WHO: Risk assessment of the introduction, spread, and zoonotic spillover of MERS-CoV Clade B in camel populations of the Nile Basin and Across Africa

 

#19,285

While the number of human MERS-CoV cases reported over the past six years has fallen dramatically, this high morbidity/mortality coronavirus continues to pose a significant public health threat ((Referral) Nature: Human MERS-CoV cases are falling but pose an ongoing pandemic threat) as it spreads and evolves in camels in the Middle East and Africa.

Some of this decline may be due to difficulties in identifying cases, while some Middle Eastern countries have shown past reluctance to report cases. It also seems likely that cases are being missed in North and Central Africa as well (see EID Journal: Geographic Distribution of MERS-CoV among Dromedary Camels, Africa). 

As of 11 June 2026, the WHO had reported a total of 2,637 laboratory-confirmed human cases have been reported - mostly from countries in the Arabian Peninsula - with an estimated case fatality ratio (CFR) of approximately 37%.   

But both the  EID Journal: Estimation of Severe MERS Cases in the Middle East, 2012–2016 and Presence of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus antibodies in Saudi Arabia: a nationwide, cross-sectional, serological study by Drosten & Memish et al., suggest that far more MERS-CoV cases have occurred than have been reported.

  

MERS-CoV clade B is most common on the Arabian peninsula, while Africa is dominated by clade C, which is thought to be less well adapted to human physiology.  Clade A hasn't been reported in humans or camels since 2015, and is now considered extinct. 

But over the past year at least two studies have reported evidence that clade B-like viruses (or clade B/C recombinants) may be circulating in Africa. Today's risk assessment cites:

• In Egypt, phylogenetic analyses of a camel-derived sample identified genome fragments clustering with clade B viruses from the Arabian Peninsula, circulating alongside endemic African clade C viruses (Gomaa, Edwards, Wang, Taweel, et al., 2025).

• In a separate study (Hassan et al., 2025), metagenomic sequencing of nasal swabs from camels imported from Sudan also detected MERS-CoV genome fragments clustering with clade B human and camel strains

In both cases, the available sequences were limited and less than 100% complete, and so they must be regarded as preliminary, and will require full-genome confirmation.

The 24-page  FAO–WHO–WOAH GLEWS+ assessment (below) reached three primary conclusions; the first two question only deal with the impact on dromedaries, while the third deals with the public health risk.

Confidence in the two camel specific answers is low, while the confidence in the public health question is moderate. 

The section discussing question 3, provides the following rationale (excerpt):

Once introduced into camels in the Nile Basin countries, the likelihood of MERS-CoV clade B spillover to occupationally exposed humans is assessed as very likely, reflecting the intensity of human-camel contact, weak and uneven implementation of biosecurity and hygiene measures and constraints in surveillance and early detection systems.

The consequences are assessed as moderate. MERS-CoV Clade B can cause severe disease in humans and is associated with a high case fatality ratio, particularly among those with underlying medical conditions, and immunocompromised individuals. 

In the absence of licensed vaccines for the general population or widely available specific treatments, spillover events have the potential to result in severe clinical outcomes, especially in settings with limited access to advanced healthcare. Healthcare-associated outbreaks also remain a concern where infection prevention and control measures are insufficient. However, despite its high replication competence, a substantial proportion of MERS-CoV infections are asymptomatic or mild.

Furthermore, sustained human-to-human transmission is generally limited and typically requires close and prolonged contact. Consequently, widespread community transmission is not expected. Overall, the public health risk of MERS-CoV clade B spillover from camel populations to humans exposed to camels or their products in the Nile Basin countries is assessed as high.

The level of confidence in the assessment is considered moderate, reflecting evidence of frequent human–camel contact and known zoonotic potential of MERS-CoV clade B, but also important uncertainties regarding the frequency of spillover events, the role of specific exposure pathways, and gaps in surveillance and epidemiological data from the Nile Basin region.

The full risk assessment is well worth reading in its entirety. 

Australia: Bird Flu Detection in Wild Birds Doubles in Less Than 4 Days

 

#19,284

On August 4th, the official count of H5 positive birds in Australia broke 100 (n=102), today that number stands at 215, with the backlog of uninvestigated bird deaths continuing to rise.         

Detection of H5 bird flu 

As of 3.00pm AEST, 8 August 2026, Australia has 215 confirmed detections of H5 bird flu in wild birds.

• 10 in Western Australia (WA)
• 147 in South Australia (SA) 
• 4 in New South Wales (NSW)
• 1 in Queensland (QLD)
• 53 in Victoria (VIC).

We've two brief updates from DAFF:

8 August 2026

Attributable to Australian Chief Veterinary Officer, Dr Beth Cookson:

Testing at CSIRO’s Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness (ACDP) has confirmed a further 2 positive detections in New South Wales, one greater crested tern near Narooma and one greater crested tern near Wentworth.

An additional 10 positive detections have also been confirmed in Victoria. These were all from greater crested terns in south-west Victoria and Clyde in south-east Melbourne.

There have now been 215 confirmed or presumed positive detections of H5 bird flu in Australia, based on samples tested.

There remain no detections in poultry or in our agricultural production system.

The risk to human health remains low.

8 August 2026

Attributable to Australian Chief Veterinary Officer, Dr Beth Cookson:

Testing at CSIRO’s Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness (ACDP) has confirmed a further 28 positive detections in South Australia.

The new confirmed cases are all in wild seabirds, including 15 greater crested terns from the Limestone Coast (5 at Robe, 4 at Port MacDonnell, 2 at Beachport, 1 at Southend, 1 at Pelican Point, 1 at Cape Douglas, and 1 at Eight Mile Creek); 11 greater crested terns on Kangaroo Island (3 at Haines, 6 at Seal Bay, 1 at Penneshaw, and 1 at Vivonne Bay); and 2 silver gulls on the Limestone Coast (Port MacDonnell and Robe).

There have now been 203 confirmed or presumed positive detections of H5 bird flu in Australia.

There remain no detections in poultry or in our agricultural production system.

The risk to human health remains low.

Thus far, no poultry, livestock, or marine mammals have been detected with the virus on the Australian mainland. 

Referral: Two Related Papers (PNAS & The Lancet) on Preparing for The Next Pandemic

 

Credit Mechanics of pandemics

#19,283

In January of 2020 - 6 weeks before the WHO declared COVID-19 a pandemic - we revisited the WHO's recently published 91-page NPI Guidance document and discussed some of the practical limitations of current pandemic planning (see No Pandemic Plan Survives Contact With A Novel Virus).

What emerged in China, and around the world with COVID, were emergency responses that ranged from draconian to laissez faire, sometimes alternating wildly between the two extremes.

 

We saw mixed, and often egregious, messaging from governments. 

And early on, overly optimistic messaging was that COVID wasn't `airborne', it wasn't likely transmitted asymptomatically, that infection produced durable immunity, that public masking was unnecessary, and that `herd immunity' would end the pandemic in a matter of months. 

Many of these ideas were promoted long after scientific evidence emerged to the contrary. And it seemed, every country and every state was working from a different script. 

Today, despite more than 15 million estimated deaths in the first 2 years, much of the world is in denial over the severity of the COVID pandemic, and believe they were somehow duped by their governments.  

Sadly, the failures and mixed messaging from the last pandemic - along with the anti-science vitriol permeating social media - have only further eroded the ability of governments to deal with the next global health threat. 

Some of this is obviously a self-inflicted wound. While some of it comes down the lack of any good options when dealing with any fast-moving, novel pathogen, which we'd never dealt with before. 

Since another pandemic is considered inevitable, there is understandably considerable interest in developing better, more flexible, frameworks to deal with the next global health threat. 

To that end we have two overlapping pandemic-preparedness papers from Max Planck which look at the same problem from different perspectives. Both are long reads, and so I'll just briefly summarize them and provide links. 

The first, Mechanics of pandemics (published in eClinicalMedicine, a Lancet journal), is a broad guide to the spread and containment of a pandemic virus. 

Mechanics of pandemics

Seba Contrerasa,b,w Send email to seba.contreras@ds.mpg.de ∙ Philipp Döngesa,b,w ∙ Laura Müllera,b,w ∙ Piklu Mallicka,b,w ∙ Sydney Paltrac ∙ Ulrik Hvidd,e,a ∙ et al. Show more

 

Summary

COVID-19 and previous pandemics have shown how diseases can disrupt, threaten, and transform daily life. Since pathogens and societies are continuously evolving, every pandemic is different. However, certain fundamental principles of disease transmission appear to hold true across different outbreaks. These “mechanisms” are grounded in natural laws or the very structure of our biology and societies.

This paper compiles ten fundamental mechanisms, curated by a multidisciplinary team with backgrounds spanning public health, medicine, epidemiology, political science, mathematics, physics, and psychology.

These mechanisms, although perhaps underappreciated, substantially shape how pandemics unfold and are controlled. The better we succeed in understanding these mechanisms and establishing this knowledge in our societies, the better we will be able to prepare for future pandemics and respond appropriately when they occur.

You'll find a brief summary provided in the following press release from Max Planck:

Beyond COVID-19: Fundamental principles that shape pandemics

Scientists have compiled ten fundamental mechanisms governing the course of pandemics from various disciplines 

Max-Planck-Gesellschaft

The second paper -  Optimizing infectious disease mitigation under dynamic conditions - published in PNAS, uses mathematical models to weigh the estimated direct and indirect costs of infections against the assumed social, economic, and psychological costs of reducing transmission through NPIs.

Optimizing infectious disease mitigation under dynamic conditions

Laura Müller, Fabio Sartori, Jonas Dehning, +1 , and Viola Priesemann viola.priesemann@ds.mpg.deAuthors Info & Affiliations
Edited by Nils Chr. Stenseth, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway; received October 9, 2025; accepted June 26, 2026

August 3, 2026

123 (32) e2527395123
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2527395123

Significance

Managing a pandemic requires balancing competing costs: interventions such as mask mandates and lockdowns reduce infections but disrupt economies and social life, while uncontrolled spread imposes treatment costs and loss of productivity and well-being. We present a general framework for identifying optimal strategies that balance these trade-offs under realistic conditions, including seasonality and vaccination.

We uncover three key principles: i) interventions are best applied either very strictly or not at all, depending on disease severity; ii) anticipating seasonal changes shifts large outbreaks away from winter, reducing their impact; and iii) even with optimal mitigation, small infection waves can arise during vaccination. By providing both insights and practical tools, our approach offers a foundation for designing responses to future epidemics.

Abstract

Mitigation measures are essential for controlling the spread of infectious diseases during pandemics and epidemics, but they impose considerable societal, individual, and economic costs. We developed a general framework that combines simulation of disease dynamics with optimal control to determine mitigation strategies that balance infection and mitigation costs.

Optimizing this trade-off, we identified three surprising effects: first, assuming a constant reproduction number , the optimal response is typically “all-or-nothing”: depending on disease severity, either strict mitigation or none at all is optimal, with intermediate levels emerging only in restricted regimes that we characterize analytically. Second, under seasonal variations, optimal mitigation is stricter during winter. Interestingly, a single wave of infections still arises in spring, replacing the autumn/winter waves known for classical influenza. Third, during steady vaccination campaigns, even optimal mitigation can result in transient infection waves.

Finally, we quantify the cost of delayed mitigation onset and show that even short delays can substantially increase total costs—if the disease is severe. Overall, our framework is easily applicable to general and complex settings and thereby presents a versatile tool to explore optimal mitigation strategies for endemic and pandemic infectious disease.

Once again, you'll find a press release available at: 

Taking appropriate protective measures during pandemics

Optimal containment measures exhibit a clear threshold depending on the severity of the disease 

While I confess to being less than optimistic about our global response to the next severe pandemic, I'm glad that some people are still working to improve our odds.

Australia: Bird Flu Detection in Birds Rises (n=175) - Victoria Releases Poultry Housing Requirements

 

#19,282

While there are still no reports of HPAI H5N1 in poultry in Australia, the number of wild (local & migratory) birds confirmed infected continues to rise (n=175), with South Australia and Victoria leading the pack. 

Overnight Victoria has announced an initial 14-day mandatory housing order for poultry in specified regions of the state.  From their Agriculture Facebook page:

A housing requirement is now in place for poultry flocks of 50 or more birds along the south of the state for an initial 14 days following recent detections of H5 bird flu.

Poultry owners in these areas must house their birds or otherwise prevent contact with wild birds wherever practical.

Housing poultry is an additional risk mitigation option aimed at reducing exposure of poultry to infected wildlife. Wild birds are a known source of H5 bird flu.

Stringent biosecurity practices remain essential. If you notice unexplained illness or deaths in your birds, report it immediately to the Emergency Animal Disease Hotline on 1800 675 888.

Find out more about the housing requirement: agriculture.vic.gov.au/birdflu

This comes after 2 announcements from Australian Chief Veterinary Officer, Dr Beth Cookson, which increased the number of wildlife detections nationally by 40% over the past 24 hours.

7 August 2026

Attributable to Australian Chief Veterinary Officer, Dr Beth Cookson:

Testing at CSIRO’s Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness (ACDP) has confirmed a further 20 positive detections in Victoria, all in greater crested terns from the Portland and Nelson area.

There have now been 175 confirmed or presumed positive detections of H5 bird flu in Australia, based on samples tested.

There remain no detections in poultry or in our agricultural production system.

The risk to human health remains low.

7 August 2026

Attributable to Australian Chief Veterinary Officer, Dr Beth Cookson:

Testing at CSIRO’s Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness (ACDP) has confirmed a further 32 positive detections in South Australia, 29 greater crested terns (12 at Port MacDonnell, 10 at Beachport, 1 at Robe, 1 at Carpenter Rocks, 1 at Cape Jaffa, 3 at Seal Bay on Kangaroo Island, and 1 at Port Elliot) and 3 silver gulls at Southend on the Limestone Coast.

There have now been 155 confirmed or presumed positive detections of H5 bird flu in Australia, based on samples tested.

There remain no detections in poultry or in our agricultural production system.

The risk to human health remains low.

 
Due to growing concerns, the Royal Adelaide Show - which is similar to a State Fair here in the U.S. - has announced the cancelation of all poultry, pigeon, and birds  exhibits in their upcoming 9-day run (5–13 Sep).

Ten days ago we looked at a preprint by Raina MacIntyre et al. (HPAI H5N1 risk in Australia: a model for the prediction of poultry outbreaks) which included a map showing current HPAI H5 detections overlaying poultry production zones.

 

You can view an updated interactive map at EPIWATCH, which shows the continued encroachment of HPAI in wild birds to these sensitive regions.

While enhanced biosecurity can help reduce these risks, even countries with decades of experience dealing with HPAI continue to struggle to keep this deadly virus out of commercial and backyard poultry (see Front. Vet. Sci: Biosecurity deficiencies in HPAI-affected poultry farms in Korea, 2020/2021–2024/2025 seasons).

Stay tuned.

Eurosurveillance: A cohort study of persons exposed to HPAI A(H5N1) at premises with infected animals, England, 2023 to 2025

 

#19,281

Despite being of the same subclade (2.3.4.4b) the HPAI H5N1 viruses circulating in the UK (and Europe) during the 2023-2025 were (and remain) genetically distinct from those circulating in North America.

While cattle-associated genotype B3.13 and a newly emerged genotype D1.1 both emerged in North America in 2024, the UK and Europe were dealing with a combination of EA-2024-DI and DI.2/D1.2 genotypes. 

This matters because even minor differences in HPAI strains (subtypes, genotypes, Amino Acid changes) can alter the transmissibility, host range, and virulence of the virus.

With that in mind, today we have a research report published yesterday in Eurosurveillance that finds relatively limited evidence of infection of  workers exposed to infected poultry in the UK. 

The time period covered (Apr 2023 - Mar 2025) saw 60 outbreaks in England (see chart below), but recruitment was done only at 34 premises (57%), and was confined to England (excluding Scotland, Wales & Northern Ireland).

Out of 862 potentially exposed individuals from these 34 premises, roughly half (n=428) were enrolled in the study. Of those, 3 were determined to have been infected, while three others had positive tests that were most likely due to contamination and not infection. 

This provides a substantial - albeit incomplete - occupational sample, but it likely only captures a fraction of those exposed in the UK during this time. 

And in the 16 months since this survey ended, the UK has reported a surge of roughly 115 additional HPAI outbreaks (note: 15 cases were reported over the summer of 2025).

While this study provides a useful snapshot of the risks of the H5N1 viruses circulating in England during the 2023-2025 study period - given HPAI's continued evolution - it isn't necessarily predictive of the risks going forward.  

It does, however, illustrate the value of PPE use and other biosecurity measures in contaminated environments. 

Due to its length I've just posted the link and some extended excerpts from the study. Follow the link to read it in its entirety. 

A cohort study of persons exposed to highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) at premises with infected animals, England, 2023 to 2025   
Florence Halford1 , Paula B Blomquist1 , Neil Bray1 , Chloe Byers1 , Carmellie Inzoungou-Massanga1 , Carys Rees1 , Maria Waghorn1 , Motolani Awokoya1 , Rachel Lunt1 , Neil Cunningham1 , Michelle Chapman1 , Philippa Jones1 , Nicholas Machin1 , Georgios Chalikias1 , Alan Lord1 , Rachel Benee2 , Sophia Makki1 , Beatrix Kele1 , Andre Charlett1 , Katja Hoschler1 , Anika Singanayagam1 , Maria Zambon1 , Oluwakemi Olufon1 , Obaghe Edeghere1 , Meera Chand1 , Susan Hopkins1 , Deepti Kumar1 , Richard Puleston1 
 
Key public health message

What did you want to address in this study and why?

Following an increase in the number of avian influenza outbreaks in England, we wanted to understand the risk of human infection among people who work closely with birds on farms where outbreaks had occurred. We were interested in whether any individuals with positive tests had any symptoms, and if any steps that were taken to reduce their exposure had an effect on their illness (such as vaccination or use of protective equipment).

What have we learnt from this study?

Less than 1% of participants in this study had an avian influenza infection after working closely with infected animals. None of the participants who had a positive test were vaccinated against seasonal influenza, none had severe symptoms, but the majority reported wearing protective equipment. Although there were some practical challenges, we found recruitment to be more achievable when undertaken in person at the outbreak sites.

What are the implications of your findings for public health?

Being able to better understand the risk of avian influenza infection among farm workers on sites with outbreaks is important for forming public health recommendations and better preparing for future outbreaks. Based on our findings, we recommend continuing proper use of protective equipment and resuming testing of workers at outbreak sites if the risk of human infection increases, to strengthen public health response to future outbreaks.

Discussion
 
This 2-year surveillance study of avian influenza A(H5N1) among persons exposed at IPs in England identified three cases meeting the criteria for infection (two confirmed, one unclear) and three cases with uncertain significance, deemed likely to have transient mucosal contamination. The low < 1% PCR positivity rate and mild symptoms in cases suggest that there is a low risk of bird-to-human transmission of the 2.3.4.4b clade and of severe disease in humans in the UK, even when exposed by touch, where PPE compliance is robust among most individuals. Comparable studies in the US and elsewhere have reported similarly low rates of human infection, but with varying severity [16,17].

The direct nature of exposure among cases in this study aligns with that of a confirmed human case of influenza A(H5N1) in the UK in January 2022 [18], reinforcing the importance of maintaining distance from infected birds and the critical use of correct PPE, which should be communicated through public health messaging [19]. Four of the six cases in this study reported wearing full PPE when exposed; therefore, it is unclear where the potential exposure occurred for these individuals. This suggests difficulty in ensuring proper PPE donning/doffing and compliance in these environments. The possibility of PPE breaches/not recognising when breaches have occurred or inaccuracies due to recall bias cannot be ruled out, as this information was self-reported via questionnaire. Our findings are consistent with cases in the US, where positivity among exposed persons was low, although occasional transmission events were observed among those with close contact and suboptimal PPE use [16].

Our study had some limitations. The study was stopped before reaching the 1,000 participant target sample size because of resource constraints. Although recruitment uptake was significantly higher when undertaken in person, this was not always feasible because of occasional unavailability of the study team at short notice, limited space on site to undertake safe recruitment as determined by the APHA, or unsuitable conditions such as extreme weather. This highlights a need for substantial resource allocation in future surveillance to increase the recruitment of eligible individuals, and thus the precision of findings. Recruitment on site also proved challenging, as eligible persons raised concerns regarding the security of their data, time requirements, and isolation should they test positive. The latter issue was more common among contractors, where sick pay was not offered and daily government compensation was insufficient to cover loss of earnings, suggestive of unequal participation due to financial insecurity. Language barriers further hindered recruitment among contractors, although translated documents were prepared ahead of time, highlighting that future surveillance programmes need to include more inclusive communication strategies.

Demographic details were not gathered for all eligible persons; thus, we were unable to calculate recruitment uptake by occupation or IMD, which limits the generalisability of our results. However, of those recruited to the study, socioeconomic differences were apparent between the two main occupational groups: the majority of the contractors resided in the lowest IMD quintile, while the majority of APHA staff resided in the three least deprived quintiles. Although all recruited participants were within the biosecurity area at some point during their exposure period, the contractors had the highest proportion exposed by touch (88.8%) and frequently spent long periods of time in sheds containing infected birds, possibly putting them at a higher risk of exposure than others. With this increased risk in mind, extra care should be dedicated to ensuring that risk and control measures (such as PPE policies and symptom awareness) are effectively communicated to all and that all workers comply with them; simple language versions as well as translated materials should be available.

        (SNIP)

Conclusions

 Our findings suggest that the influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b viruses circulating in the UK during the period 2023 to 2025 pose a low risk of zoonotic infection in exposed individuals, under present conditions.

However, the detection of mucosal contamination among people self-reporting full PPE usage highlights the need for continued vigilance, and potential challenges with fomites. Surveillance within a One Health framework remains essential for detecting emerging variants with pandemic potential and reducing inequalities in surveillance accessibility through innovative and targeted approaches is imperative to ensure populations are not overlooked.

While there are limitations surrounding chemoprophylaxis, PPE use as per guidance can be an effective barrier to transmission; however, care must be taken to ensure compliance. The combination of these preventative measures, continued biosecurity vigilance, and resumed enhanced surveillance following identification of an increased risk of animal-to-human transmission, are required for mitigating the risks posed by influenza A(H5N1) in poultry outbreak settings.

        (Continue. . . )
 

Australia: H5 Positive Bird Count Rises (n=123) - Victoria Reports 1st Land bird Infection & Investigating Dead Seal

 

#19,280

While not unexpected, overnight CSIRO has reported the first Australian land bird - a Magpie from Victoria - has been confirmed infected with HPAI H5N1. This is their first non-seabird report since the virus was confirmed in June. 

6 August 2026

Attributable to Acting Australian Chief Veterinary Officer, Dr Sam Hamilton:

Testing at CSIRO’s Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness (ACDP) has confirmed a further 16 positive detections in Victoria, 14 greater crested terns, one silver gull and one magpie. All of these birds were found in the vicinity of Portland and Nelson.

There have also been 6 further confirmed positive detections in South Australia, all in greater crested terns. This includes 1 in Beachport, 1 in Port Vincent, 1 at Pullen Island Port Elliott, 1 in Kangaroo Island,1 in Southend, and 1 in Pelican Point in the lower south east.

There have now been 123 confirmed or presumed positive detections of H5 bird flu in Australia, based on samples tested.

There remain no detections in poultry or in our agricultural production system.

The risk to human health remains low.

While tests are pending, local media is also reporting on a dead seal pup which washed up on the beaches of Warrnambool on Victoria's Southwest coast.   

There are, of course, other possible causes of death, but recent events make H5N1 a distinct possibility. 

The most recent national tally from the Australian Agriculture Dept.

Detection of H5 bird flu

As of 11am AEST, 6 August 2026, Australia has 123 confirmed detections of H5 bird flu in wild birds.

• 10 in Western Australia (WA)
• 87 in South Australia (SA)
• 2 in New South Wales (NSW)
• 1 in Queensland (QLD)
• 23 in Victoria (VIC).

This is the serious H5 bird flu strain that has been circulating globally.

There have been no detections in poultry or the wider agriculture industry.

The Consultative Committee for Emergency Animal Disease (CCEAD) has reviewed its previous advice and endorsed a framework on national poultry biosecurity measures that will commence from 31 July. Under this framework, state and territory governments are responsible for issuing advice on biosecurity measures using a risk-based approach.

State and territory governments are responsible for surveillance and response activities on the ground. They are actively working with industry to provide guidance on implementation of enhanced biosecurity measures, as appropriate. Find out more about bird flu in your state or territory.

National coordination is being led by the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF).

The risk to human health remains low.

Australia is well prepared to respond quickly.