NIH Brochure on Dual Use Research
# 6264
Over the past few months an obscure acronym has made it’s way into numerous blogs, news headlines, and even popular usage; DURC - Dual Use Research of Concern.
While it is the current debate over controversial H5N1 transmissibility studies that has prompted its emergence (see The Biosecurity Debate On H5N1 Research), DURC has been a matter of national concern for a number of years.
The NIH produced a 7 minute video in 2010 highlighting the concerns of DURC, called Dual Use Research: A dialogue. Click the link, or the image below to watch.
Last week the Office of Science Policy at the NIH released a 4 page set of guidelines for DURC (Duel Use Research of Concern) projects designed to beef up oversight and biosecurity of U.S. funded projects.
The scope of this new policy is to cover research on the most dangerous of biological organisms, listing;
a) Avian influenza virus (highly pathogenic)
b) Bacillus anthracis
c) Botulinum neurotoxin
d) Burkholderia mallei
e) Burkholderia pseudomallei
f) Ebola virus
g) Foot-and-mouth disease virus
h) Francisella tularensis
i) Marburg virusj) Reconstructed 1918 Influenza virus
k) Rinderpest virus
l) Toxin-producing strains of Clostridium botulinum
m) Variola major virus
n) Variola minor virus
o) Yersinia pestis
Specifically any research that seeks to:
a) Enhances the harmful consequences of the agent or toxin;
b) Disrupts immunity or the effectiveness of an immunization against the agent or toxin without
clinical or agricultural justification;c) Confers to the agent or toxin resistance to clinically or agriculturally useful prophylactic or
therapeutic interventions against that agent or toxin or facilitates their ability to evade detection methodologies;d) Increases the stability, transmissibility, or the ability to disseminate the agent or toxin;
e) Alters the host range or tropism of the agent or toxin;
f) Enhances the susceptibility of a host population to the agent or toxin; or
g) Generates or reconstitutes an eradicated or extinct agent or toxin listed in Section (III.1) above.
For more on DURC, the NSABB, and the Office of Biotechnology Activities, you may wish to visit the following links.
Summary of NSABB Reports and Activities
Responsible Communication of Life Sciences Research with Dual Use Potential
Global Status of Strategies for Addressing the Intersection of Science and Security
Roundtable at the ASM Biodefense and Emerging Diseases Research meeting
