#19,019
In the wake of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic it has become increasingly difficult to find substantive, and verifiable, information on avian flu, COVID, MERS-CoV, (and other) emerging disease outbreaks around the world.
Many countries simply no longer report outbreaks or incidents. Others do, but only intermittently, and are often parsimonious in the sharing of details.
Public health organizations - like the WHO, PAHO, and the ECDC - are forced to constantly `remind' countries of their obligation under the IHR to report. But since there are no real penalties for failing to comply, many countries choose silence (see From Here to Impunity).
The public remains largely apathetic (see Two Surveys (UK & U.S.) Illustrating The Public's Lack of Concern Over Avian Flu), and many governments appear more than happy to downplay the threat for political or economic reasons.
Obviously, no one truly knows what HPAI H5 will do next.
But right now, HPAI H5 remains at the top of our pandemic worry list, for reasons that are covered at length in the following Review/Perspective article published this week in the journal Advanced Genetics.
This (12-page) review recounts the evolution of the H5N1 avian influenza virus, with a focus on the 2.3.4.4b clade, and focuses on a number of critical mutations (including HA‐Q226L, HA‐T199I, PB2‐E627K, and NA‐H274Y) which could help enable cross-species transmission or increase NAI resistance.
Evolution of H5N1 Cross‐Species Transmission: Adaptive Mutations Driving Avian‐to‐Human Infection
Wenxin Man 1,2, Lin Du 2, Ying Liu 2, Zehan Pang 3, Hongyan Zhu 4,✉, Bixia Hong 2,5,✉, Zhichao Xu 1,2,✉, Huahao Fan 2,✉
PMC Copyright notice
PMCID: PMC12791573 PMID: 41531488
ABSTRACT
First detected in poultry in China in 1996, the H5N1 avian influenza virus has evolved into a significant global public health hazard, primarily owing to its high pathogenicity and potential for interspecies transmission. While primarily affecting avian species, H5N1 has repeatedly breached species barriers, infecting mammals including humans, minks, seals, and cattle.This review synthesizes current knowledge on the molecular mechanisms underpinning H5N1's host adaptation, focusing on key mutations in viral proteins‐such as hemagglutinin (HA), neuraminidase (NA), and polymerase subunits (PB2)‐which boost binding affinity to human‐type receptors, increase replicative efficiency in mammalian cells, and facilitate immune evasion.Critical mutations, including HA‐Q226L, HA‐T199I, PB2‐E627K, and NA‐H274Y, are discussed in detail, highlighting their roles in altering receptor specificity, promoting antiviral resistance, and expanding viral tropism. The paper also outlines epidemiological trends, global dissemination patterns driven by migratory birds and trade, and current strategies for prevention and control, including antiviral therapeutics and vaccine development.Ultimately, this comprehensive analysis underscores the urgent need for continued surveillance, broad‐spectrum countermeasures, and international collaboration to reduce the pandemic risk posed by H5N1.
(SNIP)
Although the current transmission efficiency of the H5N1 virus among humans remains limited, its highly variable genome provides the molecular foundation for potential evolution toward sustained human-to-human transmission [73].Significant knowledge gaps remain concerning the key factors that enable efficient human-to-human spread of the virus, its long-term evolutionary trajectory in new mammalian hosts such as cattle, and the impact of continuous surface antigen drift on the efficacy of antibody protection [74-76]. To address these issues, future global surveillance efforts must extend beyond poultry populations to systematically encompass domestic and wild mammalian species, particularly those in outbreak areas, in order to establish a comprehensive ‘One Health’ early warning system [77].Addressing this threat necessitates global collaboration in the integration of resources and technologies to continuously monitor viral evolutionary dynamics, with a particular emphasis on its cross-species transmission tendencies from poultry to humans and other mammals.
By implementing comprehensive strategies that encompass surveillance, research, and international cooperation (Figure 4), we can more effectively mitigate future H5N1 virus threats, reduce the risk of a global pandemic, and safeguard both human health and ecological balance.
While a few countries obviously `get it', see (see South Korea CDC Announces A 19-day, Nationwide, Mock-Training Exercise to Prepare for Zoonotic Influenza), most nations seem content to ignore the threat, praying nothing happens during their watch.
A policy that works well up until the point it doesn't anymore. And by then it is usually too late to do much about it. As the former Secretary of the HHS Michael Leavitt put it 20 years ago:
“Everything you say in advance of a pandemic seems alarmist. Anything you’ve done after it starts is inadequate."
