#17,134
Not quite two years ago, in February of 2021, 3 successive winter storms swept across Texas, Louisiana, and Oklahoma, causing the worst collapse of the Texas energy grid on record (see Texas: The Latest - But Not The Last - Grid Down Crisis).
At least 4.5 million homes were without power - some for as long as a week - during bitter winter temperatures, resulting in hundreds of deaths and tens of billions of dollars of damage (see City of Austin & Travis County 2021 WINTER STORM URI AFTER-ACTION REVIEW).
For coastal residents from Texas to New England, it isn’t unheard of to be without power for a week or longer after a major hurricane. In 2017 I was without power for 4 days due to hurricane Irma. And I was lucky, my power was restored relatively quickly.In 2017, the island of Puerto Rico was without power for months following Hurricane Maria, which undoubtedly contributed to the excess mortality there following the storm (see NEJM Mortality in Puerto Rico after Hurricane Maria).
But there are many other ways that the power grid can fail, and as our infrastructure ages, and the demand for power increases, the odds of seeing a prolonged, and catastrophic failure of the grid only increases.
In December of 2018, in NIAC: Surviving A Catastrophic Power Outage, we looked at a NIAC (National Infrastructure Advisory Council) 94-page report that examined the United State's current ability to respond to and recover from a widespread catastrophic power outage.
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What is a catastrophic power outage?• Events beyond modern experience that exhaust or exceed mutual aid capabilities
• Likely to be no-notice or limited-notice events that could be complicated by a cyber-physical attack
• Long duration, lasting several weeks to months due to physical infrastructure damage
• Affects a broad geographic area, covering multiple states or regions and affecting tens of millions of people
• Causes severe cascading impacts that force critical sectors—drinking water and wastewater systems, communications, transportation, healthcare, and financial services—to operate in a degraded state
(Excerpt From Dec 2018 NIAC Report)
A year earlier, in DHS: NIAC Cyber Threat Report - August 2017, we looked at a 45-page report addressing urgent cyber threats to our critical infrastructure that called for `bold, decisive actions'.
And with the 11-year solar cycle expected to peak in the next 2 or 3 years, severe space weather is increasingly viewed as a genuine threat.
In 2013 Lloyds issued a risk assessment for the insurance industry called Solar storm Risk to the north American electric grid which calls another `Carrington’ class event inevitable, and the effects likely catastrophic, but the timing was unknowable. Some of my other blogs on this threat include:
The UK’s Space Weather Preparedness Strategy
Solar Storms, CMEs & FEMA
NASA Braces For Solar Disruptions
It is the job of the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) to "ensure the reliability of the North American bulk power system", a mandate given to it in 2006 as a result of the 2003 Northeast blackout which affected more than 50 million people in the United States and Ontario, Canada.
In the past we've looked at their work, including in GridEx 2013 Preparedness Drill and 2015's The Lloyd’s Business Blackout Scenario, and while all of the above scenarios worry them, increasing demand, climate change, and and fuel delivery challenges may provide the most imminent threat.
Their winter outlook, published last week, warns of of the possibility of winter power outages, due to a combination of extreme winter weather and fuel limitations.
Announcement
November 17, 2022 ATLANTA – NERC’s 2022-2023 Winter Reliability Assessment warns that a large portion of the North American bulk power system is at risk of having insufficient energy supplies during severe winter weather. NERC advises industry to be ready to implement operating plans to manage potential supply shortfalls and to ensure fuel supplies are secured, and generators and natural gas facilities are weatherized.
“Fuel supply issues appear prominently in this year’s assessment. Reliability Coordinators across North America are closely monitoring the coal and liquid fuel inventories, as well as the potential impacts that transportation disruptions can have on availability and replenishment of all fuels,” said John Moura, NERC’s director of Reliability Assessment and Performance Analysis. “Also, while the grid has a sufficient supply of capacity resources under normal winter conditions, we are concerned that some areas are highly vulnerable to extreme and prolonged cold. As a result, load-shedding may be required to maintain reliability.”
The assessment finds high peak-demand projections, inadequate generator weatherization, fuel supply risks, and limited natural gas infrastructure are contributory factors to reliability risk. Regions at particular risk this winter include:
• Texas, SERC-East and southern parts of MISO risk a significant number of generator forced outages in extreme and prolonged cold temperatures. Generators and fuel supply infrastructure are not designed for such conditions and remain vulnerable without weatherization upgrades. Peak electricity demand increases substantially during extreme cold which compounds the risk.• Midcontinent ISO (MISO) has retired more than 4.2 GW of nuclear and coalfired generation since last winter, with few resources being added. Consequently, reserve margins in the region have fallen by more than 5%. An extreme cold-weather event that extends deep into MISO’s area could lead to high generator outages from inadequate weatherization in southern units and unavailability of fuel for natural-gas-fired generators.• New England has limited natural gas transportation capacity and relies on liquefied natural gas and oil-fired generators on peak demand days. Potential constraints on the fuel delivery systems, coupled with the limited inventory of liquid fuels, may exacerbate the risks for fuel-based generator outages and output reductions that result in energy emergencies during extreme weather.
• Alberta and NPCC-Maritimes both project that peak electricity demand will grow in these winterpeaking systems. In the Maritimes, this could strain capacity for normal winter peak conditions. Alberta has sufficient capacity for normal winter peak demand; however, extreme conditions that cause high generator forced outages are likely to cause energy emergencies.
The assessment acknowledges progress made by industry to improve generator performance, since Winter Storm Uri in 2021. Mark Olson, NERC’s manager of Reliability Assessments said, “While the risk of energy emergencies in the three areas hardest hit during that event has not been eliminated, enhancements to equipment freeze protection and cold weather preparations for both the gas and electric industries is a positive step.”
To reduce the risks of energy shortfalls on the bulk power system this winter, NERC recommends the following actions:
• Cold Weather Preparations: Generators should, while considering NERC’s Cold Weather Preparations for Extreme Weather Events–II alert, prepare for winter conditions and communicate with grid operators.
• Fuel: Generators should take early action to assure fuel and communicate plant availability. Reliability Coordinators and Balancing Authorities should monitor fuel supply adequacy, prepare and train for energy emergencies, and test protocols.
• State Regulators and Policymakers: States regulators should preserve critical generation resources at risk of retirement prior to the winter season and support requests for environmental and transportation waivers. Support electric load and natural gas local distribution company conservation and public appeals during emergencies. In New England, the states should support fuel replenishment efforts using all means possible
Undertaken annually in coordination with the Regional Entities, NERC’s Winter Reliability Assessment examines multiple factors that collectively provide deep and unique insights into reliability risk. These factors include resource adequacy, encompassing reserve margins and scenarios to identify operational risk; fuel assurance; and preparations to mitigate reliability concerns.
Emergency power is just part of a good preparedness plan, so if the power went out, stores closed their doors, and water stopped flowing from your kitchen tap for the next 14 days . . . do you have:
- A battery operated NWS Emergency Radio to find out what was going on, and to get vital instructions from emergency officials
- A decent first-aid kit, so that you can treat injuries
- Enough non-perishable food and water on hand to feed and hydrate your family (including pets) for the duration
- A way to provide light when the grid is down.
- A way to cook safely without electricity
- A way to purify or filter water
- A way to stay cool (fans) or warm when the power is out.
- A full tank of gas in your car.
- A small supply of cash to use in case credit/debit machines are not working
- An emergency plan, including meeting places, emergency out-of-state contact numbers, a disaster buddy, and in case you must evacuate, a bug-out bag
- Spare supply of essential prescription medicines that you or your family may need
- A way to entertain yourself, or your kids, during a prolonged blackout
Because it is not a matter of if there will be another major power outage, only a qustion of where, when, and for how long.
