Hong Kong CHP: Cryptic Announcement of 1 New H10N3, and 2 H9N2 Cases on the Mainland.

 

#19,049

As we've discussed previously, in HK CHP: Another Cryptic Announcement of H9N2 Cases From the Chinese Mainland, reports out of China are often belated, and lack many critical details.

The barebones report above is a prime example. 

It is worth noting that the WHO's WPRO published an update last Friday, which reported no new human novel flu infections in the region, including the following summary on H10N3:

Human infection with avian influenza A(H10N3) virus

From 30 January to 5 February 2026, no new case of human infection with avian influenza A(H10N3) virus was reported to WHO in the Western Pacific Region. The last case was reported from China with an onset date of 21 April 2025. To date, six cases of human infection with avian influenza A(H10N3) have been reported globally. 

Hopefully we'll learn more about this 7th case, including its severity and likely source of infection, from the next WHO Influenza at the human-animal interface report.  

While most confirmed H10N3 cases have produced severe illness, we have no idea how many mild, or subclinical, infections may have gone unreported. We continue to see cautionary reports, however, from Chinese researchers on the human health threat from this emerging subtype.

• In July 2024, in Frontiers: Phylogenetic and Mutational Analysis of H10N3 Avian Influenza A virus in China: Potential Threats to Human Health, we looked at a report that described 4 mutations of concern in the 2023 case (HA Q226L, PB2 D701N, PA S409N, and M2 S31N), along with the patient's treatment and course of illness.

• Also in 2024 in Vet. Microbiology: The novel H10N3 Avian Influenza Virus Acquired Airborne Transmission Among Chickens: An Increasing Threat to Public Health reported the virus has become better adapted to poultry, is highly pathogenic in mice, can be transmitted via respiratory droplets between guinea pigs, and can also be transmitted via the airborne route by chickens.

• And last June in Vet. Research: E627V Mutation in PB2 Protein Promotes the Mammalian Adaptation of Novel H10N3 Avian Influenza Virus reported that that PB2-626V is becoming increasingly common in AIV poultry isolates - including H10N3 - and that it significantly enhances mammalian adaptation while maintaining fitness in avian hosts.

Meanwhile, H9N2 cases continue to be reported sporadically across China, although testing is generally restricted to those sick enough to be hospitalized.  While children are most frequently diagnosed, we continue to see occasional adult infections reported as well. 

Last October, in China CDC Weekly: Epidemiological and Genetic Characterization of Three H9N2 Viruses Causing Human Infections, we looked at a local CDC investigation into 3 pediatric cases which were reported last April from Changsha City, Hunan Province, China.

Their report found a number of indicators of increased mammalian adaptation within the virus, including an enhanced ability to infect upper respiratory (α2,6-sialic acid) tract receptors, and a number of HA protein mutations, including; H191N, A198V, Q226L, and Q234L.

Both viruses are reminders that while H5N1 may garner the bulk of avian flu headlines, there are a number of legitimate contenders for becoming the next pandemic threat.

Nature Comms: Assessing HPAI-H5 Transmission Risk Across Wild Bird Migratory Flyways in the United States

 

#19,048

The world has been watching HPAI H5N1 for nearly 3 decades, but today's HPAI H5 viruses are a far cry from the A/Goose/Guangdong/1/1996 strain that emerged  in Southern China 30 years ago.  

Between 1996 and early 2005, HPAI H5N1 was considered primarily a disease of poultry (ducks, geese, and chickens), and was only sporadically detected in wild or migratory birds. 

All that changed in May of 2005 when a large outbreak of HPAI H5 occurred in Qinghai Lake, China, causing the deaths of thousands of bar-headed geese, great black-headed gulls, and brown-headed gulls (see H5N1 Influenza Continues To Circulate and Change 2006 by Webster et. al.).

A new clade (2.2) had emerged - one which was particularly pathogenic in some species - while some migratory birds were better able to transport it over long distances.

Over the next couple of years HPAI escaped the confines of Southeast Asia, and spread to Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. Despite this, many still clung to the notion that `sick birds don't fly'; a debate that would rage for nearly a decade (see 2014's Bird Flu Spread: The Flyway Or The Highway?).

But the HPAI H5 virus continued to evolve, generating new subclades (H5N8, H5N5, H5N9, etc.), and new subclades (e.g. 2.3.2.1a, 2.3.2.1c, 2.3.4.4b, etc.), and hundreds of genotypes. 

For a while, it appeared that aquatic migratory birds (ducks & geese) were the primary drivers of international spread.  Other species - particularly resident birds - were thought either immune or dead-end hosts.  

Following North America's first H5 epizootic (2015) researchers were unable to detect HPAI in wild or migratory birds, leading them to surmise that they were not an efficient long-term reservoir for H5 viruses (see PNAS: The Enigma Of Disappearing HPAI H5 In North American Migratory Waterfowl).

But avian flu continued to evolve, and in the fall of 2016 a new reassortant arrived in Europe that caused unusual mortality in a wide range of avian species (see Europe: Unusual Mortality Among Wild Birds From H5N8). 

After a series of H5N8 epizootics, that virus was eventually supplanted by a new & improved H5N1 virus, which further expanded its host range (see 2022's DEFRA: The Unprecedented `Order Shift' In Wild Bird H5N1 Positives In Europe & The UK). 

Increasingly, shore birds, passerines, and even raptors were being affected by the virus. The spread to resident birds increased, allowing the virus to persist over the summer, turning HPAI into a year-round threat. 

At the same time, HPAI H5 viruses have become better adapted to mammalian species, including livestock, cats, foxes, marine mammals, and even humans. 

All of which brings us to a remarkably detailed (albeit U.S. centric) analysis of the spread of HPAI H5N1 via wild (resident & migratory) birds across the 4 North American flyways between Jan 2022 and Apr 2025.

The authors not only rate the risk across U.S. flyways, they provide R₀  (pronounced R-nought) or Basic Reproductive Number estimates for transmission by various avian species.

R₀  is an estimate of a virus's transmissibility in a naive and susceptible population. In the simplest of terms; anything < 1.0 and a virus (as an outbreak) begins to sputter and die out. Above 1.0, and an outbreak can have `legs’.

This is a lengthy and detailed report, with a lot to unpack. But among its many findings, they report:

• The greatest viral genotype diversity was detected in 2022, with multiple  genotypes in circulation.

• By spring of 2025 genotype D1.1 (which only emerged the previous fall) had become the absolute dominant genotype, with its transmission mainly concentrated in Accipitriformes (birds of prey).

• The Mississippi Flyway had the highest R₀  in resident birds (6.4); higher than any other bird group or flyway in the analysis.

• While the Atlantic flyways' overall R₀ i was just under 1, Georgia and Florida provided persistent, multi‑season resident hotspots for HPAI. 

• Quite unexpectedly, Strigiformes (owls) had the strongest transmission capacity, with an R₀ of 3.164. Previously owls (and raptors in general) had been thought highly susceptible, but likely to succumb before spreading the virus. 

• Anseriformes (waterfowl), surprisingly, had the weakest transmission capacity, with an R₀ of 0.992.  

• Moderate (not extremely wet or dry) drought conditions (Palmer Index of about −3.3) corresponded to the highest numbers of infections.

The authors write:

The traditional transmission concept centred on Anseriformes is being challenged by the reality of highly efficient transmission and high pathogenicity of the virus in nontraditional hosts such as raptors and mammals. It is essential to quantify the transmission risk of avian influenza in different categories of birds and analyse their roles in the transmission chain. 

I've only reproduced the abstract below. Follow the link to read it in its entirety. I'll have a brief postscript after the break.

Assessing HPAI-H5 transmission risk across wild bird migratory flyways in the United States

Kang Fang, Jiahui Li, Hongfeng Zhao, Jiangshaya Bahati, Zeyu Zhao, Wentao Song & Tianmu Chen

Nature Communications , Article number: (2026)

We are providing an unedited version of this manuscript to give early access to its findings. Before final publication, the manuscript will undergo further editing. Please note there may be errors present which affect the content, and all legal disclaimers apply.

Abstract

As natural hosts of avian influenza viruses, wild birds pose an increasing threat to public health. Here, using surveillance data from wild bird infections across the United States (2022-2025), we show that HPAI-H5 transmission exhibits strong interspecific variation, seasonality, and spatial heterogeneity linked to migratory flyways.

Phylogeographic analysis reveals that viral genotypes evolve from early, limited transmission along single migratory routes to a nationwide dispersal pattern spanning multiple migratory flyways.

Anseriformes exhibits the highest number of infections but the lowest transmission risk, whereas Strigiformes demonstrates the greatest transmission risk. The HPAI-H5 transmission in wild birds along migratory flyways exhibits significant spatial heterogeneity and is associated with bird migration. Meteorological conditions are correlated with outbreak timing and may inform early warning efforts; however, these relationships are nonlinear. These findings provide a foundation for risk assessment, early warning systems, and integrated management of avian influenza in wild bird populations.

Despite overachieving at almost every turn (see Avian Flu's New Normal: When the Extraordinary Becomes Ordinary), the world continues to treat HPAI H5 as if it were the same virus that threatened - and failed - to produce a pandemic 20 years ago. 

While we might get lucky, and find that there is some (as yet, unknown) species barrier that prevents HPAI H5 from becoming a human pandemic, that bit of luck is by no means assured. 

Meanwhile the virus continues along an evolutionary path that remains, to a large extent, hidden from our view.  

Despite constant calls for better surveillance, testing and sharing of data (see here, here, here, here, and here), most of the world appears content to don blinders and hope for the best. 

Unfortunately, in the event things take a bad turn, hope isn't much of a plan.

Preprint: Efficient Replication of Influenza D Virus in the Human Airway Underscores Zoonotic Potential

Credit NIAID

#19,047

One of the more intriguing influenza discoveries of the past dozen years has been the identification of a previously unknown type of flu - Influenza D - infecting swine, cattle, and apparently even humans.

We first learned of this new flu early in 2013 when researchers reported finding a novel influenza virus in swine from Oklahoma - initially classified as a novel Influenza C virus - but which would later be designated as Influenza D. 

Their research – published PLoS Pathogens – was called Isolation of a Novel Swine Influenza Virus from Oklahoma in 2011 Which Is Distantly Related to Human Influenza C Viruses, and it immediately caused a stir in the flu research community.

The authors found that this new (provisional) influenza C virus could infect, and transmit, in both ferrets and pigs. The following year, in mBio: Characterizing A Novel Influenza C Virus In Bovines & Swine, cattle were added to the list, and identified as the virus's primary reservoir.

Over time the virus was reclassified as `Influenza D', and researchers found evidence of a much wider spread of this virus than just in the American Midwest. (see EID journal’s Influenza D Virus in Cattle, France, 2011–2014 and EID Journal: Influenza D In Cattle & Swine – Italy).

And while it isn't known if Influenza D can cause symptomatic illness in humans, in 2016's Serological Evidence Of Influenza D Among Persons With & Without Cattle Exposure, researchers reported finding a high prevalence of antibodies against Influenza D among people with cattle exposure. 

They wrote:

IDV poses a zoonotic risk to cattle-exposed workers, based on detection of high seroprevalence (94–97%). Whereas it is still unknown whether IDV causes disease in humans, our studies indicate that the virus may be an emerging pathogen among cattle-workers.

Since then, we've revisited Influenza D research often, including these recent posts.

EID Journal (Perspective): Emerging Respiratory Virus Threats from Influenza D and Canine Coronavirus HuPn-2018 

EID Journal: Influenza D Virus in Domestic and Stray Cats, Northern China, 2024)

Today we've a preprint with an excellent pedigree (by researchers from Ohio State University,  St. Jude Children's Research Hospital, and the Abigail Wexner Institute) which provides even more reasons to continue to track this emerging influenza type. 

Not only did they find that influenza D replicates efficiently in the human respiratory tract, they discovered it did not set off the innate immune system's `alarm bells' (interferon and ISG signaling) to the extent that influenza A typically does.

For now, Influenza D appears to produce a muted immune response in humans, which likely explains its extremely mild or subclinical presentation. This stealthy behavior, however, gives it more opportunities to spread unnoticed while potentially better adapting to human hosts. 

I've just reproduced the abstract and a brief excerpt from the preprint. Follow the link to read it in its entirety.  I'll have a bit more after the break.

Efficient replication of influenza D virus in the human airway underscores zoonotic potential
Christina G Sanders, Min Liu, Jovanna A Fusco, Elizabeth M Ohl, Natalie N Tarbuck, Emily M King, Devra Huey, Thomas P Fabrizio, Phylip Chen, Amanda R Panfil, Richard J Webby, Mark E Peeples, Andrew S Bowman, Cody J Warren
doi: https://doi.org/10.64898/2026.02.07.704474
This article is a preprint and has not been certified by peer review [what does this mean?].
 
Preview PDF

Abstract

Influenza D virus (IDV), primarily found in livestock species, has demonstrated cross-species transmission potential, yet its threat to humans remains poorly understood. Here, we curated a panel of IDV isolates collected during field surveillance from 2011 to 2020 from swine and cattle to assess their ability to infect human airway cells as a proxy for zoonotic threat assessment.

Using lung epithelial cell lines, primary well-differentiated airway epithelial cultures, and precision-cut lung slices, we demonstrated that IDV efficiently propagates in cells and tissues from the human respiratory tract, reaching titers comparable to human influenza A virus (IAV).

Infection kinetics in primary porcine airway cultures and respiratory tissues mirrored those from human, suggesting similar infectivity across species.

To define host responses to IDV infection, we evaluated innate immune sensing and downstream interferon signaling in human respiratory cells. IDV infection resulted in markedly reduced activation of interferon regulatory factor (IRF) signaling and diminished induction of interferon lambda 1 and interferon-stimulated genes compared to IAV, indicating inefficient activation of innate immune sensing pathways.

However, IDV replication was potently restricted in interferon-pretreated cells, demonstrating sensitivity to interferon-mediated antiviral effector mechanisms once an antiviral state was established.

Together, these findings show that IDV can efficiently infect the human airway while limiting innate immune sensing, a feature that may facilitate zoonotic spillover. Our study highlights the need for enhanced surveillance of IDV at the animal-human interface and provides a foundation for further investigation into its biology and potential for causing human infection and disease.

        (SNIP)

Taken together, our findings indicate that IDV can infect and replicate efficiently in human respiratory tissues with minimal innate immune restriction. Although human infections documented so far appear subclinical, published studies demonstrate that IDV transmits efficiently among mammalian hosts—including airborne transmission between ferrets (49)— suggesting that the virus already possesses several traits compatible with respiratory spread in humans.

While our study did not directly evaluate the evolutionary steps required for sustained human-to-human transmission, these observations raise important questions about the degree of additional adaptation needed.

This uncertainty underscores the importance of intensified surveillance and mechanistic studies that define the viral and host determinants of IDV transmissibility. What appears today as a quiet livestock virus could, with little warning, ignite the next influenza pandemic. 

        (Continue . . . )

IDV is not detected by routine human influenza surveillance programs, and while some research is underway (see Novel Influenza D Virus Vaccine Strategy) there are currently no vaccines available for humans or animals.

Admittedly the zoonotic potential of Influenza D appears to be low right now, but that could change over time. Like influenza A viruses, influenza D and C viruses have segmented RNA genomes, which allows for reassortment.

The  discovery of frequent reassortment between IDV clades D/660 and D/OK, along with spillovers into new hosts (like dogs and cats), makes influenza D a virus very much worthy of our attention.

More Than One Way To Start An Epidemic . . .

#19,046

Last week, in Taiwan: Another Avian Flu `Incident', we looked at the latest in a series (see here, here, and here) of high profile illegal (avian or swine) vaccine smuggling and/or manufacturing operations detected by Taiwanese officials. 

Counterfeit vaccines are particularly worrying, since they may exacerbate existing epizootic threats, but they are far from the only imported zoonotic threats. 

There is a huge global trade in both illegal bushmeat, and in smuggled wildlife, both of which can transport infectious diseases into new regions of the world. Just yesterday Hong Kong Customs reported their seizure of more than 100 wild birds at one of their border crossing points with the Mainland. 

Hong Kong Customs seizes suspected illegally imported live birds (with photo)

 

Hong Kong Customs today (February 7) detected a suspected case of illegal importing of live bird at the Lo Wu Control Point. 112 live birds with an estimated market value of about $15,000 were seized.

Customs officers today intercepted an incoming 26-year-old female passenger at the arrival hall of the said control point. Upon examination, 112 live birds contained in bird cages were seized from the trolley she carried, and she was subsequently arrested.

The case was handed over to the Agriculture, Fisheries and Conservation Department for follow-up investigation.

Under the Public Health (Animals and Birds) Regulations, it is an offence to import any bird unless it is accompanied by a valid health certificate. The maximum penalty upon conviction is a fine of $25,000.

Members of the public may report any suspected activities of illegal import of live birds to Customs' 24-hour hotline 182 8080 or its dedicated crime-reporting email account (crimereport@customs.gov.hk) or online form (eform.cefs.gov.hk/form/ced002).

Ends/Saturday, February 7, 2026

The most obvious concern is of accidentally importing avian flu, which has happened before:

Vienna: 5 Smuggled Birds Now Reported Positive For H5N1

Taiwan Seizes H5N1 Infected Birds

Bulgarian NVS: Confirmed Avian Flu In 2 Illegally Transported Birds

But avian flu isn't the only concern, as we've seen literally dozens of reports over the years of `parrot fever' (see China: Media Reports Of A Psittacosis Outbreak (Parrot Fever) in Zhejiang Province) outbreaks in Asia and in Europe.

The United States famously saw a national panic over `Parrot Fever' in 1929 (see How Parrot Fever Changed Public Health In America), with many fearing a return of the 1918 pandemic.

We've seen horrific examples of the lengths that some people will go to in order to illegally import live birds, including in 2010, when two men were indicted for attempting to smuggle dozens of song birds (strapped to their legs inside their pants) into LAX from Vietnam. 

Sadly, many of the birds did not survive the plane trip.

 Last December Interpol reported on their enforcement efforts in 2025, reporting:

30,000 live animals seized in global operation against wildlife and forestry crime

11 December 2025

134 participating countries make record seizures of protected plants, animals and timber

LYON, France — A global operation against the illegal trafficking of wild fauna and flora has led to the seizure of nearly 30,000 live animals and the identification of 1,100 suspects.

From 15 September – 15 October, law enforcement agencies comprising police, customs, border security and forestry and wildlife authorities from 134 countries made a total of 4,640 seizures during Operation Thunder 2025. This record number of seizures included tens of thousands of protected animals and plants and tens of thousands of cubic metres of illegally logged timber, as well as more than 30 tonnes of species classified as endangered under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).

Coordinated by INTERPOL and the World Customs Organization (WCO), with the support of the International Consortium on Combating Wildlife Crime (ICCWC), the operation sought to intercept and seize illegally traded wildlife and forestry commodities across the global supply chain and identify, disrupt and dismantle criminal networks involved in these types of environmental crime.

(SNIP)

While live animal seizures reached a record high this year — driven largely by demand for exotic pets — most wildlife trafficking involved animal remains, parts and derivatives, often used in traditional medicine or specialty foods.

Estimates put the annual value of wildlife crime at USD 20 billion, but the clandestine nature of the trade suggests that the real figure is likely much higher.

        (Continue . . . )

The full report is very much worth reading in its entirety (but warning, some of the photos are hard to look at . . ).

In the summer of 2010 headlines were made when a study – published in the journal Conservation Letters looked at the amount of smuggled bushmeat (est. 5 tons a week) that was coming into Paris's Charles de Gaulle airport over a 17 day period on flights from west and central Africa. 

Not all cases of smuggling are part of elaborate criminal conspiracies, sometimes it's just a traveler trying to bring a bit of `home' back to the United States. 

In May of 2013, in All Too Frequent Flyers, we saw a Vietnamese passenger, on a flight into Dulles Airport, who was caught with 20 raw Chinese Silkie Chickens in his luggage. 

But in some cases, illegal imports are being done on a commercial scale, as evidenced by the next two reports which came during the height of China's ASF epidemic. 

• In 2022's USDA/APHIS Seize Nearly 1 Ton Of Illegal Pork Products in NYC Imported From China

• In 2019 (see Feds Seize 1 Million Pounds of Illegal Chinese Pork Products In New Jersey).

Much of the global spread of ASF over the past 15 years has been attributed to careless or illegal transport of contaminated products, making this a serious and ongoing concern. 

An infamous example of the potential zoonotic risks, in 2003 the United States experienced a multi-state (Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, Ohio, and Wisconsin) outbreak of Monkeypox when a Texas animal distributor (legally) imported hundreds of small animals from Ghana, which in turn infected prairie dogs that were subsequently sold to the public (see MMWR Update On Monkeypox 2003).

By the time that outbreak was quashed, the U.S. saw 37 confirmed, 12 probable, and 22 suspected human cases. Among the confirmed cases 5 were categorized as being severely ill, while 9 were hospitalized for > 48 hrs; although no patients died (cite).

At roughly the same time the United States was dealing with Monkeypox, Asia, Canada, and the rest of the world were dealing with another zoonotic threat; the first SARS-CoV outbreak (see SARS and Remembrance).

That outbreak was linked to the practice of serving exotic animals - including masked palm civets (and possibly raccoon dogs) - in `wild flavor' restaurants (see A Hong Kong Civets Lesson).

China and the United States (along with many other countries) have since  tightened up their laws and regulations regarding the importation, or consumption, of many of these exotic animals, but the evidence suggests that better laws haven't proven to be an effective deterrent. 

All reasons while increased vigilance is needed if we are to prevent the next global (human or agricultural) infectious disease crisis. 

NERC: Long-Term Reliability Assessment (Jan 2026)

 

#19,045

NERC, or the North American Electric Reliability Corporation,  was tasked with "ensuring the reliability of the North American bulk power system" in 2006 following the 2003 Northeast blackout which affected more than 50 million people in the United States and Ontario, Canada.

Over the years we've looked at a number of their summer and winter reliability reports (see The NERC 2025-2026 Winter (Electrical Grid) Reliability Assessment) and their drills and exercises (see GridEx 2013 Preparedness Drill), amid growing governmental concerns over the reliability of the electrical grid (see NIAC: Surviving A Catastrophic Power Outage).

Previously, the biggest threats to the grid were thought to be natural disasters (hurricanes, ice storms, severe space weather, etc.), `bad actors' (cyber-threats, sabotage, etc.), or aging infrastructure (see ASCE report card on America’s infrastructure). 

But the recent and rapidly increasing power demands from A.I. data centers have added yet another potential failure point. 

Last summer's the U.S. Department of Energy published a 73-page report that warned that if current schedules for retirement of reliable power generation (especially baseload) continue, without enough firm replacement, the risk of blackouts in 2030 could increase by 100× over current levels.

Number one on their Key Takeaways is:

Status Quo is Unsustainable. The status quo of more generation retirements and less dependable replacement generation is neither consistent with winning the AI race and ensuring affordable energy for all Americans, nor with continued grid reliability (ensuring “resource adequacy”). 

Absent intervention, it is impossible for the nation’s bulk power system to meet the AI growth requirements while maintaining a reliable power grid and keeping energy costs low for our citizens.

To this growing chorus we can add a 181-page NERC Long-Term Reliability Report - published in January - which also warns that our power grid is facing a growing risk of electrical shortfalls over the next decade.

For those wanting a brief summary, NERC has published the following press release (see Resource Adequacy Risks Intensify Across North America as Demand Growth Surges).

January 29, 2026

WASHINGTON, D.C. – NERC’s 2025 Long-Term Reliability Assessment (LTRA) and infographic spotlight intensifying resource adequacy risks throughout the North American bulk power system (BPS) over the next 10 years. Summer peak demand is forecast to grow by 224 GW, a more than 69% increase over the 2024 LTRA forecast with new data centers for artificial intelligence and the digital economy accounting for most of the projected increase.

Winter demand growth continues to outpace summer demand growth with 246 GW of growth forecast over the next 10 years, reflecting the evolution of electricity usage. Uncertainty and lag in the pace of new resource additions are driving heightened concerns that industry will not be able to keep up with rapidly increasing demand.

       (Continue . . . )

Some brief excerpts from the executive summary include:

Executive Summary

The overall resource adequacy outlook for the North American BPS is worsening: In the 2025 LTRA, NERC finds that 13 of 23 assessment areas face resource adequacy challenges over the next 10 years. Projections for resource and transmission growth lag what is needed to support new data centers and other large loads that drive escalating demand forecasts. 

Most new resources in development to come on-line in the next five years consist of battery storage and solar photovoltaic (PV), which are inverter-based and weather-dependent resources that increase the complexity of planning and operating a reliable grid. Meanwhile, more fossil-fired generator retirements loom in the next five years, reducing the amount of generation that has fuel on site and impacting the system’s ability to respond to spikes in demand. 

The continuing shift in the resource mix toward weather-dependent resources and less fuel diversity increases risks of supply shortfalls during winter months. As Resource Planners, market operators, and regulators grapple with steep increases in demand and swelling resource queues, they face more uncertainty, adding to the already-complex endeavor of planning for resource adequacy during this period of rapid grid transformation. 

To ensure there are sufficient resources for supplying electricity in the future and to reliably meet the growing electricity needs for North Americans, industry, regulators, and policymakers need to be vigilant for shifting projections, keep plans for deactivating existing generators flexible, expedite system development, and perform robust adequacy assessments of future scenarios. In addition, careful planning and broad cross-sector coordination will be needed to navigate a period of potentially strained electricity resources.

The findings presented here are vitally important to understanding the reliability risks to the North American BPS as it is currently planned and being influenced by government policies, regulations, consumer preferences, and economic factors. Summaries of the report sections are provided below.

       (Continue . .  )

 
While the tone of this report is cautiously optimistic that the risks going forward are manageable; it stresses that `broad cross-sector coordination will be needed to navigate a period of potentially strained electricity resources.'

The same sort of  broad cooperation that is often called for - but is rarely seen - for mitigating climate change or preventing the next pandemic. 

Hopefully, this time the stakes will be deemed high enough that our collective  response will be different.  

But I'm not planning on selling my solar panels anytime soon.  

Taiwan: Yunlin County Reports Another `Midnight' Dumping of H5N1 Infected Poultry

 

#19,045

Last week Taiwan's poultry industry was roiled by the discovery of thousands of H5N1 infected poultry illegally dumped or buried in locations spanning two counties (see Taiwan: The Plot Thickens . . .), while earlier this week Taiwan's APHIA announced the seizure of a large quantity of illegal Chinese poultry vaccines, which were (reportedly) purchased from a Chinese online shopping website.

Given the steep civil and criminal penalties involved in these types of activities, it gives us some idea of how desperate the HPAI situation must be for some farmers in Taiwan.

Today, the Yunlin County Animal and Plant Disease Control Center (YCAPDCC) is reporting a similar incident, involving the illegal dumping of hundreds of H5N1 infected geese into a local fish pond.

First the translated statement from Yunlin County, after which I'll have a bit more.

Bird flu alert! Urges to implement food safety measures, proactive reporting, and severe penalties for concealing or disposing of dead poultry.
Issuing unit: Institute of Zoology and Plant Disease Control

 Yunlin County Government News Reference Material 115.02.06

On February 4, 2016, the Yunlin County Animal and Plant Disease Control Center (hereinafter referred to as the Disease Control Center) received a report that dead poultry (meat geese) had been randomly dumped next to a fishpond in Kouhu Township.

The source farm (Sihu Township) was found to have H5N1 subtype highly pathogenic avian influenza. In accordance with standard operating procedures, 1,626 7-week-old meat geese were culled and destroyed. The Center also supervised the operator to complete the cleaning and disinfection of the farm area.

County Magistrate Chang Li-shan stated that it is currently the peak season for avian influenza, and poultry farmers must not only implement biosecurity measures on their farms but also cooperate with relevant disease prevention measures.

Regarding the farm's indiscriminate disposal and failure to proactively report the outbreak, the county government will, in accordance with the Animal Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Act, not compensate for the losses from culling animals and destroying materials, and will impose a fine of up to NT$1 million. Furthermore, the failure to properly process the dead poultry will also be punished according to the Animal Husbandry Act.

Liao Pei-chih, director of the Disease Control Center, stated that disinfection of public areas will be strengthened at farms where highly pathogenic avian influenza cases have been confirmed and at sites where dead poultry are disposed of. Sampling and site visits will also be conducted at two poultry farms within a 1-kilometer radius to control the risk of disease transmission.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza can spread through migratory birds and then horizontally through the production and sales system. It is imperative for poultry farms to strengthen their own biosecurity measures. Poultry farmers are urged to continue implementing bird-proofing facilities and access control at their farms. All personnel, vehicles, and equipment (including egg boxes and cages) entering the farm must be thoroughly cleaned and disinfected.

Farmers should also be vigilant and monitor the health of their poultry daily. If any abnormalities are found, they should be reported immediately (reporting hotline: 0932-690674) to prevent the spread of the virus and avoid significant economic losses to the industry.

We've often seen this sort of `midnight' dumping in places like China, India, and Vietnam, but it even occurs occasionally here in the United States (see news report Dozens Of Illegally Dumped Dead Chickens In Acton Test Positive For Contagious Avian Disease).  

Note: in this case, the disease was Infectious Laryngotracheitis, or ILT - not avian flu.

The wholesale dumping of ASF infected pigs in China (and elsewhere) likely contributed to the further spread of the disease (see Philippines Ag. Dept. Warns On Illegal Disposal Of Dead Pigs), and there are similar concerns with HPAI.

Soberingly, there is probably a lot more of this illegal activity than we ever hear about.