Conservation Bio: Emerging threat of avian influenza to the world's vultures

 
Black Vulture - Credit Wikipedia

#19,307

Of the 19,631 entries in the USDA's Detections of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in Wild Birds - which has only been intermittently updated in 2026  - 1215 (6.2%) are listed as vultures. 

Other raptors and scavenger birds on the list include eagles (n=990), hawks (n=1010), Owls (n=764) and California Condors (n=22). But these lists are far from complete

Three and a half years ago, (Apr 8th, 2023) the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service issued a statement stating that HPAI Was Confirmed As Cause Of Death For 3 California Condors found in Northern Arizona.

Considered a critically endangered species with a population of  ≈ 560 birds today -  the California Condor nearly went the way of of the dodo in the early 1980s, when its population declined to just over 20 (in the wild) due to the combined effects of DDT, lead poisoning and a loss of habitat.

As scavengers, Condors feed almost exclusively on carrion, which increasingly runs the risk of being infected with HPAI H5 (see USDA Mammalian HPAI Infection List). Within days, the number of Condor deaths rose sharply. 

HPAI UPDATE

(Excerpt)

As of April 17, 2023, 20 condors have died in the Arizona-Utah flock; HPAI has been confirmed for 10 of those condors. Eight birds were captured and brought in for supportive care. Four of those condors died shortly thereafter and are included in the total of 20 deceased birds. Four condors are still receiving supportive care and have shown improvement. Learn more about HPAI.

While an emergency vaccination program was initiated in the fall of 2023, and more than 200 birds were eventually vaccinated, the carnage visited upon scavenger birds by H5N1 has continued. 

While not every bird that gets infected dies (see Preprint: Exposure & Survival of Wild Raptors During the 2022-2023 Highly Pathogenic Influenza A Virus Outbreak), the virus's toll on avian populations around the world has been enormous. 

Over the past few years we've looked at a number of papers from the tag-team of Pablo Plaza & Sergio A. Lambertucci (often in collaboration with Andrea Santangeli), including:

ISIRV: Update on H5N1 Panzootic: Infected Mammal Species Increase by Almost 50% in Just Over a Year

Travel Medicine & Inf. Dis.: Differences Between Influenza H5N1, A/H1N1 2009, and SARS-CoV-2 in a Pandemic Risk Scenario

Nature Reviews: The Threat of Avian Influenza H5N1 Looms Over Global Biodiversity

Travel Med. & Inf. Dis.: Pacific and Atlantic Sea Lion Mortality Caused by HPAI A(H5N1) in South America

EID Journal: Recent Changes in Patterns of Mammal Infection with Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Virus Worldwide

Last week they published the following letter (excerpts below) in Conservation  Biology.  Follow the link to read it in its entirety. 

Emerging threat of avian influenza to the world's vultures

Jon Morant, Andrea Santangeli, Pablo Plaza, Sergio A. Lambertucci
First published: 19 August 2026
https://doi.org/10.1111/cobi.70372Digital Object Identifier (DOI)
view metrics

Article impact statement: Five action areas need to be implemented across continents to address the potential impact of H5N1 on world's vulture populations.

Vultures are among the most threatened bird groups globally (Buechley & Şekercioğlu, 2016), yet they provide invaluable ecosystem services that support human well-being (Santangeli et al., 2024). At least 16 of 23 vulture species are of conservation concern worldwide, largely owing to toxicosis and other anthropogenic threats (Buechley & Şekercioğlu, 2016). The current panzootic caused by highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (H5N1) (hereafter H5N1) (Lambertucci et al., 2025) could represent a catastrophic addition to this threat mix, magnifying already steep population declines. In fact, globally, several important vulture hotspots are under threat from the intensive spread of this pathogen (Figure 1).

(SNIP)

 

 

We call upon conservationists and wildlife managers to adopt a comprehensive, multilayered approach to mitigating H5N1 risks in vultures, prioritizing five key action areas that balance immediate fieldwork situations with broader population resilience.

First, there is an urgent need for intensive medium- to long-term population monitoring in geographic regions impacted by the current H5N1 panzootic (Figure 1); this monitoring should be coupled with targeted epidemiological surveillance and seroprevalence studies in vulture communities to evaluate immunological status and improve knowledge of how H5N1 affects their populations beyond acute mortality events. This action is especially relevant for sites where information on vulture mortality due to H5N1 remains limited. Second, we advocate for the continuous evaluation of the potential need for vaccination campaigns for specific and emerging cases where populations face severe risk and logistical conditions allow (Katzner et al., 2025; Larson 2026).

Third, carcass management must be carefully adapted to local socioeconomic contexts; managers should prioritize preventing the use of suspected or H5N1-infected carcasses at feeding stations, mirroring existing safe carcass protocols used to exclude toxic pharmaceuticals in vulture safe zones (VSZs). Ensuring the provision of H5N1-free carcasses from both domestic and wild sources is crucial to reducing viral transmission at supplementary feeding stations (i.e., vulture restaurants) (Santangeli et al., 2025), which often attract large aggregations of obligate and facultative scavengers (Brink et al., 2020; Cortés-Avizanda et al., 2016). Rapid molecular testing protocols (such as rRT-PCR using freeze-dried reagents; Takekawa et al., 2011) and the systematic removal of infected carcasses (Gold et al., 2026) could be valuable interventions, although we recognize that their availability, cost, and sensitivity may represent important barriers to their implementation in many regions.

Fourth, we recommend strictly following handling protocols for vultures during fieldwork (e.g., tagging, morphometry, and health surveys) in accordance with H5N1 biosecurity guidelines to minimize transmission risk among individuals and species. Finally, given the diversity of socioeconomic and governance contexts in the countries across the vulture's range, we urge regional conservation and health bodies, such as the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH), to develop and promote context-specific action plans that prioritize these feasible, locally adapted interventions.

This pathogen could represent the final threat to some vulture populations; therefore, tackling the five action areas outlined above is urgent. Crucially, these measures must not be pursued in isolation; their integration into coordinated, transboundary frameworks is essential to address the full geographic and ecological scope of the crisis.

The current H5N1 panzootic is occurring across all continents where vultures occur, concomitantly with other threats affecting these species. Coordinated and transboundary plans that embed these actions into shared governance structures are urgently needed to address this dangerous epidemiological scenario, which could decimate vulture populations, as has occurred with other avian groups globally.

(Continue . . . )

In early 2025, in Nature Reviews: The Threat of Avian Influenza H5N1 Looms Over Global Biodiversity, we looked at the massive, and often underappreciated, impact of HPAI H5 on both avian and mammalian wildlife around the globe.

While I can't tell you precisely what negative impacts the loss of a Billion+ wild and captive birds, hundreds of thousands of marine mammals - or unfathomable numbers of peridomestic mammals - might have on our human society, one thing is certain.

We are well on our way towards finding out.

Australia: SA Reports 1st H5N1 Detection in a Marine Mammal (long-nosed fur seal)

 

#19,306

Less than a year ago HPAI H5N1 was detected on Heard Island - an Australian external possession 4000 km south west of Perth - resulting in the the deaths of thousands of marine mammals and seabirds (see Preprint: Mass mortality of southern elephant seals during multi-species outbreak of HPAI H5N1 on sub-Antarctic Heard Island).

Drone surveys revealed mass mortality in southern elephant seals, with 8,573 pups (62%) recorded dead across Heard Island by the final surveys. Mortality increased at an average rate of 5.6% per day in a subset of harems, and the highest observed mortality in a harem was 97%. Based on the average (76%) mortality in the final surveys, total estimated pup mortality at Heard Island was 13,359 (from a total population of 17,364 pups), though this may be an underestimate as mortality was ongoing at this time. 

Just over 2 months ago HPAI H5N1 arrived - via migratory birds - to the Australian mainland. Since then we've been watching as thousands of birds - both migratory and local - have succumbed to the virus.  

While all previous detections have been limited to birds, overnight Australia confirmed HPAI finding in a first mammalian casualty in the following brief announcement. 

23 August 2026

Attributable to Australian Chief Veterinary Officer, Dr Beth Cookson:

Testing at CSIRO’s Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness (ACDP) has confirmed H5 high pathogenicity avian influenza (bird flu) in a long-nosed fur seal, found at Beachport in South Australia. This is the first detection of H5 bird flu in a mammal species in Australia.

Although this is a concerning development, it is not unexpected that H5 bird flu has been detected in other wildlife, particularly marine mammals, in areas where there are high levels of infection in wild birds.

From 12 August 2026, we have changed how we report on H5 bird flu detections. Reporting will be based on events, rather than individual detections. See birdflu.gov.au for the latest information.

There remain no detections in poultry or in our agricultural production system.

The risk to human health remains low.

We get a few more details from the SA August 23rd update, which reads in part:

The long-nosed fur seal was found dead with no signs of injury and reported to the EAD hotline by a member of the public on Wednesday, 19 August. It was not reported as a suspect detection initially as state-based testing was inconclusive. However, samples were dispatched to ACDP for urgent testing which confirmed the H5 bird flu detection.

Based on the HPAI carnage we've seen among marine mammals elsewhere in the world (see UC Davis: High pathogenicity Avian Influenza in Pinniped conservation), today's announcement likely only heralds a much larger impact. 

And while the Australian government still reminds the public that poultry and agricultural livestock remain unaffected, how long that happy status quo will stand is anyone's guess. 

That Touch of Mink Flu (H5N1 in Utah Edition)

#19,305

Mink are members of the Mustelidae family of carnivorous mammals, which also includes otters, badgers, weasel, martens, ferrets, and wolverines. Many of these species are susceptible to flu viruses – most notably ferrets – which are often used in influenza research.

Over the past 20 years we've looked a a number of concerning spillovers, including:

• 2009's That Touch Of Mink Flu, where at least 11 mink farms in the Holstebro municipality of Denmark were reported to be infected with a variant of the human H3N2 virus.

• In 2007, an antigenically distinct H3N2 Swine Influenza was detected in Canadian Mink, reported in a 2009 Journal of Clinical Microbiology study called Characterization of a Canadian Mink H3N2 Influenza A Virus Isolate Genetically Related to Triple Reassortant Swine Influenza Virus.

• A year earlier CIDRAP reported on a European mink found infected with an aggressive form of the H5 flu virus in the Blekinge region of southern Sweden near where H5N1 had been detected in wild birds.

• And even as far back as 1984, a large outbreak in Swedish mink farms was found to be due to the H10N4 avian virus.

We've seen literally dozens of reports of spillovers into mink since, including the generation of mink-variant COVID strains which - at least temporarily - circulated in humans in Europe back in 2020 (see Preprint: Emergence & Spread of SARS-CoV-2 Variants from Farmed Mink to Humans and Back - Denmark, June-November 2020).  

New alarms were raised in the fall of 2022 when H5N1 began spreading rapidly through a large mink farm in Spain (see Eurosurveillance: HPAI A(H5N1) Virus Infection in Farmed Minks, Spain, October 2022).

This mink-derived H5N1 virus from Spain carried a rare mutation (PB-T271A), which is believed to `enhance the polymerase activity of influenza A viruses in mammalian host cells and mice'. In 2023 the CDC issued an IRAT Risk Assessment On Mink Variant of Avian H5N1, finding it's scores had risen in 6 of the 10 parameters used to evaluate their zoonotic potential.

In 2023 we saw scores of fur farms (both mink & fox) in Finland hit by HPAI, resulting in massive culls.      

During that protracted outbreak, in PNAS: Mink Farming Poses Risks for Future Viral Pandemics, we looked at an opinion piece by Professor Wendy Barclay & Tom Peacock on why fur farms - and mink farms in particular - are high risk venues for both flu and SARS.

Spillovers into farmed animals are particularly worrisome, because they allow for serial transmission across a large number of hosts, which may result in host adaptation.

Since then, new studies have continued to emerge highlighting the risks, including:

• January 2025's Zoonosis & Public Health: Detection of a Reassortant Swine- and Human-Origin H3N2 Influenza A Virus in Farmed Mink in British Columbia, Canada.

• Last December's Viruses: Replication and Transmission of Influenza A Virus in Farmed Mink

Yesterday the USDA updated their Detections of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in Mammals dashboard to include 6 captive American Mink in Utah infected with EA H5N1 (see below).

1 To protect data confidentiality, the county and mapped locations of these detections represent the approximate location of the State capitol.

Details are extraordinarily scant (even the county location is `masked'), but the dates of collection and confirmation all are quite recent (8/7 & 8/17).  This is presumably a fur farm, but no details are provided. 

I've found no media reports on this event, and there appears to be nothing publicly available on the Utah Agriculture Department Website. As of this writing, I don't find anything on the WOAH WAHIS website, either. 

Whether these mink were sick, or died, or how many others might be infected on the premises or at risk, and what steps are being taken to contain this outbreak, or protect farm workers, isn't stated. 

Utah has already been having a rough H5N1 summer, with 16 cattle herds reportedly infected since June, and nearly 1.5 million chickens culled due to the virus. 

There are disappointingly far too few details provided to make any reasonable assumptions about the size, or potential impact, of this outbreak.  Hopefully we'll get more details sooner rather than later. 

Note: After I posted this blog I noticed Hogvet51 has posted his own thoughts. If you aren't reading his substack, you should add it to your list.

CDC FluView Week 32: Two H1N2v Human Infections Reported in Michigan

 

Credit Wikipedia

#19,304

Nine days ago, in  Kent County MI Health Department Bulletin on Swine Flu (in pigs) at Local Fair, we learned of the death (and several illnesses) of pigs at a local county fair due to swine flu, and a health alert issued for possible human cases. 

Two days later, on Aug. 15th, we learned of one confirmed human infection with H1N2v from the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (see Michigan DOH Confirms H1N2v (swine flu) in Fair Exhibitor).

While there were rumors of more than one `flu-like illness' among attendees to the county fair, until now we've heard of no other cases.  Today, the CDC announced a total of two confirmed H1N1v swine flu infections linked to this county fair. 

Novel Influenza A Virus Infections

Two human infections with influenza A(H1N2) variant (A(H1N2)v) virus were reported by the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services.

The patients, who are <18 years of age, initially developed illness and sought healthcare during the week ending August 15, 2026 (Week 32). The patients were not hospitalized, one patient received influenza antiviral treatment, and both are recovering from their illnesses.

Investigation by local and state public health officials identified that both patients, who have not had contact with one another, had attended the same agricultural fair where ill swine were present prior to their illness onset. No additional cases of human infection with A(H1N2)v virus associated with these cases or the fair have been identified.

These are the third and fourth human infections with a variant influenza virus reported in the 2025-2026 season; all four have been influenza A(H1N2)v viruses.

When an influenza virus that normally circulates in swine (but not people) is detected in a person, it is called a “variant” influenza virus. Most human infections with variant influenza viruses occur following exposure to swine, but human-to-human transmission can occur. It is important to note that in most cases, variant influenza viruses have not shown the ability to spread easily and sustainably from person to person.

No additional notification to WHO of this case is required per International Health Regulations (IHR). More information regarding IHR can be found at http://www.who.int/topics/international_health_regulations/en/.

Although it is possible there were other infections linked to this fair, most people who experience minor or even moderate flu-like symptoms never see a doctor, or are tested, for novel flu viruses. 

The CDC regularly advises people who are at higher risk of serious flu complications (including children under 5, adults over 65, pregnant women, and those with certain chronic medical conditions), to avoid pigs and the swine barn altogether.

Although the pandemic risk from swine variant viruses is currently regarded as low, the H1N1 pandemic of 2009 demonstrated just how quickly the status quo can change. 

Nature Comms: Trimester-dependent vertical transmission of H5N1 influenza virus through placental and mammary routes impairs offspring development

Photo Credit – CDC

#19,303

In late 2024, in EID Journal: Systematic Review of Avian Influenza Virus Infection and Outcomes during Pregnancy - among 30 pregnant women diagnosed with avian flu (H5N1 n = 16, H7N9 n = 13, and H5N6 n = 1) - researchers reported high mortality rates for both mothers (90.0%, 27/30) and their babies (86.7%, 26/30).

As we've discussed often (see Pregnancy & Flu: A Bad Combination), novel flu often exacts a heavy toll on expectant mothers and their unborn children.

Even during the relatively mild H1N1 pandemic of 2009, we saw studies (see BMJ: Perinatal Outcomes After Maternal 2009/H1N1 Infection) where pregnant women who were admitted to the hospital with an H1N1 infection experienced a 3 to 4 times higher rate of preterm birth, 4 to 5 times greater risk of stillbirth, and a 4 to 6 times higher rate of neonatal death.

We also know that during the 1918 pandemic an abnormally high number of pregnant women died from the influenza, and those that survived endured a very high miscarriage rate. Again, during the much milder 1957 Asian Flu, pregnant women reportedly suffered disproportionately higher mortality rates than non-pregnant women of the same age.

Historical reviews of both events are available in a Perspective, written by 3 CDC physicians (Sonja A. Rasmussen, Denise J. Jamieson, Joseph S. Bresee) and published in the CDC Journal of EID article, Pandemic Influenza and Pregnant Women in February of 2008.

As bad as they were, most of these effects have been attributed to the mother's immune response (fever, cytokine production, etc.) to the infection; not the vertical transmission of the virus to the fetus in utero.

A 2012 CDC study, however (Effects of influenza on pregnant women and infants) does cite H5N1 as potentially being an exception, due to its ability to cause extrapulmonary infection & viremia. Their conclusion, however:

"Therefore, the limited evidence to date suggests that vertical transmission of influenza viruses can occur but is likely to be very rare."

Last November we looked at a preprint (see Vertical Transmission of Bovine H5N1 Influenza Virus during Pregnancy and Lactation in Mice) which demonstrated that in (lab inoculated) pregnant mice (2nd Trimester), the bovine B3.13 H5N1 virus crossed the placenta (in a subset of litters) and, in a separate late-gestation experiment, spread through milk, infecting pups.

Exposed offspring were typically smaller, reached developmental milestones later, and showed lasting behavioral changes into adolescence.

Interestingly, they used two different isolates (A/bovine/Texas/98638/2024 and A/bovine/Ohio/B24OSU-439/2024), which produced different clinical courses and pathology in mice. 

The Texas isolate produced a faster, more lethal course and higher viral burdens in several tissues—including mammary, ovarian, and CNS tissues—than the Ohio isolate in mice. The authors elected to use the slower-progressing Ohio virus for their pregnancy experiments.

That (revised and renamed) preprint has now been published in Nature Comms, and is offered early (subject to additional edits) at the link below.  The full study is  lengthy, and at times, highly technical. 

Those wanting a deeper dive should download the PDF. I'll have a postscript after the break.

Trimester-dependent vertical transmission of H5N1 influenza virus through placental and mammary routes impairs offspring development

Brittany A. Seibert, Maclaine A. Parish, Sattya N. Talukdar, Tianle Zhang,

Jennifer A. Liu, Sabal Chaulagain, Jaiprasath Sachithanandham, Oscar Hernandez,

Cosette Schneider, Lynda Coughlan, Andrew S. Bowman, Richard J. Webby,

Jack R. Harkema, Andrew Pekosz & Sabra L. Klein

Nature Communications (2026) Cite this article 

We’re sharing this article early to provide faster access to peer-reviewed, accepted research. It is citable and carries a permanent DOI. This version is subject to further edits and will be replaced automatically by the final Version of Record. All legal disclaimers apply.

Abstract

Avian influenza H5N1 has pandemic potential and historically causes more severe disease in pregnant women than the general population. With increasing transmission of H5N1 detected among placental mammals, animal models are necessary for testing countermeasures, including during pregnancy. Pregnant outbred mice infected with a contemporary strain of bovine H5N1 during the second trimester equivalent causes in utero transmission, with infectious virus detected in the uterus, placenta, and fetus. Birth following third trimester infection results in offspring with decreased size, neurodevelopmental delays, and adolescent behavioral impairments, with infectious virus detected in the neonatal milk ring and lungs, as well as mammary tissues. H5N1 viral protein colocalizes with trophoblast cells in the placenta and epithelial cells in mammary tissue that spatially overlap with lectins for α2,3-linked SA. With the pandemic potential of H5N1, our vertical transmission model in placental mammals is essential for understanding viral spread and evaluating treatments during pregnancy.

       (Continue . . . )

The usual caveats apply; including a) mice have anatomical and immunological differences from humans. b) this study only looked at genotype B3.13, and c) and it is unknown how much these findings will actually translate to humans.

But even without vertical transmission, pregnant women and their offspring are presumed at higher risk during any flu outbreak.

Last February, in Viruses: Avian Influenza H5N1 Infection During Pregnancy: Preparing for the Next Flu Pandemic and Improving Perinatal Outcomes, we looked at a review article published in Viruses that looked at the limited data we have on novel flu and pregnancy, and argued that H5N1 could be particularly dangerous to pregnant women and their offspring if it should begin to spread in humans.

The authors proposed a basic algorithm for initial clinical management of suspected H5N1 in pregnancy and lobbied for prioritizing both antivirals and vaccines (when available) for high-risk patients, including those who may be pregnant.

While an H5Nx pandemic is by no means assured, pandemic history has not been kind to pregnant women and their offspring, making it imperative that we consider the risks - and how we might handle them - now, while we still have the luxury of time.

New Zealand Reports 3rd H5N1 Detection in a Wild Bird

Credit Wikipedia

#19,302

It has been just over a month since New Zealand reported their second H5N1 detection in a local bird (a swamp harrier hawk) found in the sparsely populated Wairarapa region on the north island (see map above).

Today, New Zealand has confirmed a 3rd detection - this time in a northern giant petrel, found dead on a remote Cape Palliser beach (also in the Wairarapa).

While it is likely there are other, as-yet undetected cases in New Zealand, they don't appear to have seen the same level of influx that Australia has had to deal with.   How long that will last is anyone's guess.

First the NZ announcement, then a brief update on Australia's numbers. 

Situation update: 21 August 2026

New Zealand has 3 confirmed detections of H5 high pathogenicity avian influenza (H5 bird flu).

New Zealand’s third case of H5 bird flu was confirmed on 21 August in a northern giant petrel, found dead on a remote Cape Palliser beach in the Wairarapa.

There is no evidence of any mass mortality in wildlife. There has been no detection in poultry.

Chicken and eggs remain safe to eat and bird flu is a very low risk to human health.

New Zealand is well prepared to respond to H5 bird flu and is working to protect poultry production and reduce impacts on wildlife and communities. Response and surveillance work has intensified in close coordination with industry partners and other agencies.

The Department of Conservation is implementing a vaccination programme for 300 core breeding birds from 5 of our most endangered birds – kākāpō, takahē, tūturuatu/shore plover, kakī/black stilt, and kākāriki karaka/orange-fronted parakeet.

Be alert and use good habits to limit the impact of bird flu

Keep your distance. Stay away from sick or dead wildlife. Keep pets away too.

Keep clean. Wash your hands and clean your gear after being outdoors.

Know when to report. If you see 3 or more sick or dead wild birds in a group, report it immediately to the exotic pest and disease hotline on 0800 80 99 66 or online at report.mpi.govt.nz

If you report online, select the ‘dead or dying wild birds’ option from the dropdown list and then the type of bird you have found. Don’t handle or move the birds.

Meanwhile, in Australia, the flow of information continues to be a bit confusing.

Depending on which DAFF (Department of Agriculture) page you land on (here or here), the last updated national bird flu numbers (as of this writing) are listed as being either 27 or  51 hours old (see double screenshot below).

The last avian flu update from Australia's Chief Veterinary Officer was on August 14th, and - while reporting formats are not uniform across the individual states - a quick perusal suggests that the national tallies are lagging a day or two behind local reporting. 

With the number of hotline reports of dead or sick birds now approaching 25,000 - far exceeding their ability to investigate and test - these sorts of delays are not unexpected. 

The DAFF bird flu site offers the following caveats:

Data disclaimer

Data reflects information provided by state and territory governments to the Australian Government as at 17:00 AEST daily. The Australian Government publishes this information for national reporting purposes. Responsibility for the accuracy, completeness and currency of the data remains with the relevant state or territory government. Due to differences in reporting timing, information on the national dashboard may differ from information published on state or territory government websites.

Approach to reporting

From 12 August 2026, we have changed how we report on H5 bird flu detections.

Reporting is now based on events, rather than individual bird detections.

An event may involve one or more birds. The new number of positive events captures all previously reported individual confirmed detections.

Definitions

Investigation: An event where one or more wild birds or wild mammals showing signs of H5 bird flu have been reported to state or territory authorities and samples have been collected for laboratory testing.

Positive event: An investigation where H5 bird flu has been confirmed through laboratory testing.

Hotline report: A report to relevant state or territory authorities through the Emergency Animal Disease Hotline or other official sources.

While continued surveillance is important to track the geographic spread - and increasing host-range - of H5N1 in Australia, the numbers posted each day become less significant over time.  

A reminder of how quickly an unprecedented event - like the first arrival of HPAI H5 to Oceania 2 months ago - can become the `new normal'.