#17,299
Although I fall into the camp that SARS-CoV-2 probably emerged naturally from the wet markets of Wuhan, I concede the possibility that it could have come from a lab leak. The evidence for each scenario is largely circumstantial - and given China's veil of secrecy that still surrounds the opening days of the pandemic - I doubt we'll ever know for certain.
But even if COVID emerged naturally, the next pandemic could easily come from an accidental - or deliberate - release from a lab or other man-made source.
Few remember that 46 years ago another `unexpected' virus emerged; H1N1 influenza, which had not been seen since 1957. The virus swept the globe causing a pseudo-pandemic (aka `the Russian Flu'), primarily affecting those under the age of 20 (see mBio: The Reemergence Of H1N1 in 1977 and The GOF Debate).
The 1977 virus was essentially unchanged from its last appearance in the 1950s, raising suspicions that it was the result of a laboratory release (either in China or Russia).
Lab accidents and mishaps are far more common than most people think (see here, here, here, here, and here for just a few), and recent advances in the science of synthetic biology make if far easier for bad actors on a budget to create dangerous pathogens (see National Academy Of Sciences: Biodefense in the Age of Synthetic Biology).
A dozen years ago the debate over Gain of Function (GOF) research made national, and international, headlines after the 2011 ESWI Influenza Conference in Malta, where Dutch researcher Ron Fouchier described the results of a groundbreaking – and later, ground shaking – experiment he’d conducted with the H5N1 avian flu virus and ferrets.Katherine Harmon’s piece in Scientific American (see SciAm: What Will The Next Influenza Pandemic Look Like?) briefly touched on his work, but it was Debra MacKenzie’s article a week later (see New Scientist: Five Easy Mutations) that really called attention to this experiment.
Fouchier was quoted as saying that he’d `mutated the hell’ out of the H5N1 virus in the lab, and then passed it serially through 10 ferrets, during which time it mutated further to become easily transmissible among the lab animals while retaining virulence.
Halfway across the world, Yoshihiro Kawaoka, a highly respected virologist at the University of Wisconsin-Madison School of Veterinary Medicine announced the creation of a comparable H5N1 super flu at roughly the same time.
After much discussion, both studies would eventually be published (see Science Publishes The Fouchier Ferret Study), but the debate raged on.
Scientists engaged in this type of work insisted that the risks were negligible (see Scientists For Science: GOF Research `Essential’ & Can be Done `Safely’), while others were less convinced (see Lipsitch & Galvani: GOF Research Concerns).
As you might imagine, those urging caution over this sort of research weren't very popular in some circles of academia, as these (often government funded) research projects can bring in large grants, along with substantial publicity and prestige to labs, universities, and researchers.
And suggestions that this sort of work be restricted to biosafety level 4 facilities are often met with stiff resistance, as that would exclude most of the university based labs in this country.
A brief moratorium on GOF experimentation was ordered in 2012, but was lifted in 2013 after the Office of Science Policy at the NIH released a 4 page set of guidelines for DURC (Duel Use Research of Concern) projects, and ordered a review of all current life sciences projects (see U.S. Issues new DURC Oversight Rules).
GOF experimentation is no longer strictly prohibited in the United States, and there are oversight rules that must be followed. But these `rules' are often vague, ambiguous, or subject to interpretation, making it sometimes easier to ask forgiveness than permission.
Four months ago the `Gain of Function' debate was reignited (see The COVID Preprint Heard `Round the World) after researchers at Boston University announced their creation of a lab-made COVID hybrid that combined the original Wuhan strain with the newer Omicron strain.
It is against this ongoing backdrop that a new NGO (Protect Our Future) has recently been formed to advocate for `strengthening biosafety, biosecurity, and biorisk management for research on dangerous pathogens'.
Below you'll find the press release (follow the link for a list of founding members), after which I'll have a postscript.
PRESS RELEASE; EMBARGOED UNTIL FEBRUARY 6, 2023 AT 12:00 NOON EST
"Protect Our Future": a new non-governmental organization dedicated to preventing labgenerated pandemics
For decades, scientists have been conducting research that enhances potential pandemic pathogens. This research--originally called "gain-of-function research of concern," and more recently called "enhanced potential pandemic pathogens research"--creates new, more dangerous pathogens that can cause pandemics if they escape from a lab. For example, a lethal virus that doesn’t transmit between humans can be engineered to do so, or a virus that is not lethal can be engineered to be lethal.
Lab-generated pandemics can arise as the result of either accidental releases or deliberate releases of pandemic pathogens. Both accidental lab releases and deliberate lab releases have occurred multiple times in the last five decades. But the stakes now are higher than ever before, due to the rapidly increasing power and rapidly decreasing cost of advanced biotechnology. We now face the threat of lab-generated pandemics as deadly as, or more deadly than, COVID-19, including lab-generated pandemics that could threaten the survival of the human species. Remarkably, despite the major risks to the public, this research is subject to almost no national or international oversight. Moreover, to date, the public largely has been unaware of, and excluded from, discussion of this threat.
To combat this threat, we have established Protect Our Future (www.biosafetynow.org), a new non-governmental organization that will advocate for reducing numbers of high-level biocontainment laboratories and for strengthening biosafety, biosecurity, and biorisk management for research on pathogens. We also aim to inform and empower the general public to participate in discussion and decisions.
Our Mission is to demand national- and international-level regulations and oversight to reduce the risks to the public posed by research on pathogens.
Our Vision is a future free of lab-generated pandemics, a future free of reckless research on enhanced potential pandemic pathogens, and a future where public trust in science is restored.
Our Leadership Team comprises persons with expertise and experience in biomedicine, mathematics, public health, public policy, law, and public advocacy, all of whom agree that research that creates potential pandemic pathogens more dangerous than those in nature poses existential risks to the public and provides few, if any, benefits for science, medicine, public health, or national security.
website: www.biosafetynow.org
contact: info@biosafetynow.org
A little over a decade ago, in Science At The Crossroads, I wrote about the public's growing mistrust of `science' - and while it may not be completely deserved - the scientific community hasn't exactly helped themselves.
Showing some restraint when it comes to GOF or DURC research may not solve all of those image problems, but it is a good place to start, and it might just prevent the next global health crisis.
If you'd like to learn more, visit www.biosafetynow.org.
