Credit WOAH
#18,922
Not quite 2 weeks ago we looked at an 11-page OFFLU technical document (see OFFLU Guidelines for High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Virus Risk Mitigation in Cattle) which outlined new - and far more robust - recommendations on HPAI risk mitigation in cattle.
That report came with a disclaimer: This document provides the point of view of independent OFFLU experts and does not necessarily reflect the position of the parent organisations FAO and WOAH.
- Implementing risk-based bulk milk surveillance
- Enforcing pasteurization and safe disposal of waste milk
- Applying flexible movement controls with testing and quarantines
- Improved biosecurity & milking practices
- Protecting workers with PPE
Although WOAH began asking member states to notify them of any outbreaks in cattle last spring (based on a February SCAD report), in this week's statement they make it mandatory, stating:
In light of the impact on animal and public health, the Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases considered at its February 2025 meeting that ‘infection of bovines (Bos taurus) with influenza A viruses high pathogenicity’ meets the Terrestrial Code glossary definition for ‘emerging disease’. Accordingly, Members are required to notify the occurrence of HPAI in cattle to the World Animal Health Information System (WAHIS) in accordance with the WOAH Terrestrial Code Article 1.1.4.WOAH also reminds its 183 Members that, based on the information currently available, restrictions to the international trade of healthy cattle and their products are only recommended if justified by an import risk analysis conducted according to the WOAH Terrestrial Animal Health Code Chapter 2.1.
They then proceed to endorse the recommendations from the OFFLU report:
Finally, WOAH invites Members to consult OFFLU Guidelines for High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Virus Risk Mitigation in Cattle. These guidelines provide practical, evidence-based measures to support Members in their efforts to mitigate the risk of HPAI virus spread in cattle. It outlines key transmission pathways and proposes proportionate intervention strategies based on the latest scientific evidence.
While I've provided an excerpt below, the full policy statement can be read at: https://www.woah.org/en/high-pathogenicity-avian-influenza-hpai-in-cattle/
I'll have a brief postscript after the break.
WOAH calls on its Members to:
- Increase avian influenza surveillance in domestic and wild birds.
- Enhance surveillance for early detection in cattle population in countries where HPAI is known to be circulating.
- Include HPAI as a differential diagnosis in non-avian species, including cattle and other livestock populations, with high risk of exposure to HPAI viruses, in particular:
- Animals showing clinical signs compatible with avian influenza;
- Sick or dead domestic animals near HPAI affected premises; and
- Suspected cases, including apparently healthy animals, that have been exposed to or epidemiologically linked to suspected or confirmed HPAI in birds or cattle (i.e. situated in HPAI high-risk areas or in areas where avian influenza has been confirmed).
- Notify cases of HPAI in all animal species, including cattle or other unusual hosts, to WOAH through its World Animal Health Information System (WAHIS). Genetic sequences of avian influenza viruses should be shared in publicly available databases.
- Consider OFFLU ‘Guidelines for High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Virus Risk Mitigation in Cattle’ .
- Implement preventive and early response measures to break the HPAI transmission cycle among animals. These include applying movement restrictions of infected livestock holdings until infection has stopped and strict biosecurity measures in all holdings, in particular in milking parlours.
- Employ good production and hygiene practices when handling animal products. Raw milk or raw milk products from HPAI infected or exposed cows should not be used for animal feed or for human consumption.
- Protect humans in close contact with or handling sick cattle or other sick livestock and their products. Exposed humans should always take precautionary measures to avoid getting infected and minimise the risk to mechanically carrying the virus to livestock or companion animals. This should include wearing personal protective equipment, avoiding visiting other livestock premises after the exposure and implementing standard food safety measures when handling animal products from exposed livestock.
- Avoid implementing unjustified trade restrictions. Import risk management measures should be scientifically justified and in line with the WOAH International Standards.
- Technical guidelines for the adaptation of diagnostic tests for Influenza A in animals including cattle and other species as well as different types of samples such as milk and nasal swabs are available in the OFFLU website and will be regularly updated.
- WOAH is fully committed to supporting its Members to mitigate the risks associated with avian influenza. We will continue to engage with our networks of experts, OFFLU, as well as public and private partners, notably through the One Health Quadripartite and the Global Framework for Transboundary Animal Diseases (GF-TADs) to provide technical updates as more information becomes available.
While both of these documents are encouraging signs that the world is starting to take HPAI in cattle as a serious threat, they come more than 18 months after the first HPAI outbreak was reported in Texas dairy cows.
For the better part of a year, it was assumed that only the North American B3.13 genotype was capable of spilling over into cattle, making this an American - not a world - problem.
Slowly those hopes have eroded:
- First, following a statement from Germany's FLI on the Experimental Infection Of Dairy Cows With A European H5N1 Virus in June of 2024
- Followed by reports of H5N1 antibodies found in Pakistani goats and sheep.
- Since February we've seen another strain (genotype D1.1) spillover into dairy cattle in two states (Nevada & Arizona)
- And in recent months we've seen additional evidence of infection with other strains in both a UK sheep and in sheep in Norway.
As our global track record to date (see From Here To Impunity), has not been particularly encouraging.
