Showing posts with label Fauci. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Fauci. Show all posts

Tuesday, July 09, 2013

mBio: An H7N9 Perspective by Morens, Fauci & Taubenberger

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Credit CDC

 

# 7461

 

In an article that appears later today  in the open access journal mBio, well known NIH scientists and researchers David M. Morens, Jeffery K. Taubenberger, and Anthony S. Fauci describe the history of H7 influenza viruses both in animals and in humans, and discuss why China’s emerging H7N9 virus is viewed with concern.

 

I’ll update this blog with a link to the article when it goes live, but for now we have a press release from the American Society for Microbiology, which provides us with some details.

 

UPDATED:

 

H7N9 Avian Influenza A Virus and the Perpetual Challenge of Potential Human Pandemicity

David M. Morens, Jeffery K. Taubenberger and Anthony S. Fauci doi:10.1128/mBio.00445-13

 

 

 

 

H7N9 influenza: History of similar viruses gives cause for concern

The H7N9 avian flu strain that emerged in China earlier this year has subsided for now, but it would be a mistake to be reassured by this apparent lull in infections. The virus has several highly unusual traits that paint a disquieting picture of a pathogen that may yet lead to a pandemic, according to lead scientists from the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases. David Morens, Jeffery Taubenberger, and Anthony Fauci, in a paper published in mBio®, the online open-access journal of the American Society for Microbiology, describe the history of H7 viruses in animal and human disease and point out that H7 influenza has a tendency to become established in bird, horse, and swine populations and may spillover repeatedly into humans.

 

“The evidence as a whole is complex and the implications of past outbreaks for predicting the future course of the current H7N9 epizootic [an epidemic among animals] are uncertain," write the authors.

 

The outbreak of H7N9 earlier this year led China to temporarily close scores of live poultry markets in an effort to limit the spread of the virus. Although this previously unrecognized strain of avian influenza A has now been associated with 132 confirmed human infections and 39 related deaths (as of June 14), the rate at which new cases are recognized has dwindled in recent weeks.

 

In their minireview, Morens, Taubenberger and Fauci point out that despite this apparent hiatus, viruses like H7N9, which have subtype 7 hemagglutinin, are a cause for heightened concern because of several highly unusual characteristics. First, H7 viruses have repeatedly been involved in numerous explosive poultry outbreaks including incidents in New York, Canada, Mexico, the Netherlands, and Italy, and in almost all of these cases the virus eventually spilled over into humans. Also, H7 viruses have the ability to mutate from a low pathogenicity form to a high pathogenicity form in birds, a scenario that can lead to large-scale culling and ultimately to human exposure to the virus among poultry workers.

 

H7N9 also shares many characteristics with another influenza strain that continues to spillover into humans: highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1. Among other commonalities, both viruses have a clinical picture that includes bilateral pneumonia, acute respiratory distress syndrome, and multi-organ failure, and it appears they are both currently unable to easily infect most humans but cause severe disease in individuals with uncharacterized genetic susceptibilities.

 

The fact that many H7 viruses tend to infect conjunctival cells is also cause for concern. Some, but not all, cases of human H7 infection feature prominent signs and symptoms in the eyes, including itching, swelling, and tearing, that could enhance person-to-person spread in an H7N9 outbreak.

 

The authors point out that many H7 viruses have adapted to infect mammals, including horses and pigs, which raises the possibility that H7N9 could adapt in a similar fashion. The possibility that H7N9 might infect pigs is particularly troubling, as swine are considered a "mixing vessel" for viruses - a breeding ground for novel viral reassortants like the 2009 H1N1 pandemic influenza strain commonly known as "swine flu".

 

The sum of these observations is this: we do not know what H7N9 will do next. Although avian influenza viruses have not caused widespread human transmission in 94 years of surveillance, there have been numerous instances of avian influenza spillover and H7N9 "might arguably be more likely than other avian viruses to become human-adapted," write the authors.

 

Regardless of its future, H7N9 certainly holds lessons for preventing human and animal pandemics. All the unknowns surrounding the virus make a strong case for enhancing basic and applied research into the evolution of influenza viruses and for better integration of influenza virology within human and veterinary public health efforts.

 

"We have a unique opportunity to learn more of influenza's many secrets, and thereby enhance our ability to prevent and control an important disease that seems destined to appear again and again, in multiple guises, far into the foreseeable future," write the authors.

 

 

While certainly not in the same league, a little over 3 months ago (on the day we first learned of the emergence of the H7N9 virus) I penned my own Brief History Of H7 Avian Flu Infections, which you may wish to revisit.

Wednesday, May 08, 2013

NPR Shots: The CDC’s Pandemic Preps – Just In Case

A CDC scientist uses a pipette to transfer H7N9 virus into vials for sharing with partner laboratories for public health research purposes.

A CDC scientist uses a pipette to transfer H7N9 virus into vials for sharing with partner laboratories for public health research purposes.

 


# 7248

 

 

From NPR’s Richard Knox this morning - a good look at the advance work being done by the CDC to prepare for the H7N9 virus – just in case it should mutate into a humanized virus.

 

You’ll find remarks from Dr. Anthony Fauci, director of  NIAID, along with Daniel Jernigan, Deputy Director of CDC's influenza division, on why H7N9 has public health officials on guard.

 

Well worth visiting.

 

 

Officials Prepare For Another Flu Pandemic — Just In Case

by Richard Knox - May 08, 2013 2:49 AM

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For more on the CDC’s Preparedness efforts you may wish to revisit:

 

MMWR: Emergence of Avian Influenza A(H7N9)
H7N9 Preparedness: What The CDC Is Doing

Tuesday, September 28, 2010

Morens, Taubenberger & Fauci: What’s Next For H1N1

 

 

 

# 4946

 

 

In an open access perspective article appearing in the journal mBio, well known NIH scientists and researchers David M. Morens, Jeffery K. Taubenberger, and Anthony S. Fauci give their take on the future of the novel 2009 H1N1 virus.

 

 

The 2009 H1N1 Pandemic Influenza Virus: What Next?

  1. David M. Morens, Jeffery K. Taubenberger, and Anthony S. Fauci

ABSTRACT

History suggests that the 2009 pandemic H1N1 influenza virus faces extinction unless it mutates to avoid already high global population immunity. The immune escape mechanisms potentially at its disposal include antigenic drift, antigenic shift via genetic reassortment, and intrasubtypic reassortment.

 

Going back to the late 19th century, the evolutionary histories of past pandemic viruses are examined in an effort to better understand the nature and extent of the immune pressures faced by the 2009 pandemic virus in the immediate future.

 

While human influenza viruses have often surprised us, available evidence leads to the hope that the current pandemic virus will continue to cause low or moderate mortality rates if it does not become extinct.

 

The FULL TEXT is available here.

 

For those who prefer the Press Release condensed version, we have that as well:

 

NIH scientists consider fate of pandemic H1N1 flu virus

Whither pandemic H1N1 virus? In a new commentary, scientists from the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), part of the National Institutes of Health, review the fates of previous pandemic influenza viruses in the years following a pandemic and speculate on possible future courses for the 2009 pandemic H1N1 (pH1N1) virus during the upcoming flu season and beyond.

 

The authors estimate that at least 183 million Americans (about 59 percent of the total U.S. population) have some immunity to pH1N1 because they were exposed to related viruses or vaccines prior to 2009, were immunized against pH1N1 or developed immunity following infection with the pandemic virus.

 

To stay in circulation in the face of such high levels of population immunity, the pH1N1 virus must adapt either through abrupt or gradual changes. The authors briefly examine a number of earlier pandemics and trace paths taken by the causative viruses. Some—for reasons not well understood—died out, while others, like those of 1889 and 1918, returned in an explosive fashion. Such an explosive return of pH1N1 virus is unlikely, note the authors, because global levels of immunity are already high and will increase further through immunization with 2010-2011 seasonal influenza vaccines, which contain the pH1N1 strain.

 

In light of what is known about pH1N1, the NIAID authors express a cautious optimism that unless it disappears entirely the virus will follow a route like that of 1968 pandemic virus, that is, it will persist in a form that causes relatively few deaths.

 

Nevertheless, the authors caution against complacency. As they acknowledge, many gaps remain in understanding how a given pandemic influenza virus adapts to increased immunity in humans. For that reason, influenza vaccination for everyone older than six months is a wise public health measure to maintain high levels of population-wide immunity. Immunization with 2010-2011 seasonal flu vaccine is particularly urged for babies older than six months, children, teens and young adults as the best way to protect individuals in those potentially more susceptible age groups from illness.