Showing posts sorted by date for query preparedness. Sort by relevance Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by date for query preparedness. Sort by relevance Show all posts

Friday, October 09, 2026

Isaias Forecast To Become A Major Hurricane Later Today - Landfall Tonight

 

#19,366

While wind shear may lower its intensity a bit (depending on timing) as it approaches the coast, Isaias is expected to be at least a strong CAT 2 storm at landfall, possibly higher.  

Regardless of its intensity, Isaias is expected to produce life-threatening surge, high winds, and torrential rains.  Residents in the affected area should hurry to complete the preparations today. 


While most people prepare for the actual storm, often the days (and sometimes weeks) following the storm are the most stressful.  

The power may be out for days, floodwaters may contain hidden dangers, local stores may be closed, and people may risk injury using chainsaws, generators, or ladders. 


I've written extensively on After The Storm Passes, but many of those preparedness links are no longer active. The CDC has updated their Preparing for Hurricanes or Other Tropical Storms webpage, covering most of those topics. 

A few related blogs you may wish to revisit include:

Thursday, October 08, 2026

ECDC Assessment: Zoonotic influenza A(H5) vaccination in humans in the EU/EEA


#19,363

In the summer of 2024 , the EU Commission secured access for Member States to purchase 665,000 doses of zoonotic influenza vaccines to prevent avian flu, with the first shipment scheduled to go to Finland, which had recently experienced a prolonged H5 outbreak in fur farms (see Finland: MOH Announcement On Avian Flu Vaccine Availability For People At High Risk).

From the EU 6/24 announcement:
The vaccine is intended for those most exposed to potential transfers of avian influenza from birds or animals, such as poultry farm workers and veterinarians. It aims to prevent the spread or potential outbreaks of avian influenza in Europe, protecting citizens and livelihoods. The vaccine is the only preventive zoonotic avian influenza vaccine currently authorized in the EU.

Fifteen EU and EEA Member States are participating in this voluntary procurement with the company Seqirus UK Ltd. The contract allows each participating country to take into account their public health context and order vaccines depending on national need. The contract will run for a maximum of 4 years.
This initial order was enough to vaccinate 330,000 people (assuming 2 doses each), with an option to buy another 40 million doses if needed. But the EU would need nearly 900 million doses to cover their entire population.

Last May, in Vaccines: Lessons from the 2024 avian influenza vaccination campaign in Finland: a qualitative inquiry, we looked at the disappointingly low uptake of the H5 vaccine by Finland's target groups, with the authors reporting:
In 2024, Finland became a global forerunner to offer H5 vaccine to occupational risk groups, specifically fur and poultry workers, following an extensive HPAI H5N1 outbreak in 2023 in fur-farmed minks and foxes. Despite targeted efforts to reach the people at increased risk, only 8,6% of the target population received the first dose and 7,5% completed both doses.

While disappointing, this uptake is not unexpected, given the hurdles public health has faced getting poultry, swine, and fur farmers to get the seasonal flu vaccine to try to prevent reverse zoonosis. 

And, as we've seen previously (see Two Surveys (UK & U.S.) Illustrating The Public's Lack of Concern Over Avian Flu) - in addition to growing vaccine hesitancy - the public appears largely unconvinced over the HPAI threat. 

Last December in ECDC Pre-pandemic Guidance: Strategies to Fight Avian and Swine flu in Humans we looked at a  71-page operations framework for European countries to use when dealing with outbreaks of novel swine or avian influenza. 

One of the topics covered was potential pre-pandemic vaccination of high-risk individuals with a zoonotic influenza A(H5) vaccine.

Yesterday the ECDC published the results of a survey of 30 EU/EEA member nations on their plans for current or future H5 vaccination of humans, of which 27 responded. 

This is a fairly brief report (9 pages), which finds 5 (19%) of reporting countries have begun limited vaccination of high-risk individuals, another 11% plan to begin offering the vaccine in the next year, and the remaining 70% have no plans in place at this time. 


While there are sizable gaps in the data, uptake of the vaccine - as we saw in Finland - appears to have been quite limited.   


All of this is self-reported data, of course - and since there is no standardized reporting format - making comparisons between countries is extremely difficult. 

Follow the link to read the report in its entirety.  I'll have a brief postscript after the break. 



Assessment
7 October 2026

Highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) continues to circulate widely in wild birds and cause outbreaks in poultry and other animals across Europe. Despite extensive circulation, human infections remain rare and no human cases have been confirmed in the EU/EEA to date.

Considering this, ECDC assesses the risk from A(H5N1) viruses circulating in Europe as low for the general population and low to moderate for people occupationally or otherwise exposed to infected animals or contaminated environments.

Key findings
  • Twenty-seven of 30 EU/EEA countries responded to the survey on influenza A(H5) vaccination in humans – national plans and implementation status in EU/EEA. Eight countries reported having national A(H5) vaccination recommendations in place, eight were currently developing them, and 11 had no plans at the time of the survey.
  • Implementation of the plans remained limited: five countries had started vaccination campaigns (Austria, Finland, Lithuania, the Netherlands and Portugal) and three planned to do so within one year. Priority groups most commonly included in the cohort to be vaccinated were veterinarians and animal-health staff, culling teams, laboratory staff and workers in farming and the poultry sector.
  • Most countries reported that they are monitoring or planning to monitor vaccine uptake; the majority through immunisation registries.
  • Reported vaccine uptake in reporting countries was generally low outside laboratory settings, but data were incomplete and not comparable across countries.
  • Overall, results were heterogeneous in the EU/EEA due to variation in national recommendations, implementation plans, delivery arrangements and uptake monitoring. For preparedness purposes, countries would benefit from clearly defined programme objectives and scenario-based triggers, tested delivery pathways, targeted communication and uptake-monitoring plans. 

Publication file



In addition to the EU's purchase, over the past 3 years we've seen a number of other countries announced their intention to stockpile limited supplies of a pre-pandemic H5N1 vaccine, including: 
All are quantities that might help protect those occupationally most at risk during an H5Nx outbreak, but the general population would likely have to wait 6 months or longer before large quantities of vaccine would be made available (see Referral: SCI AM - A Bird Flu Vaccine Might Come Too Late to Save Us from H5N1).

At least that's the theory.  

Whether we'll be ready to react to an actual human outbreak remains to be seen. 

 

Wednesday, October 07, 2026

NHC: Isaias Now A Tropical Storm - Forecast to Threaten Northern Gulf Coast As A Strong Hurricane


 #19,362

October storms born in the Bay of Campeche have a reputation for spinning up rapidly as they approach a landfall.  Although that doesn't always happen, it occurs often enough to take these late season storms seriously.

While conditions in the gulf were described as `only marginally conducive for development' just 24 hours ago, the NHC is now forecasting Isaias to ramp up to a strong CAT 2 hurricane by the end of the week.

Estimated wind speeds and positions from today's (Oct 7th) NHC discussion:

Watches and warnings have not been raised yet, but the NHC will probably do so later today. For now the NHC's key messages to the public are:

 

Currently, it appears that anywhere from the western panhandle of Florida to central Louisiana are in the cone, but high winds, surge tides, and heavy rains are likely to impact well beyond those limits. 

Inland flooding could occur hundreds of miles inland, and spin-off tornadoes are possible across much of the southeast. Widespread power outages are likely. 
 
If this is your first hurricane season - or you are just in need of a refresher - you'll find a number of short videos on hurricane prepareded at this NOAA website:

Hurricane Prep: social media (English)

The Hurricane Preparedness Week Social Media Plan

2026 SOCIAL MEDIA PLANS AND VIDEOS English: May 3 - May 9, 2026

En español: 3 de mayo - 9 de mayo de 2026

Chinese: 年5月3日 - 2025年5月9日

Vietnamese: Ngày 3 Tháng 5, Năm - Ngày 9 Tháng 5, Năm 2026

English: Videos

En español: Videos

#HurricaneStrong #HurricanePrep

Please help the NWS spread the word about Hurricane Preparedness Week (May 3-May 9, 2026) on social media! Everyone is welcome to use the text and images provided below to help the NWS build a Weather-Ready Nation.

May 3, 2026 — Know Your Risk: Wind & Water

May 4, 2026 — Prepare Before Hurricane Season

May 5, 2026 — Understand Forecast Information

May 6, 2026 — Get Moving When a Storm Threatens

May 7, 2026 — Stay Protected During Storms

May 8, 2026 — Use Caution After Storms

May 9, 2026 —Take Action Today


While this blog, and many other internet sources (I follow Mark Sudduth's Hurricane Track, and Mike's Weather page), will cover this year's hurricane season. your primary source of forecast information should always be the National Hurricane Center in Miami, Florida.

These are the real experts, and the only ones you should rely on to track and forecast the storm.

If you are on Twitter, you should also follow @FEMA, @NHC_Atlantic, @NHC_Pacific and @ReadyGov and of course take direction from your local Emergency Management Office.

Tuesday, October 06, 2026

NHC Monitoring Gulf Disturbance with 80% Chance of Development

 

#19,361

As a hurricane weary Floridian (see 2024's Hurricane Watches Raised For Most of Florida's West Coast), our El Niño dampened 2026 Atlantic Hurricane season has been a happy respite.  The last time there were no hurricanes this late into  October was 1914 (albeit, well before satellite coverage). 

There are still nearly 2 months left to the season (ends Nov 30th), so we may not get away completely unscathed.  

While conditions are only marginally conducive, the National Hurricane Center has given an area off the Mexican gulf coast an 80% chance of developing into a tropical system. 

If that happens, it will be named Isaias.
 
While it is too early to predict its strength or where it might head, residents along the northern Gulf coast should keep tabs on its development. The overnight forecast from the NWS NHC reads:

Tropical Weather Outlook
NWS National Hurricane Center Miami FL
200 AM EDT Tue Oct 6 2026

For the North Atlantic...Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of America:

1. Southwestern Gulf of America (AL92):
A trough of low pressure over the southwestern Gulf of America is
producing disorganized showers and thunderstorms. Although
environmental conditions appear only marginally conducive for
development, a tropical depression is likely to form within the next
couple of days. The system is expected to drift east-northeastward
through the middle portion of the week before turning northward. It
is too early to determine specific impacts to the northern Gulf
Coast, but interests there should closely monitor the progress of
this system.
* Formation chance through 48 hours...high...80 percent.
* Formation chance through 7 days...high...80 percent.

Our summer reprieve due to El Niño may be short-lived, as this phenomenon often brings wet and stormy winters to the gulf coast, and can batter California with repeated torrential rains (see California Declares State of Emergency to Bolster Statewide El Niño Preparedness).

As we discussed a month ago, in #NPM26: Preparing For An El Niño Winter, many parts of our country - and the world - may experience wild or unusual weather patterns over the next few months. 

Some areas may see floods, or ice storms, or blizzards, while others may see drought, or other weather anomalies.  While not everyone will be affected, this winter, it is a good idea to expect the unexpected. 


Tuesday, September 29, 2026

#NPM26: Making Preparedness a Priority

 

Note: This is the 29th day of National Preparedness Month. Follow this year’s campaign on Twitter by searching for the #NatlPrep #BeReady or #PrepMonth hashtags
.
This month, as part of NPM26, I’ll be rerunning some updated preparedness essays, along with some new ones.

#19,353

Over the summer - and most particularly the past 4 weeks -  we've looked at a number of personal preparedness scenarios (see links below), covering topics such as earthquakes, severe weather, prolonged power outages, and even pandemics. 

#NPM26: It's a 12 Volt Life
#NatlPrep: 75% of Americans At Risk Of Experiencing A Damaging Earthquake

We've also looked at a number of governmental concerns and/or reports; with an emphasis on this winter's El Niño, an increasingly stressed power grid, risks to the global food supply, and a plethora of other threats. 



NERC Reliability Report: Large Computational Load Risks Due to Voltage Sensitivity

UK National Risk Register 2026 - Urges Citizen Preparedness

NERC Issues Level 3 Alert As Grid Faces `Unprecedented Challenges' Due to Surge In Large Power Consumers

 
While I can't tell you what untoward events may happen in the months ahead, or when or where they might occur, it is a pretty safe bet that some - potentially large - number of people will be affected by one or more local or regional disasters. 

How they will cope with whatever comes will depend in large part on how well they've prepared. 

While I'm a huge proponent of having a good first aid kit (or three), emergency power options, and a full pantry, I can think of no prep more valuable than having one or more `disaster or flu' buddies on whom you can rely in an emergency.

Simply put, a network of family, friends, and neighbors to whom you can turn for help in a emergency, who can turn to you for if they need it. My disaster buddy and I have saved each other's bacon more than once. 

Most disasters boil down to unscheduled camping - for days, or sometimes weeks - in your home, in a community shelter, or possibly even in your backyard. So having the right gear - before an emergency arises - can make life far easier.

Every year I publish a long list of preparedness items that I've either bought for myself, or as gifts for other people. While I'll update that list for the holidays, you'll find my most recent list at The Gift of Preparedness 2025.

Since being sick with the flu, of COVID, during an emergency can seriously degrade your ability to cope, I've long recommended staying current with yearly vaccines (see #NatlPrep: Giving Your Preparedness Plan A Shot In The Arm).

Which is why later today I'll be getting both the fall flu and COVID shots from my local pharmacy. I'm also current with my tetanus shot, and pneumonia vaccines. 

Long time readers know I love to tinker with solar panels and emergency power options, and I've put together some low cost systems for myself, and for a couple of friends (see Emergency Solar Power: Revisited).

For as little as $100, you can buy off-the-shelf plug-and-play components to keep phones charged, and a couple of LED lights powered.  Double that, and you can have comms, fans, and an emergency shortwave radio.

My older (circa 2019) basic $200 kit

While solar generators are the preparedness rage, a system capable of running refrigerators, TVs, and other appliances for more than a few hours can run into the thousands of dollars.  For me, that isn't an option. 

In 2024 I described building a rudimentary LiFePo4 power station (see picture below), which packs a whopping 600 Watt/hour capacity. LiFePo4 batteries are lighter than lead/acid, are far less dangerous, and can be charged and discharged (fully) thousands of times.

My system featured dual 12V Car Cigarette Lighter Sockets, 2 USB outlets, and I added a small 110v inverter (which I will probably never use).  I have both a wall charger and a 100 watt solar panel to keep it charged. 

I now have 3 of these battery systems, and 2 solar panels. They won't run my fridge or big-screen TV, but they will keep lights, radios, MP3 player, fans, DVD player, and other creature comforts going for weeks or even months.  

And most importantly, there is enough redundancy built into these systems than if one (or even two) should fail, I'm not left in the dark.  The old prepper's adage, that `one is none, and two is one' applies. 

I've also got 60 gallons of water stored, water filters, a full pantry, a propane stove, and enough books (audio & physical), MP3 radio shows/podcasts, and DVDs to keep me from going stir crazy for months if need be. 

While my investments have been small, they have already paid off, since I've been without power twice in the past 10 years - each time for several days - thanks to Hurricanes Irma (2017) and Helene & Milton (2024).  

The road to preparedness needn't be terribly expensive, but it's a journey you need to start before the next crisis occurs.  

So . . . if a disaster struck your region today, and the power went out, stores closed their doors, and water stopped flowing from your kitchen tap for the next 7 to 14 days . . . do you already have:

  • A battery operated NWS Emergency Radio to find out what was going on, and to get vital instructions from emergency officials
  • A decent first-aid kit, so that you can treat injuries
  • Enough non-perishable food and water on hand to feed and hydrate your family (including pets) for the duration
  • A way to provide light when the grid is down.
  • A way to cook safely without electricity
  • A way to purify or filter water
  • A way to stay cool (fans) or warm when the power is out.
  • A small supply of cash to use in case credit/debit machines are not working
  • An emergency plan, including meeting places, emergency out-of-state contact numbers, a disaster buddy, and in case you must evacuate, a bug-out bag
  • Spare supply of essential prescription medicines that you or your family may need
  • A way to entertain yourself, or your kids, during a prolonged blackout
If your answer is `no’, then I would suggest the time to start preparing
is now.

Sunday, September 27, 2026

PLoS One: Occurrence of influenza antivirals and resistance development in influenza A viruses in aquatic environments: A risk assessment


Photo Credit USGS – Wastewater: The Primary Treatment Process
1. Screening 2. Pumping 3. Aerating 4. Removing sludge 5. 
Removing Scum 6. killing bacteria

#19,350

Almost 20 years ago (January 2007), in The Law of Unintended Consequences, we looked at a study by researchers at the Centre for Ecology and Hydrology in Oxford titled Potential Risks Associated with the Proposed Widespread Use of Tamiflu, that questioned what might happen if millions of people simultaneously began taking Tamiflu and releasing it into our environment.

A large percentage (60%-80%) of the Tamiflu (aka oseltamivir) a person takes is eventually excreted in their urine as oseltamivir carboxylate (OC), a factoid that 20 years ago briefly led to internet speculation about the practice of ‘recycling’ our own urine, to stretch out the supply of Tamiflu during a crisis. 

While that thankfully never became an internet challenge, it did inspire a doctor to publish a proposal in Nature on the co-administration of a generic gout medicine - probenecid - which slows the excretion of certain drugs - potentially increasing the effectiveness (and lowering the overall dose) of oseltamivir. 

But I digress . . . 

The 2006 Oxford study specifically warned that large quantities of oseltamivir carboxylate (OC) could be excreted into sewers during a pandemic - which wastewater plants are largely unable to remove - and could end up in rivers and streams, and eventually birds, where it might promote antiviral resistance in avian flu viruses. 

Similar concerns re-emerged in the fall of 2009 (see Everything Old Is News Again) when researchers at Kyoto University tested wastewater discharge from three local sewage treatment plants and water from two rivers into which they drained during the 2008-09 flu season looking for signs of the active ingredient in Tamiflu, oseltamivir carboxylate (OC).

For years Japan has been the largest consumer of antivirals for seasonal flu, and they found exactly what they were looking for; substantial levels of the Tamiflu metabolite in the environment.

In 2011, in Pandemics & The Law Of Unintended Consequences, we looked at not only the potential effects of antivirals in our sewage system, but also how the consumption (and excretion) of antibiotics during a pandemic might affect wastewater treatment plants (WWTPs).

But a proof of concept was published in 2015, in AAC: LPAI H7N9 Acquires Antiviral Resistance When Exposed To Environmental Oseltamivir, which reported that mallards experimentally infected with LPAI H7N9, and then exposed to low levels of oseltamivir carboxylate (OC) in their water, developed antiviral resistance markers (NA-I222T) in as few as 2 days. 

From the Abstract:

In an in vivo Mallard (Anas platyrhynchos) model, we tested if low-pathogenic avian influenza A(H7N9) virus could become resistant if the host was exposed to low levels of OC. Ducks were experimentally infected and OC was added to their water, where after infection and transmission was maintained by successive introductions of uninfected birds. Daily fecal samples were tested for IAV excretion, genotype and phenotype.

Following Mallard exposure of 2.5 μg/L OC, the resistance related NA-I222T substitution, was detected within 2 days during the first passage and was found in all viruses sequenced from subsequently introduced ducks.

Two of those same authors (Lindström & Järhult) are back with today's report, which provides a relative risk assessment of introducing four different antivirals (3 Neuraminidase inhibitors (NAIs), plus Amantadine, an M2 ion-channel inhibitor) into aquatic environments.  

The authors report that the use of PE (peramivir) and OC (oseltamivir) pose the highest environment risk, and suggest using ZA (zanamivir) whenever possible, and limiting the use of oseltamivir in uncomplicated influenza in non-risk groups.

Zanamivir, however, isn't always a good substitute for oseltamivir because it is an inhaled powder, which can be problematic for those with COPD, asthma, or who are experiencing respiratory symptoms. 

They also recommend stockpiling Baloxavir (see yesterday's blog EID Journal: Comparison of Baloxavir-Based Combinations and Monotherapies for Treating Influenza A(H5N1) Clade 2.3.4.4b Virus Infection in Mice) to provide additional therapeutic options.

This is a lengthy, and times technical report. Follow the link to read it in its entirety. I'll have a postscript after the break. 

Hanna Söderström Lindström, Sara H. Norström , Chaojun Tang, Richard H. Lindberg, Josef D. Järhult

Published: September 21, 2026
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0358447
Abstract

Influenza antivirals (IAs) have been detected in aquatic environments inhabited by dabbling ducks, the natural reservoir of influenza A virus (IAV), raising concerns about the development of antiviral resistance. Because novel human IAV strains often contain genetic material of avian origin, this may contribute to resistance in viruses with pandemic potential. 

This study aimed to assess the environmental risk posed by four IAs—oseltamivir carboxylate (OC), zanamivir (ZA), peramivir (PE), and amantadine (AM)—based on their potential for environmental release, environmental stability, and induction of antiviral resistance. The assessment combined data from new experiments on (1) environmental release and (2) environmental stability of PE, AM, OC, and ZA, with results from previously published in vivo experiments in a mallard model examining (3) resistance development to OC, PE, and ZA in IAV. 

The risk of environmental release was assessed as high for OC, AM, and PE, and very high for ZA. Environmental stability ranged from very high to low, in the order PE > AM > OC > ZA. The potential to induce resistance in IAV was similar for PE and OC, and lower for ZA.
Overall, the environmental risk ranking was PE > OC > ZA, with PE and OC posing the highest risks. 

Prudent use of IAs requires balancing the risk of resistance development against clinical benefit. In cases of complicated influenza or in high-risk patient groups, the clinical benefits are substantial and justify IA use. However, in uncomplicated influenza among otherwise healthy individuals, the clinical benefit is limited, and the risk of resistance development should be carefully considered. Among the evaluated antivirals, ZA showed the lowest environmental risk and should be preferred when feasible.

        (SNIP)

Conclusions

This is the first study to jointly assess the environmental risk of influenza antivirals (IAs), and the public health risk caused by environmental resistance development in influenza A viruses (IAVs). This comprehensive approach provides new knowledge to support sustainable antiviral use, helping to prevent resistance development in future pandemics and preserve the effectiveness of antiviral stockpiles.
Our study shows that the environmental occurrence of IAs, and resistance development in IAVs in aquatic environments, is a concern for all three IAs (OC, PE, and ZA) studied with a high environmental risk of both PE and OC. Our risk assessment was based on virus experiments on individual IAs which could underestimate the risk for environmental resistance development due to cocktail effects in natural environments.

As antiviral drugs constitute a cornerstone in pandemic preparedness, especially in the first phase before vaccines can be mass-produced, it is crucial to work to retain their effectiveness. Given our assessment of the high environmental risk of both PE and OC, and the risk for the resistance developed to be part of a novel IAV with pandemic potential in humans, non-pandemic use should be prudent. This includes balancing benefits of pre-pandemic use with risks of a resistant pandemic IAV. IAs are important in treating complicated diseases and diseases in risk groups and should be used in these cases. However, in uncomplicated influenza in non-risk groups we argue that the clinical benefit is minimal, and if the use is extensive, it will drive environmental occurrence and risk for resistance development. Therefore, we argue that the risk for resistance development should be considered when treating uncomplicated influenza in non-risk groups.

From our risk assessment, it seems beneficial to use ZA rather than oseltamivir phosphate (the pro-drug for OC) when practically possible. PE is the IA with the highest environmental risk in our assessment, hence highest public health risk and other alternatives should be used when possible. As PE is at present only available as an intravenous formulation, it is likely that the use of this drug will not be extensive.

New influenza antivirals such as baloxavir are a very important addition to the treatment arsenal. They should be considered as additions to stockpiles in pandemic preparedness to have access to alternate antivirals with a different mode of action. This will increase the chances of a viable treatment option in case of a resistant pandemic IAV. At the same time, it is crucial to evaluate the risk for environmental resistance development potential of new antivirals to guide prudent pre-pandemic use.
        (Continue . . . )


Antivirals, antibiotics, and most antifungal medicals all share the same Achilles' heel. Over time - and particularly if they are used recklessly or excessively - the pathogens (viruses, bacteria, or fungi) they were designed to suppress can evolve or mutate enough to render them ineffective.

While many people fear that a hyper-virulent novel virus will someday emerge and kill hundreds of millions of people, the reality is - if we don't protect our limited armamentarium of antibiotics and antivirals - something relatively ordinary, and previously treatable, could do the job equally as well.

But balancing today's needs with those of tomorrow is always easier said than done. For more on the potential environmental risks from wastewater treatment plants, you may wish to revisit: 

Preprint: Spillover of Human Antivirals May Promote Resistant Pathogens in Animal Reservoirs

Study: NDM-1 Bacteria Survive & Thrive In Two Chinese Wastewater Treatment Plants

Study: MRSA In Waste Water Treatment Plants

Saturday, September 26, 2026

EID Journal: Comparison of Baloxavir-Based Combinations and Monotherapies for Treating Influenza A(H5N1) Clade 2.3.4.4b Virus Infection in Mice

 

Screenshot: CDC's  Interim Guidance on the Use of Antiviral Medications 
for Treatment of Human Infections with Novel Influenza A Viruses Associated 
with Severe Human Disease - July 2025

#19,349

While newer antivirals have been developed (see FDA Approval Of Xofluza : A New Class Of Influenza Antiviral), oseltamivir (aka `Tamiflu') has remained the `Go to' antiviral for influenza treatment in the United States - and much of the world - for more than 20 years. 

Oseltamivir is our most studied antiviral, nations of the world have stockpiled hundreds of millions of doses, and now that can be acquired as a generic drug, its cost has plummeted. 

While exact numbers have never been disclosed, our National Strategic Stockpile supposedly has somewhere around 50-60 million courses of oseltamivir on hand; sufficient to treat 15-20% of the nation during a severe flu pandemic (assuming a single, standard dose).

Stockpiles of Baloxavir (aka Xofluza) are similarly unknown, but according to a media report in 2024 (see The U.S. strategic drug stockpile is inadequate for a bird flu outbreak) likely numbers only in the hundreds of thousands of doses.

But oseltamivir's track record against novel flu is far from perfect. To be effective, it must be started early in one's infection (1st 48 hrs, ideally), and even then, a good outcome is far from guaranteed. 

The first barrier is getting the drug to the patient in a timely manner, something which we've struggled with, even during normal flu seasons (see Sporadic Tamiflu (Oseltamivir) Shortages Reported In U.S. & Canada).

There is also the problem of resistance, something that can develop spontaneously in 1%-2% of people receiving treatment, or worse - can become `fixed' in circulating strains - such as we saw with H1N1 in 2008. 

Last year, in - in Emerg. Microbes & Inf: Oseltamivir Resistant H5N1 (Genotype D1.1) found On 8 Canadian Poultry Farms - we saw a report on a large outbreak of Oseltamivir resistant H5N1 which emerged over several weeks in the fall of 2024.

While we haven't seen that happen on a large scale, 18 months ago concerns over the effectiveness of our current antiviral armamentarium were raised by St. Jude Researchers: Current Antivirals Likely Less Effective Against Severe Infection Caused by Bird Flu in Cows’ Milk. 

Last January, in Nature Comms: Oseltamivir and Baloxavir Monotherapy and Combination Therapy Efficacy Against Clade 2.3.4.4b A(H5N1) Influenza Virus Infection in Ferrets, we saw a CDC study which looked at both mono and combination therapy with oseltamivir and baloxavir in ferrets infected with H5N1 (genotype D1.1).

In short, they found:

  • Ferrets infected with H5N1 D1.1 and treated with oseltamivir saw little or no clinical or virologic benefit compared to no treatment, with persistent high fevers, weight loss, and systemic viral replication.
  • Ferrets treated with Baloxavir saw significantly less fever, weight loss, and viral replication. Some ferrets, however, saw a late rise in fever (after 4 days) and viral shedding, suggesting a viral rebound. 
  • Ferrets treated with both drugs saw similar clinical protection to baloxavir alone, but did not show signs of rebound. 
Note: Ferrets are a good, but not perfect, proxy for humans in influenza research, so these results may not be 100% applicable to humans.  

A month later, we looked at a study (Nature Comms: Baloxavir outperforms oseltamivir, favipiravir, and amantadine in treating lethal influenza A(H5N1) HA clade 2.3.4.4b infection in mice) by Webby & Jones et al. which suggests that baloxavir outperforms oseltamivir, favipiravir, and amantadine in treating clade 2.3.4.4b (circa 2022) H5N1 avian viruses (in mice).

And last April, in Emerg Microbes & Inf: Antiviral Activities of Multiple Antivirals Against HPAI H5N1 in Vitro and in Mice, the authors reported the existing 5-day course of oseltamivir appears inadequate to treat severe HPAI H5N1 infection (at least, in mice).

The authors reported Baloxavir as being more potent, but even a 5-day B.I.D course (10 times the current dose) only saved 16.7% of treated mice.  Extending treatment to 7 days (14 doses), raised survival to 50%. 

While a 7-day course of Baloxavir (BXM) was the strongest single-drug therapy, extended courses of MNP+BXM and OSP+BXM provided the most effective treatments.

The caveat here being that - due to their higher metabolic rate - the half-life of baloxavir is much shorter in mice than in humans. While it remains to be determined, an equivalent dose in humans might be more like 2 or 3 doses spread out over a week's time.

And mice, and ferrets, and other lab animals - while useful - are never a perfect analog for humans. They don't have the same physiology, metabolism, or past virus and/or vaccine exposures that can modify our immune response. 

Adding to this long and winding narrative, we have a new report from the EID Journal which provides additional support for the baloxavir-based strategy described above. 

As in the previous report, the authors found that baloxavir outperformed both oseltamivir and molnupiravir against clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 in a mouse model, although it should be noted they began treatment just 6 hours after inoculation. 

Combining baloxavir with either oseltamivir or molnupiravir was even more effective in suppressing viral replication and spread beyond the lungs.

The bottom line: both studies suggest oseltamivir monotherapy may be inadequate for severe H5N1, that baloxavir appears more potent, and that combination therapy may prove a more effective regimen - at least in mice. 

How all of this might translate to humans, who would be unlikely to receive antiviral treatment in such short order - remains to be seen. 

I've only posted the abstract and some extended excerpts from the EID dispatch. Follow the link to read it in its entirety.  I'll have a postscript after you return.

Comparison of Baloxavir-Based Combinations and Monotherapies for Treating Influenza A(H5N1) Clade 2.3.4.4b Virus Infection in Mice
 
Seong Cheol Min, Ju Ryeong Lee, Beom Kyu Kim, Ji-Hyun Park, Dong Gyu Lee, Gi Chan Lee, Se Hee An, Santosh Chokkakula, Aman Jain, Young Ki Choi, Yun Hee Baek, and Min-Suk Song
 
 Abstract

Highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b virus continues to cause animal outbreaks and sporadic zoonotic infections. In a mouse model of lethal influenza disease, we compared oseltamivir, baloxavir, and molnupiravir monotherapies with 2-drug combinations.
Baloxavir-based combinations improved survival, reduced lung viral loads, and prevented extrapulmonary dissemination, supporting H5N1 preparedness strategies. 

Highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b virus continues to cause widespread outbreaks and sporadic zoonotic infections, underscoring the need to optimize antiviral strategies (1–3). Licensed influenza antiviral drugs can reduce disease severity but might be compromised in severe infections by high viral burdens, treatment delays, and treatment-emergent resistance, motivating evaluation of combination regimens (4–7). 

Recent H5N1 treatment studies using mouse models suggest antiviral performance can vary by exposure route and disease progression (8–11). To inform preparedness-oriented selection, we compared direct-acting antiviral drugs from distinct classes in a lethal mouse model. We tested monotherapies and 2-drug combinations of 2 licensed influenza antiviral agents, oseltamivir phosphate (OSP; neuraminidase inhibitor) and baloxavir acid (BXA; cap-dependent endonuclease inhibitor), and molnupiravir (MPV; nucleoside analog) to assess whether combinations provided synergistic benefit.

(SNIP)

Conclusions

In a lethal clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 mouse model, monotherapies with OSP, MPV, or BXA improved outcomes in a dose-dependent manner but did not consistently prevent death or extrapulmonary spread. In contrast, 2-drug combinations, particularly those containing BXA, achieved complete survival at both dosing regimens and suppressed pulmonary replication to near LOD while preventing neuroinvasion and cardiac dissemination. 

Those findings are consistent with recent clade 2.3.4.4b A(H5N1) studies showing strong in vivo activity of BXA and BXA-containing regimens and extend those observations by directly comparing BXA/OSP and BXA/MPV with OSP/MPV in a lethal mouse model (8,10,11,14). Our findings extend recent antiviral-combination studies in less virulent influenza models by showing that BXA-containing combinations provided the strongest protection in a lethal clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 model (14,15). 

Together, our findings provide an experimentally grounded rationale to prioritize BXA-based 2-drug regimens as a preparedness-oriented option for emergent H5N1 infections when antiviral treatment is initiated early after infection, particularly where severe disease or resistance risk can compromise single-agent performance.
        (Continue . . . )

Currently, the CDC's guidance is for prompt oseltamivir treatment of suspected or confirmed novel influenza A infections, while allowing clinicians to consider adding baloxavir in selected severe or high-risk cases.
  • Combination antiviral treatment (e.g., oseltamivir and baloxavir) can be considered for hospitalized patients with novel influenza A virus infection because it is possible that some novel influenza A viruses might become resistant to oseltamivir and peramivir during antiviral treatment with one of these agents 36789
  • Oseltamivir resistance has been reported in hospitalized patients with HPAI A(H5N1) virus infection, resulting in fatal outcome 3. If a hospitalized patient treated with oseltamivir or peramivir manifests progressive lower respiratory disease, the presence of a resistant virus should be considered. After consultation with CDC's Influenza Division, investigation for antiviral resistance should be performed.
  • Combination treatment with a neuraminidase inhibitor and baloxavir did not have clinical benefit compared with neuraminidase inhibitor and placebo in a randomized clinical trial in hospitalized patients with seasonal influenza, but the addition of baloxavir reduced duration of infectious viral shedding 10

Added to this are the logistical considerations: The global supply of oseltamivir is far greater than baloxavir, while the cost is far lower.

The reality is, even oseltamivir may be hard to get - at least during the first critical 24-48 hrs of infection - during any global influenza pandemic. It seems likely that `extended' baloxavir or combination therapy will be limited to hospitalized patients with severe disease.

Combine that with an expected wait of at least 6 months before having any large quantities of vaccine, and we will once again have to rely heavily on preventing infection; wearing face masks, hand washing, improved indoor ventilation, staying home while sick, and avoiding crowds.

While I would certainly avail myself of whatever antivirals are available in an influenza pandemic, my primary strategy is always one of prevention. I've already got my supply of masks, hand sanitizer, and OTC meds in the hall closet, and have stayed current with all of my vaccines.

If you aren't similarly prepared, you may want to revisit: