# 7290
A 51-page PDF file outlining the results of the World Health Organization’s April visit to China to assist in their investigation into the H7N9 virus (see H7N9: Dr. Keiji Fukuda Summarizes Mission Findings) has been posted on the WHO website.
While I’ve not had time to absorb the entire document, I’ve provided a link, and a few excerpts below to give my readers a head start.
From the assessment (see below), it is obvious that the WHO takes this new avian influenza threat very seriously.
China-WHO Joint Mission on Human Infection with Avian Influenza A(H7N9) Virus, 18-24 April 2013, Mission Report pdf, 1.09Mb
From the Assessment:
Currently, evidence so far is not strong enough to conclude there is person‐to‐person transmission. The limited available information suggests that many infections caused by this virus may be related to exposure to infected poultry in live poultry markets or to environments contaminated by this virus. However, future studies can strengthen the evidence.
The risk to people posed by the emergence of the H7N9 virus must be considered unusually serious, for several reasons. First, this virus has caused serious disease, including death, in some people. Second, this virus does not appear to cause disease in poultry (although it could change in the future to become highly pathogenic) and therefore could spread silently. Third, this virus has caused more human infections and disease in a shorter period of time than any other known avian influenza virus. Fourth, some H7N9 viruses show genetic changes that suggest they are partially adapted to infect humans more easily than other avian influenza viruses.
Taken together, these findings suggest that the possibility of this virus becoming transmissible among people is higher than for any other known avian influenza virus and therefore it must not be ignored.
Recommendations
Undertake intense and focused investigations to determine the source(s) of human H7N9 infections. Identification of the source will enable urgent action to prevent continuing virus spread, with its potentially severe consequences for human and animal health.
Maintain a high level of alert, preparedness and response even though human cases might drop in the summer (as they do for many other avian influenza viruses) because of the seriousness of the risk posed by this virus and because much basic information remains unknown.
Continue to conduct and strengthen both epidemiological and laboratory‐based surveillance in human and animals in all provinces of China to identify changes that might indicate the virus is spreading geographically and gaining the ability to infect people more easily or transmit efficiently from person to person.
Ensure frequent mutual sharing of information, close and timely communication and, when appropriate, coordinated or joint investigations and research among ministries of health, agriculture and forestry because this threat requires the combined efforts of all these sectors.
Continue high‐level scientific collaboration, communication and sharing of sequence data and viruses with WHO and international partners because the threat of H7N9 is also an international shared risk and concern.
Encourage and foster the scientific and epidemiological studies and research needed to close major gaps in critical knowledge and understanding.
Continue preparedness planning and other IHR core capacity strengthening work because such investments make a major difference in readiness to address health security risks and emergencies, including H7N9.
