BSL-4 Lab Worker - Photo Credit –USAMRIID
# 8101
It’s been more than two years since Dutch Virologist and flu researcher Dr. Ron Fouchier announced, at the 2011 ESWI Influenza Conference in Malta, that he’d created a `more transmissible’ form of the H5N1 virus (see Debra MacKenzie’s New Scientist: Five Easy Mutations).
That, combined with a similar announcement from Yoshihiro Kawaoka, a highly respected virologist at the University of Wisconsin-Madison School of Veterinary Medicine, set alarm bells ringing in the biosecurity community.
In the months that followed we saw a protracted, and at times rancorous, debate over the merits and safety of so-called `Gain of Function’ (GOF) research on dangerous pathogens. GOF research involves the creation of viruses and/or bacteria with enhanced virulence, transmissibility, or host range.
By December of 2011 The Biosecurity Debate On H5N1 Research reached fevered pitch, which led to a group of internationally renowned Scientists to Announce a 60 Day Moratorium On Some H5N1 Research in January, 2012. That moratorium was subsequently extended until January of 2013 (see NIH Statement On Lifting Of The H5N1 Research Moratorium).
In March of 2012 the NIH - which funds many of these research projects - promulgated new DURC Oversight Rules (Dual Use Research of Concern), which also includes some types of GOF research. For those unfamiliar with the lexicon of biomedical research, DURC in this new policy is defined as:
. . . life sciences research that, based on current understanding, can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge, information, products, or technologies that could be directly misapplied to pose a significant threat with broad potential consequences to public health and safety, agricultural crops and other plants, animals, the environment,
After much heated debate, during the summer of 2012 Science Published The Fouchier Ferret Study and Nature Published The Kawaoka H5N1 Study. But the debate over the safety, merits, and wisdom of conducting these sorts of experiments has continued.
Researchers in favor of GOF studies argue against undue restrictions and `censorship’ of science (see mbio Science Should Be in the Public Domain by Vincent R. Racaniello), while critics point out that the benefits of such research have been overstated (see Options VIII: Dr. Marc Lipsitch Argues Against HPAI GOF Experiments) and the risks have been downplayed.
All of which serves as prelude to an article over the weekend in in the Journal Nature (and SciAm) regarding a letter – signed by 56 scientists – sent to the European Commission, calling for `urgent talks’ over the future course of GOF research on influenza viruses, and other pathogens.
Scientists call for urgent talks on mutant-flu research in Europe
Benefits and risks of ‘gain-of-function’ work must be evaluated, they say.
20 December 2013
A group of over 50 researchers has called on the European Commission to hold a scientific briefing on research that involves engineering microbes to make them more deadly.
In an 18 December letter to European Commission president José Manuel Barroso, the scientists — including representatives from the non-profit Foundation for Vaccine Research in Washington DC — urged the commission to organize the briefing, and to formally evaluate the risks and benefits of such 'gain-of-function' research.
Although initial concerns were that the publication of the Fouchier or Kawaoka papers could serve as a blueprint for `bad actors’ to create a bio weapon, of even greater concern is the possibility of a laboratory accident that could result in the release of an `enhanced pathogen’.
While accidents in well regulated Bio-level 4 labs are rare, they are not unheard of. And many researchers doing GOF studies only have access to Bio-level 3 or 3+ labs, where safety standards are not as rigorous.
Last November, in BMC Medicine: Containing Laboratory Escape Of Pandemic Viruses, we looked at a report that found the risks of seeing an accidental release from one of these labs is far from zero.
They calculated a .3% chance of release from any given lab each year, which works out to be roughly one every 100 years of lab operation. With hundreds of of BSL-3 and BSL-4 labs around the world, the odds of seeing an accident in any given year somewhere in the world go up substantially.
Between 2003 and 2009, US government laboratories had 395 incidents that involved the potential release of select agents, according to this report from CIDRAP NEWS. While only 7 related infections were reported, this does add weight to some of the concerns being expressed by GOF research critics.
Whether `an urgent meeting’ will help resolve this controversy is difficult to predict, as there are strong feelings on both sides of this issue. But as I wrote nearly 2 years ago, in Science At The Crossroads, one need only look at the public’s reaction to vaccines, GMO foods, and nuclear power to see that their trust in science, and scientists, continues to ebb badly.
While seemingly a debate for Academia, how this debate is conducted, and how this issue is resolved, has to potential to greatly affect the public’s perception – for better or worse – of the entire scientific community.
Stay tuned.
