At Least One Evacuated American Passenger From m/v Hondius Tests Positive for Hantavirus

 

#19,156

Overnight the HHS announced that - of the 17 evacuated Americans from the m/v Hondius - 1 (currently asymptomatic) individual has tested positive for Hantavirus, and a second individual has shown `mild symptoms'.  

While the mantra has been that testing of asymptomatic individuals was unlikely to yield positive results, this is a reminder that there are very few absolutes when it comes to viruses and human physiology. 

We discussed the possibility of asymptomatic spread of the Andes Virus a week ago, and while evidence is sparse, studies have suggested (see Serological Evidence of Hantavirus Infection in Apparently Healthy People from Rural and Slum Communities in Southern Chile) that at least some infections may be mild or asymptomatic.

A more recent 2025 study (see Virological characterization of a new isolated strain of Andes virus . . .), published in PloS NTD reported:

In this work, we described the isolation of the strain responsible for the largest ANDV PTP transmission outbreak, which occurred in the small town of Epuyén and began on November 2, 2018. This strain, ARG-Epuyén, exhibited a high capacity for PTP transmission, necessitating the implementation of quarantine measures to curtail further spread [8].

The median reproductive number (the mean number of secondary cases caused by an infected person) was 2.12 before control measures were implemented and subsequently dropped to below 1.0 by late January.

Early intervention allowed for the collection of samples leading to the isolation of this new ANDV strain from an asymptomatic case. An early passage of this strain was sequenced, revealing only one amino acid difference from the virus recovered from the patient. Like the Andes/ARG strain, this strain was able to grow in a new host without needing adaptation [26].

So while rare, there is precedent for positive test results from asymptomatic individuals.  

What isn't well understood is whether - or how effectively - asymptomatic (or presymptomatic) individuals may be able to transmit the virus. The ECDC's Threat Assessment Brief, published on May 6th, had this to say:

Do asymptomatic individuals have a role in transmission?

Current very limited evidence does not support a significant role for asymptomatic individuals in hantavirus transmission, supporting active symptom monitoring of asymptomatic exposed individuals. Infectivity is highest on the first day of symptom onset, which indicates a high likelihood of some infectiousness one-two days before onset of symptoms.

 
While a lot of governments, eager to reassure the public, are quick to equate asymptomatic with `healthy', the reality is far more nuanced. Given its lengthy incubation period, an exposed individual's status can change in a matter of hours. 

Which is why - while not wanting to use the dreaded `Q' word - exposed individuals around the world are being segregated and monitored for symptoms. 

While I remain far from convinced that this Andes virus outbreak will turn into a global public health emergency, there are enough unknowns here to command our respect and attention. 

And even if the current strain of ANDV is incapable of bigger things, evolution is a thing. 

Meaning that anything we say today about the virus may not hold true tomorrow. 

WHO WPRO: 1 (fatal) Human Infection with H5N6 Reported By China

 

#19,155

After an impressive run of cases between 2021-2023 (see ECDC chart below), we've gone nearly 2 years (July 2024) since the last human H5N6 case was reported by of China.

While it is certainly possible that there have been cases that were either not detected by local surveillance - or were simply not reported - we've continued to see studies coming out of China cautioning on the the evolution of this subtype.

Emerg. Microbes & Inf: Unique Phenomenon of H5 HPAI Virus in China: Co-circulation of Clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 and H5N6 results in diversity of H5 Virus

Transboundary & Emerging Dis.: The H5N6 Virus Containing Internal Genes From H9N2 Exhibits Enhanced Pathogenicity and Transmissibility

China CDC Weekly: Infection Tracing and Virus Genomic Analysis of Two Cases of Human Infection with Avian Influenza A(H5N6) — Fujian Province, China

So it is not completely surprising that the WHO reported, in their most recent  Avian Influenza Weekly Update # 1044 SitRep, on China's 93rd human infection (since 2014) with H5N6.  

Human infection with avian influenza A(H5N6) virus

From 1 to 7 May 2026, one new case of human infection with avian influenza A(H5N6) virus was reported to WHO in the Western Pacific Region. The case is a 55-year-old female from Chongqing Municipality,China, with symptom onset on 16 April 2026. She developed severe pneumonia, was hospitalised on 23 April, and died on 3 May. 

She had purchased, slaughtered, and consumed poultry. Samples collected from a cutting board tested positive for influenza A (H5). All close contacts tested negative and developed no symptoms. Since 2014, a total of 93 laboratory-confirmed cases of human infection with influenza A(H5N6) virus including 58 deaths (CFR 62.4%) have been reported to WHO in the Western Pacific Region.

Once again, this case appears to be linked to the purchase of live market poultry.

As we've discussed previously (see Mixed Messaging On HPAI Food Safety), there is some degree of risk in the slaughtering of live birds and preparation of raw poultry; especially from birds raised at home or purchased from live markets.

In 2024 the WHO published  Interim Guidance to Reduce the Risk of Infection in People Exposed to Avian Influenza Viruses, which lists a number of `risk factors', including:

• keep live poultry in their backyards or homes, or who purchase live birds at markets;

• slaughter, de-feather and/or butcher poultry or other animals at home;

• handle and prepare raw poultry for further cooking and consumption;

Although far more common in Asia and the Middle East, dozens of outbreaks of HPAI H5 in poultry markets here in the United States have been reported (see USDA Report 9 More Live Bird Markets Infected With HPAI H5).

While reports of human H5N6 infection in China have receded sharply over the past couple of years, novel influenza A viruses have a nasty habit of reinventing themselves (often via reassortment), before making dramatic returns.

Which is why we never like to say `never' when it comes to novel flu.  

Sci Adv: Mammary and Respiratory Infection of Sheep with H5Nx clade 2.3.4.4b Viruses with Milk-mediated Transmission to Lambs

 

#19,154

While we await further news on the offloading of hantavirus exposed passengers from the m/v Hondius, we still have plenty of older and emerging threats to keep our eye on.  Late last week a new study was published in Science Advances by Canadian researchers who investigated the susceptibility of sheep to both HPAI H5N1 and HPAI H5N5. 

Since the first outbreak of HPAI H5N1 was reported in U.S. dairy cattle a little over 2 years ago, surveillance and testing of mammalian livestock has focused almost exclusively on lactating dairy cows.

Yet during this time, we've also seen sporadic HPAI spillovers into goats, alpacas, pigs, and sheep in the UK and the discovery of  H5N1 antibodies in sheep in Norway. Other non-bovine findings include:

Transboundary & Emerg Inf: Serological Evidence of HPAI (H5N1) in Invasive Wild Pigs in Western Canada,

Preprint: Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5 Virus Exposure in Goats and Sheep (in Pakistan).

EID Journal: Evidence of Influenza A(H5N1) Spillover Infections in Horses, Mongolia

Livestock surveillance - even of cattle - remains passive and limited, despite the call from animal health authorities (see WOAH Statement (Oct 22nd): High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza (HPAI) in Cattle) to increase vigilance. 

Although cattle-centric, WOAH does refer to `cattle and other livestock populations' in their messaging, but until now spillovers into sheep, goats, and other non-bovie ruminants have been often dismissed as either rare or dead end infections.

Today's study illustrates that small ruminants are not only susceptible to HPAI H5 infections; there is the potential for `widespread virus transmission within flocks'.  

The authors discuss the need for increased surveillance and the implementation of stricter biosecurity measures, particularly in mixed-species environments.

First the link, abstract, and some excerpts from a much longer study.  Follow the link to read it in its entirety.  I'll have a bit more after the break.  

 

Mammary and respiratory infection of sheep with H5Nx clade 2.3.4.4b viruses with milk-mediated transmission to lambs
Tamiru N. Alkie , Carissa Embury-Hyatt, Anthony V. Signore , Estella Moffat , Darwin Ramos, Sugandha Raj, Tamiko Hisanaga, Ifeoluwa Ayilara , Daniel S. Sullivan, [...] , and Yohannes Berhane 9 authors Authors Info & Affiliations
Science Advances
8 May 2026
Vol 12, Issue 19

Abstract

H5Nx clade 2.3.4.4b viruses are evolving rapidly, expanding host ranges and threatening animal and public health. In the US, genotype B3.13 dominates dairy outbreaks, while D1.1 is linked to fewer cases. In the UK, an asymptomatic ewe infected with genotype DI.2 raised concerns about ruminant susceptibility.

We inoculated lactating and nonlactating sheep with D1.1 (H5N1) and A6 (H5N5) viruses. Intramammary inoculation in lactating sheep caused clinical mastitis, high viral loads in milk, and transmission to suckling lambs, which further spread infection to the uninoculated mammary glands. Both ewes and their lambs seroconverted.

Aerosol exposure of nonlactating sheep led to transient respiratory infection, with low-level viral replication, and seroconversion. In vitro, both viruses replicated in sheep mammary epithelial cells.

These findings establish sheep as a viable ruminant model for H5N1 and H5N5 infection and highlight previously unidentified transmission dynamics, including milk-mediated and lamb-to-ewe spread, relevant for surveillance and biosecurity in ruminant populations.

        (SNIP)

Deep sequencing of milk samples from mammary glands, oral swabs, and lung tissues revealed the emergence of viral variants distinct from the consensus sequence generated from the challenge D1.1 virus.

Notably, the left mammary gland of a D1.1-infected sheep appeared to select for the variant PB2-701N, while the right gland retained mixed residues of PB2-627 (E/K) and PB2-701 (D/N). Sequence analysis suggests that the PB2-D701N mutation arose before transmission to the left gland, as oral swab from one suckling lamb already carried this mutation.

Dairy cows experimentally infected with H5N1 via the intramammary route acquired PB2-E627K mutation (32). While D1.1 viruses from some dairy cases exhibited the mammalian adaptive mutation PB2-D701N, the genotype B3.13 from all dairy cases retained the bovine-specific PB2-M631L mutation (74). Both PB2-E627K and PB2-D701N provide IAVs with significant replication advantages in mammalian hosts and enhanced viral transmission (75, 76).

(SNIP)

The findings from this study have significant implications, even though there are limitations such as small sample sizes and the lack of assessment of transmission from inoculated mammary glands to uninoculated glands from the environment.

However, all experimental studies in dairy cows revealed the restriction of infections and virus replication to infected quarters only. Our experimental approach has demonstrated that small ruminants are susceptible to H5N1 infections. 

The detection of seropositive goats and sheep during periods of heightened H5N1 activity underscores the necessity for more extensive investigations within the small ruminant herds. Once mammary infections with H5N1 have occurred in some lactating ruminants, virus can spread between the udders of lactating ruminants during suckling as some neonates could access milk from cohoused multiple lactating mothers.

This scenario suggests potential for widespread virus transmission within the flocks. We suggest increased surveillance and the implementation of biosecurity measures, especially in mixed-species livestock systems or where large numbers of lactating ruminants and their neonates were cohoused or allowed to graze on communal pastures. 

Moreover, similar to infected dairy cows, milk obtained from infected lactating small ruminants was found to harbor higher levels of infectious viruses. This raises important zoonotic considerations in areas where raw milk consumption is common. Furthermore, the handling of infected small ruminants poses risks to human health, highlighting the need for thorough risk assessments to be carried out.

       (Continue . . . )

Whether sheep, goats, or other small ruminants will ultimately increase the risk of HPAI remains unknowable, but it does give the virus more places where it can hide, thrive, and potentially make genetic improvements. 

Mixed-species farms are particularly worrisome, as they provide novel viruses with access to numerous hosts, and fresh opportunities to reassort or adapt (see Study: Seroconversion of a Swine Herd in a Free-Range Rural Multi-Species Farm against HPAI H5N1 2.3.4.4b Clade Virus).

While the evidence of HPAI H5's growing host range continues to mount, the $64 question remains; can we adapt to the threat faster than the threat is adapting to us?

Stay tuned. 

ECDC: Rapid Scientific Advice on Management of Hantavirus Exposed Passengers

#19,153

The ECDC has released their own set of recommendations for EU countries regarding the management of passengers returning from the m/v Hondius.  It should be noted that this is an advisory document, and not a mandate.

While these types of documents carry considerable weight, each member state can decide how to best manage the situation.

I've provided the the summary, and a link to the full 8-page PDF below.

Rapid Scientific Advice on the management of passengers - In the context of the Andes virus outbreak on the cruise ship MV Hondius

Assessment
9 May 2026

As of 9 May 2026, a total of eight cases of Andes virus infection, including three deaths and one critically ill patient, linked to the M/V Hondius cruise ship have been reported.

Key messages

ECDC has classified all people on board the ship and for the purpose of disembarkation and repatriation to be high-risk contacts.

• Monitoring/quarantine up to six weeks (42 days); Day 0 = 6 May 2026.
• High-risk contacts: self-quarantine, daily symptom monitoring, test if symptomatic.
• Low-risk contacts: passive monitoring; isolate and test if symptoms develop.
• Flights: trace contacts for probable/confirmed cases only (same row ±2 rows on long flights).
• IPC: masking, one to two metres distancing, PPE for healthcare/cleaning
• Strong risk communication and misinformation management.

This document provides advice for public health professionals in the EU/EEA managing individuals potentially exposed to ANDV, including on:Defining contact classification criteria based on level of exposure, including close and prolonged contact with symptomatic people;

• The identification, management and monitoring of contacts, including advice on testing.
• Appropriate infection prevention and control (IPC) measures for managing repatriated passengers and crew, suspected and confirmed cases and their contacts in healthcare and community settings; and
• Risk communication, community engagement and the management of misinformation.

ECDC rapid scientific advice disclosure statement: ECDC issues rapid scientific advice to meet an emergent or urgent public health need or to quickly reply to external requests. To accommodate the accelerated timeline, the process and methods used for the development of rapid scientific advice may be modified from those of standard assessments and recommendations. Potential limitations are described.

Publication file

Rapid Scientific Advice on the management of passengers - In the context of the Andes virus outbreak on the cruise ship MV Hondius

CDC Statement On Quarantine of Returning Passengers From the m/v Hondius

 

 #19,152

Late yesterday the CDC released a brief statement on how passengers from the m/v Hondius - currently enroute to the Canary Islands - will be repatriated and quarantined following potential exposure to the Hantavirus. 

While somewhat lacking in details, it clearly expresses the intent to quarantine returning passengers for an unstated period of time at the National Quarantine Center at the University of Nebraska. 

`Quarantine' refers to the sequestration of healthy-but-exposed individuals, while `isolation' refers only to symptomatic or confirmed infections.  At this point, none of the 17 returning passengers are symptomatic.

If symptoms were to develop, they would be moved to the Nebraska Biocontainment Unit.

Long time readers will recall that we've seen the National Quarantine Center activated before, including 2018's Nebraska Medicine Statement On Patient Being Monitored Following Possible Ebola Exposure. 

While not explicitly stated, this appears to be a federally mandated quarantine, although I'm pretty sure they will `ask nicely' first. Between the CDC's Legal Authorities for Isolation and Quarantine, and various other state and federal statutes, I'm sure they can enforce it if anyone resists. 

First the CDC's statement, after which I'll have a bit more. 

CDC Provides Update on Hantavirus Outbreak Linked to M/V Hondius Cruise Ship

Statement
For immediate release: May 8, 2026
CDC Media Relations
(404) 639-3286
media@cdc.gov
https://www.cdc.gov/media/

The U.S. government is actively monitoring and responding to a hantavirus outbreak linked to the M/V Hondius cruise ship. At this time, the risk to the American public remains extremely low.

CDC developed health guidance for impacted American passengers, which was delivered by the U.S. Department of State. CDC's premier infectious disease experts are continuing to work closely with international partners to develop consistent monitoring guidance. This guidance will be distributed today, in addition to resources targeted for state and local health departments.

The U.S. government's top priority is the safe repatriation of American passengers. These individuals are planned to be evacuated on a U.S. government medical repatriation flight to Offutt Air Force Base in Omaha, Nebraska, where they will be transported to the National Quarantine Center at the University of Nebraska, Omaha.

The CDC deployed a team of epidemiologists and medical professionals to the Canary Islands, where the M/V Hondius is expected to dock. The team will conduct an exposure risk assessment for each American passenger and provide recommendations for the level of monitoring required. An additional CDC team will deploy to Offutt AFB to support public health assessment of returning passengers.

https://www.cdc.gov/hantavirus/about/index.html

https://www.cdc.gov/hantavirus/about/andesvirus.html

It is less clear how stringently individual states will handle the 6+ passengers who have already returned from the cruise (reportedly to Georgia, Texas, Virginia, Arizona, and California).   

The Texas DSHS released as statement 2 days ago, which stated:

DSHS statement on Texas residents who were on board the MV Hondius

News Release

May 7, 2026

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has notified DSHS that two Texas residents were passengers on the MV Hondius, a ship that experienced an outbreak of hantavirus while traveling in the Atlantic Ocean. The passengers left the ship and returned to the United States before the outbreak was identified.

Public health workers in Texas have reached the two individuals, and they report they are not experiencing any symptoms and did not have any contact with a sick person while aboard the ship. They have agreed to monitor themselves for symptoms with daily temperature checks and contact public health officials at any sign of a possible illness.

And yesterday the State of Virginia released:

Hantavirus – Statement from the Virginia Department of Health
Posted on May 7, 2026

Last Updated: May 8, 2026

As of May 7, 2026, please see the Virginia Department of Health’s statement:

• The Virginia Department of Health is monitoring this situation closely and has been in active communication with our federal partners at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
• To date, one Virginia traveler who was on the MV Hondius disembarked the ship and has returned home. This person is currently in good health and is under public health monitoring. To protect the privacy of this person, no further details will be shared about this individual.
• Our understanding is that fewer than 30 U.S. Citizens were on board the ship. A small number (<5) of other potentially exposed Virginians might be identified in the days ahead.

Exactly what `under public health monitoring' means isn't detailed. Neither state mentions restricting social contacts or activities, but that could change given the CDC's announced plan of action. 

While I'm still reasonably confident that this outbreak can be contained, that assumes everyone takes the threat seriously, and does what is needed to nip this in the bud. 

Regardless of how this outbreak resolves itself, this is a sobering reminder of how quickly the threat board can change.  

CDC HAN #00528: 2026 Multi-country Hantavirus Cluster Linked to Cruise Ship

 
WHO Epi Chart of Probable & Confirmed Cases

#19,151

While it remains to be seen whether the hantavirus outbreak aboard the m/v Hondius has `legs' , overnight the CDC published its first HAN advisory on the outbreak. 

The CDC’s Health Alert Network (HAN) is designed to ensure that communities, agencies, health care professionals, and the general public are able to receive timely information on important public health issues.

Given the extended incubation period, and the co-circulation of other respiratory and gastrointestinal illness this time of year, we are likely to hear of a lot of `suspected' cases in the days and weeks ahead. 

While most will probably turn out to be false alarms, it is imperative that physicians maintain a high index of suspicion when dealing with epidemiologically linked patients.   

While primarily of interest to clinicians, I've reproduced the CDC HAN below. Follow the link for references. 

2026 Multi-country Hantavirus Cluster Linked to Cruise Ship
May 8, 2026

Distributed via the CDC Health Alert Network
May 8, 2026
CDCHAN-00528

Summary

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is issuing this Health Alert Network (HAN) Health Advisory to inform clinicians and health departments about a new cluster of hantavirus disease cases caused by infection with Andes virus. Hantavirus disease can cause severe illness and can be fatal. Clinicians should be aware of the potential for imported cases, although the risk of broad spread to the United States is considered extremely unlikely at this time. As a precaution, this Health Advisory summarizes CDC's recommendations for U.S. public health departments, clinical laboratories, and healthcare workers about hantavirus disease case identification, testing, and biosafety considerations in clinical laboratories.

Background

On May 2, 2026, the World Health Organization (WHO) was notified of a cluster of severe acute respiratory illness (SARI) among passengers and crew of a cruise ship in the Atlantic Ocean. The cluster included two deaths and one critically ill passenger, whose laboratory tests confirmed hantavirus. On May 6, 2026, WHO confirmed that the type of hantavirus responsible for this outbreak is the Andes virus. As of May 8, 2026, WHO has reported eight cases (six confirmed and two suspected), including three deaths. Investigations are ongoing to assess exposure risk of all Americans passengers on the cruise ship or who may have been exposed to an infected cruise ship passenger on an aircraft.

The cruise ship departed from Ushuaia, Argentina, on April 1, 2026, and traveled across the South Atlantic Ocean, stopping at several remote locations, including Antarctica, South Georgia Island, Tristan da Cunha, Saint Helena, and Ascension Island. It carried 147 people (86 passengers and 61 crew) from 23 different countries. The extent of their contact with wildlife before or during the expedition is unknown.

CDC is working with partners (federal government, state and local and international) on safely repatriating American passengers from the cruise ship to a facility in Nebraska with specialized medical capabilities. On May 7, 2026, CDC sent a team to meet the cruise ship in the Canary Islands, Spain following travel from Cape Verde, South Africa. The team is prepared to assess exposure risk among U.S. passengers and determine appropriate monitoring measures.

CDC is also coordinating with international partners to align public health guidance and has already issued health guidance to affected Americans via the State Department. The risk to the public's health in theUnited States is considered extremely low at this time. As a precaution, CDC is working to increase awareness of the outbreak among travelers, public health agencies, laboratories, and healthcare professionals nationwide.

Hantavirus pulmonary syndrome

Hantaviruses are a group of viruses that can cause severe illness and death. They are most commonly transmitted (spread) to humans through contact with infected rodents (e.g., urine, droppings, saliva). Rarely, infection can occur from rodent bites or scratches. From 1993 through 2023, a total of 890 laboratory-confirmed cases of hantavirus were reported in the United States.

In the Americas, hantaviruses can cause hantavirus pulmonary syndrome (HPS), a severe and potentially deadly disease that affects the lungs. HPS can be life-threatening. Among patients who have severe respiratory symptoms, the case fatality rate has been estimated at approximately 38%.

Andes virus, confirmed as the cause of this hantavirus outbreak, is the only type of hantavirus that has been documented to spread from person-to-person. Although rare, spread between people has typically required close, prolonged contact with a symptomatic person. This could include direct physical contact, prolonged time spent in close or enclosed spaces, and exposure to the infected person's saliva, respiratory secretions, or other body fluids (e.g., kissing, sharing utensils, handling contaminated bedding).

Symptoms of HPS caused by Andes virus usually appear within 4-42 days after exposure. Early symptoms can include fever, fatigue, and muscle aches, especially in large muscle groups like the thighs, hips, back, or shoulders. Early symptoms such as fever, headache, muscle aches, nausea, and fatigue can be easily confused with influenza or other viral illnesses. About half of all HPS patients have experienced headaches, dizziness, chills, and gastrointestinal symptoms, including nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, and abdominal pain. Late symptoms of HPS appear approximately 4-10 days after the initial phase of illness and can include coughing, shortness of breath, and chest tightness Individuals are generally only infectious while symptomatic.

Early diagnosis of HPS can be difficult, especially within the first 72 hours of symptoms, before the virus can be accurately detected in body secretions and excretions. Repeat diagnostic testing is often done 72 hours after symptom onset. CLIA assays for detection of New World hantavirus IgM and IgG antibodies are available at CDC, some state public health laboratories, and Quest Diagnostics.

For questions or concerns about submitting a specimen, please contact your state or local health department or CDC's Emergency Operations Center at 770-488-7100.

No specific treatment is recommended for hantavirus infection; early supportive care is critical even before the diagnosis is confirmed. Patients with suspected HPS can deteriorate rapidly, and delayed care reduces the chance of survival. In severe cases, extra-corporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO) can significantly improve survival (up to ~80%) if started early. Usually, the critical phase of disease is fairly short, and survivors can recover quickly.

Recommendations for Healthcare Providers

• Be prepared to follow CDC's guidance under Appendix A: Type and Duration of Precautions Recommended for Selected Infections and Conditions | Infection Control | CDC.

• In healthcare settings, for patients with suspected or confirmed Andes virus infection, CDC recommends patient placement in an airborne infection isolation room and the use of a gown, gloves, eye protection, and an N95 or higher-level respirator when entering the patient's room.

• Include HPS in the differential diagnosis for an ill person who has compatible symptoms AND who has reported epidemiological risk factors, including at least one of the following, within the 42 days before symptoms onset:

• Had direct physical contact, or spent time in close or enclosed spaces, with a symptomatic person with confirmed or suspected Andes virus infection or with any objects contaminated by their body fluids.

• Had exposure to an infected person's saliva, respiratory secretions, or other body fluids (e.g., kissing, sharing utensils, handling contaminated bedding).

• Experienced a breach in infection prevention and control precautions that resulted in potential contact with body fluids of a patient with suspected or confirmed Andes virus infection.

• Consider and perform diagnostic testing for more common illnesses as well, such as COVID-19, influenza, and other common causes of gastrointestinal and febrile illnesses in an acutely ill patient with epidemiological risk factors and compatible symptoms.

For More Information

General Resources 

About Hantavirus | CDCAbout Andes Virus | CDCReported Cases of Hantavirus Disease | CDCHantavirus Prevention |CDC

Clinician Resources 

Clinical Overview of Hantavirus | CDCClinician Brief: Hantavirus Pulmonary Syndrome (HPS) | CDCClinician Brief: Hemorrhagic Fever with Renal Syndrome | CDCHantavirus Disease Trainings for Healthcare Providers | CDCAppendix A: Type and Duration of Precautions Recommended for Selected Infections and Conditions | Infection Control | CDC

Health Department Resources 

Hantavirus Case Definition and Reporting | CDC