#18,392
While many countries have long held avian flu (and other emerging infectious disease) information close to the vest (a few examples from Indonesia, China, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia), in recent years it has increasingly become the norm, rather than the exception.
WHO member nations are required under the 2005 IHR to report novel virus detections within 24-hours, but the reality is that many governments are often slow - or simply refuse - to release `bad news' which may impact their economy, or political stability (see From Here To Impunity).
Even when countries do report cases and/or outbreaks to the WHO/FAO/WOAH, they frequently contain only limited details.
Genetic sequences - when they are submitted to GISAID - are often devoid of crucial metadata (i.e. collection date, exact location, host-specific information, etc.), limiting their value to the scientific community.
And as we learn from a correspondence published this week in Nature Biotechnology, many H5 sequences linger for months before before being submitted to GISAID. Sometimes for a year or longer.
The full commentary is behind a paywall, but we do have an Abstract and a press release (see below).
Correspondence
Published: 25 March 2025
Lengthy delays in H5N1 genome submissions to GISAID
The press release follows:
Canada slowest in reporting bird flu at 618 days – but COVID shows we can do better
University of British Columbia
The global average for countries to report genetic information about bird flu, crucial to tracking and preventing a human pandemic, was seven months, and Canada came in last, a new study has found.
Authors of the non-peer reviewed commentary published today in Nature Biotechnology say the work highlights the urgent need for Canada and other countries to speed up the pipeline from sampling an infected creature, analysis of the genetic information, and submission to a global scientific database.
Dr. Sarah Otto (SO), professor in the department of zoology, and Sean Edgerton (SE) (he/him), zoology doctoral student, discuss why getting this information quickly is crucial, and how Canada has pulled its socks up once before.
Why do we need this data?
SO: We need to track the evolution of viruses if we are to have any hope of preventing another pandemic. The particular ‘flu strain we’re worried about, H5N1, has wreaked havoc on the dairy and poultry industry in several countries and spread to hundreds of species of birds and mammals, but so far, the virus has not evolved the features needed to spread efficiently among humans. With real-time genetic data being submitted from around the world, we can keep an eye on these features and, if we see this evolution, raise the alarm.
We did this with the COVID variants. By tracking the virus’ evolution through genetic data, we were able to provide advanced warnings about the spread of variants, allowing public health responses such as increasing hospital capacity and quickly offering vaccines to those most at risk. Together, we saved lives.
What did you find?
SE: We looked at close to 19,000 H5N1 samples from January 2021 to December 2024 on a global database, the Global Initiative for Sharing All Influenza Data (GISAID). We measured the time taken from when a sample of the virus was collected from an animal or human through analysis of the genetic data to submission to this database, where it’s then available for other scientists to study. We then calculated the average per country submitting at least 50 sequences. We found the global average was about 228 days. Canada was the slowest at 618 days on average. The fastest countries were the Czech Republic and the Netherlands at only 25 days on average.
It was a bit shocking how long it took especially for a virus with pandemic potential like H5N1.
Why are the delays this long?
SO: We’re not sure, but the delays could be due to the number of different institutions involved in the entire collection, analysis, and submission process. In addition, there is little targeted funding to monitor H5N1 in Canadian wildlife, so most efforts to monitor the spread of this highly pathogenic flu virus are piggy-backing on other studies.
What can we do?
SO: I know we can get better. Canada improved submission times dramatically for SARS-CoV-2, dropping data delays from about 88 days to 16. Canada is now one of the strongest and most efficient countries informing the world about changes to the virus that causes COVID-19. We can do the same with H5N1.
We are also concerned about recent restrictions on gathering and sharing information in the United States, with widespread firing of government scientists and restrictions on data sharing. Wildlife don’t care about borders, so Canada needs to step up to the plate and monitor what’s happening in North America to help alert ourselves and other countries to worrisome changes in this virus.
Admittedly, some HPAI H5 sequences - particularly those involving humans - are deposited far quicker (often within days). But understanding the evolution of H5Nx across a wide array of birds, mice, skunks, foxes, and marine mammals could prove equally important.
Our global `don't test, don't tell' strategy may be politically or economically expedient in the short run - and the public may be comforted by a lack of information - but we risk sleepwalking our way into the next pandemic.
But at least our leaders can honestly say when that happens; they never saw it coming.
