Coronavirus: WHO Update & Genome Sequence

Coronavirus – Credit CDC PHIL

 

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The World Health Organization has posted an update on the novel coronavirus situation, and indicate that no additional cases have been identified and the evidence to date suggests that this virus is not easily transmissible to humans.

 

Novel coronavirus infection - update

28 September 2012 - As of 28 September 2012, no additional confirmed cases due to infection with the novel coronavirus have been reported to WHO.

 

WHO is working closely with the national authorities of the involved countries (Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Kingdom) and international partners in order to better understand the public health risk from the novel coronavirus.

 

From the information available thus far, it appears that the novel coronavirus cannot be easily transmitted from person-to-person.

 

Given the severity of the two laboratory confirmed cases, WHO is continuing to monitor the situation in order to provide the appropriate response, expertise and support to its Member States.

 

Rapid progress has been made in the characterization of the novel coronavirus, and in the development of sensitive and specific diagnostic assays. WHO is collaborating with partner laboratories to make these available as quickly as possible. It is anticipated that the first batch of reagents, together with information and testing algorithms, will be available for urgent testing within the coming days.

 

Tests for novel coronavirus infection of patients under investigation - based on the case definition issued by WHO – are currently available by some partner laboratories. National Health Authorities can contact these laboratories through WHO.

 

WHO continues to inform its Member States through the designated National Focal Points under the International Health Regulations (2005).

 

No travel or trade restrictions have been recommended by WHO for Saudi Arabia or Qatar with respect to the novel coronavirus infections.

 

 

Meanwhile, overnight the entire genome sequence for this betacoronavirus 2c was deposited at GenBank by a team from Erasmus University in the Netherlands headed by Ron Fouchier.

 

With only two known cases, roughly 2 months apart, the question now becomes what was the likely source of their infection?

 

The virus is similar to those previously detected in bats, but other animal hosts (intermediate or primary) are certainly possible.

 

For now, this novel coronavirus appears to pose more of a epidemiological enigma than a threat to public health.

 

While more is being learned about this new coronavirus everyday, our knowledge of this emerging pathogen is still very limited. And viruses can always change over time – so it is important that we not let down our guard. 

 

Stay tuned.

Nature: Bird Flu Research Oversight

 

BSL-4 Lab Worker - Photo Credit –USAMRIID  

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From the journal Nature today, a detailed look by Brendon Maher at how the NSABB examined the Kawaoka and Fouchier H5N1 research papers, and the long, tortuous road towards a final decision on their publication.

 

For those who did not follow this story, briefly:

 

In September of 2011, one of the best known flu researchers in the world - Ron Fouchier of Erasmus Medical Centre in Rotterdam - announced at a scientific conference that he’d managed to turn H5N1 into a virulent, and easily transmissible (among ferrets, anyway) pathogen.

 

(You can read about this work in Katherine Harmon’s Sci-Am article and in a follow up to this story in New Scientist: Five Easy Mutations.)

 

Halfway across the world, Yoshihiro Kawaoka, a highly respected virologist at the University of Wisconsin-Madison School of Veterinary Medicine announced the creation of a comparable H5N1 super flu at roughly the same time.

 

Within weeks biosecurity experts began to question whether scientists should even be tinkering with this particularly lethal flu strain, and whether (or how) those results should be published.

 

The NSABB was tasked with reviewing these projects, and making a recommendation to the United States government.

 

After first recommending that the full studies not be published, the NSABB – under mounting pressure from a number of directions – reconsidered their decision in light of `revised and clarified’ manuscripts from Fouchier, and green-lighted their publication.

 

Brendon Maher explores the process by which these disparate decisions were reached, and the lingering concerns held by many involved in. 

 

This is an important story, and well worth reading in its entirety, so follow the link below:

 

 

Nature | News Feature

Bird-flu research: The biosecurity oversight

The fight over mutant flu has thrown the spotlight on a little-known government body that oversees dual-use research. Some are asking if it was up to the task.

• Brendan Maher

23 May 2012

Peter Sandman: Outrage On Both Sides

 

 

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Dr. Peter Sandman is a world renown expert on crisis communications, and along with his wife and colleague Dr. Jody Lanard, provide consulting services to individuals, organizations, and companies – often during their worst public relations nightmares.

Together they also produce a wealth of invaluable risk management advice on their website, which quite frankly should be second home for anyone involved in public relations or risk communications.

 

 

I’ve highlighted Peter and Jody’s work often in the past, including:

 

Peter Sandman: Swine Flu For Grownups

Experts: `Mild’ Is A Misleading Term For This Pandemic

Peter Sandman On Pandemic Risk Communication

 

 

When you think about `risk communications’ and `flu’, very little comes close to the often unseemly debate of the past few months over the publication of the Kawaoka and Fouchier H5N1 transmissibility papers.

 

 

For those that need a refresher:

 

Last September, Ron Fouchier from the Netherlands (and almost simultaneously Professor Yoshihiro Kawaoka from Wisconsin) announced success in creating enhanced strains of the H5N1 avian flu virus in the laboratory that can transmit efficiently among ferrets, which quickly sparked biosecurity concerns.

 

For some background, see Katherine Harmon’s Sci-Am article , New Scientist: Five Easy Mutations, & NPR: Bio-Terrorism Concerns Over Bird Flu Research.

 

 

The fate of these two papers has now been decided; Kawaoka’s was published earlier this month (see Nature Publishes The Kawaoka H5N1 Study), and a revised version of Fouchier’s paper is due out anytime.

 

While the original focus of this debate has been settled, we are left with nagging questions regarding the way this debate was handled, and concerns over what happens when this sort of situation inevitably occurs again.

 

Which brings us to a long, detailed, and very informative analysis of the risk communication missteps made by both sides of this debate, posted by Dr. Sandman on his website in response to a reader’s comment.

 

It is called:

 

Risk communication aspects of the debate over H5N1 transmission studies

 

 

I’ll not try to summarize this well reasoned and detailed examination of the events of the past few months, as to do so would be a disservice.

 

This article deserves to be read in its entirety. 

 

Highly recommended.

Dutch Govt. Grants Fouchier Export License For H5N1 Research

 

 

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Four days after holding hearings in the Netherlands, the Dutch government today announced the granting of an export license to Ron Fouchier which clears the way for the publication of his research on transmissible strains of the H5N1 virus.

 

The decision was announced today in a letter of authorization posted on the Dutch Ministry for Agriculture and Foreign Trade website.

 

 

Letter authorization for export manuscripts on bird flu research

Letter authorization for export manuscripts on bird flu research

Page | 1 page | 31 KB

Unknown type | 27/04/2012 | EL & I

Letter from Secretary Bleacher (EL & I) about the status of the license for the export of manuscripts with detailed information about the modified avian flu virus (H5N1). The Secretary of State has decided to grant the license.

Fouchier Research To be Debated In The Netherlands This Week

BSL-4 Lab Worker - Photo Credit –USAMRIID

 

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Although the United States has officially withdrawn its objections to the publication of Ron Fouchier’s H5N1 ferret research study (see The Biosecurity Debate On H5N1 Research for background on this issue), there remains another bureaucratic obstacle to publication in the form of an export license from the Dutch government.

 

According to a Radio Netherlands report, the debate will be taken up tomorrow, and there remains considerable opposition to the publication. 

 

A hat tip to Pathfinder on FluTrackers for this link.

 

Publication ban on virus research: security or censorship?

Published on : 21 April 2012 - 6:41pm | By Willemien Groot

On Monday, Dutch experts will debate whether or not Dr Ron Fouchier should be allowed to publish the results of his research, which has created a potentially dangerous strain of the H5N1 bird flu virus. The United States biosecurity watchdog has withdrawn its objections to publication. Dutch Deputy Minister for Innovation Henk Bleker, on the other hand, still fears the research could be used by terrorists. Fouchier rejects any ban on publication of his work. A row is in the making.

(Continue . . . )

 

 

Fouchier has reportedly not applied for an export license, and has stated that he intends to publish his research with – or without – the sanctioning of his government.

 

According to a report by CIDRAP NEWS last week (see Fouchier plans to flout Dutch export law, publish H5N1 study),  Fouchier could conceivably find himself facing criminal charges if he attempts to publish his data without government permission.

 

While the U.S. has withdrawn its objections to the publication of Fouchier’s research (and Professor Yoshihiro Kawaoka’s in Wisconsin), and has recently issued new regulations regarding oversight of Dual Use Research of Concern (see U.S. Issues New DURC Oversight Rules), there remain many unresolved bio-security issues surrounding the life sciences and bioengineering fields.

 

Among them:

• How are we to handle this brave new world of life sciences, where new viruses and other life forms can be created in the laboratory?
• Who is to decide on what is appropriate, or safe research?
• Who decides what should be published, and who should have access to redacted information?
• What laboratory protocols and protections are necessary for working the the H5N1 virus, and other virulent pathogens?

 

Regardless of what the Dutch government decides in the near term on the publication of Fouchier’s research, the problem of what to do about future DURC research projects are not going away.

 

These are serious biosecurity concerns that must be faced, debated, and agreed upon internationally, not just by individual countries.

And better sooner, rather than later. 

ScienceInsider: A Flawed Flu Papers Process?

 

 

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The `must read’ for today comes from the pen of CIDRAP director and NSABB  board member Michael Osterholm in a letter to the Associate Director for Science Policy at the NIH where he critiques the NSABB’s recent reversal of their previously unanimous decision to block the full publication of Ron Fouchier’s controversial H5N1 ferret studies.

Of the eighteen members who voted again on the issue, twelve recommended publication while six did not.  Osterholm voted in the minority.

 

Jon Cohen writing for Science’s ScienceInsider provides the background, in his report:

 

 

A Flawed Flu Papers Process?

by Jon Cohen on 13 April 2012, 4:26 PM

 

Last month, one-third of the members of the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) disagreed with the group's recommendation to publish in full two studies that describe how to make the bird flu virus transmissible in mammals. Now one of the six dissenters, influenza epidemiologist Michael Osterholm of the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities, has written a sharp critique of the meeting that led to the decision. In a letter sent yesterday to Amy Patterson, an official at the U.S. National Institutes of Health whose office oversees NSABB, Osterholm charged that the meeting was "designed to produce the outcome that occurred."

(Continue . . .)

 

Osterholm’s 7-page letter is available  HERE - and regardless where you stood on the publication of Fouchier’s research - Osterholm calls into serious question many aspects of the NSABB review process that should be of concern to all of us.

Helen Branswell has even more on all of this in her recently updated Canadian Press story:

 

Updated: April 13, 2012 | 6:39 pm

Flu expert slams bird flu panel process

By Helen Branswell The Canadian Press

 

In a world where we can now create `designer’ organisms in the laboratory, the biosecurity issues facing life sciences research are becoming increasingly complex. While the benefits of this kind of work may prove enormous, the risks are not trivial.

 

Despite reassurances from researchers, mistakes, laboratory accidents, and even intentional misuse of these new technologies are always possible.

 

Against this backdrop, public confidence in science and scientists continues to deteriorate (see Science at the Crossroads). Already there is a good deal of public resistance to the use of GM (Genetically Modified) food crops, and bio-engineered organisms, and the anti-vaccine movement continues to thrive.

 

If this type of research is to have a viable future, then it must first engender the public’s trust.

 

And based on their handling of this controversy over the past few months, the scientific community has got a long way to go.

Webcast: Royal Society Meeting on H5N1 Research

 

Note: Due to this Symposium my blogging over the next couple of days will probably be light.

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Tomorrow (Apr 3rd) and the following day (Apr 4th), The Royal Society, London will host a 2 day international symposium on the `practice and policy of H5N1 research’.

 

Attending will be some of the biggest names in influenza research - including Ron Fouchier and Yoshihiro Kawaoka – whose H5N1 research papers got the green light by the NSABB for publication last Friday.

 

Other recognizable names include (but are not limited to) Robert Webster, Malik Pieris, Dr. Paul Keim, Michael Osterholm, Thomas Inglesby, Dr Philip Campbell, Dr. Bruce Alberts, Laurie Garrett, David Brown, Professor Peter Doherty, and Arthur Caplan.

 

 

The good news is that this two day session will be live streamed on the web. 

 

Note: Broadcast times listed are for local London Time.  So adjust for your time zone accordingly.

 

 

For details, including a list of sessions and participants, follow the link below.

 

H5N1 research: biosafety, biosecurity and bioethics

9:00 am on Tuesday 03 April 2012 – 6:00 pm on Wednesday 04 April 2012

 

 

 

For details on how to watch live, visit the following link:

 

H5N1 research: biosafety, biosecurity and bioethics

An international symposium

Tuesday 03 April 2012 - Wednesday 04 April 2012
at The Royal Society, London

Organised by the Royal Society in partnership with the Academy of Medical Sciences and the Foundation for Vaccine Research with support from the American Society for Microbiology, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Fondation Mérieux, the German National Academy of Sciences Leopoldina, Institut Pasteur, and the Society for General Microbiology.

 

Webcast requires Windows Media Player and a 500k or better broadband connection. Test your connection speed here. For best results use Internet Explorer and 1024X768 or higher resolution. Latest Windows Media Player download here. MAC users: if the video does not play, please ensure you have the appropriate media player or flip4mac. If you are still having problems with a MAC try this test and this live link.

 

 

Since I will be away from my computer for part of the day tomorrow and will miss some of these broadcasts, I am hoping that these videos will appear on the Royal Society TV website within a few days.

NSABB To Re-examine H5N1 Research Risks

 

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Today and tomorrow the NSABB (National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity) will reconvene to re-examine the issues surrounding the publication of controversial H5N1 research that produced a ferret-transmissible strain of bird flu.

 

Last September, Ron Fouchier from the Netherlands (and almost simultaneously Professor Yoshihiro Kawaoka from Wisconsin) announced success in creating enhanced strains of the avian flu virus in the laboratory, which subsequently unleashed a firestorm of controversy.

 

For some background, see Katherine Harmon’s Sci-Am article , New Scientist: Five Easy Mutations, & NPR: Bio-Terrorism Concerns Over Bird Flu Research.

 

Over the ensuing six months we’ve seen a steady stream of opinion pieces from both sides of this debate (see H5N1 Research: A Plethora Of Positions), including side forays into the lethality of the H5N1 virus (see The Great CFR Divide).

 

This week we’ve seen the release of additional dueling commentaries, three of which Lisa Schnirring of CIDRAP NEWS  highlighted last night in her article:

 

Scientists volley ahead of more dual-use H5N1 debate

Lisa Schnirring Staff Writer

Mar 28, 2012 (CIDRAP News) – As researchers from both sides of the debate over two controversial H5N1 studies weighed in yesterday on full publication versus a more cautionary approach, two US journals said they are developing policies to address any future such instances.

(Continue . . .)

 

 

The NSABB serves strictly in an advisory role, and any policy decisions must come from the United States government. Nonetheless, all eyes will be on the NSABB as they consider this issue.

 

And I can think of no one better than Helen Branswell  of the Canadian Press to preview this meeting for us:

 

Biosecurity panel reconvenes to reexamine controversial bird flu studies

3-28-12 6:31 PM EDT  By Helen Branswell

A bid from some quarters in the U.S. to resolve the ongoing controversy over two unpublished bird flu studies will begin to play out over the next two days as government biosecurity advisers reconvene to reconsider the issue.

 

The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity will meet Thursday and Friday in Washington, D.C., to go over revised versions of the two studies and hear about the work from their principal authors, noted flu virologists Ron Fouchier of Erasmus Medical Centre in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, and Yoshihiro Kawaoka of the University of Wisconsin-Madison.

(Continue . . . )

Laurie Garrett Dissects The Rationale For H5N1 Research

 

BSL-4 Lab Worker - Photo Credit –USAMRIID

 

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Pulitzer-prize winning journalist and author Laurie Garrett has a new blog up today where she once again takes a hard look at the H5N1 research controversy (see The Furor Over H5N1 Research Continues), and this time dissects the rationale being offered by scientists for doing these types of experiments.

 

Follow the link below to read:

 

Rationales for Man-made H5N1 Experiments Evaporating?

 

You can read some of her earlier takes on this controversy at the following links:

 

Laurie Garrett Blogs On The H5N1 Research Controversy

Laurie Garrett: Keeping Superbugs Away From Terrorists

Referral: Laurie Garrett On The Bird Flu Research Controversy

Branswell: WHO Hopes H5N1 Studies Can Be Published By Summer

 

 

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Helen Branswell has details this afternoon on the hopes, expressed by Dr. Keiji Fukuda – the World Health Organization’s lead official on influenza – that the two controversial H5N1 studies by Ron Fouchier and Yoshihiro Kawaoka can be published by summer.

 

Since I’m still nursing an injured wrist, I’ll just get out of the way and invite you to read:

 

 

 

The Canadian Press - ONLINE EDITION

WHO hopes controversial bird flu studies will be published by summer

By: Helen Branswell, The Canadian Press

ScienceMag: Ron Fouchier Interview On The H5N1 Research Moratorium

BSL-4 Lab Worker - Photo Credit –USAMRIID

 

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Via Science Magazine’s Insider coverage, we get a lengthy interview (translated  & edited for clarity and brevity) with Erasmus University Flu researcher Ron Fouchier, whose revelations of creating a transmissible form of H5N1 at a scientific conference last September has unleashed a firestorm of debate.

 

Earlier today he, along with 38 other prominent flu researchers, agreed to a 60 day moratorium on controversial genetic research on the H5N1 virus to to `allow time for international discussion.’

 

As you’ll read, this debate has badly polarized scientists and policy makers.  Follow the link to read:

 

Flu Researcher Ron Fouchier: 'It's a Pity That It Has to Come to This'

by Martin Enserink on 20 January 2012, 3:42 PM |

In a statement posted today on the Web sites of Nature and Science, a group of 39 influenza researchers announced a 2-month moratorium on studies that make the avian influenza strain H5N1 more transmissible between mammals. The moratorium is intended to allow time for an international debate about this type of research, which some people say has the potential to help bioterrorists.

 

(Continue . . . )

 

 

To prevent this from becoming a one-sided debate (both sides are raising valid & important issues), you’ll find opposing views expressed in a series of opinion pieces published yesterday in Public Health, Biosecurity, and H5N1 via Science Magazine’s  Science Express.

 

You’ll also find a series of news articles that cover this ongoing  controversy, along with a link to Science’s Special Online Collection: Influenza page at THIS LINK.

 

For background on this growing  controversy, you may wish to revisit these earlier blogs:

 

Nature: 10 Expert Opinions On The H5N1 Research Dilemma

WHO To Take Role In Sorting Out Bird Flu Research Controversies

The Furor Over H5N1 Research Continues