Wednesday, June 24, 2026

France MOH: First Ebola Case Identified In a Humanitarian Doctor Returning the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

 

#19,219

Note quite a week ago, in ECDC: Preparedness and response for imported cases of Ebola disease into an EU/EEA country, we looked at ECDC guidance for EU/EEA countries in the handling of imported Ebola cases. 

Given the estimate size, and trajectory, of the outbreak in the DRC and Uganda (see ECDC Assessment), exported cases are not unexpected.

Last May Germany received a patient for treatment, and today France reports their first imported case of the Bundibugyo virus, in a doctor returning from the region. This (translated) statement comes from the French MOH. 

Ebola: First case identified in a humanitarian doctor returning from a mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

Published on 24.06.26 

The Ministry of Health, Families, Autonomy, and Persons with Disabilities today confirmed the identification of the first positive case of Ebola virus disease in the country. The patient, who had returned from a humanitarian mission in one of the areas where the virus is circulating in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), was immediately admitted to a specialized facility and is in stable condition.

France has specialized capabilities for managing highly transmissible infectious diseases. Patients are treated in a designated healthcare facility, following strict biosafety protocols (negative pressure room, dedicated equipment and protocols). Health authorities are fully mobilized and the situation is being continuously monitored.

All precautionary measures, including the patient's isolation, were taken upon his arrival in the country, with transfer to the hospital under secure conditions to prevent any risk of contamination.
A thorough epidemiological investigation is underway to identify individuals who may have been in contact with the patient. These individuals will be contacted without delay by the regional health agency, will undergo 21 days of home isolation, and will be closely monitored during this period. Following the Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) declared by the World Health Organization (WHO) on May 17 in response to the active circulation of the Ebola virus in Ituri Province, DRC, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) has assessed the risk of infection as low for European residents and travelers to areas of active transmission, and very low for the general European population.

A dedicated monitoring system is in place for the return of French aid workers to the national territory.
 

While many people are understandably unnerved by reports of imported cases, in most places - including the United States, Canada, and much of Europe - the conditions are not particularly conducive for seeing large outbreaks.  

In 2014, we saw 2 imported cases to the United States (Texas & NYC), which involved roughly 380 potential contacts.  Yet, out of all of those interactions, only 2 people (both nurses) were infected.  

None of which is to suggest that imported Ebola cases aren't a serious threat, only that with proper public health interventions, they can usually be managed. 

For a more detailed look at the contact tracing and epidemiological investigation into the first, and only, cluster of Ebola in the United States you may wish to revisit:

Active Tracing and Monitoring of Contacts Associated With the First Cluster of Ebola in the United States 

USDA Reports 4 More Screwworm Detections in Texas (n=19)

 

#19,218

After going more than a week without any new reports, since the weekend the USDA has announced 7 new detections of the New World Screwworm in Texas. 

So far, 8 Texas counties have reported infections in cattle, sheep, and goats. While no wildlife detections have been reported, it is highly likely that many more infections have occurred in non-farm environments. 

The Texas Department of Agriculture has their own dashboard, and reporting form, which can be accessed at: https://screwworm.texasagriculture.gov/map


 

Australia Confirms 3rd H5N1 Detection (Giant Petrel), This Time in South Australia



#19,217

Over the weekend Australia reported its first 2 detections of HPAI H5N1, both in migratory birds (Brown Skua & Giant Petrel) in Western Australia (see Australia: 2nd H5N1 Infected Bird Confirmed). 

Today, South Australia is reporting a 3rd confirmed detection - roughly 1,000 miles east - on the Fleurieu Peninsula, very near Adelaide. Meanwhile, WA is reportedly testing another sick bird.

The following statement comes from the SA government's Department of Primary Industries and Regions Agency.

South Australia confirms first H5 bird flu case

Wednesday 24 June 2026
On Wednesday 24 June, South Australia recorded its first confirmed case of H5 bird flu in a vagrant migratory seabird found on a beach on the Fleurieu Peninsula.

The confirmed case, a Southern Giant Petrel, was found by a wildlife welfare organisation on 14 June on Knights Beach at Port Elliot in a debilitated condition and taken into care.

PIRSA contacted the organisation on Friday 19 June upon learning of the case via social media and took samples immediately.

Testing by CSIRO's Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness (ACDP) has today returned a positive detection.

This is the first time this strain has been detected in South Australia. Since 1 January 2026, 774 samples from birds have been tested in SA.

Testing of the two seabirds found near Fowlers Bay on Eyre Peninsula has returned negative results.

The Southern Giant Petrel is a migratory seabird that breeds in Antarctica and the sub-Antarctic islands between October and March. During the southern winter, these birds migrate north and can travel significant distances, including to the waters off South Australia.

Importantly, this is currently being treated as an isolated incident, and there are no detections in poultry anywhere in Australia at this time.

The State Government is asking the public to avoid, record and report any dead or sick birds or other wildlife to the Emergency Animal Disease Hotline on 1800 675 888.

South Australia is well prepared to respond quickly to H5 bird flu to protect poultry production and reduce impacts on wildlife and communities.

The South Australian Government is also working with equivalent agriculture, environment and health agencies at a state and national level to coordinate emergency animal disease response activities, and the Department of Primary Industries and Regions (PIRSA) continue to lead the state’s preparedness for H5 bird flu.

Significant preparedness activities for H5 bird flu have included a $6.8 million State Government investment since 2022 to establish a mobile diagnostic laboratory, decontamination units and other equipment to enable rapid deployment and on-ground responses, and workforce readiness and capability development has included comprehensive training of over 240 personnel.

While SA is treating this as an `isolated incident', the fact that this is the 3rd confirmed detection in less than a week - coming from two different states - is sobering. 

H5N1's recent history (at least since 2020) has been that once it arrives to a new region (North America, South America, Antarctic, etc.), it quickly establishes a beachhead. 

As noted above, authorities in WA are also testing a presumed positive sick bird in Quindalup (WA), some 400 mile west of where the first 2 birds were detected. 

Animal Health Australia has posted the following update:

Latest emergency response news

Updated: 24 June 2026

H5N1 high pathogenicity avian influenza (H5 bird flu) has been detected in migratory seabirds in both Western Australia (WA) and South Australia (SA).

In WA, two vagrant migratory seabirds — a brown skua and a northern giant petrel —have been confirmed with H5 bird flu following testing by CSIRO’s Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness (ACDP).

On 24 June 2026, a southern giant petrel near Quindalup (WA) returned a preliminary positive result for H5 bird flu. Confirmatory testing is underway to determine the pathogenicity and clade.

On the same day, SA recorded its first confirmed case of H5 bird flu in a vagrant migratory seabird found on the Fleurieu Peninsula.

At this stage:
  • there have been no detections in poultry
  • there is no evidence of any mass mortality in wildlife or spread to other animals
  • there are currently no trade restrictions on poultry or poultry products for export out of Australia.
H5 bird flu is a low health risk to the public and rarely affects humans. Bird flu is not a food safety risk for chicken meat and eggs if they are handled and cooked correctly.

The Department of Primary Industries and Regional Development (DPIRD) is leading the response in WA. This includes enhanced surveillance and coordination with industry, veterinarians, wildlife carers and local communities.

The Department of Primary Industries and Regions (PIRSA) is leading the SA’s preparedness and response activities. The South Australian Government is working closely with agriculture, environment and health agencies at state and national levels.

National coordination is being led by the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF).

Further information is available at birdflu.gov.au. 

Tuesday, June 23, 2026

Viruses: Epidemiological and Virological Characteristics of H9N2 Avian Influenza Virus in Jiangsu Province, China, 2024


Jiangsu Province - Credit Wikipedia

#19,216

It is not exactly a state secret that the Chinese CDC has become increasingly concerned over the evolution and spread of LPAI H9N2 in both poultry and people, particularly in the eastern provinces of China. 

In addition to a human infection reported 10 days ago in Hong Kong, the CHP's latest weekly Avian Influenza report lists 15 known human infections on the mainland over the past 6 months.

While most (but not all) of these reported cases have been mild or moderate, its true incidence and burden in China is unknown. Most people with mild to moderate flu are never hospitalized, or tested, for novel flu. 

Last October the Chinese CDC Weekly published a detailed report (see Epidemiological and Genetic Characterization of Three H9N2 Viruses Causing Human Infections — Changsha City, Hunan Province, China, April 2025) which found:

Three children infected with H9N2 AIV were identified in Changsha in April 2025, and no epidemiological links were found between these mild and sporadic cases. Genetic analysis showed that the H9N2 viruses had enhanced binding ability to upper respiratory tract receptors, particularly the α2,6-sialic acid receptors.

The report goes on describe some of the notable HA mutations suggesting enhanced mammalian adaptation:

Analysis of receptor-binding sites showed that the HA proteins had mutations at amino acid positions H191N, A198V, Q226L, and Q234L, which potentially enhanced the binding ability of the virus to the receptor (5-6).

While there is still no evidence of sustained or efficient human-to-human transmission of H9N2, the virus remains poorly controlled in poultry, and  appears on a path towards greater mammalian adaptation.

LPAI H9N2 continues to evolve and diversify (see EM&I: A new clade of H9N2 avian influenza virus circulating in Laos), and our own CDC has assessed 2 lineages (A(H9N2) G1 and A(H9N2) Y280) as having at least some pandemic potential (see CDC IRAT SCORE).

All of which brings us to a new study, from researchers at several Provincial-level CCDC agencies, which looks at nearly 5,800 environmental samples from live poultry markets, farms, slaughterhouses, and bird habitats in Jiangsu Province in 2024, and finds further evidence of mammalian adaptation. 

They also compared 370 occupationally exposed human sera with 240 non-exposed sera using HI assays, and found a low level of seropositivity in both.

Given the detailed, and highly technical nature of much of this report, I've only posted the Abstract and some excerpts from the Discussion and Conclusion.  Those looking for a deeper dive will want to follow the link to read it in its entirety, but the authors summed up their findings stating:
These findings confirm that Jiangsu’s circulating H9N2 viruses have acquired human receptor preference and mammalian adaptation, posing silent infection and pandemic risks
As you read this, it is worth noting this strongly worded report comes from researchers at China's CDC.  I'll have a bit more after the break.

19 June 2026
Epidemiological and Virological Characteristics of H9N2 Avian Influenza Virus in Jiangsu Province, China, 2024

Xue Gao 1,†, Huiyan Yu 2,†, Na Zhang 3, Liqi Liu 3, Jing Tong 1, Xian Qi 2, Haodi Huang 2, Shenjiao Wang 2, Zi Li 3,* … Liguo Zhu 2,*

Abstract

H9N2 avian influenza viruses inherently carry cross-species transmission potential, making continuous surveillance critical for pandemic prevention. This study focused on monitoring the 2024 H9N2 epidemic in Jiangsu Province’s external environment, analyzing its molecular evolution and receptor binding properties, assessing cross-species transmission and pandemic risks, and investigating serological antibody levels across different human populations.

Environmental samples were collected from live poultry markets, farms, slaughterhouses, and bird habitats across Jiangsu, screened via quantitative PCR (qPCR), with positive samples used for virus isolation and whole-genome sequencing. Receptor binding properties were tested by hemagglutination assay, and H9N2 antibody levels were measured in 370 occupationally exposed individuals and 240 non-exposed individuals using hemagglutination inhibition (HI) assays.

Among the 5779 collected samples, 6.89% tested H9N2-positive, and 12 strains belonging to the Eurasian lineage Y280-like clade G57 genotype were successfully isolated. All strains carried the HA-Q226L mutation, with 11 showing preferential binding to human α-2,6 receptors and one strain possessing dual receptor binding capability.

Internal genes harbored mammalian adaptation mutations, and M2 proteins contained mutations conferring complete resistance to amantadine-class antiviral drugs.Serological tests revealed antibody positive rates of 4.05% in exposed populations and 2.5% in non-exposed populations, with no statistically significant difference between groups.

These findings confirm that Jiangsu’s circulating H9N2 viruses have acquired human receptor preference and mammalian adaptation, posing silent infection and pandemic risks. Enhanced surveillance and the development of candidate vaccine stockpiles are strongly recommended.

 (SNIP)

Notably, dual receptor binding is a key determinant for cross-species transmission and pandemic potential in influenza viruses [21]. Strain CZ3053 not only possessed strong human receptor binding capacity but also retained agglutination activity against horse, sheep, and rabbit red blood cells. Analysis suggests that the HA-V306L mutation may be key for its acquisition of dual receptor binding capability. Amino acid substitution at position 306 may fine-tune the conformation of the receptor binding site through remote allosteric effects, enabling it to maintain avian α-2,3 receptor recognition capacity while further optimizing spatial adaptation to human α-2,6 receptors, thereby acquiring dual receptor binding characteristics.

All isolate PB2 proteins in this study carried a characteristic set of mutations (L89V, L134H, M147I, I292V, R340K, R389K, and A588V) [16]. Among these, M147I and R340K are key molecular markers of the G1-like lineage, closely related to enhanced polymerase activity and replication capacity in mammalian cells [22]. Additionally, combined with the commonly present mutations in PB1 protein (D622G) and PA protein (K356R, S409N, and A515T) related to virulence and polymerase activity, as well as adaptive mutations in NP protein that optimize nuclear transport efficiency (K398Q) and antagonize human restriction factor interference (V352M), these molecular characteristics functionally couple to provide a solid molecular basis for the H9N2 virus breaking through species barriers [23,24,25].

Serological results showed low H9N2 exposure levels in human populations in Jiangsu region in 2024, with no statistically significant difference between occupationally exposed (4.05%) and non-occupationally exposed (2.5%) groups. Based on our findings, H9N2 infection risk may not be limited to occupationally exposed populations, as general residents may also face infection risks through live poultry market environmental exposure or aerosol contact.

Therefore, serological investigation and detection work should be strengthened for different populations. Meanwhile, both positive cases in the non-occupational group were from the adult group, possibly related to higher social activity frequency and environmental exposure opportunities in this age group. Since current antibody levels are far from sufficient to form population immune barriers, accelerating development and application of novel vaccines is a key measure for improving prevention and control effectiveness. 5. 

Conclusions

H9N2 viruses circulating in Jiangsu Province in 2024 have acquired human receptor preference, along with PB2-A588V and other internal gene compensatory adaptations, indicating pandemic potential. It is recommended to conduct continuous surveillance of the H9N2 subtype AIV while accelerating candidate vaccine strain matching and stockpiling work for current circulating branches to respond to potential public health crises. 

       (Continue . . . )

While trying to predict the source of the next influenza pandemic is a mug's game, H9N2 shows up twice the top 10 zoonotic influenza A viruses the CDC has pegged as having at least some pandemic potential, with the Y280 lineage having a higher emergence score than H5N1.


Given that we've already seen 2 modern influenza pandemics (1957 & 1968) caused by avian viruses spilling over from birds to humans in China, it makes sense that China's CDC is taking this threat seriously.

Monday, June 22, 2026

Australia: 2nd H5N1 Infected Bird Confirmed

 
Agriculture Minister Julie Collins Statement

#19,215

Overnight here in the states, Australia's Agriculture Minister and other officials held a press conference and announced the 2nd suspected H5N1 infected bird (Giant Petrel) has been confirmed positive by the CSIRO lab

Thus far, only two wild birds - both found in the Cape Le Grand National Park (see map below) - have tested positive. 


For now, Australia's poultry industry has not been affected, and the risk to human health remains low. The public, however, is urged to remain vigilant, and asked to  avoid any physical contact with sick or dead birds and to report sightings to the Emergency Animal Disease Hotline at 1800 675 888.

Animal Health Australia has posted the following update:

Latest emergency response news

Updated: 22 June 2026

H5 high pathogenicity avian influenza (H5 bird flu) has been detected in two wild birds in Western Australia.

The infected birds — a brown skua and a northern giant petrel — were found in the Cape Le Grand National Park, around 50km east of Esperance in Western Australia.

This is the first time the globally circulating H5 bird flu strain has been detected in Australia.

At this stage:
  • there have been no detections in poultry
  • there is no evidence of any mass mortality in wildlife or spread to other animals 
  • there are currently no trade restrictions on poultry or poultry products for export out of Australia.
H5 bird flu is a low health risk to the public and rarely affects humans. Bird flu is not a food safety risk for chicken meat and eggs if they are handled and cooked correctly.

The Western Australia Department of Primary Industries and Regional Development (DPIRD) has responded swiftly to the detection and is leading response activities on the ground. This includes enhanced surveillance, working closely with industry, veterinarians, wildlife carers, and local communities.

National coordination is being led by the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF).

Further information is available at birdflu.gov.au.

For more background information, The Conversation has published 3 excellent explainers from well known Australian researchers over the past couple of days:

C Raina MacIntyre, UNSW Sydney and Pan Zhang, UNSW Sydney
The outbreak isn’t widespread, so the risk to humans is low. But it does have the potential to cause severe illness.

Published: June 22, 2026
Bird flu is here. Can we stop the spread?

Jane Younger, University of Tasmania
An ecologist explains how Australia can curb the spread of the H5N1 strain.


Published: June 20, 2026
The first case of H5N1 bird flu in Australia has been confirmed. What does this mean?

Marcel Klaassen, Deakin University; Meagan Dewar, Federation University Australia, and Michelle Wille, The University of Melbourne
This is not the moment to call defeat. There is a chance we can stop this infectious virus, this time at least.
 

USDA Reports 3 More Screwworm Detections (Texas)

 

#19,214

After going more than a week without any new reports, late yesterday the USDA updated their New World Screwworm dashboard to show 3 new detections; 2 (cattle) in Edwards County, Tx, and 1 (sheep) in Crockett County, Tx. 

Previously, Edwards county had reported 2 cases (1 cattle, 1 goats), while this is the first report from Crockett county. 

As discussed previously, the New World Screwworm (NWS) fly lays its eggs in exposed wounds on practically any warm-blooded animal, including birds.  While reported cases remain low, most of our surveillance is among livestock, while infections in the wild go largely unmonitored. 

The CDC describes its life cycle as:

New World screwworm infestations begin when a female fly lays eggs on open wounds or other parts of the body in live, warm-blooded animals. Most infestations occur in animals, but they also occur in people. The smell of a wound or body opening such as the nose, mouth, eyes, ears, or genitals can attract female flies. Wounds as small as a tick bite may attract a female fly to lay her eggs. One female can lay 200 – 300 eggs at a time and may lay up to 3,000 eggs during her 10- to 30-day lifespan.

Eggs hatch into maggots that burrow into the wound to feed on the living flesh. After feeding for about 7 days, larvae drop to the ground, burrow into the soil, and emerge as adult screwworm flies.


The arrival of the NWS this early in the summer maximizes the number of cycles that may occur before winter weather sets in, which greatly limits the spread and survival of the NWS. 

While the USDA continues to release sterile flies in the infested areas, it will take many months - possibly more than a year - to ramp up sterile fly production enough to combat a multi-state outbreak. 

This is only part of the USDA's 8-part plan (see below) to try to contain this threat. 


The ultimate goal is not only to eradicate the NWS in the United States, but also to drive the screwworm back south to its old control line - below the Darien Gap in Panama - to prevent yearly reintroductions from Northern Mexico. 

All of which means winning this battle will likely take years, not months. 

Meanwhile, state veterinarians from as far north as Minnesota are considering their options (see MPR News Minnesota state veterinarian worries New World screwworm could enter the state).

Stay tuned.