Showing posts with label NEJM. Show all posts
Showing posts with label NEJM. Show all posts

Thursday, August 28, 2014

Mackay On The NEJM MERS-CoV Transmission Study

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Coronavirus – Credit CDC PHIL

 

 

# 9010

 

 

Last night the NEJM published a study looking at the transmission of the MERS coronavirus to secondary contacts within a household, penned by such notables as Dr. Christian Drosten and Dr. Ziad Memish. The study focused on 26 index cases and their 280 household contacts, and found a relatively low (12 cases, 4%) incidence of household transmission.

 

Additionally, of the 26 index cases, only 6 (23%) appeared to have passed the infection on to other household members. Of those infections, only 7 were detected using RT-PRC testing, while 5 were detected though serology.

 

 

Transmission of MERS-Coronavirus in Household Contacts

Christian Drosten, M.D., Benjamin Meyer, M.Sc., Marcel A. Müller, Ph.D., Victor M. Corman, M.D., Malak Al-Masri, R.N., Raheela Hossain, M.D., Hosam Madani, M.Sc., Andrea Sieberg, B.Sc., Berend Jan Bosch, Ph.D., Erik Lattwein, Ph.D., Raafat F. Alhakeem, M.D., Abdullah M. Assiri, M.D., Waleed Hajomar, M.Sc., Ali M. Albarrak, M.D., Jaffar A. Al-Tawfiq, M.D., Alimuddin I. Zumla, M.D., and Ziad A. Memish, M.D.

(Continue . . . )

 

 

This morning Dr. Ian Mackay takes a look at this study on his VDU Blog. Follow the link to read:

 

Thursday, 28 August 2014

MERS-CoV around the house-yes, it does transmit at home

Click on graph to enlarge.

Some Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) questions remain stubbornly unanswered even after two and a half years.


Today comes a study from Prof Christian Drosten and colleagues, including Prof Ziad Memish, released by the New England Journal of Medicine.[1] This study takes a look at MERS-CoV infection among the contacts of MERS cases.

(Continue . . .)

 

 

While a 4% transmission rate in these households is reassuring, it stands in sharp contrast to the much higher transmission rates observed in healthcare facilities.

 

To date we’ve seen more than 800 confirmed cases - and it is assumed that additionally, some unknown (but likely significant) number of cases have gone undetected. 

 

As only a handful of those cases have been attributed to animal-to-human transmission, it is obvious that under some conditions and settings the MERS coronavirus transmits more efficiently.

 

Today’s study adds to our knowledge of the virus, but there still remain a lot of unanswered questions including the role of mild or asymptomatic transmission. And of course the obvious concern, that the longer the virus circulates in people, the greater the chances that it will better adapt to human physiology. 

Wednesday, June 11, 2014

ScienceInsider: When MERS Transmission Studies Clash

Photo: ©FAO/Ami Vitale

Credit FAO

 

# 8726

 

Last week, in More Evidence for Camel-to-Human MERS-CoV Transmission, we looked at a NEJM study that Dr. Ian Mackay rightfully pointed out on his blog, was based on a transmission event that had previously been described by Memish, Drosten, et al. in an EID Journal report published in March.


The NEJM study was co-authored by Dr Tariq Madani of King Abdulaziz University in Jeddah, who was appointed special MERS advisor by the newly appointed Health Minister, Adel bin Mohammed Faqih,  last April.

 

Curiously, there was no mention of the earlier publication by Memish et at. on the same patient/camel testing in the EID Journal, published nearly two months earlier.  I would note that when I checked back yesterday, the editors at the NEJM had belatedly attached a terse note stating:

 

Editor’s note: The patient and camels discussed in this article are also described in Memish ZA, Cotten M, Meyer B, et al. Human infection with MERS coronavirus after exposure to infected camels, Saudi Arabia, 2013. Emerg Infect Dis 2014;20:1012-5.

 

This story only gets stranger, as we learn from a Science Insider report from Kai Kupferschmidt, who delves deeper into the behind-the-scenes machinations surrounding this study.  Included are observations and comments from Dr. Ian Mackay, Dr. Michael Osterholm, Dr. Christian Drosten, and Dr. Ziad Memish.

 

Along the way, we also see concerns expressed over possible contamination issues with the second paper’s test results.

 

While this story has the makings of a terrific prime-time soap opera, it doesn’t exactly infuse the reader with a warm fuzzy feeling over the way that MERS research is being conducted in Saudi Arabia.   Follow the link to read:

 

 

Research teams clash over too-similar MERS papers

Kai Kupferschmidt

Tuesday, June 10, 2014 - 6:45pm

A great story can be told again and again. But scientists working on the deadly Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) virus are puzzled by two papers appearing in separate journals that not only tell the same story, but also are based on data from the very same patient in Saudi Arabia.

(Continue . . .)

Thursday, June 05, 2014

CIDRAP: More Evidence for Camel-to-Human MERS-CoV Transmission

Photo: ©FAO/Ami Vitale

Credit FAO 

*** UPDATED*** 
See note at bottom

 

# 8708

 

Since August of last year, when the first evidence was presented (see Lancet: Camels Found With Antibodies To MERS-CoV-Like Virus), researchers have known that some camels on the Arabian peninsula had been exposed to – and likely carried - a MERS-like virus.

 

By December, researchers led by Marion Koopmans, DVM, PhD, head of virology at the Laboratory for Infectious Diseases at the RIVM in the Netherlands, determined that the human viruses and the camel viruses collected from a Qatari farm were almost an identical match (see The Lancet: Identification Of MERS Virus In Camels).

 

So close, in fact, that they were unable to determine whether the humans or the camels were infected first.

 

Since then, we’ve continued to see evidence mount supporting the notion that most camels on the Arabian peninsula – at least when they are young – get infected with the MERS coronavirus, and that they are a likely source of zoonotic spillover into humans (see mBio: MERS-CoV In Saudi Arabian Camels & EID Journal: MERS Coronavirus In A Saudi Dromedary Herd).

 

Acceptance of this MERS-camel connection in Saudi Arabia and the Middle East has been slow in coming. We’ve seen tepid warnings about avoiding raw camel products, along side statements from officials that there is no actual `proof’ that camels can transmit the virus to humans (see Saudi MOA Spokesman: Camel Link Unproven).

 

For many Saudis, the idea that camels – a beloved national symbol that literally made settlement of that arid region possible – could carry a disease deadly to humans,  is simply unthinkable. 

 

A concept made even harder to accept due to the widespread belief in the healthful effects of camel’s milk and urine in the treatment of disease.  While it may not convince everyone, late yesterday the NEJM published a study that finds even more evidence supporting the camel transmission scenario.

 

Lisa Schnirring  at CIDRAP NEWS has done a terrific job describing this research, and has comments from two top MERS researchers (Marion Koopmans, DVM, PhD & Matthew Frieman, PhD), making my job here dead simple. I would simply invite you follow the link below to read Lisa’s excellent report:

 

Study builds case for camel-human link in MERS

Lisa Schnirring | Staff Writer | CIDRAP News

Jun 04, 2014

In findings that shed more light on the suspected link between camels and humans, an investigation into a fatal human MERS-CoV (Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus) infection identified the virus in both the man and his sick camels, with genetic-sequencing showing the viruses to be identical.

 

The 44-year-old man, from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, kept a herd of nine camels near the city and had had contact with the respiratory secretions of one of the animals that was sick, according to a team of scientists from King Abdulaziz University in Jeddah who reported their findings today in an early online edition of the New England Journal of Medicine.

(Continue . . .)

 

Here is the link to the NEJM Abstract and report:

 

Brief Report

Evidence for Camel-to-Human Transmission of MERS Coronavirus

Esam I. Azhar, Ph.D., Sherif A. El-Kafrawy, Ph.D., Suha A. Farraj, M.Sc., Ahmed M. Hassan, M.Sc., Muneera S. Al-Saeed, B.Sc., Anwar M. Hashem, Ph.D., and Tariq A. Madani, M.D.

June 4, 2014DOI: 10.1056/NEJMoa1401505

We describe the isolation and sequencing of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) obtained from a dromedary camel and from a patient who died of laboratory-confirmed MERS-CoV infection after close contact with camels that had rhinorrhea. Nasal swabs collected from the patient and from one of his nine camels were positive for MERS-CoV RNA. In addition, MERS-CoV was isolated from the patient and the camel. The full genome sequences of the two isolates were identical. Serologic data indicated that MERS-CoV was circulating in the camels but not in the patient before the human infection occurred. These data suggest that this fatal case of human MERS-CoV infection was transmitted through close contact with an infected camel.

(Continue . . .)

 

UPDATE:

My thanks to Dr. Ian Mackay for pointing out that this transmission incident was documented previously by another team of researchers (albeit with less complete sequencing of the camel MERS-CoV genome) in the CDC’s  EID Journal  Volume 20, Number 6—June 2014.

 

Dispatch

Human Infection with MERS Coronavirus after Exposure to Infected Camels, Saudi Arabia, 2013

Ziad A. Memish, Matthew Cotten, Benjamin Meyer, Simon J. Watson, Abdullah J. Alsahafi, Abdullah A. Al Rabeeah, Victor Max Corman, Andrea Sieberg, Hatem Q. Makhdoom, Abdullah Assiri, Malaki Al Masri, Souhaib Aldabbagh, Berend-Jan Bosch, Martin Beer, Marcel A. Müller, Paul Kellam, and Christian Drosten

Abstract

We investigated a case of human infection with Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) after exposure to infected camels. Analysis of the whole human-derived virus and 15% of the camel-derived virus sequence yielded nucleotide polymorphism signatures suggestive of cross-species transmission. Camels may act as a direct source of human MERS-CoV infection.

Thursday, April 17, 2014

Ebola: NEJM - New Clade, WHO Messaging & Updated FAQ

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Credit @UNMILNews

 

# 8484

 

 

While our attentions have understandably been diverted by the MERS coronavirus outbreak in the Middle East, the battle against a large Ebola outbreak in west Africa continues, and this morning we have updated numbers and some interesting news on that front. 

 

Yesterday the NEJM published a preliminary report on this outbreak, breaking the news that the viral culprit is a new strain of Ebola, not an imported strain of Ebola Zaire as first thought.


Although the two most common strains of Ebola known to cause outbreaks are Ebola Zaire (EBOV) and Ebola Sudan (SUDV), three other strains have previously been identified; Bundibugyo ebolavirus (BDBV), rarely seen Taï Forest ebolavirus (TAFV), and a strain found in the Philippines - not known to cause illness in humans - called Ebola Reston (RESTV) (see A Brief History of Ebola).

 

A link and a couple of snippets from the NEJM report follows:

 

Brief Report

Emergence of Zaire Ebola Virus Disease in Guinea — Preliminary Report

Sylvain Baize, Ph.D., Delphine Pannetier, Ph.D., Lisa Oestereich, M.Sc., Toni Rieger, Ph.D., Lamine Koivogui, Ph.D., N'Faly Magassouba, Ph.D., Barrè Soropogui, M.Sc., Mamadou Saliou Sow, M.D., Sakoba Keïta, M.D., Hilde De Clerck, M.D., Amanda Tiffany, M.P.H., Gemma Dominguez, B.Sc., Mathieu Loua, M.D., Alexis Traoré, M.D., Moussa Kolié, M.D., Emmanuel Roland Malano, M.D., Emmanuel Heleze, M.D., Anne Bocquin, M.Sc., Stephane Mély, M.Sc., Hervé Raoul, Ph.D., Valérie Caro, Ph.D., Dániel Cadar, D.V.M., Ph.D., Martin Gabriel, M.D., Meike Pahlmann, Ph.D., Dennis Tappe, M.D., Jonas Schmidt-Chanasit, M.D., Benido Impouma, M.D., Abdoul Karim Diallo, M.D., Pierre Formenty, D.V.M., M.P.H., Michel Van Herp, M.D., M.P.H., and Stephan Günther, M.D.

April 16, 2014DOI: 10.1056/NEJMoa1404505

ABSTRACT

In March 2014, the World Health Organization was notified of an outbreak of a communicable disease characterized by fever, severe diarrhea, vomiting, and a high fatality rate in Guinea. Virologic investigation identified Zaire ebolavirus (EBOV) as the causative agent. Full-length genome sequencing and phylogenetic analysis showed that EBOV from Guinea forms a separate clade in relationship to the known EBOV strains from the Democratic Republic of Congo and Gabon. Epidemiologic investigation linked the laboratory-confirmed cases with the presumed first fatality of the outbreak in December 2013. This study demonstrates the emergence of a new EBOV strain in Guinea.

<BIG SNIP>

DISCUSSION

Phylogenetic analysis of the full-length sequences established a separate clade for the Guinean EBOV strain in sister relationship with other known EBOV strains. This suggests that the EBOV strain from Guinea has evolved in parallel with the strains from the Democratic Republic of Congo and Gabon from a recent ancestor and has not been introduced from the latter countries into Guinea. Potential reservoirs of EBOV, fruit bats of the species Hypsignathus monstrosus, Epomops franqueti, and Myonycteris torquata, are present in large parts of West Africa.18 It is possible that EBOV has circulated undetected in this region for some time. The emergence of the virus in Guinea highlights the risk of EBOV outbreaks in the whole West African subregion.

(Continue . . .)

This morning the World Health Organization – via their twitter account – have been updating the situation.  You can monitor the conversation by following @WHO & @HaertlG (both Highly recommended to keep track of global health concerns).

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Additionally, the World Health Organization has published a new, updated FAQ on the Ebola virus;

Frequently asked questions on Ebola virus disease

Published 15 April 2014

 

And lastly, I would note that Crawford Kilian over at Crofsblog has done a terrific job covering the flood of news reports coming out of West Africa on this outbreak. 

Saturday, April 05, 2014

NEJM: Lessons Learned From The 2009 Pandemic

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Credit NEJM

 

# 8435

 

 

Although it seems like just yesterday, it’s been nearly five years since we first received word that a new swine-origin H1N1 virus had been identified in both San Diego and Imperial County, California and in San Antonio, Texas (see CDC Issues Outbreak Notice On Swine Flu).  Soon it became apparent that an outbreak had been ongoing for several weeks in Mexico, and early reports suggested a worrisome morbidity and mortality rate.

 

While it would take another six weeks - as the World Health Organization waited to see if the virus would continue to spread - on June 11th, 2009 the `swine’ H1N1 outbreak was declared a pandemic (see Chan Declares Level 6, Calls Pandemic `Moderate’ Severity).

 

This week Harvey V. Fineberg, M.D., Ph.D. - President of the Institute of Medicine (IOM) – has penned a review for the NEJM on what went right, and what went wrong, during the first pandemic response of the 21st century.  After a frank recounting of the public health challenges (both met and unmet) during the pandemic,  Dr. Fineberg notes:

 

In light of these structural impediments and operational deficiencies, the world was very fortunate that the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic was not more severe.


In 2011, an expert panel - chaired by Dr. Fineberg - produced  a 180-page assessment of the International pandemic response (see WHO Panel: World Ill-Prepared To Deal With A Pandemic), which concluded:


“The world is ill prepared to respond to a severe influenza pandemic or to any similarly global, sustained and threatening public-health emergency. 

 

In this latest review, Dr. Fineberg finds that – despite progress made over the past three years -  that this original assessment remains basically unchanged. 

 

The full article is available on the site, which I’m certain you’ll want to read in its entirety. 

 

Pandemic Preparedness and Response — Lessons from the H1N1 Influenza of 2009

Harvey V. Fineberg, M.D., Ph.D.

N Engl J Med 2014; 370:1335-1342April 3, 2014DOI: 10.1056/NEJMra1208802

Lessons from the 2009 H1N1 Influenza Pandemic.

A number of viruses have pandemic potential. For example, the coronavirus responsible for the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), which first appeared in southern China in November 2002, caused 8096 cases and 774 deaths in 26 countries before coming to a halt by July 2003 mainly owing to isolation and quarantine.1 In terms of persistence, versatility, potential severity, and speed of spread, however, few viruses rival influenza virus. Endemic in a number of species, including humans, birds, and pigs, influenza virus causes annual outbreaks punctuated by occasional worldwide pandemics, which are characterized by sustained community spread in multiple regions of the world.

(Continue . . . )

Thursday, February 06, 2014

CIDRAP: NEJM H7N9 Epidemiology Study & Yesterday’s Case Summary

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Credit CDC

 

 


# 8273

 

Yesterday the NEJM published a lengthy study that looked at the epidemiology of the first 139 human H7N9 cases (and nearly 2,700 contacts), that reaffirms what the World Health Organization, China’s CDC, and our own CDC have repeatedly said regarding this virus;  while there is a lot we don’t know, so far there is no evidence of sustained human-to-human spread.

Last night Robert Roos summarized this report on CIDRAP NEWS, which you can read at the link below:

 

Study reaffirms that H7N9 rarely spreads person to person

Robert Roos | News Editor | CIDRAP News

A Chinese study suggests that H7N9 may spread person to person only with prolonged close contact, if at all.

Feb 05, 2014

 A detailed epidemiologic study of the first 9 months of the H7N9 avian flu outbreak in China reinforces the image of the illness as one that rarely spreads from person to person but may possibly do so when there is prolonged, close contact between the sick and the healthy.

The lengthy report, released today by The New England Journal of Medicine, covers 139 human H7N9 cases recorded through November of 2013. All but 2 of the patients were hospitalized, and 47 (34%) died. More than 80% of the patients were exposed to animals, mostly poultry, before they got sick.

(Continue . . . )

 

As we saw in 2009 with the pandemic H1N1 virus, once an influenza virus manages to achieve efficient transmission, it doesn’t take long for it to become painfully obvious.  The fact that we haven’t seen hundreds of H7N9 cases show up in London, New York, Sydney, and Paris is a pretty good indicator that as a pandemic virus, H7N9 isn’t ready for prime time.

 

While reassuring news, influenza viruses have a history of changing over time. And so while this virus isn’t currently spreading efficiently, there are no guarantees about its behavior tomorrow or next week.

 

As Lisa Schnirring wrote last night, also on CIDRAP News, the daily parade of new human cases from Easter China continues, as do concerns over the geographic spread of the virus.

 

No H7N9 letup as Guangxi detections prompt warning

Lisa Schnirring | Staff Writer | CIDRAP News

Feb 05, 2014

China reported nine new H7N9 influenza cases today, including the third from Guangxi province, signaling a rise in disease activity in a region that borders Vietnam along with the first reports of poultry market detections there, according to a warning today from an animal health group.

 

The other eight new cases are from two provinces—Guangdong and Zhejiang—that are reporting the largest portion of cases in the second wave, which has now eclipsed the first wave by a growing margin. So far 174 cases have been reported in the outbreak's second wave, compared to 136 recorded during the first spike in disease activity last spring.

(Continue . . . )

 

Thursday, August 08, 2013

NEJM: Mild MERS-CoV Infections In HCWs

Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV)

Photo Credit WHO

 

# 7550

 

 

On Sunday, in Study: Possible Transmission From Asymptomatic MERS-CoV Case, we looked at research that appeared in the International Journal of Infectious Diseases, that suggested a 51 year old man who became infected with the MERS coronavirus during a hospital stay last February in Saudi Arabia probably contracted it from an asymptomatic or unrecognized mild case.

 

While most of the initial MERS cases reported involved severely ill patients, as testing capabilities have improved doctors have been able to indentify a number of mildly ill, or asymptomatic cases over the past few months.

 

Yesterday, in a letter to the NEJM, Saudi Deputy Health Minister Dr. Ziad Memish et al. describe 7 mild and/or asymptomatic MERS infections among female Healthcare Workers in Saudi Arabia.

 

Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus Infections in Health Care Workers

August 7, 2013DOI: 10.1056/NEJMc1308698

 

(EXCERPT)

The presence of asymptomatic or subclinical MERS-CoV infections in the community or among health care workers could have important public health implications, since these infections may be sources of transmission to close contacts in the community or to patients with coexisting medical conditions. The close proximity of health care workers to patients and the handling of human biologic material (sputum, respiratory secretions, feces, urine, or blood) may increase the risk of transmission, and health care workers may be particularly at risk for MERS-CoV infections.

 

 

While mild cases provide a welcomed lowering of the mortality rate of the MERS coronavirus, they also open the possibility of unrecognized spread of the virus in the community. 

 

The authors point out the need for better diagnostic tests, and warned of the necessity for constant vigilance against the MERS virus, and the rapid implementation of infection prevention and control measures when it is suspected.

 

The authors also point out that: … questions remain about the possible infectiousness of body fluids, excreta, and clinical samples and their infectivity and cross-transmission through contaminated surfaces and medical devices to the hands of health care workers.

 

The entire correspondence is online, and Robert Roos - News Editor at CIDRAP NEWS – wrote an excellent summary last night at:

 

Report profiles mild MERS cases in Saudi nurses

Aug 07, 2013

 

 

For more on the recommended infection control measures for medical personnel when dealing with the novel coronavirus, you may wish to revisit:

 

WHO: Interim Infection Control Guidance On nCoV (MERS)
CDC Interim H7N9 Infection Control Guidelines

Thursday, August 01, 2013

NEJM: MERS-CoV – An Evolving Picture

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Coronavirus – Credit CDC PHIL

 

 

# 7532

 

If we know of one thing that viruses are particularly good at, it’s evolving over time. Viruses are continually changing – some more rapidly than others – but always with the same goal  . . . survival.

 

Viruses need susceptible hosts in order to replicate. Since most viruses either leave behind a degree of immunity in (or kill off) their hosts, the need for new, immunologically naive hosts is ongoing.

 

So viruses must either change enough over time to be able to re-infect a host without triggering pre-existing antibodies, or they must find new hosts or  species to infect.

 

Since viruses predate mankind by hundreds of millions of years (see Oldest Viruses Infected Insects 300 Million Years Ago), they’ve had a lot of practice evolving, and are exceedingly good at it.

 

Which is why we watch emerging viruses that infect mammals with such rapt attention. If today they do not possess the ability to spark a pandemic, there are no guarantees of what tomorrow will bring.

 

All of which serves as prelude to a NEJM editorial on the evolving picture of MERS-CoV.  The authors point out that while a larger epidemic is far from a certainty, that this virus is not without pandemic potential.

 

Follow the link below to read their editorial in full, as there is much to glean here. I’ve only included a small excerpt.

 

 

Person-to-Person Spread of the MERS Coronavirus — An Evolving Picture

Stanley Perlman, M.D., Ph.D., and Paul B. McCray, Jr., M.D.

N Engl J Med 2013; 369:466-467August 1, 2013DOI: 10.1056/NEJMe1308724

(EXCERPT)

On one hand, coronaviruses are notorious for rapid adaptation to new hosts,8 a finding that is best illustrated by the ability of SARS-CoV to adapt to replication in the human lung. Adaptation involved changes in the surface glycoprotein, which is responsible for binding to the host-cell entry receptor, and in proteins involved in viral replication.9 Additional adaptation of MERS-CoV to human populations, although not observed thus far, is likely to occur and would augment the possibility of widespread infection.

 

Furthermore, the community (probably zoonotic) source for MERS-CoV remains unknown, making it difficult to know whether periodic reintroduction into human populations will occur and contribute to the potential for human adaptation. Moreover, the relative importance of aerosol transmission versus spread by large droplets or contact is unknown, but the mode of transmission will affect the likelihood of large-scale human infection.

(Continue  . . . )

 

 

Dr. Ian Mackay takes notice of this editorial this morning on his Virology Down Under blog as well. You can read his comments in:

 

Patients with diabetes or chronic renal failure at high risk for MERS...

Friday, July 19, 2013

NEJM Journal Watch: Characteristics of H7N9

 

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# 7498

 

Over the past several months we’ve watched a steady procession of research published on China’s newly emerging H7N9 virus, and which each report, we seem to find more reasons for concern.

 

Today, in NEJM’s Journal Watch, Richard T. Ellison III, MD (Professor of Medicine, Molecular Genetics and Microbiology in the Division of Infectious Diseases and Immunology at the University of Massachusetts Medical School) reviews four of these recent studies in a piece called:

 

Characteristics of the 2013 Influenza A (H7N9) Virus

 

Richard T. Ellison III, MD reviewing Zhou J et al. Nature 2013 Jul 3. Belser JA et al. Nature 2013 Jul 10. Watanabe T et al. Nature 2013 Jul 10. Zhu H et al. Science 2013 Jul 12.

 

A novel avian influenza A (H7N9) virus that causes human disease shows binding to human respiratory receptors, infectivity in multiple species, and respiratory-droplet transmissibility.

     

 

The four studies cited by Dr. Ellison will be familiar to regular readers of this blog, as we’ve discussed them all at some point over the past two months. 

 

They are:

 

Zhou J et al. Biological features of novel avian influenza A (H7N9) virus. Nature 2013 Jul 3; [e-pub ahead of print]  (see Nature: Biological Features Of H7N9).

 

Belser JA et al. Pathogenesis and transmission of avian influenza A (H7N9) virus in ferrets and mice. Nature 2013 Jul 10 (see Nature: H7N9 Pathogenesis and Transmissibility In Ferrets & Mice)

 

Watanabe T et al. Characterization of H7N9 influenza A viruses isolated from humans. Nature 2013 Jul 10 (see CIDRAP: Yesterday’s H7N9 Studies In Nature).

 

Zhu H et al. Infectivity, transmission, and pathology of human-isolated H7N9 influenza virus in ferrets and pigs. Science 2013 Jul 12  (See Branswell: Studies Show Transmissibility Of H7N9 In Ferrets).

 

 

Dr. Ellison nicely summarizes the major findings of all four studies, and then issues his own comment. His calls to control its spread in poultry and to develop a human vaccine are certainly well taken – but may prove difficult to achieve. 

 

This H7N9 virus is currently non-pathogenic in poultry, which allows it to spread easily, and unnoticed, in farmer’s flocks.

 

In June, the FAO  described some of the challenges facing China’s poultry industry in containing this virus (see FAO calls for continued vigilance in face of H7N9 avian influenza).

 

And while work is being done on the development of human H7N9 vaccine candidates (see Lisa Schnirring’s CIDRAP  article Federal officials weigh H7N9 vaccine options), the road to actually having a vaccine that can be deployed (in any serious quantity) is likely a long and difficult one.

 

As Lisa points out in the above article, our limited experience with H7 and H5 vaccines suggests that they are more difficult to produce than vaccines for seasonal (or even the H1N1 pandemic) strains.

 

H5N1 vaccines required as much as 12 times as much antigen as seasonal flu vaccines, and still only produced modest immune responses.

 

In early May we saw an analysis of some of these problems published in JAMA, penned by CIDRAP’s  Michael T. Osterholm, PhD, MPH; Katie S. Ballering, PhD; and Nicholas S. Kelley, PhD.

 

Major Challenges in Providing an Effective and Timely Pandemic Vaccine for Influenza A(H7N9)

 

Michael T. Osterholm, PhD, MPH; Katie S. Ballering, PhD; Nicholas S. Kelley, PhD

JAMA. 2013;():1-2. doi:10.1001/jama.2013.6589.

Published online May 9, 2013

 

Of course, we could get lucky.

 

In 1976 we were similarly watching a novel virus – swine H1N1 – that had appeared briefly the previous winter, and experts fully expected it to return in the fall (see Deja Flu, All Over Again).

 

But in that case, the virus was only detected in one location (Fort Dix, NJ), and was apparently contained on the army barracks. 

 

H7N9 is far more widespread (detected across 10 Chinese provinces), and therefore less likely to go gently back into the wild.

 

All of which will make H7N9 surveillance a major concern for public health officials this fall.

Wednesday, June 19, 2013

Branswell:The NEJM Saudi MERS-CoV Cluster Report

Coronavirus

Photo Credit NIAID

 


# 7411

 

Today the New England Journal of Medicine published an extensive analysis of the (possibly ongoing) outbreak of MERS-CoV at four hospitals in Eastern Saudi Arabia, between April 1st and May 23rd.

 

The authors – which included Canadian SARS expert Dr. Allison McGeer - tracked the likely transmission routes, incubation times, and serial intervals (time between onset of symptoms individuals in a chain of infections) of 23 confirmed coronavirus infections.


As Helen Branswell tells us in her article tonight, MERS-CoV appears to transmit in a hospital environment very much in the same as did SARS ten years ago. 

 

First stop, Helen’s in-depth report, which includes comments by Dr. McGreer, and Dr. Michael Osterholm of CIDRAP, followed a link to the full  NEJM report.

 

Saudi MERS outbreak showed SARS-like features, including possible superspreader

Helen Branswell, The Canadian Press Jun 19, 2013 05:00:17 PM

TORONTO – A long-awaited report on a large and possibly still ongoing outbreak of MERS coronavirus in Saudi Arabia reveals the virus spreads easily within hospitals, at one point passing in a person-to-person chain that encompassed at least five generations of spread.

 

The study, co-written by Toronto SARS expert Dr. Allison McGeer, also hints there may have been a superspreader in this outbreak, with one person infecting at least seven others.

 

The study lays out what is known about an outbreak of MERS that erupted this spring in four hospitals in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, in an area whose name translated into English can be spelled Al-Ahsa or Al-Hasa (the study uses the second version). It was reported online on Wednesday by the New England Journal of Medicine.

(Continue . . .)

 


The full NEJM article is available online, and you’ll no doubt want to read it in its entirety, but a few key points (bolding & underlining mine) lifted the discussion include:

 

  • Most of the case patients were men, and the median age was 56 years
  • The most common symptoms were fever (87%) and cough (89%), while 35% presented with gastrointestinal symptoms (vomiting or diarrhea)
  • Laboratory testing for MERS-CoV remains a challenge. Validated serologic assays are not yet available, and this may have limited the identification of cases.
  • Because some patients presented with gastrointestinal symptoms, and transmission appeared to occur between rooms on the ward, the current WHO recommendations for surveillance and control should be regarded as the minimum standards;
  • The Case Fatality Ratio was 65%

 

 

Hospital Outbreak of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus

Abdullah Assiri, M.D., Allison McGeer, M.D., Trish M. Perl, M.D., Connie S. Price, M.D., Abdullah A. Al Rabeeah, M.D., Derek A.T. Cummings, Ph.D., Zaki N. Alabdullatif, M.D., Maher Assad, M.D., Abdulmohsen Almulhim, M.D., Hatem Makhdoom, Ph.D., Hossam Madani, Ph.D., Rafat Alhakeem, M.D., Jaffar A. Al-Tawfiq, M.D., Matthew Cotten, Ph.D., Simon J. Watson, Ph.D., Paul Kellam, Ph.D., Alimuddin I. Zumla, M.D., and Ziad A. Memish, M.D. for the KSA MERS-CoV Investigation Team

June 19, 2013DOI: 10.1056/NEJMoa1306742

Thursday, June 06, 2013

MIT: Two Avian Flu Receptor Cell Binding Studies

image

 

 

# 7370

 

We’ve a pair of avian flu studies, published today in the online journal Cell, that look at the current ability of both the H7N9 and H5N1 viruses to bind to human receptor cells.

 

While there may be other factors at play, the primary barrier that prevents these viruses from sparking a pandemic appears to be their preferential binding to avian receptor cells.

 

We’ve discussed receptor binding often in the past (see Study: Dual Receptor Binding H5N1 Viruses In China & PLoS: Human-Type H5N1 Receptor Binding In Egypt) but to review:

 

image

Flu Virus binding to Receptor Cells – Credit CDC

 

Human adapted influenza viruses have an RBS - Receptor Binding Site (the area of its genetic sequence that allows it to attach to, and infect, host cells) that – like a key slipping into a padlock -`fit’ the receptor cells commonly found in the human upper respiratory tract; the alpha 2,6 receptor cell.

 

Avian adapted flu viruses, like the H5N1 virus, bind preferentially to the alpha 2,3 receptor cells found in the gastrointestinal tract of birds.

 

While there are some alpha 2,3 cells deep in the lungs of humans, for an influenza to be successful in a human host, most researchers believe it needs to a able to bind to the a 2,6 receptor cell.

 

The $64 question that the research team lead by Ram Sasisekharan, the Alfred H. Caspary Professor of Biological Engineering at MIT, have endeavored to answer is: what type - and how many - changes would these viruses need in order to become more transmissible in humans?


And the authors suggest, it’s probably not a lot.

 

Particularly with the H7N9 virus. 

 

Quick links to the abstracts to these two studies (both studies are, alas, behind pay walls), and then a look at the press release, that describes their findings.

 

Glycan Receptor Binding of the Influenza A Virus H7N9 Hemagglutinin

Cell, 06 June 2013
Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
10.1016/j.cell.2013.05.034

Authors

Kannan Tharakaraman, Akila Jayaraman, Rahul Raman, Karthik Viswanathan, Nathan W. Stebbins, David Johnson, Zachary Shriver, V. Sasisekharan, Ram Sasisekharan

    Highlights

    • The hemagglutinin of H7N9 virus does not efficiently bind human receptors
    • A single residue change in receptor binding site increases binding to human receptors
    • Mutations on hemagglutinin may reduce the effectiveness of current H7 vaccines

    (Continue . . . )

     

     

     

    Structural Determinants for Naturally Evolving H5N1 Hemagglutinin to Switch Its Receptor Specificity

     

    Cell, 06 June 2013
    Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
    10.1016/j.cell.2013.05.035
     

    Authors

    Kannan Tharakaraman, Rahul Raman, Karthik Viswanathan, Nathan W. Stebbins, Akila Jayaraman, Arvind Krishnan, V. Sasisekharan, Ram Sasisekharan

      Highlights

      • Hallmark mutations do not switch receptor preference of recent H5 strains
      • Structural comparison of H5 and H2 hemagglutinin receptor complexes
      • Determination of key H5Nl receptor-binding features needed for quantitative switch
      • Recent strains may require a single base pair change to switch receptor preference

      (Continue . . . )

       

      While the full text of the articles are behind a pay wall, we do have a press release from MIT that tells us, in general terms, what these studies found. A few excerpts below, but follow the link to read it in its entirety.

       

       

      Keeping an eye on bird flu

      June 6, 2013

      MIT studies of two influenza viruses reveal genetic mutations that could result in pandemic flu.

      Anne Trafton, MIT News Office

       

      (EXCERPTS)

      New research from MIT shows that two recently emerged bird flu strains, which do not spread easily now, could become much more infectious with just one or a few genetic mutations.

       

      The studies, which focused on the H5N1 and H7N9 flu strains, should help public health officials monitor evolving flu viruses for potential human-to-human transmission. They could also guide the development of new vaccines, says Ram Sasisekharan, the Alfred H. Caspary Professor of Biological Engineering and senior author of two papers appearing in the June 6 online edition of the journal Cell.

       

      <SNIP>

       

      H5N1

      In the new Cell paper, the MIT team studied the structure of HA proteins from hundreds of H5N1 strains and identified three HA regions where one or two mutations would enable the HA to bind efficiently to human receptors. Most of these regions affect the base of the receptor-binding site.

       

      The researchers also found that H5N1 has been evolving rapidly since 2005, but none of the current strains have all of the mutations needed to spread from human to human. However, the researchers found one strain that needs only a single amino-acid switch to become highly infectious, and several others that need only two. “There are multiple different ways that this can happen,” says Sasisekharan, who is also a member of MIT’s Koch Institute for Integrative Cancer Research.

       

      Furthermore, because of all of the viral evolution that has occurred since 2005, the H5N1 vaccines that governments have stockpiled would probably no longer be effective, Sasisekharan says. “There is cause for concern,” he says. “Yet these findings open opportunities to make sure that some of these newer strains do become part of the stockpiling, because they are closer to human adaptation.”

       

      H7N9

       

      H7N9 has infected at least 132 people this year, mostly in China, and there have been 37 deaths, according to the World Health Organization — a lower fatality rate than that of the H5N1 virus.

      The MIT researchers found that although the current circulating forms of H7N9 bind weakly to human receptors, a change in just one amino acid would dramatically increase the HA protein’s binding strength. “It was not a marginal increase; we saw a pretty significant increase in receptor binding,” Sasisekharan says.

       

      “Our research provides insights to help keep track of potentially important mutations so that proactive steps can be taken to be better prepared against dangerous viruses.”

      (Continue . . . )

       

       

      Whether any avian influenza strain can make the right changes, and become a human pandemic strain, remains a mystery.

       

      Yesterday, in a NEJM Perspective, David M. Morens, M.D., Jeffery K. Taubenberger, M.D., Ph.D., and Anthony S. Fauci, M.D. wrestled with this problem in:

       

      Pandemic Influenza Viruses — Hoping for the Road Not Taken

      This  remains one of the great debates in influenza science - and the question will likely only be settled after one finally does.

      Thursday, May 30, 2013

      NEJM: Targeted vs Universal Decolonization For ICU Patients

      image 

      UPDATED:   Maryn Mckenna – who is Flublogia’s resident expert in all things antimicrobial – has just posted a blog post on this important story on her Superbug Blog.

      To Prevent MRSA In Hospitals, Don’t Prevent Only MRSA

       

      # 7341

       

      HCAIs (Health care associated Infections) or HAIs (Hospital acquired infections) constitute a major threat to life, health, and the cost of medical care in this country, and around the world.

       

      This oft quoted assessment from the CDC on the burden of Hospital Acquired Infections in the United States is from 2010.

       

      A new report from CDC updates previous estimates of healthcare-associated infections. In American hospitals alone, healthcare-associated infections account for an estimated 1.7 million infections and 99,000 associated deaths each year. Of these infections:

      • 32 percent of all healthcare-associated infection are urinary tract infections
      • 22 percent are surgical site infections
      • 15 percent are pneumonia (lung infections)
      • 14 percent are bloodstream infections

       

      Since 2008 the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) have adopted a `no pay’ rule for `preventable infections’, or medical mistakes associated with hospital stays in order to encourage facilities to improve procedures and patient safety.

       

      The problem is that many people entering hospitals are colonized – but not necessarily infected – with bacteria like MRSA. When hospitalized, invasive procedures (needle sticks, catheterization, PICC lines, etc) can turn a benign colonization into a life threatening infection.

       

      And their bacteria can be transferred to other patients, staff, or visitors as well.

       

      We’ve covered HAIs often in this blog, including:

       

      HPA: Healthcare-Associated Infection (HCAI) Survey
      A Barrier To Good Hand Hygiene
      Study: Hospital Uniforms And Bacteria
      Study: HAIs, Universal Surveillance, & MRSA

       

      Today, a look at a large study -involving 74 adult ICUs and 74,256 patients between 2009-2011 – published yesterday in the  NEJM - that compared three HAI prevention strategies for ICU patients.

       

      1. MRSA screening and isolation of colonized patients;
      2. Targeted decolonization (screening, isolation, & 5 day decolonization regimen of MRSA carriers)
      3. Universal decolonization (decolonization of all patients without screening - ie. twice-daily intranasal mupirocin x 5 days, daily bathing with chlorhexidine-impregnated cloths for the entire stay)

       

      The results showed that bloodstream infections were cut by more than 40% with universal decolonization. The CDC – which was a participant in this study – has the press release below, after which I have a link to the NEJM study itself.

       

      MRSA study: simple steps slash deadly infections in sickest hospital patients

      Bloodstream infections cut by more than 40 percent in study of more than 74,000 patients

       

      A new studyExternal Web Site Icon on antibiotic-resistant bacteria in hospitals shows that using germ-killing soap and ointment on all intensive-care unit (ICU) patients can reduce bloodstream infections by up to 44 percent and significantly reduce the presence of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA).  Patients who have MRSA present on their bodies are at increased risk of developing a MRSA infection and can spread the germ to other patients.

       

      Researchers evaluated the effectiveness of three MRSA prevention practices: routine care, providing germ-killing soap and ointment only to patients with MRSA , and providing germ-killing soap and ointment to all ICU patients.   The study found:

      • Routine care did not significantly reduce MRSA or bloodstream infections.
      • Providing germ-killing soap and ointment only to patients with MRSA reduced bloodstream infections by any germ by 23 percent.
      • Providing germ-killing soap and ointment to all ICU patients reduced MRSA by 37 percent and bloodstream infections by any germ by 44 percent.

      The study, REDUCE MRSA trial, was published in the New England Journal of Medicine and took place in two stages from 2009-2011. A multidisciplinary team from the University of California, IrvineExternal Web Site Icon, Harvard Pilgrim Health Care InstituteExternal Web Site Icon, Hospital Corporation of AmericaExternal Web Site Icon (HCA) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) carried out the study.  A total of 74 adult ICUs and 74,256 patients were part of the study, making it the largest study on this topic to date.

       

      You can read the NEJM Editorial on REDUCE MRSA Trial, and the study at the link below.

      Targeted versus Universal Decolonization to Prevent ICU Infection

      Susan S. Huang, M.D., M.P.H., Edward Septimus, M.D., Ken Kleinman, Sc.D., Julia Moody, M.S., Jason Hickok, M.B.A., R.N., Taliser R. Avery, M.S., Julie Lankiewicz, M.P.H., Adrijana Gombosev, B.S., Leah Terpstra, B.A., Fallon Hartford, M.S., Mary K. Hayden, M.D., John A. Jernigan, M.D., Robert A. Weinstein, M.D., Victoria J. Fraser, M.D., Katherine Haffenreffer, B.S., Eric Cui, B.S., Rebecca E. Kaganov, B.A., Karen Lolans, B.S., Jonathan B. Perlin, M.D., Ph.D., and Richard Platt, M.D. for the CDC Prevention Epicenters Programthe AHRQ DECIDE Network and Healthcare-Associated Infections Program

      May 29, 2013DOI: 10.1056/NEJMoa1207290

      Full Text of Results...

      Conclusions

      In routine ICU practice, universal decolonization was more effective than targeted decolonization or screening and isolation in reducing rates of MRSA clinical isolates and bloodstream infection from any pathogen. (Funded by the Agency for Healthcare Research and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; REDUCE MRSA ClinicalTrials.gov number, NCT00980980.)

       

      It is an impressive result, and reduced not only MRSA, but bloodstream infections by any pathogen. It may very well affect the way ICU admissions are handled in the future.

       

      One caveat from the authors was that extensive use of these antimicrobials could eventually lead to bacteria developing resistance to mupirocin and chlorhexidine.

       

      The authors conclude by writing:

       

      In conclusion, we found that universal decolonization prevented infection, obviated the need for surveillance testing, and reduced contact isolation. If this practice is widely implemented, vigilance for emerging resistance will be required.

      Thursday, February 07, 2013

      NEJM: Pertactin Resistant Bordetella Pertussis – United States

      image
      Credit CDC Pink Book


      # 6913

       

       

      Technological solutions to biological challenges are often fleeting, as nature’s incredibly prolific experimental laboratory begins work almost immediately to come up with a workaround.

       

      Through random mutation and evolution antibiotic resistant bacteria often thrive while susceptible strains are constrained, viruses that drift antigenically are more likely to succeed, and mosquitoes not repelled by DEET or killed off by pesticides are more likely to live to bite another day.

       

      Hence the old saying that Nature always bats last.

       

      Over the past decade we’ve been watching the re-emergence of an old scourge; Whooping Cough.  A sometimes fatal childhood disease that 30 years ago was all but vanquished in the United States.

       

      The following chart shows the number of Pertussis cases (whooping cough) in California over the past 60 years.

      image

      The dramatic drop in Pertussis - which began in the early 1950s – closely follows the introduction of the first whole-cell pertussis vaccine combined with diphtheria and tetanus toxoids (DTP) was introduced in the mid-1940s.

       

      In the 1940s more than 160,000 cases  (and about 5,000 deaths) were recorded annually across the nation, but by 1976 the number of reported cases reached a record-low of 1,010 cases, a decrease of 99%

       

      But over the past decade the number of cases has steadily risen, and in 2012 more than 40,000 cases were reported in the United States.

       

      The reasons behind these increases are complex, and not completely understood, but some factors may include:

      • lower vaccination uptakes
      • the move away from whole cell pertussis vaccines to safer acellular vaccines in the 1990s
      • evolutionary changes in the Bordetella pertussis bacteria.

      Today the New England Journal of Medicine published a letter to the Editor that alerts us to the identification of:

       

      Pertactin-Negative Variants of Bordetella pertussis in the United States

      N Engl J Med 2013; 368:583-584 February 7, 2013 

      DOI: 10.1056/NEJMc1209369

      Anne Marie Queenan, Ph.D.Janssen Research and Development, Raritan, NJ 
      Pamela K. Cassiday, M.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GAAlan Evangelista, Ph.D.St. Christopher's Hospital for Children, Philadelphia, PA

       

      Researchers at St. Christopher’s Hospital for Children found that in 11 of 12 isolates of B. Pertussis they examined in 2011-2012, Western blot analysis failed to detect Pertactin.

       

      Pertactin (PRN) is a membrane protein that facilitates the attachment of Bordetella pertussis bacteria to epithelial cells in the trachea, and is one of the prime components of the acellular pertussis vaccine introduced in the 1990s.

       

      The researchers state, "To our knowledge, this finding represents the first reported occurrence of pertactin-negative variants of B. pertussis in the U.S.”

       

      Similar pertactin-negative strains have been reported in Japan, France, and Finland. Pertactin-negative strains reportedly remain infectious in humans, and retain lethality in laboratory testing on mice.

       

      While recent attention has been focused on waning protection afforded by the safer acellular pertussis introduced in the 1990s (see JAMA: Waning Pertussis Vaccine Effectiveness Over Time), another possible cause of the increase in whooping cough cases could be the emergence of a vaccine resistant strain.

       

      Eleven isolates collected in one geographic region of the nation are hardly conclusive evidence of a national trend, so the authors call for:

       

      Isolates of B. pertussis from geographically distinct U.S. regions should be evaluated to determine whether our finding is a local event or represents a more widespread shift in B. pertussis strains. An understanding of the epidemiology and virulence of pertactin-negative variants is crucial to developing the next generation of pertussis vaccines

       

      Media reports indicate we may get more on this story later today from the CDC.  If so, I’ll post a link on this blog.

      Thursday, January 17, 2013

      NEJM: Effectiveness Of Fecal Transplants For C. diff

       

      image

      C. difficile – Credit CDC PHIL

       

      UPDATE:  Just as I posted this blog, Maryn McKenna posted her take on this study, which you can read at Fecal Transplants: A Clinical Trial Confirms How Well They Work

       

      # 6863

       

      In December of 2011 I reviewed some of the early history of using donor feces to resolve C. difficile infections, and invited my readers to read a post by Maryn McKenna’s called Fecal Transplants: They Work, the Regulations Don’t.

       

      Clostridium difficile – or C. diff – is a bacterial intestinal infection which claims tens of thousands of lives each year, and is – as the name implies – very difficult to treat.

       

      Usually brought on by the use of antibiotics  - which kill off good gut bacteria along with the bad guys – C. diff can produce prolonged, and often life threatening bouts of diarrhea.

       

      The idea behind a `fecal transplant’ is the re-introduction of good bacteria to afflicted patient’s gut biome.  

       

      Today the NEJM has an original article showing a remarkable success rate using donor feces to resolve recurrent C. diff infections among a small group of mostly elderly patients in the Netherlands.

       

      Doctors randomly selected C. diff patients to receive one of three therapies:

       

      • An initial vancomycin regimen (500 mg orally four times per day for 4 days), followed by bowel lavage and subsequent infusion of a solution of donor feces through a nasoduodenal tube;
      • a standard vancomycin regimen (500 mg orally four times per day for 14 days);
      • or a standard vancomycin regimen with bowel lavage


      The criteria for success was the resolution of diarrhea associated with C. difficile infection without relapse after 10 weeks.

       

      Among patients receiving the combination vancomycin -fecal transplant treatments, 81% (n=13 of 16) saw a resolution of their C. diff diarrhea symptoms after one infusion.

       

      Of the remaining three, two responded after a second infusion (total success rate 15 of 16, or 94%).

       

      Success rates were more than triple that of patients who received vancomycin alone (4 of 13 patients or 31%), or vancomycin with lavage (3 of 13 patients or 23%).

       

      Their conclusion:

      The infusion of donor feces was significantly more effective for the treatment of recurrent C. difficile infection than the use of vancomycin.

       

      The article, with considerable detail,  is available at the NEJM.

       

      Duodenal Infusion of Donor Feces for Recurrent Clostridium difficile

      Els van Nood, M.D., Anne Vrieze, M.D., Max Nieuwdorp, M.D., Ph.D., Susana Fuentes, Ph.D., Erwin G. Zoetendal, Ph.D., Willem M. de Vos, Ph.D., Caroline E. Visser, M.D., Ph.D., Ed J. Kuijper, M.D., Ph.D., Joep F.W.M. Bartelsman, M.D., Jan G.P. Tijssen, Ph.D., Peter Speelman, M.D., Ph.D., Marcel G.W. Dijkgraaf, Ph.D., and Josbert J. Keller, M.D., Ph.D.

      January 16, 2013DOI: 10.1056/NEJMoa1205037

       

       

      Two points I’m sure everyone is curious about.   How donors were screened, and any adverse side effects reported:

       

      The authors describe the screening process this way:

      Donors (<60 years of age) were volunteers who were initially screened using a questionnaire addressing risk factors for potentially transmissible diseases. Donor feces were screened for parasites (including Blastocystis hominis and Dientamoeba fragilis), C. difficile, and enteropathogenic bacteria. Blood was screened for antibodies to HIV; human T-cell lymphotropic virus types 1 and 2; hepatitis A, B, and C; cytomegalovirus; Epstein–Barr virus; Treponema pallidum; Strongyloides stercoralis; and Entamoeba histolytica. A donor pool was created, and screening was repeated every 4 months. Before donation, another questionnaire was used to screen for recent illnesses.

       

      As far as adverse events were concerned:

       

      Immediately after donor-feces infusion, most patients (94%) had diarrhea. In addition, cramping (31%) and belching (19%) were reported (Table 2). In all patients, these symptoms resolved within 3 hours.

      During follow-up, three patients who were treated with donor feces (19%) had constipation. No other adverse events related to study treatment were reported.

       

      For patients afflicted with C. diff, but who cannot get past the `ick’ factor of receiving donor feces, there may be hope on the horizon. 

       

      Researchers in Ontario, Canada have developed a `synthetic stool’, containing 33 types of `good’ bacteria, they call RePOOPulate.

       

      Results of limited testing (only two patients) were recently published in the open access journal Microbiome.

       

       

      Stool substitute transplant therapy for the eradication of Clostridium difficile infection: ‘RePOOPulating’ the gut

      Elaine O Petrof1*, Gregory B Gloor2, Stephen J Vanner1, Scott J Weese3, David Carter4, Michelle C Daigneault5, Eric M Brown5, Kathleen Schroeter5 and Emma Allen-Vercoe5

      Conclusion

      This proof-of-principle study demonstrates that a stool substitute mixture comprising a multi-species community of bacteria is capable of curing antibiotic-resistant C. difficile colitis. This benefit correlates with major changes in stool microbial profile and these changes reflect isolates from the synthetic mixture.

       

      For now, fecal transplants are not FDA approved, and questions remain over the safety of using donor feces.

       

      If synthetic stools products can be shown to have a Darwinian advantage over C. diff bacteria in the human gut, it would go a long ways towards eliminating any concerns over the `origins of feces’.


      Bad . . . I know.  

       

      But If I didn’t use that line, someone else would have.