stay tuned. While things are quiet now, it could be a bumpy fall. 

The Lancet Regional Health Europe (Comment): If the EU is serious about One Health, it must ban fur farming

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Last month, in That Touch of Mink Flu (H5N1 in Utah Edition), we looked at the latest report of an avian flu virus detected in 7 captive (presumably farmed, but details are scant) mink here in the United States.  

This time, the viral culprit was avian H5N1, but over the years we've followed numerous reports of zoonotic pathogens detected on fur farms, with some even spilling over into humans.  

While mink are most frequently cited, fox, raccoon dogs, and rabbits are also farmed.  Some early reports include:

• As far back as 1984, a large outbreak in Swedish mink farms was found to be due to the H10N4 avian virus.

• In 2006 CIDRAP reported on a European mink found infected with an aggressive form of the H5 flu virus in the Blekinge region of southern Sweden near where H5N1 had been detected in wild birds.
• In 2007, an antigenically distinct H3N2 Swine Influenza was detected in Canadian Mink, reported in a 2009 Journal of Clinical Microbiology study called Characterization of a Canadian Mink H3N2 Influenza A Virus Isolate Genetically Related to Triple Reassortant Swine Influenza Virus.

• In 2009's That Touch Of Mink Flu, at least 11 mink farms in the Holstebro municipality of Denmark were reported to be infected with a variant of the human H3N2 virus.
• 2017's That Touch Of Mink Flu (H9N2) - Revisited looked at the spread of LPAI H9N2 in mink.

It was in 2020, however, when a unique mink-variant of SARS-CoV-2 was discovered spreading through millions of farmed mink in Denmark - which then jumped to humans - that the alarm bells were really raised (see EID Journal: SARS-CoV-2 Transmission between Mink (Neovison vison) and Humans, Denmark).

This prompted authorities to order the depopulation of 17 million mink (see Denmark Orders Culling Of All Mink Following Discovery Of Mutated Coronavirus), to temporarily lock down North Jutland (where most of the human cases had been identified) and led to some countries banning travel to and from Denmark.

 

Denmark wasn't alone, as fur farms in Spain, the United States, Canada, and several other European countries all eventually reported outbreaks of COVID, with some evidence of spillovers into humans (see CDC: Investigating Possible Mink-To-Human Transmission Of SARS-CoV-2 In The United States).

Alarms were raised again in the fall of 2022 when H5N1 began spreading rapidly through a large mink farm in Spain (see Eurosurveillance: HPAI A(H5N1) Virus Infection in Farmed Minks, Spain, October 2022).

This mink-derived H5N1 virus from Spain carried a rare mutation (PB2-T271A), which is believed to `enhance the polymerase activity of influenza A viruses in mammalian host cells and mice'. In 2023 the CDC issued an IRAT Risk Assessment On Mink Variant of Avian H5N1, finding its scores had risen in 6 of the 10 parameters used to evaluate their zoonotic potential.

The following year (2023) Finland's fur industry was hit unusually hard by HPAI H5N1, with more than 70 fur farms infected, and > 500,000 animals culled, prompting  Finland's Institute for Health and Welfare (THL) to warn `Avian influenza poses a risk to public health – improvements to health security needed at fur farms'.

During the height of this outbreak, we looked at an excellent opinion piece (see PNAS: Mink Farming Poses Risks for Future Viral Pandemics) penned by two well known virologists from the UK (Professor Wendy Barclay & Tom Peacock) on why fur farms - and mink farms in particular - are high risk venues for flu.

Since then we've seen several other notable outbreaks, including SFTS in Chinese Farmed Mink and a reassorted swine and human-origin H3N2 in Canadian farmed mink.  Many farms, and governments, are reluctant to provide details on outbreaks, and so we are likely only seeing the tip of the iceberg. 

While some EU countries have taken steps to phase out or ban fur farming, the industry continues in many parts of the world, including China, Russia, the United States, Canada and parts of the EU.

All of which brings us to a commentary, published two weeks ago in The Lancet Regional Health: Europe, which calls upon the EU to ban fur farming due to the public health risks they pose. 

If the EU is serious about One Health, it must ban fur farming
Joanna Swabea Send email to jswabe@humaneworld.org ∙ Chris Walzerb,c ∙ Benjamin Roched,e ∙ Arnaud Fontanetf ∙ Thijs Kuikeng ∙ Manon Lounnasd ∙ et al. 
Received August 4, 2026; Accepted August 20, 2026; Published August 29, 2026
DOI: 10.1016/j.lanepe.2026.101848 External Link 
Copyright: © 2026 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd.
User License: Creative Commons Attribution – NonCommercial – NoDerivs (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) | Elsevier's open access license policy

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The One Health approach, which recognises the fundamental interconnectedness of human wellbeing with that of other animals and the environment, is a keystone of the European Union’s health policy.1 While the prevention of zoonotic diseases, including pandemics, is a core objective of this policy, the European Commission paradoxically seems reluctant to take decisive action to address one of the highest risk sources within its borders precisely at the moment when it finally can do so. 

Specifically, the Commission is currently considering legislation to ban fur farming in the EU, prompted by a 2023 European Citizens’ Initiative on the issue that had the support of more than 1.5 million EU citizens.2 A decision was due by March 2026, but the Commission has thus far delayed issuing one. There are indications that it may instead propose minimum welfare standards for the intensive production of fur-producing animals.2 However, doing so would be a grave mistake for animals and humans alike.

Fur farming is a niche industry producing non-essential luxury products, yet it poses a threat to human health. It is an avoidable anthropogenic system that concentrates large numbers of genetically homogeneous, susceptible wild fur-bearing animals in close confinement creating the conditions that favour the introduction, amplification, adaptation and spillover of pathogens to humans (spillover being the transmission of a pathogen from one vertebrate species to another).3 Once a pathogen is introduced to captive animals on these farms (whether from humans, contaminated feed, or from wildlife attracted to the farms), it can spread easily and eventually infect humans working on these farms.3

Fur farms have already been implicated in serious outbreaks in multiple countries across Europe. In 2020, for example, mink became infected with SARS-CoV-2 on multiple mink farms in the Netherlands, with subsequent “spillback” of SARS-CoV-2 from mink into humans.4 SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks were also identified on 290 mink farms in Denmark, resulting in hundreds of COVID-19 cases in humans caused by mink variant strains.5 The Danish government responded by culling the country’s entire farmed mink population — 17 million animals — while compensating mink farmers over €3 billion for their losses.6,7 It also suspended mink farming activities, but these have since resumed.

Lessons learned?

The lesson learned from COVID-19 was not that more surveillance could make fur farms safe, but rather that surveillance documented the predictable consequences of a production system that facilitates pathogen introduction, amplification and adaptation. This cyclical reactive response followed by a return to business as usual reflects a pervasive global health security framework that is unsustainable. One Health is fundamentally about investing upstream, reducing the conditions that give rise to disease emergence rather than continually paying for downstream surveillance and response, after damage is already done. Continuing to invest public resources in managing risks generated by an economically failing niche industry is difficult to reconcile with the EU’s preventive One Health ambitions.7

Outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) have also affected fur farms. In 2023, infections were confirmed on multiple fur farms in Finland, likely introduced to captive animals from wild birds.8 Spain also recorded an H5N1 outbreak on a mink farm in 2022, with possible viral mutation on the farm.9 An especially concerning aspect of influenza in mink is that they are susceptible to influenza viruses originating from both birds and humans. They can therefore serve as a host in which genetic reassortment occurs, which is a known route for the evolution of influenza viruses that can cause pandemics.3

These outbreaks have accelerated the decline of the EU fur farming industry. By 2024, fur production had dropped to an annual low of 6.3 million pelts, corresponding to €183 million in sales — a decline of 92% compared with the previous decade.7 Meanwhile, the industry costs European society approximately €446 million per year after accounting for its environmental and public health consequences.7 Consumers and fashion brands are also turning away from fur, and 24 (out of 27) EU Member States have already enacted production bans or restrictions on fur farming.7

The public moral concerns about the welfare of animals on fur farms, which precipitated these restrictions, are also well-founded. Indeed, the European Food Safety Authority concluded through an independent scientific investigation that, in the current caged fur farming system, the most serious adverse welfare consequences for mink, foxes, raccoon dogs and chinchillas cannot be prevented or substantially mitigated in the majority of cases.10 It is highly doubtful that changing cage dimensions, introducing enrichment requirements or inspection regimes will achieve meaningful animal welfare improvements. What it certainly will not do is remove the core epidemiological hazards posed by fur farming, namely keeping large numbers of captive bred-wild mammals in intensive systems where viruses can circulate and evolve.

If the European Commission intends to do more than merely pay lip service to One Health, it must accept accountability and take action before the next zoonotic crisis occurs. Banning fur farming would demonstrate what effective One Health policy looks like in practice: eliminating an avoidable anthropogenic source of zoonotic disease risk, while responding to citizens' concerns, thereby establishing Europe as a global leader in upstream pandemic prevention.

        (Continue. . . )

The concern, particularly with high density animal farms, is that it provides the virus with an ideal environment to spread from mammal to mammal. Long chains of infection (see graphic below) can provide the virus with additional opportunities to adapt to a new host species, furthering its evolution.

 Admittedly, the next pandemic could arise from any farmed livestock (poultry, swine, cattle, etc.), or even from the wild. We can never truly pandemic-proof our world. 

But fur farming practices are arguably more conducive to the generation and spread of zoonotic viruses, as mink are highly susceptible to influenza and coronaviruses, and it is common in many countries to feed raw poultry or poultry meat products to mink raised in captivity.

Whether we can summon the political will to do something about this threat remains to be seen.  

NERC Reliability Report: Large Computational Load Risks Due to Voltage Sensitivity

 

Link

What is a catastrophic power outage?

• Events beyond modern experience that exhaust or exceed mutual aid capabilities
• Likely to be no-notice or limited-notice events that could be complicated by a cyber-physical attack
• Long duration, lasting several weeks to months due to physical infrastructure damage
• Affects a broad geographic area, covering multiple states or regions and affecting tens of millions of people
• Causes severe cascading impacts that force critical sectors—drinking water and wastewater systems, communications, transportation, healthcare, and financial services—to operate in a degraded state

 (Excerpt From Dec 2018 NIAC Report)

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Eight years ago, in NIAC: Surviving A Catastrophic Power Outage, we looked at a presidential commission's report on the risks of a major, prolonged, grid collapse.  

This 92-page report was released a little more than a year after hurricane ravaged Puerto Rico suffered the longest (11-month) grid failure in American History  and a year following another report - DHS: NIAC Cyber Threat Report - August 2017 - that warned of growing cyber threats to our critical infrastructure and called for `bold, decisive actions'.

While previously the biggest threats to the grid were thought to be natural disasters (earthquakes, hurricanes, ice storms, severe space weather, etc.), `bad actors' (cyber-threats, sabotage, etc.), or aging infrastructure (see ASCE report card on America’s infrastructure), the recent and rapidly increasing power demands from A.I. data centers and bitcoin mining operations have added yet another potential point of failure.

Last summer the U.S. Department of Energy published a 73-page report that warned that if current schedules for retirement of reliable power generation (especially baseload) continue, without enough firm replacement, the risk of blackouts by 2030 could increase dramatically.

Number one on their Key Takeaways was:

Status Quo is Unsustainable. The status quo of more generation retirements and less dependable replacement generation is neither consistent with winning the AI race and ensuring affordable energy for all Americans, nor with continued grid reliability (ensuring “resource adequacy”).

 
Absent intervention, it is impossible for the nation’s bulk power system to meet the AI growth requirements while maintaining a reliable power grid and keeping energy costs low for our citizens.

In 2006 NERC, or the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, was tasked with "ensuring the reliability of the North American bulk power system" following the 2003 Northeast blackout which affected more than 50 million people in the United States and Ontario, Canada.

We've been following their reliability reports and mitigation efforts for many years, but last February we looked at an a 181-page NERC Long-Term Reliability Report which warned that our power grid is facing a growing risk of electrical shortfalls over the next decade.

For those wanting a brief summary, NERC published the following press release (see Resource Adequacy Risks Intensify Across North America as Demand Growth Surges).

January 29, 2026

WASHINGTON, D.C. – NERC’s 2025 Long-Term Reliability Assessment (LTRA) and infographic spotlight intensifying resource adequacy risks throughout the North American bulk power system (BPS) over the next 10 years. Summer peak demand is forecast to grow by 224 GW, a more than 69% increase over the 2024 LTRA forecast with new data centers for artificial intelligence and the digital economy accounting for most of the projected increase.

Winter demand growth continues to outpace summer demand growth with 246 GW of growth forecast over the next 10 years, reflecting the evolution of electricity usage. Uncertainty and lag in the pace of new resource additions are driving heightened concerns that industry will not be able to keep up with rapidly increasing demand.

       (Continue . . . )

Four months ago, in NERC Issues Level 3 Alert As Grid Faces `Unprecedented Challenges' Due to Surge In Large Power Consumers we looked at a new threat; that the power draw from these massive computing centers can be erratic, with sudden drop offs and surges, that can destabilize the grid.

Previously, NERC had warned:

NERC, Regional Entities, and NERC registered entities have analyzed a series of disturbances that occurred on the bulk power system (BPS) resulting in widespread and unexpected customer-initiated load reduction of large loads. These disturbances involved multiple events during which 1,000+ MW of unexpected Large Loads output reduction occurred, with most events occurring in 2024 or 2025. The increase of Large Loads-related events coincides with an increase in Large Load penetration across the BPS.

Since then, it has become apparent that:

• the risks are increasing
• real-world events are already occurring,
• and industry response to the earlier alert has been insufficient

While we've seen similar warnings for more than a year, this week NERC released a 3-page report which described several recent incidents where abrupt power demand drops temporarily affected the grid. 

(Excerpt)

One risk detailed by the LLWG and enumerated in two NERC incident reviews (1, 2) is the voltage sensitivity of computational loads. There have been several incidents involving computational loads that have been shown to impact BPS operations when the loads remove themselves from the system during system disturbances. Several voltage-sensitive customer-initiated load reductions have occurred in the Eastern Interconnection and the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) over the past two years.

The incidents largely unfold in a familiar pattern:

• The grid experiences a normally cleared fault, and voltage dips occur as part of normal reclosing to isolate the fault.
• After several reclosing attempts, computational load entities react to the voltage dips by transferring their load to their backup power systems, removing themselves from the grid, with the goal of protecting their equipment from outages and any potential damage resulting from prolonged voltage dips
• As a result, large amounts of demand suddenly disappear from the BPS, creating oscillations on the systems as generation rebalances frequency and voltage to meet the remaining demand.

Historically, the electric grid has not experienced, nor planned or operated for, these significant amounts of simultaneous load losses in response to a fault on the system. Rather, planners and operators have traditionally focused on the risk of large generation losses (and generators must meet certain Reliability Standards associated with “riding through” these types of faults).

While these recent load reduction incidents did not create any near- or long-term issues for the system, future incidents could result in severe impacts given the expansion in the number and size of computational load sites, especially when their deployment is geographically concentrated (such as in “Data Center Alley” in Virginia).

 Additionally, since all computational loads on a circuit could see the same disturbance and take the same action, this creates significant common-mode failure risk.

       (Continue . . . )

While none of these reported incidents have seriously threatened the grid, and the tone of this report is cautiously optimistic that the risks going forward are manageable; it stresses that:

The North American BPS has reached a historic juncture defined by the rapid change in the nature and volume of electricity demand. Recent customer-initiated load reduction events underscore the potential significant risks that large computational loads may present to BPS reliability. Fortunately, mitigation options are available, and computational load stakeholders have taken proactive steps to work with NERC, the Regional Entities, and grid operators.  

While work is being done to reduce these risks, data centers aren't the only threat to the grid. As a Floridian who has gone through more than a few extended power outages - sometimes lasting a week or more - I've learned to put my faith more in preparedness rather than reassurances.   

Which is why I've got 60 gals of water stockpiled, a full pantry, and a basic solar power setup (see Emergency Solar Power: Revisited); enough to provide lights, fans, and to keep my phone charged. 

While I can't tell you what disruptions will come, or when they might occur, I firmly believe that being prepared - in advance - is the best insurance you and your family can have in an increasingly uncertain world.

Poultry Sci & Mgt: Partial Protection of Commercial H5 Avian Influenza Vaccines to clade 2.3.4·4b H5N1 and H5N8 Avian Influenza Infections in Chickens

Poultry Vaccination - Photo Credit OIE

#19,327

Nearly 14 years ago, in Egypt: A Paltry Poultry Vaccine, we looked at an analysis by the researchers from the Virology department at St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital - that studied the effectiveness of six commercially available H5 poultry vaccines then deployed in Egypt.

They reported - out of the 6 vaccines tested - only one (based on a locally acquired H5N1 seed virus) actually appeared to offer genuine protection.

This was at a time when H5 vaccination was only utilized by a handful of countries (primarily China, Indonesia, Egypt, and Vietnam), and the OIE (now WOAH) routinely warned that vaccination of poultry `. . . cannot be considered a long-term solution to combating the avian flu virus'.

The authors of this study urged: 

In light of our findings, we recommend that the H5N1 prevention and control strategy in Egypt be updated and reinforced. Special consideration should be given to the vaccination strategy, and the use of vaccines based on currently circulating viruses is advisable.

Fast-forward 6 years (2018) and the St. Jude research team revisited Egypt's poultry vaccination program (see Sci. Reports: Efficacy Of AI Vaccines Against The H5N8 Virus in Egypt), and found many of the same problems persisted. 

They wrote:

Our results indicate that most of the commercial poultry H5 vaccines used in the present study were ineffective because the seed viruses in these vaccines are genetically distinct from the H5N8 viruses currently circulating in Egypt.

Although some of the commercial vaccines protected chickens from mortality, they failed to prevent chickens from shedding the virus. Accordingly, we recommend updating and reinforcing the H5N8 prevention and control strategies in Egypt. The vaccination strategy should be reconsidered based on currently circulating viruses.

While the reduced mortality among poultry may have seemed like a `win' for farmers, theses avian flu viruses could continue to spread - often unnoticed - due to the `masking' of symptoms by the vaccine.

Of course, Egypt wasn't alone in the continued use of older, mismatched, poultry vaccines.  Earlier in 2018, in PLoS One: Effectiveness of HPAI H5N1 Vaccination in Poultry - Indonesia, we looked at an assessment of that country's poultry vaccination campaign. 

HPAI vaccination, intensively applied in Sector 3 layers in Indonesia, had highly variable outcome, including vaccination failures and did not provide sufficiently long protective immunity in the majority of flocks. Indonesia adopted HPAI vaccination in 2004 with the aim of reducing the incidence of H5N1 infections in poultry, with the ultimate objective of achieving eradication of the virus.

The concern is that vaccine mismatches, and/or poor or inconsistent application, can allow avian flu to spread silently among flocks, and may allow AI viruses to continue to reassort and evolve, potentially leading to the emergence of new variants of avian flu.

 A few earlier blogs addressing those concerns include:

Subclinical Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus Infection among Vaccinated Chickens, China.

Study: Recombinant H5N2 Avian Influenza Virus Strains In Vaccinated Chickens

EID Journal: Subclinical HPAI In Vaccinated Poultry – China

While there have certainly been successful avian flu vaccination campaigns (see EID Journal: China's H5+H7 Poultry Vaccination Program, Guangdong 2017-18), vaccines must be continually updated - and flocks tested for breakthrough infections - in order to remain successful.  

In 2025, in NPJ Vaccines: Impact of Inactivated Vaccine on Transmission and Evolution of H9N2 Avian Influenza Virus in Chickens, we saw evidence that not only had inactivated vaccines failed to prevent - or even reduce - LPAI H9N2 in China's poultry, they may have driven viral evolution (including mammalian adaptations).

None of this is to suggest that an effective poultry vaccine campaign can't be mounted, or effectively maintained.  But it does require more than just a `vaccinate & forget' strategy. 

All of which brings us to a new study which finds that despite the introduction of newer vaccine formulations, many of the earlier concerns about Egypt's vaccination program persist.  I've only posted the Abstract, and some excerpts, so follow the link to read it in its entirety. 

I'll have a bit more after the break. 

Partial protection of commercial H5 avian influenza vaccines to clade 2.3.4·4b H5N1 and H5N8 avian influenza infections in chickens

Research
Open access
Published: 08 September 2026
Volume 3, article number 22 (2026)

Download PDF

Ahmed El Taweel, Mokhtar Gomaa, Yassmin Moatasim, Omnia Kutkat, Mina Nabil Kamel, Mohamed El Sayes, Mohamed GabAllah, Mohamed Ahmed Ali, Ghazi Kayali & Rabeh El-Shesheny

Abstract

Background

Avian influenza viruses (AIVs) continue to cause substantial economic losses to the poultry industry and pose a significant burden on global public health systems. The increasing diversity and geographical spread of different subtypes of influenza viruses in poultry populations increases the risk for reassortment events and the emergence of novel strains. Vaccination remains a key strategy for preventing influenza infection and its complications, especially high pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI), as it can reduce morbidity, mortality, and viral transmission.

However, vaccine effectiveness is closely tied to the antigenic match between vaccine strains and circulating viruses. In this study, we tested six commonly used commercial poultry H5 vaccines in Egypt to evaluate mortality, and virus shedding following experimental infection of specific pathogen free chickens with clade 2.3.4·4b H5N1 and H5N8 HPAI viruses.

Results

Our results showed that most of the tested vaccines provided detectable antibody titers and protected against mortality but were not able to control virus shedding. ValleyVac vaccines induced high HI titers (up to 9 log2) against recent clade 2.3.4·4b A(H5N1) and A(H5N8) strains, while Zoetis and Egy-flu R 2-in-1 induced lower HI titers (<6 log2). Although some of the commercial vaccines did not elicit considerable HI titers, vaccines provided 71%–100% protection against clade 2.3.4·4b viruses. Importantly, virus titers were detected till seven days post-infection (dpi). This incomplete protection is likely due to genetic and antigenic mismatches between the vaccine seed strains and the H5N1 and H5N8 viruses detected in Egypt.

Conclusions

These results highlight the urgent need to revise H5Nx prevention and control strategies in Egypt and update vaccine seed strains to reflect currently circulating HPAI viruses.

(SNIP)

The prolonged use of suboptimal vaccines or inadequate vaccination programs may contribute to the selection of antigenic escape mutants through immune pressure, potentially reducing vaccine effectiveness.

        (SNIP)

In summary, our data indicate that vaccines designed on strains that differ from circulating strains are not able to provide optimal protection. Although an immune response was elicited and survival rates were high, viral shedding continued. This indicates that the use of those vaccines will reduce morbidity and mortality but will allow virus transmission and potentially the emergence of vaccine escape mutants.

Mass vaccination remains a crucial component of a multifaceted approach aimed at preventing AIV illness and its spread in poultry. The ongoing threat of an AIV pandemic highlights the need to design novel vaccines that are easier to manufacture, more streamlined, and capable of inducing better and broader immune protection against emerging strains.

 

        (Continue . . . )

 

These, and other (often trade related) concerns - are why many countries (including the United States, Canada and the UK) have yet to authorize the use of HPAI poultry vaccines, although many are studying the matter (see UK Defra Announces New Avian Influenza Vaccine Trials Begin in UK).

But as HPAI increases its presence in the environment -  and continues to spill over into livestock - the need for well mounted vaccination campaigns only increases. 

We've discussed some of the ongoing biosecurity measures that would be required to mount a safe and effective poultry vaccination campaign (see UK Joint Taskforce Policy Paper: Vaccination of Birds Against HPAIV (bird flu)), including:

• Most captive birds would likely require more than one vaccination over their lifetime, and regular testing that can differentiate infected from vaccinated animals (DIVA) would be needed to prevent `subclinical spread' of the virus. 
•  Culling and/or quarantine would still be needed for `breakthrough' infections
• A different vaccine, schedule and testing regimen would likely be required for non-avian livestock.
• And vaccine seed viruses would have to be regularly updated to match circulating strains

None of this would be cheap or easy, but - given the growing endemicity of the H5Nx virus - vaccination may be our best option going forward.

But only if we take the time and effort to do it right.