#19,178
In 2023 Finland's fur industry was hit hard by HPAI H5N1, with more than 70 fur farms infected, and > 500,000 animals culled. After an uncertain start, the Finnish Food Agency ordered an aggressive quarantine and culling program, which was strongly opposed by the fur industry.
Following on the heels of a mink-variant COVID outbreak in 2020, these HPAI outbreaks also brought renewed calls for the banning of the fur trade in the EU, and around the globe.
Although outbreaks reports from fur farms declined by the end of 2023, this epizootic - combined with increasing avian flu activity around the globe - led the EU to order a significant quantity of H5 vaccine the following summer.
PRESS RELEASE 11 June 2024 Brussels
Commission secures access for Member States to 665,000 doses of zoonotic influenza vaccines to prevent avian flu
Today, the Commission's Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA) as part of its mandate on preparedness, has signed on behalf of participating Member States, a joint procurement framework contract for the supply of up to 665,000 pre-pandemic vaccine doses of the up-to-date Zoonotic Influenza Vaccine Seqirus, as well as an option for a further 40 million doses over the duration of the contract. Thanks to this contract the participating Member States will have access to medical countermeasures to prevent avian flu.
The vaccine is intended for those most exposed to potential transfers of avian influenza from birds or animals, such as poultry farm workers and veterinarians. It aims to prevent the spread or potential outbreaks of avian influenza in Europe, protecting citizens and livelihoods. The vaccine is the only preventive zoonotic avian influenza vaccine currently authorized in the EU.
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While the intent was to store these doses for use in a future outbreak, the EU carved out 20,000 doses for immediate use in Finland; specifically for the vaccination of high risk fur farmers (see Finland: MOH Announcement On Avian Flu Vaccine Availability For People At High Risk).
In August of 2024, Finland's
THL Announced the Start Of H5 Vaccination For High Risk Groups. While details on the campaign were scant, last December, in
a study published in Nature Microbiology, researchers discussed the disappointingly low uptake -
particularly among fur farmers - of this vaccine.
The final sample size was smaller than planned due to recruitment challenges, largely reflecting the overall low vaccine uptake across all target groups. This was particularly evident among fur farm workers, none of whom participated despite repeated outreach efforts.
I've not been able to determine how many fur farmers actually accepted the vaccine, but it appears to be a small fraction of the roughly 860 people who received as least 1 dose.
All of which brings us to a new Short Communications, published in the journal
Vaccines, which details the Finnish vaccination campaign and some of the perceived difficulties in convincing high-risk individuals to get the shot.
While the timing, logistics, and `divergent risk perceptions' were cited as barriers to vaccination, distrust of the government appears to have been the biggest factor.
They call it the `most unexpected barrier', but to anyone who has spent any time online - or actually talking to the public over the past 20 years - it can't have been that unexpected.
This report is based in large part on 17 interviews, of which only one was actually a farmer (poultry). Since no fur farmers were willing to talk to these researchers, many of their conclusions are - by necessity - based on 3rd-party assessments.
Despite these limitations, this is a fascinating look at the growing chasm between governmental expectations and the public's willingness to cooperate. I've only posted some excerpts, so follow the link to read it in its entirety.
I'll have a bit more after the break.
Short communication
Lessons from the 2024 avian influenza vaccination campaign in Finland: a qualitative inquiry
Vuokko Härmä a, Minttu Palsola a, Aapo Kuusipalo a b, Erika Lindh a, Merit Melin a, Hanna Nohynek a
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2026.128736
Under a Creative Commons license
Abstract
Highly pathogenicity avian influenza H5N1 (HPAI H5N1) viruses cause a continuous threat to wild avian populations. During recent years, spillover to both wild and domestic mammals has occurred with an increasing frequency. As a consequence of the recent developments in the epidemiological situation, the human-animal interface with the risk of human exposure to HPAI H5 has expanded.
In 2024, Finland became a global forerunner to offer H5 vaccine to occupational risk groups, specifically fur and poultry workers, following an extensive HPAI H5N1 outbreak in 2023 in fur-farmed minks and foxes. Despite targeted efforts to reach the people at increased risk, only 8,6% of the target population received the first dose and 7,5% completed both doses.
To seek a better understanding of the barriers behind low vaccine uptake a Behavioural and Cultural (BCI) insight approach was chosen. A rapid qualitative study was conducted in late 2024 (n = 17), utilising semi-structured interviews with health authorities, industry stakeholders, and risk group representatives in the Ostrobothnia region in Finland. Barriers were identified across three dimensions:
(1) logistical failures, including poor timing and difficulties in reaching target groups
(2) divergent risk perceptions, where economic livelihood overshadowed personal health risks; and
(3) political distrust, stemming from perceived stigmatization by national health authorities.
The results will provide vital information for future pre-pandemic communication and implementation strategies and helps to identify key stakeholders and target groups.
(SNIP)
3.3. Trust and political tensions
Perhaps the most unexpected barrier identified was the erosion of trust between the fur industry and national health authorities. Our analysis suggests that the campaign's reception was influenced by ongoing political and ethical debate regarding the future of fur farming in Finland.
The 2023 outbreak led to intense public debate and strict regulatory measures, including mass culling of animals in affected farms ordered by the Finnish Food Authority as part of outbreak control measures. Advocates of the fur industry publicly argued that such measures were excessive, and that the industry was being “scapegoated” for a natural phenomenon. Statements from national health and political figures during the outbreak were perceived by farmers as stigmatizing. Consequently, when these same national authorities recommended vaccination in 2024, the message was not welcomed but was met with skepticism.
A dichotomy in trust was evident, while farmers generally maintained high trust in local occupational healthcare nurses and municipal doctors, they expressed deep distrust toward national authorities. National-level communication was characterised as bureaucratic, distant, and sometimes “accusatory”. Participants reported that official messaging was perceived as stigmatizing for the fur farmers for the zoonotic risk, which reduced willingness to comply with voluntary measures.
Additionally, local media in the region were reportedly hesitant to publish pro-vaccination content related to avian influenza, fearing backlash from a community already feeling under siege. This created a vacuum of positive reinforcement, further limiting the reach of health messaging.
(SNIP)
4. Conclusion and implications
The low uptake of the H5 vaccine in Finland serves as a critical case study in the challenges of implementing public health interventions within agricultural and occupational settings that have been involved in political tensions. Achieving high vaccination coverage can be particularly challenging when the target population experiences a combination of marginalisation and structural distrust. However coverage was low across all target groups, which further indicates structural and communicational challenges.
(SNIP)
While the socio-political climate of the Finnish fur industry is unique and findings should be applied cautiously to other contexts, this study offers broader insights for One Health interventions. They demonstrate that preparedness requires more than just clinical readiness; it demands a multisectoral strategy that aligns public health goals with the economic and social realities of the agricultural sector. Vaccination outcomes are shaped by context-specific social, political, and cultural factors, which must be considered to ensure optimal uptake.
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While the embattled fur farming community is probably not the best proxy for attitudes of the rest of the world's population, convincing the public to take any experimental vaccine in the absence of an imminent high-morbidity/mortality outbreak is always going to be a tough sell.
Today, trust (and uptake) in vaccines has plummeted, while warnings from the WHO, or the CDC, are often dismissed as hyperbole or part of some conspiratorial `plandemic'.
Although most of this is ginned up out of whole cloth by clickbait videos and deranged social media posts, some of this mistrust has been rightfully earned (see When Scientists Behave Badly).
When the next global public health threat begins its world tour, governments and health agencies are going to be desperate to find some way to regain the trust - and cooperation - of the public.
And right now, that's not a battle they appear to be even close to winning.
