Showing posts with label Journal. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Journal. Show all posts

Thursday, December 26, 2013

Hong Kong: Epidemiological Update On H7N9

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# 8107

 

Via Hong Kong’s CHP’s bi-weekly online journal Communicable Diseases Watch, we get an Update on the situation of avian influenza A(H7N9) infection reported by Dr Conan Tsang, Medical and Health Officer, Respiratory Disease Office, Surveillance and Epidemiology Branch, CHP. 

 

This update – dated December 24th - adds 14 new cases since the last update in August of 2013.  I’ve only included a few excerpts, follow the link to read it in its entirety.

 

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Geographic spread of cases  - Credit HK CHP

 

Update on the situation of avian influenza A(H7N9) infection

Reported by Dr Conan Tsang, Medical and Health Officer, Respiratory Disease Office, Surveillance
and Epidemiology Branch, CHP.


Since the publication of last issue concerning avian influenza A(H7N9) infection (http://www.chp.gov.hk/files/pdf/cdw_v10_16.pdf), 14 more confirmed cases of human infection with avian influenza A(H7N9) virus were reported (as of December 20, 2013). Among these cases, two of them were likely imported cases from Shenzhen and were confirmed in Hong Kong (HK) on December 2 and 6 respectively, whereas 6 cases were reported from Guangdong Province between August 10 and December 19, 2013.

As of December 20, 2013, the National Health and Family Planning Commission (NHFPC) has reported 144 cases of human infection with avian influenza A(H7N9) virus across 10 provinces and 2 municipalities, including 47 deaths. The health authority of Taiwan also reported one imported case from Jiangsu Province on April 24, 2013. Including the 2 cases confirmed in HK, there are a total of 147 cases. The geographical distribution of the cases is summarized in Figure 1.


Based on the available information, the age of the cases ranged from 2 to 91 years (median: 60 years) and involved 104 males and 43 females. Forty-seven cases died with a case fatality rate of around 32%. The onset dates of the confirmed cases were between February 19 and December 11, 2013 (Figure 2).

(Continue . . . )

 

While obviously a huge concern, thus far we’ve not seen any evidence of sustained or efficient human-to-human transmission of the H7N9 virus.The WHO Avian Flu Risk Assessment – December, provides the following risk assessment on this emerging avian flu virus:

 

Overall public health risk assessment for avian influenza A(H7N9) virus: Sporadic human cases and small clusters would not be unexpected in previously affected and possibly neighbouring areas/countries of China. The current likelihood of community-level spread of this virus is considered to be low.

Continued vigilance is needed within China and neighbouring areas to detect infections in animals and humans. WHO advises countries to continue surveillance and other preparedness actions, including ensuring appropriate laboratory capacity. All human infections with non-seasonal influenza viruses such as avian influenza A(H7N9) are reportable to WHO under the IHR (2005). 

 

Similarly, the ECDC recently published an  Epidemiological Update on H7N9, which is current through the last reported case in Shenzhen on Wednesday of last week.

 

After reviewing the data to date, the ECDC’s Risk Assessment at the end of this report illustrates the concern which many scientists and public health officials have regarding this virus.  They warn that public health authorities in the EU should be prepared for the importation of this virus, and close by stating::

 

ECDC’s view is that if this virus persists in poultry, it will represent a significant long-term threat, either as a zoonosis or perhaps a pandemic virus. Both eventualities should be prepared for.

 

So we watch these scattered cases carefully, looking for any signs that this virus is moving closer to becoming a serious public health threat.

Thursday, November 21, 2013

CMJ: Varied Clinical Presentations Of H7N9

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# 7997

 

 

While we’ve only seen a limited number H7N9 infections in China, as studies are published we are learning more about the different ways this virus manifests in patients, with some  experiencing relatively mild illness, while others progress to ARDS and even death.

 

Last month in PLoS One: Epidemiological & Clinical Description Of 6 H7N9 Cases – Shanghai we looked at the course of illness among a half dozen patients treated at Fifth People’s Hospital of Shanghai, as well as a study on Hematological & Biochemical Abnormalities In H7N9 Patients in the Journal of Medical Virology.

 

Today, a pair of reports from the Chinese Medical Journal (CMJ) that discuss four unusual H7N9 presentations (h/t @Ironorehopper), including both cardiovascular and neurological complications.

 

First stop, a brief letter describing a non-typical presentation in an 87 year-old man, who initially (April 4th) complained of loss of appetite and strength but no fever, cough, or expectoration.  Chest x-rays on the 6th indicated some lung inflammation, but due to his symptoms a bacterial, not a viral cause, was suspected.  He admitted to the hospital and was placed on antibiotics (cefuroxime).

 

Five days into his illness, he developed dyspnea (shortness of breath) and an elevated temperature, and on April 10th deteriorated further. Influenza was finally suspected, and he was started on oseltamivir and levofloxacin, and a decision to test for H7N9 was made. 

 

Despite ICU treatment, and a transfer to specialized hospital, the patient died on April 21st.

 

The authors write:

This case history serves to remind us that we need timely use of antiviral treatment, even for the patients whose clinical manifestations are not typical but whose lung inflammation may be developing rapidly. Careful clinical observation needs to be carried out so that appropriate treatment can begin as early as possible and progression culminating in death is minimized

 

The entire letter may be read at:

 

Chinese Medical Journal 2013;126(22):4399-4399
A case with non-typical clinical course of H7N9 avian influenza

ZHENG Yu-fang, CAO Ye, LU Yun-fei, XI Xiu-hong, QIAN Zhi-ping, Lowrie Douglas, LIU Xi-nian, WANG Yan-bin, ZHANG Qi, LU Shui-hua and LU Hong-zhou

 

 

A second, more detailed report also appears in the Chinese Medical Journal, that looks at three H7N9 cases, and the variability in their clinical presentation – including neurological and cardiovascular manifestations.

 

The authors write:

In this report, the initial clinical manifestations of three confirmed cases are summarized. Two of the patients were in critical condition. In addition, two of the patients experienced changes in mental status, one of which was believed to be the first published case with Brugada syndrome associated with H7N9 infection in China. We suggest that this H7N9 virus causes various signs and symptoms in the early stages of infection.

 

We’ve seen reports of neurological complications with influenza in the past (see Neurologic Manifestations of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Virus Infection), but the bulk of these cases have involved children or adolescents. And we’ve also seen studies that suggest that influenza can induce cardiogenic changes as well (see  Another Study Links Heart Attacks & Influenza). 

 

So while these H7N9 cases are the first to be documented in China with these complications, their existence is not without precedence.

 

Follow the link below to read the complete case histories of all three patients (age range 39 to 69), two of whom survived.  For those unfamiliar with Brugada syndrome, is a relatively recently (1992) recognized condition that is characterized by an abnormal EKG that signifies an increased risk of sudden cardiac arrest.

 

Chinese Medical Journal 2013;126(21):4194-4196
Clinical variability in onset of influenza A (H7N9) infection

WANG Shu-ying, REN Shu-hua, HUANG Mei-xian, YU Dao-jun, SHEN Qiang, ZHAO Hong-feng, LÜ Qiao-hong and QIAN Shen-xian

(EXCERPT)

Based on these case reports, patients with H7N9 influenza virus infection from symptom onset to laboratory confirmation showed variable findings in clinical manifestation. Patients with H7N9 infection present variable symptoms: fever, cough, phlegm production, hemoptysis, chest tightness, diarrhea, and disturbance of consciousness. Detection of the nucleic acids of H7N9 virus in the throat swab specimens may show negative results in the early stage. Clinicians should remain vigilant to the possibility of H7N9 infection associated with neurological and cardiovascular complications, because the novel virus may unmask some underlying diseases. Documentation of

 

 

Four cases out of a pool of just over 130 doesn’t really tell us a lot about the incidence of these atypical findings, but it does serve to remind us that a severe influenza infection can impact our physiology in many ways, and can exacerbate many previously existent (even if not previously diagnosed) conditions.

Sunday, January 06, 2013

EID Journal: XDR-TB/HIV Treatment Outcomes

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(From the 2011 TB Progress Report)

 

# 6828

 

 

Despite great advances made against tuberculosis since the introduction of antibiotics in the 1940s, in recent years we’ve seen the rise of new drug resistant strains of this killer disease; MDR-TB (Multi-drug Resistant Tuberculosis) and XDR-TB (Extensively Drug Resistant Tuberculosis).

 

Although the numbers have decreased in recent years, in 2010 1.4 million deaths were attributed TB, and it remains one of the three greatest causes of death of women (ages 14-44) in the world.

 

In 2009, the NIH had this to say about the global spread of the disease, including the fact that about 1 in 5 active cases of TB are also co-infected with HIV.

 

Today, one-third of the world’s population is thought to be infected with Mycobacterium tuberculosis (Mtb), the microbe that causes TB.

 

An estimated 13.7 million people have the active form of the disease. In 2007, approximately 9.27 million people developed TB, of whom 1.37 million were HIV positive, and 1.75 million died, including 456,000 individuals co-infected with HIV.

 

And in 2010, the World Health Organization announced:

 

Drug-resistant tuberculosis now at record levels

18 MARCH 2010 | GENEVA | WASHINGTON DC -- In some areas of the world, one in four people with tuberculosis (TB) becomes ill with a form of the disease that can no longer be treated with standard drugs regimens, a World Health Organization (WHO) report says.

 


Also from the World Health Organization:

 

Tuberculosis and HIV

 

The risk of developing tuberculosis (TB) is estimated to be between 20-37 times greater in people living with HIV than among those without HIV infection. In 2010, there were 8.8 million new cases of TB, of which 1.1 million were among people living with HIV.

In response to demands from countries, WHO recommends 12 TB/HIV collaborative activities, including the Three I's for HIV/TB. The WHO HIV/AIDS and TB Departments and their partners, including community groups, work collaboratively on joint HIV/TB advocacy, policy development and implementation in countries.

The Three I’s

  • Intensified TB case finding
  • Isoniazid preventive therapy
  • Infection control for TB.

 

While the incidence of co-infection with XDR-TB and HIV is rising, little is known about the effectiveness of treatment of these patients.

 

We’ve some new research, appearing in the CDC’s EID Journal, indicating that among a small cohort of patients followed in South Africa over 2 years – disappointingly - only 22% were cured or successfully completed treatment.

 

A few excerpts ( reparagraphed for readability), but follow the link to read the entire study:

 

 

Treatment Outcomes for Extensively Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis and HIV Co-infection

Max R. O’Donnell , Nesri Padayatchi, Charlotte Kvasnovsky, Lise Werner, Iqbal Master, and C. Robert Horsburgh

Abstract

High mortality rates have been reported for patients co-infected with extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis (XDR-TB) and HIV, but treatment outcomes have not been reported. We report treatment outcomes for adult XDR TB patients in KwaZulu-Natal Province, South Africa. Initial data were obtained retrospectively, and outcomes were obtained prospectively during 24 months of treatment.

 

A total of 114 XDR TB patients were treated (median 6 drugs, range 3–9 drugs); 82 (73%) were HIV positive and 50 (61%) were receiving antiretroviral therapy. After receiving treatment for 24 months, 48 (42%) of 114 patients died, 25 (22%) were cured or successfully completed treatment, 19 (17%) withdrew from the study, and 22 (19%) showed treatment failure.

 

A higher number of deaths occurred among HIV-positive patients not receiving antiretroviral therapy and among patients who did not show sputum culture conversion. Culture conversion was a major predictor of survival but was poorly predictive (51%) of successful treatment outcome.

 

Discussion

The main findings of our study were a high mortality rate (42%) and a low rate of successful treatment outcomes (22%) for XDR TB patients after completion of 24 months of treatment in a setting with a high incidence of HIV.

 

All deaths in this cohort occurred in the first 12 months after start of treatment. Predictors of deaths in this cohort included TB-specific (TB culture conversion) and HIV-specific (ART use) factors. Consistent with findings in other studies of treatment of drug-resistant TB/HIV, HIV was not independently associated with death (12,13,20).

 

Although HIV was not independently associated with death, use of ART among HIV-infected patients was associated with improved survival.

 

Sex appeared to modify the association between death and HIV because female sex was associated with higher survival rates among HIV-negative XDR TB patients but with higher death rates in women co-infected with HIV than in men co-infected with HIV.

 

However, this finding was not significant in all strata. TB culture conversion was a useful predictor of survival and treatment outcome. However, it was not sufficiently sensitive in this cohort to be a surrogate for successful TB treatment outcome, given the number of patients who ultimately showed treatment failure (n = 7), defaulted (n = 7), or died (n = 4) after TB culture conversion.

 

 

The authors conclude by saying:

 

Although not addressed by our study, improvements in treatment outcomes for patients co-infected with MDR TB and HIV will require changes in HIV- and TB-related factors. For HIV, these include more rapid HIV testing for early initiation of ART, appropriate monitoring of CD4 T-cell counts, HIV virus load testing, appropriate opportunistic infection prophylaxis, and improvement in ART adherence.

 

Although not addressed by our study, we recommend that for TB these improvements include widespread implementation of rapid diagnostics, particularly for smear-negative disease; early drug susceptibility testing for first-line and second line agents; improvement in adherence for second-line TB drugs; development of more effective anti-TB drugs and regimens; and guidance of drug selection by timely and ongoing drug susceptibility testing.

 

 

While often overshadowed by other issues, the HIV AIDS epidemic (exacerbated by TB) in South Africa (and much of Sub-Saharan Africa) continues to devastate the populace.

 

The UNAIDS website lists the following grim statistics for South Africa, a country that has seen more than a 10 year-drop in life expectancy since HIV began to spread in the 1980s:

 

HIV AND AIDS ESTIMATES (2011)

Number of people living with HIV
5,600,000 [5,300,000 - 5,900,000]
 
Adults aged 15 to 49 prevalence rate
17.30% [16.60% - 18.10%]
 
Adults aged 15 and up living with HIV
5,100,000 [4,900,000 - 5,400,000]
 
Women aged 15 and up living with HIV
2,900,000 [2,700,000 - 3,000,000]
 
Children aged 0 to 14 living with HIV
460,000 [410,000 - 520,000]
 
Deaths due to AIDS
270,000 [240,000 - 300,000]
 
Orphans due to AIDS aged 0 to 17
2,100,000 [2,000,000 - 2,300,000]

Monday, October 08, 2012

Diary From The HMNZ Tahiti During The 1918 Pandemic

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Troop Ship Tahiti in Wellington Harbor, circa 1918-19  Unknown Photographer

 

# 6617

 

For years historians, epidemiologists, and virologists have been attempting to peel back the cobwebs of time in order to analyze the deadliest pandemic in human history; the 1918 Spanish Flu Pandemic.

 

John Barry’s The Great Influenza: The Epic Story of the Greatest Plague in History, has probably done more to reawaken memories of that awful time than any other source, but many gaps in our knowledge remain.

 

Jeffrey  K. Taubenberger and David Morens - both researchers at NIAID – have added considerably to our understanding of the H1N1 virus and the events surrounding its emergence. Taubenberger was the first to sequence the the genome of the 1918 Spanish Flu virus while David Morens is a prominent medical historian.

 

See Morens & Taubenberger on Influenza’s History for a fascinating look back at influenza through the ages. Highly recommended.

 

Spanish Flu broke out in the spring and summer of 1918, while WWI was still underway. It so devastated troops on both sides of the conflict that historians believed it helped to hasten the end of the war.

 

Soldiers and sailors – living in cramped and often unhygienic quarters – bore the early brunt of the pandemic, while troop trains and ships helped to spread it around the globe.

 

While there are many horrific accounts from the pandemic – including some small villages in Alaska entirely wiped out – some of the best documented events occurred onboard troop ships. 

 

One of the most famous was the HMNZ Troop Carrier Tahiti, which during August-September of 1918 carried 1217 troops and crew (almost double what the ship was rated to carry) from New Zealand to Plymouth, England with provisioning stops at Cape Town and Sierra Leone. 

 

Since fever was reported in Sierra Leone, no crew or passengers reportedly went ashore , but locals came aboard to coal the ship.  Within a few days of leaving port, half the men on the ship were sick, and in a matter of days, more than 80 would perish.

 

The University of Otago has an well done 1-page synopsis of the investigation, which you can access here.

 

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The detailed report, on which this exhibit is based, appeared in the CDC’s EID Journal in December of 2010.

Historical Review

Mortality Risk Factors for Pandemic Influenza on New Zealand Troop Ship, 1918

Jennifer A. SummersComments to Author , Nick Wilson, Michael G. Baker, and G. Dennis Shanks

 

 

Adding another dimension to this story, Jennifer A. Summers returns to the October, 2012 edition of the EID Journal with excerpts from a recently uncovered diary, kept by one of the troops aboard that ship.

 

 

Pandemic Influenza Outbreak on Troop Ship—Diary of a Soldier in 1918

Jennifer A. Summers
Abstract

A newly identified diary from a soldier in 1918 describes aspects of a troop ship outbreak of pandemic influenza. This diary is the only known document that describes this outbreak and provides information not officially documented concerning possible risk factors such as overcrowding and the suboptimal outbreak response by military leaders. It also presents an independent personal perspective of this overwhelming experience.

(Continue . . . )

 

The diary entries make fascinating reading, as does the commentary provided by the author. Well worth following the link and to read in its entirety.

 

For more on the history and impact of the 1918 Spanish flu, you may wish to pay a visit to Flu.gov’s Pandemic history page, with offerings such as:

 

Monday, October 01, 2012

EID Journal: Challenges To Defining TDR-TB

 

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(From the 2011 TB Progress Report)

 

# 6600

 

In January of this year reports began to emerge out of India regarding what was being called Totally Drug Resistant (TDR) tuberculosis (see Crof’s report India: New TB strain is "totally drug-resistant" (updated)).

 

While not an officially recognized term, TDR-TB was portrayed by the media as a frightening escalation of the existing classifications of Multi-drug resistant (MDR-TB) and Extensively-drug resistant (XDR-TB).

 

Resistant forms of Tuberculosis have come about primarily as the result of incomplete, irregular, or inappropriate treatment and management of infected patients.

 

A few days later (January 14th), the World Health Organization updated their Drug-resistant tuberculosis FAQ where they take exception to the term TDR-TB.

 

Why are these terms not yet recognised by WHO?

Terms such as “totally drug resistant” have not been clearly defined for tuberculosis. While the concept of “total drug resistance” is easily understood in general terms, in practice, in vitro drug susceptibility testing (DST) is technically challenging and limitations on the use of results remain: conventional DST for the drugs that define MDR and XDR-TB has been thoroughly studied and consensus reached on appropriate methods, critical drug concentrations that define resistance, and reliability and reproducibility of testing

Around the same time we saw an ECDC Comment On Drug Resistant TB In India. One of the points being made in the comments section (excerpted below) is that the term TDR-TB is as yet not well defined, and may be misleading.

 

 

Total drug resistant TB is a relative notion and depends on the local drugs available and tested on. This term/expression should either be avoided or should be defined worldwide. The World Health Organization (WHO) has internationally-endorsed treatment recommendations for the treatment of drug-susceptible, MDR-TB and XDR-TB.

 

In March, as part of my World TB Day Roundup, the World Health Organization released this statement on the supposed TDR-TB, cautioning:

 

More evidence and better diagnostics needed before redefining severe forms of drug-resistant TB says WHO

Note for the media

23 March 2012 | Geneva - Reports of tuberculosis (TB) cases with severe patterns of drug resistance are increasing, said experts who attended a WHO meeting in Geneva on 21-22 March. Participants stressed that the emergence of drug resistance should be a wake-up call for Ministries of Health. The group urged the global TB community to make greater efforts to prevent drug resistance and scale up provision of appropriate care and management to avoid a scenario where TB becomes incurable.

Insufficient evidence

The meeting concluded that there is currently insufficient evidence to adopt new case definitions for drug-resistant TB. Drug susceptibility testing (DST), which is key to defining new levels of drug resistance, lacks accuracy for several of the drugs that are used to treat multi drug-resistant (MDR) and extensively drug resistant (XDR)-TB. Secondly, there is insufficient correlation of DST results with clinical response to treatment for several drugs currently used to treat XDR-TB. Thirdly, new drugs are currently undergoing clinical trials, and could prove effective against drug resistant strains. The meeting urged diagnostics companies and TB laboratories to develop better diagnostic tests and also agreed that WHO and technical partners should develop more detailed guidance on XDR-TB treatment.

(Continue . . . )

 

 

All of which brings us to a new article appearing ahead of print in the CDC’s EID Journal that looks at the:

 

Challenges and Controversies in Defining Totally Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis

Peter Cegielski , Paul Nunn, Ekaterina V. Kurbatova, Karin Weyer, Tracy L. Dalton, Douglas F. Wares, Michael F. Iademarco, Kenneth G. Castro, and Mario Raviglione
Abstract

In March 2012, in response to reports of tuberculosis (TB) resistant to all anti-TB drugs, the World Health Organization convened an expert consultation that identified issues to be resolved before defining a new category of highly drug-resistant TB.

 

Proposed definitions are ambiguous, and extensive drug resistance is encompassed by the already defined extensively drug-resistant (XDR) TB. There is no evidence that proposed totally resistant TB differs from strains encompassed by XDR TB.

 

Susceptibility tests for several drugs are poorly reproducible. Few laboratories can test all drugs, and there is no consensus list of all anti-TB drugs. Many drugs are used off-label for highly drug resistant TB, and new drugs formulated to combat resistant strains would render the proposed category obsolete. Labeling TB strains as totally drug resistant might lead providers to think infected patients are untreatable. These challenges must be addressed before defining a new category for highly drug-resistant TB.

(Continue . . . )

 

Given the complexities of evaluating for total drug resistance, attaching the label TDR-TB to these strains may well be both premature and inaccurate.

  

But the sobering fact remains, if you are infected with one of these XDR-TB strains - and no drug is available to you that can treat it – for you, it may as well be totally resistant.

 

Of course, this disparity of available medical treatment exists for a great many diseases around the world, and is not just limited to TB.

 

 

The authors of the EID study conclude with this warning:

 

As countries increase treatment of MDR and XDR TB, it is inevitable that resistance to second-line drugs will increase. New drugs and better diagnostic tools are needed urgently for patients with highly drug-resistant TB.

 

For more on the global spread of TB, you may wish to revisit:

 

WHO-ECDC: Joint Report On Tuberculosis In Europe
Resistant TB: The Limits Of Surveillance & Reporting
WHO: Blood Tests To Detect Active TB Unreliable

Wednesday, August 29, 2012

Study: Kids, Underlying Conditions, And The 2009 Pandemic Flu

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Credit CDC FluView

 

# 6522

 

The chart above illustrates the sharp rise in pediatric deaths from flu-related complications during the 2009-2010 H1N1 pandemic seasons in the United States.  As grim as this charts is, it probably doesn’t fully represent the burden the 2009 pandemic placed on the pediatric community.

 

In another chart, again from the CDC, we get an estimate of deaths related to the 2009 pandemic, broken down by age groups through April of 2010.

 

image

 

While just over 300 pediatric deaths were recorded during this time period, the CDC estimates that 4 times (n=1280) that many children likely died from flu-related illness in the United States.

 

Globally, the number was undoubtedly many times higher than that (see Lancet: Estimating Global 2009 Pandemic Mortality).

 

 

All of which serves as prelude to a new study that appears today in the journal  Pediatrics, that looks at 336 documented pH1N1-associated deaths, and finds a high number of kids with underlying neurologic conditions.

 

Two-thirds of all deaths in children under the age of 17 occurred in kids with at least 1 underlying medical condition (n=227), and just under half of all cases (n=146) involved neurological disorders, such as cerebral palsy, epilepsy, or intellectual disability.

 

 

Neurologic Disorders Among Pediatric Deaths Associated With the 2009 Pandemic Influenza

Lenee Blanton, MPHa,Georgina Peacock, MD, MPH, FAAPb, Chad Cox, MD, MPHa, Michael Jhung, MD, MPHa, Lyn Finelli, DrPHa, and Cynthia Moore, MD, PhDb

ABSTRACT (Excerpts)

RESULTS: Of 336 pH1N1-associated pediatric deaths with information on underlying conditions, 227 (68%) children had at least 1 underlying condition that conferred an increased risk of complications of influenza. Neurologic disorders were most frequently reported (146 of 227 [64%]), and, of those disorders, neurodevelopmental disorders such as cerebral palsy and intellectual disability were most common.

CONCLUSIONS: Neurologic disorders were reported in nearly two-thirds of pH1N1-associated pediatric deaths with an underlying medical condition. Because of the potential for severe outcomes, children with underlying neurologic disorders should receive influenza vaccine and be treated early and aggressively if they develop influenza-like illness.

 

According to a statement released last night by the CDC:

 

Of the children with neurologic disorders for whom information on vaccination status was available, only 21 (23 percent) had received the seasonal influenza vaccine and 2 (3 percent) were fully vaccinated for 2009 H1N1.

 

 

With September just around the corner, the annual push for flu vaccinations is upon us, and today’s study will hopefully help inspire parents to get all kids – regardless of underlying conditions - vaccinated against influenza.

 

While the effectiveness of flu vaccines vary from year-to-year, and indeed, from one person to the next, they remain the single most important preventative step you can take to avoid getting the flu each year.

 

Despite the hyperbolic anti-vaccine rhetoric often found on the Internet, the truth is, serious adverse reactions to the vaccine are exceedingly rare (see the CDC’s  Influenza Vaccine Safety).

 

With two new strains of seasonal flu expected to be in circulation this winter (Yamagata B, and the Victoria H3N2) ones that will be covered by this year’s vaccine – getting the flu shot this year is doubly important.

 

CDC recommends that just about everyone aged 6 months and older get an annual influenza vaccination, and stresses their importance for those who are at greater risk of serious complications.

 

For more on vaccine safety and effectiveness, the CDC maintains extensive web pages, and resources, on seasonal flu vaccines, including:

 

What You Should Know for the 2012-2013 Influenza Season

 

Preventing Seasonal Flu With Vaccination

 

Children, the Flu, and the Flu Vaccine

Thursday, August 16, 2012

EID Journal: Flu In Healthy-Looking Pigs

 

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Credit Wikipedia


# 6497

 


Over the past month we’ve been watching a small but growing number of human infections with a novel H3N2v influenza virus - most of which are associated with direct contact with pigs being displayed at county and state fairs.

 

Efficient and sustained human-to-human transmission has not been established by the CDC, and so their recommendations at this time revolve around preventing disease transmission from pigs to humans.

 

Earlier this week the CDC issued advice to Fair organizers, that included:

 

Animal Health Recommendations:
  • Monitor animals daily for signs of illness, including discharge from nose and/or eyes, lethargy (sleepiness), no appetite, fever, or sometimes coughing. Ensure that a veterinarian, such as the fair vet or state vet, is notified of any ill animals.
  • Ill pigs, animals suspected or known to be infected with influenza viruses, and animals from herds with a recent history of respiratory disease should not be exhibited. They should be immediately isolated or sent home.

 

 

Yesterday, a dispatch appearing in the CDC’s EID Journal illustrated just how difficult identifying and separating influenza-infected pigs from the rest can be. 

 

It’s called:

 

Volume 18, Number 9—September 2012
Dispatch

Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 Virus among Healthy Show Pigs, United States

Article Contents

Gregory C. Gray , Jeffrey B. Bender, Carolyn B. Bridges, Russell F. Daly, Whitney S. Krueger, Michael J. Male, Gary L. Heil, John A. Friary, Robin B. Derby, and Nancy J. Cox

Abstract

Within 5 months after the earliest detection of human influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus, we found molecular and culture evidence of the virus in healthy US show pigs. The mixing of humans and pigs at swine shows possibly could further the geographic and cross-species spread of influenza A viruses.

 

 

Asymptomatic carriage of viruses is not uncommon in humans, of course.  A few examples we’ve looked at in the past include:

 

  • During the 2009 pandemic I wrote They Walk Among Us, that looked at the difficulties of identifying those who might be infectious based on symptoms such as fever.
  • Earlier this year, in The Very Common Cold, we looked at a study of rhinovirus among college students tested over an 8 week period – that found asymptomatic infections led symptomatic infections by a factor of 4 to 1.
  • And last year, in EID Journal: Pre-Symptomatic Influenza Transmission, we saw evidence of presymptomatic spread of the H1N1 virus in three clusters in Japan, which also suggests that asymptomatic carriers ought to be able to spread the virus as well.

 

The idea that pigs might carry influenza viruses asymptomatically, therefore, is hardly surprising. But the amount of available scientific research has been limited.

 

Yesterday’s study found that nearly 1 in 5 healthy-looking pigs they tested were actually infected with a flu virus.

 

Last night Lisa Schnirring and Robert Roos of CIDRAP NEWS  wrote extensively on this study, and so at this point, I’ll simply invite you to read their excellent report.

 

 

Study finds flu in healthy-looking pigs at state fairs

Lisa Schnirring and Robert Roos * Staff Writers

Aug 15, 2012 (CIDRAP News) – Testing of a sampling of pigs shown at the Minnesota State Fair during the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic revealed that 19% of them were infected with flu viruses, even though they looked healthy, according to a new study.

 

The findings highlight the challenges of preventing pigs and humans from passing flu viruses back and forth at fairs and swine shows, especially this summer when several states are tracking human illnesses from a novel H3N2 virus that has been detected in both pigs and people.

(Continue . . . )

 

 

During the 2009 H1N1 pandemic Japan, India, and China were among the nations that attempted to identify, interdict, and isolate those who might be carrying the H1N1 virus when they entered their country.

 

While their efforts may have slowed the introduction of the virus, they certainly didn’t stop it.  Earlier blogs on these attempts include:

 

Japan: Quarantine At Ports Ineffective Against Pandemic Flu
Experts: Extreme Measures Won’t Stop The Flu

 

Their failure was likely due to the large number of presymptomatic, and asymptomatic carriers of the virus that arrived without showing signs of illness.

 

And the same is likely true with pigs on display at county fairs this fall.

 

Removing symptomatic pigs certainly makes sense - and will certainly reduce the risks of spreading the virus - but it is unlikely to totally eliminate it.

 

Which means that additional human cases of H3N2v are likely, even with the enhanced biosecurity measures in place at county fairs.

 

Before anyone gets freaked out over the risks of going to the county fair, so far this summer there have been only about 200 confirmed cases of this H3N2v flu, involving 5 brief hospitalizations and no deaths. 

 

During roughly the same time period, there have been nearly 700 West Nile Infections, involving hundreds of hospitalizations, and 26 deaths.

 

So if you are looking to lower your risks of illness when you go to the county fair this fall, it only makes sense to carry and use a hand sanitizer, and avoid eating or drinking around animal displays. 

 

But to avoid serious illness, the better advice is to wear an insect repellant whenever you go outside, as your risks of contracting viral illness are greater right now from infected mosquitoes, than they are from sick pigs.

 

image

Tuesday, August 07, 2012

EID Journal: Persistence Of H5N1 In Soil

 

image

Photo Credit – FAO

 

# 6478

 

The notion that the H5N1 `bird flu’ virus can persist in the environment – for hours or days (or perhaps even weeks) - is hardly new, yet very little is really known about how, and where, the virus resides outside of a living host.

 

As H5N1 is primarily a gastrointestinal malady in birds it is believed that the virus is commonly spread in the wild via shared feces-contaminated pond and lake waters (see Bogor: H5N1 Detected In Retention Pond).

 

But there appear to be other routes of transmission as well.

 

In June of 2010, we saw a study (see Birds Of A Feather . . . .) in PLoS One, suggesting that waterfowl may be spreading avian flu viruses because their preening oils bind the virus to their feathers.

 

Another study conducted by researchers at the  National Institute of Animal Health, Tsukuba, Ibaraki, Japan was reported in the August 2010 issue of Applied and Environmental Microbiology.

 

They determined that the H5N1 virus may persist on the dropped feathers from infected ducks and may therefore spread to the environment. 

 

Applied and Environmental Microbiology, August 2010, p. 5496-5499, Vol. 76, No. 16
0099-2240/10/$12.00+0     doi:10.1128/AEM.00563-10

Persistence of Avian Influenza Virus (H5N1) in Feathers Detached from Bodies of Infected Domestic Ducks
Yu Yamamoto, Kikuyasu Nakamura, Manabu Yamada, and Masaji Mase

 

The surprising part of this study is how long these feathers retained some degree of viral contamination at various temperatures.

 

At 4°C (39F) the virus was detectable for 160 days, while at the higher temperature 20°C (68F), the virus was detected for 15 days.

 

We saw another study from 2010, which appeared in Environmental Science and Technology, titled:

 

Environmental Persistence of a Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (H5N1) Virus

Joseph P. Wood, Young W. Choi, Daniel J. Chappie, James V. Rogers, and Jonatha

n Z. Kaye

DOI: 10.1021/es1016153

Copyright © 2010 American Chemical Society

 

Researchers conducted tests on four inanimate materials (glass, wood, galvanized metal, and top soil) to determine how long – and under what environmental conditions – the virus could survive.

 

They adjusted factors such as  temperature, relative humidity, and simulated sunlight and checked the samples over a period of 13 days. The virus was most persistent at lower temperatures, and on surfaces such as glass and steel.

 

Their conclusion?: under the right conditions, the virus could be expected to persist beyond 13 days.

 

 

Earlier this year we looked at a study published in the journal Influenza and Other Respiratory Viruses that examined environmental samples taken in Cambodia between April 2007 and February 2010 during several bird flu outbreaks (see Environment: a potential source of animal and human infection with influenza A (H5N1) virus  Gutiérrez, Buchy et al.)

Out of 246 samples taken around farms with outbreaks, 19% of dust, mud and soil samples showed contamination from the H5N1 virus.

 

Admittedly, just because RT-PRC testing was able to detect a virus in a sample doesn’t necessarily mean that the virus is viable.  But it does give us an idea of the environment spread of the virus.

 

All of which brings us to a letter, again from  Ramona A. Gutiérrez and Philippe Buchy of the Institut Pasteur in Cambodia, that appears in September’s edition of the CDC’s EID journal.

 

Volume 18, Number 9—September 2012
Letter

Contaminated Soil and Transmission of Influenza Virus (H5N1)

To the Editor: Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus (H5N1) has been responsible for 603 confirmed human cases worldwide, including 356 that resulted in death, and for >7,000 epizootic outbreaks (1,2). Direct contact between hosts is the main mechanism of transmission for avian influenza viruses, but the possible role of the environment as a source of HPAI virus (H5N1) infection has been rarely studied, particularly in the context of countries where the virus is enzootic or epizootic (37). To determine if contaminated soil contributes to the transmission cycle of HPAI virus (H5N1), we used experimental and simulated field conditions to assess possible transmission in chickens.

(Continue . . . )

 

 

Essentially, these researchers took 3 types of soil, described as:

 

(1) sandy topsoil collected from around rice fields in Phnom Penh Province, Cambodia;

2) building sand purchased from a local building company; and

3) soil-based compost purchased from a local tree nursery

. . . and inoculated samples with low to high doses of the H5N1 virus. They then introduced these soil samples to the bottom of cages where chickens were housed, and then tested the chickens for infection over the next several days.

You can read the entire letter for more details on their methods and materials. The results are summarized in the chart below:

image

 

Essentially, sandy topsoil collected from rice fields proved to be a poor environment for transmitting the H5N1 virus, while soil-based compost proved highly effective. 

 

The authors believe that the highly acidic nature of the sandy topsoil may work to inactivate viral particles.

 

Since one of the methods used to control and contain an avian flu outbreak is environmental decontamination, knowing which types of soil are unlikely to harbor and transmit the virus can save time, and reduce the use of harsh (and often scarce) chemicals in the environment.

 

Interestingly, the authors also found evidence to suggest that exposure to moderately contaminated soil may help poultry to develop a protective immune response to the virus.

 

H5N1 is not the only viral contender to spark the next pandemic, but due to its apparent high lethality, it is the one we tend to concentrate on the most.  

 

Fortunately the virus remains adapted primarily to avian physiology – not human - and must mutate further if it is to become an imminent public health threat. 

 

But with 20+ clades of the virus now circulating, and numerous opportunities to expose and infect other hosts (human, swine, mammal, and avian), the concern is this virus may one day succeed.

Wednesday, July 18, 2012

EID: Environmental NDM-1 Detected In Vietnam

image

Inoculated MacConkey agar culture plate cultivated colonial growth of Gram-negative, small rod-shaped and facultatively anaerobic Klebsiella pneumoniae bacteria. – CDC PHIL.

 

# 6440

 


In a study reminiscent of one we saw published in April of last year (see Lancet Study: NDM-1 In New Delhi Water Supply), the CDC’s EID Journal has a letter by R. Isozumi et al. that appears (ahead of print) in their August issue, that reveals the detection of the NDM-1 gene in a river in Hanoi.

 

blaNDM-1–positive Klebsiella pneumoniae from Environment, Vietnam

Rie Isozumi , Kumiko Yoshimatsu, Tetsu Yamashiro, Futoshi Hasebe, Binh Minh Nguyen, Tuan Cuong Ngo, Shumpei P. Yasuda, Takaaki Koma, Kenta Shimizu, and Jiro Arikawa

 

By way of explanation, blaNDM-1 is the gene responsible for creating the NDM-1 (New Delhi metallo-β-lactamase) enzyme that can make many types of bacteria resistant to a wide spectrum of antibiotics.

 

Of particular concern, this enzyme is carried by a plasmid – a snippet of portable DNA  - that can be transferred to other types of bacteria (see Study: Adaptation Of Plasmids To New Bacterial Species).

 

Over the past few years we have seen a worrisome expansion of β-lactamase enzymes in bacteria, and they are slowly eroding the value of much of our antibiotic arsenal.

 

Those that inhibit the antimicrobial actions of the (formerly resistant) Carbapenem class of antibiotics – called carbapenemases – are of particular concern. Carbapenems are often used as the drug of last resort for treating difficult bacterial infections, including Escherichia coli (E. coli) and Klebsiella pneumoniae.

 

So when the gene responsible for the NDM-1 enzyme begins to show up in the environment, doctors and researchers take notice.

 

The author’s of today’s EID Journal report state their reasons for concern:

 

The possible appearance of bacteria harboring blaNDM-1 in Vietnam is of concern because cultural and economic links between Vietnam and India are strongly established, including extensive person-to-person exchanges that could enable easy exchange of pathogens. In addition, Vietnam faces a serious problem of antimicrobial drug resistance because drugs are freely available and used in an indiscriminate fashion. Thus, once blaNDM-1–positive bacteria colonize persons in Vietnam, they would be able to spread easily and pose a serious public health threat.

 

To look for environmental blaNDM-1, researchers examined water samples taken from 20 locations within 10 km of Hanoi, Vietnam. Samples were collected from rivers, lakes, and standing water in the streets.


The authors report finding the NDM-1 enzyme producing gene in two locations – 3km apart – in the Kim Nguu River, which flows through the city.  They write:

 

We harvested several species of bacteria from the 2 seepage samples positive for blaNDM-1: Acinetobacter baumannii, Klebsiella pneumoniae, Pseudomonas aeruginosa, P. fluorescens/putida, and P. luteola

 

They also report finding 2 other βeta-lactamases (blaTEM-1 and blaCTX-M-3) that were highly resistant to another class of antibiotics called aminoglycosides (which include neomycin, streptomycin & tobramycin)

The authors conclude by saying:

Wide-scale surveillance of environmental and clinical samples in Vietnam and establishment of a strategy to prevent further spread of blaNDM-1 are urgently needed.

It’s been nearly 2 years since The Lancet published a study (see NDM-1: A New Acronym To Memorize)  by Walsh, Toleman, Livermore, et al. that awakened the world to the  emergence and growing prevalence of the NDM-1 enzyme.

 

Since that time, we’ve seen a slow, but inexorable spread of NDM-1 carrying bacteria around the globe. A few of my past blogs on the subject include:

 

Carbapenemases Rising

NDM-1: One Year Later

WHO Unveils 6-Point Plan To Preserve Antibiotic Effectiveness

Eurosurveillance On Antimicrobial Resistance

 

For a far more complete discussion of antimicrobial resistance issues, I can think of no better primer than Maryn McKenna’s book SUPERBUG: The Fatal Menace of MRSA. And Maryn’s SUPERBUG Blog, part of Wired Science Blogs, continues to provide the best day-to-day coverage of these issues.

 

Last March, Director-General of the World Health Organization Margaret Chan warned that the World Faces A `Post-Antibiotic Era’. One where even common infections may become untreatable.

 

While we aren’t there yet, reports such as the one today in the EID Journal add to the growing concern that someday, that fear may become a reality.

Thursday, June 07, 2012

EID Journal: Guinea Pigs As Reservoirs For Influenza

 

 


# 6369

 

 

From the CDC’s EID Journal we’ve a new study that looks at influenza infections in farm-raised guinea pigs in Ecuador, that provides several surprising results.

 

Ferrets and mice are often used in influenza research, but neither is truly ideal.

 

So in recent years a number of researchers have looked at guinea pigs as possible model mammalian host for influenza virus studies (see PNAS The guinea pig as a transmission model for human influenza viruses by Peter Palese et al. 2006).

 

The success in using guinea pigs in lab studies has led some scientists to wonder just how guinea pigs might fit into the hosting and spread of flu viruses outside of the laboratory.

 

Which brings us to a dispatch (again from Peter Palese et al.) that was published yesterday in the EID journal called:

 

Dispatch

Influenza Virus Infection in Guinea Pigs Raised as Livestock, Ecuador

Victor H. Leyva-Grado, Samira Mubareka, Florian Krammer, Washington B. Cárdenas, and Peter Palese

Abstract

To determine whether guinea pigs are infected with influenza virus in nature, we conducted a serologic study in domestic guinea pigs in Ecuador. Detection of antibodies against influenza A and B raises the question about the role of guinea pigs in the ecology and epidemiology of influenza virus in the region.

 

 

Guinea pigs are raised and used as food in parts of South America (Peruvians reportedly consume more than 65 million of them each year, and they may also be found on the menu in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Columbia).

 

While the consumption of guinea pigs may seem an unusual culinary choice to many of us, it is so entrenched in the Andean culture that in 1753 - when Marcos Zapata painted his version of `The Last Supper’ for Peru (which now hangs in The Cathedral Of Cusco ) - he depicted Christ and the Apostles dining on a platter of cuy, or guinea pig.

image

Photo Source – Wikipedia.

 

But I digress . . .

 

Most of these animals are raised on small farms, and often in close contact with other livestock as well as humans.

 

Given these conditions, and their propensity for hosting and spreading influenza in laboratory studies, a seroprevalence study was undertaken to see how widespread influenza infection among guinea pigs might be outside of the laboratory.

 

This study examined blood samples from 40 guinea pigs taken from 3 locations across Ecuador, and subsequently found evidence of previous Influenza A infections in a unusually large number of them.

 

The surprises (of which there were several) included:

 

  • The high percentage of positive influenza A samples (50% H1, 45% H3)
  • The detection of several (n=14)animals carrying antibodies to an H5 virus
  • And perhaps the biggest surprise of all – finding evidence of influenza B infections (previously only thought to infect humans) in 27 of the 40 samples tested.

 

 

An earlier seroprevalence study of influenza A among humans in Ecuador showed a seroprevalence of H1 (5.1%) and H3 (5.5%) -  about 1/10th that found in these guinea pigs.

 

The authors suggest that the way these animals are raised (caged together and in close quarters) may facilitate the spread of influenza. 

 

The discovery of H5 antibodies is intriguing, but since this study only tested only for seroreactivity to parts of the H5 virus, further study will be required to identify and quantify the prevalence of avian influenza viruses in this population.

 

And the last finding - that of Influenza B in roughly 2/3rds of the samples – support the idea that this type of influenza can be readily transmitted from humans to other hosts.

 

The authors write:

 

Further studies are needed to isolate and characterize the type B influenza virus present in the population of guinea pigs to determine if there has been an adaptation to the new host or if the guinea pig is only a transient reservoir for the human virus.

 

The authors conclude this dispatch by stating:

 

We did not determine whether guinea pigs are an incidental host for influenza virus infection or, if instead, the virus has been adapted to these animals or if guinea pigs are a natural reservoir for some influenza viruses. To this end, virus isolation and characterization would be necessary to determine the virus strains circulating in this population. In the laboratory, guinea pigs are infected and efficiently transmit influenza viruses to naive hosts without showing any overt clinical signs of disease (1). Therefore, further studies are needed to address the specific role of guinea pigs raised as livestock in the ecology and epidemiology of influenza viruses in the region.

 

 

For more details on the methods used, the full text is available online at this link.

 

While this research might seem a bit obscure to all but the most ardent infectious disease geeks, it serves to show just how little we still know about influenza viruses and their host range,  and that there are still plenty of surprises waiting out there yet to be uncovered.

Wednesday, April 04, 2012

EID Journal: Human Infection With H10N7 Avian Influenza

 

 

 

 

# 6261

 

 

Although they are only rarely detected, there is evidence to suggest that humans may be infected by avian influenza viruses more often than is commonly suspected.

 

Every year billions of people around the world experience flu-like symptoms that can stem from any of hundreds of different viruses.

 

Of those, only the tiniest fraction are tested to see what pathogen caused the illness.

 


While most people are aware of the roughly six hundred H5N1 `bird flu’ infections detected over the past decade, we’ve also seen a smaller number of human infections caused by a variety of avian and swine origin flu viruses.

 

 

In 2003, an outbreak of H7N7 at a poultry farm in the Netherlands went on to infect at least 89 people (mostly mildly, but 1 death), and many more may have been infected subclinically.

 

In Egypt - in 2004 -  2 infants were shown to be infected by the H10N7 avian flu virus.

 

In 2006 1 person in the UK was confirmed to have contracted H7N3, and the following year, 4 people tested positive for H7N2 – both following local outbreaks in poultry.

 

But in terms of concern, the closest runner up to H5N1 virus right now is probably H9N2 – which is known to have infected a handful of humans, mostly in Asia.

 

 

During the last half of 2011 we also saw the emergence of a small number of H3N2v swine influenza infections (see H3N2v: Three’s A Crowd) in the United States.  

 


Over the years, we’ve seen a small number of sero-prevalence studies that have looked for (and found) evidence of prior infection by avian influenzas in people exposed to poultry or wild birds, including this one from 2006.

 

Avian Influenza among Waterfowl Hunters and Wildlife Professionals

James S. Gill,* Comments to Author Richard Webby,† Mary J.R. Gilchrist,* and Gregory C. Gray‡


ABSTRACT

We report serologic evidence of avian influenza infection in 1 duck hunter and 2 wildlife professionals with extensive histories of wild waterfowl and game bird exposure. Two laboratory methods showed evidence of past infection with influenza A/H11N9, a less common virus strain in wild ducks, in these 3 persons.

 

 

Interestingly, antibodies to the relatively rare H11N9 virus were detected in these 3 individuals, while antibodies for the far more common H4 and H6 avian viruses (known to circulate in American ducks) were not.

 

One theory that has been suggested is that humans are less likely to develop long-lasting antibodies when exposed to avian-type influenza viruses. 

 

Which brings us to a new study that appears in the May edition of the CDC’s EID Journal that detected the H10N7 avian influenza virus in two poultry abattoir workers in Australia.

 

 

Influenza Virus A (H10N7) in Chickens and Poultry Abattoir Workers, Australia

Article Contents

George G. Arzey , Peter D. Kirkland, K. Edla Arzey , Melinda Frost, Patrick Maywood, Stephen Conaty, Aeron C. Hurt, Yi-Mo Deng, Pina Iannello, Ian Barr, Dominic E. Dwyer, Mala Ratnamohan, Kenneth McPhie, and Paul Selleck

Abstract

In March 2010, an outbreak of low pathogenicity avian influenza A (H10N7) occurred on a chicken farm in Australia. After processing clinically normal birds from the farm, 7 abattoir workers reported conjunctivitis and minor upper respiratory tract symptoms. Influenza virus A subtype H10 infection was detected in 2 workers.

 

 

Although 7 abattoir workers reported symptoms, only 2 tested positive for the H10 virus. The authors write:

 

The conjunctivitis and other reported symptoms among the 7 workers were mild and of short duration, and there was no evidence of seroconversion by hemagglutination inhibition or virus neutralization tests in any of the workers from whom convalescent-phase blood was collected, including the 2 with confirmed influenza A subtype H10 infection.

 

These findings are consistent with the mild symptoms and lack of serologic evidence reported in humans after experimental infection with influenza A (H10N7), which may indicate the limited ability of the virus to multiply and stimulate a detectable immune response in humans (10).

 

Other studies have reported no evidence of elevated subtype H10–specific antibody titers among poultry abattoir workers, although serologic evidence of subtype H10 infection was detected among turkey farmers in the absence of clinical symptoms (11).

 

Although this outbreak was limited, and the symptoms were mild, the abattoir has instituted new policies requiring PPEs (personal protective equipment) for employees who have direct exposure to birds and carcasses.

 

Admittedly, the H10N7 virus would seem an unlikely public health threat.

 

But this study does show that it can infect humans, and that mild or subclinical infections from avian viruses are probably happening that are not being picked up by routine surveillance.

 

When it comes to the next influenza threat, we worry most about H5N1 and H9N2. But the next pandemic virus to successfully jump species could just as easily come out of left field, as we saw in 2009 with the H1N1 swine flu.

 

image

 

All of which highlights the importance of establishing better global surveillance of humans, and farm animals, for the next emerging influenza virus.

 

Regardless of its strain.

Monday, November 07, 2011

Study: Kids, Pandemic H1N1 & MRSA Co-Infection

 

 

 

# 5945

 


We’ve looked at a connection between enhanced flu mortality and bacterial co-infections many times in the past, most recently last September in mBio: Lethal Synergism of H1N1 Pandemic Influenza & Bacterial Pneumonia.

 

In that study scientists at NIAID and the Institute for Systems Biology (ISB) infected experimental mice with both seasonal flu and the 2009 H1N1 pandemic flu, and after 48 hours exposed some of them to Streptococcus pneumoniae, one of the main causes of pneumonia.

 

Mice that were exposed only to the two flu strains showed expected flu symptoms, but all survived.

 

Mice that were exposed to seasonal flu and S. pneumoniae experienced minor lung damage, but once again, all survived.

 

But all of the mice infected with the pandemic H1N1 virus, and S. pneumoniae showed severe weight loss, lung damage, and 100% mortality

 

Indicating that pandemic H1N1, more than seasonal flu, exacerbated an S. pneumoniae co-infection.

 

In 2008, we saw a study in The Journal of Infectious Diseases by Morens, Taubenberger, and Fauci that looks at the role of bacterial pneumonia in the high death toll of 1918 (see Viral-Bacterial Copathogenesis).

 

An excerpt from their study reads:

 

Conclusions. The majority of deaths in the 1918–1919 influenza pandemic likely resulted directly from secondary bacterial pneumonia caused by common upper respiratory–tract bacteria.

 

Less substantial data from the subsequent 1957 and 1968 pandemics are consistent with these findings. If severe pandemic influenza is largely a problem of viral-bacterial copathogenesis, pandemic planning needs to go beyond addressing the viral cause alone (e.g., influenza vaccines and antiviral drugs).

 

2008 also saw additional studies published in the CDC’s EID Journal that looked at the synergy between pandemic flu and bacterial pneumonia, including:

 

Brundage JF, Shanks GD. Deaths from bacterial pneumonia during 1918–19 influenza pandemic. Emerg Infect Dis. 2008 Aug;

 

Ravindra K. Gupta,*  Robert George, and Jonathan S. Nguyen-Van-Tam Bacterial Pneumonia and Pandemic Influenza Planning Emerg Infect Dis. 2008 Aug;

 

Shanks and Brundage found, for instance, that during the 1918 pandemic 5% of the deaths attributed to the 1918 pandemic occurred in the first 3 days of infection, while the median time from illness onset to death was 7–10 days, with many deaths occurring >2 weeks after initial symptoms..

 

Which they believed was more indicative of death due to secondary bacterial infection than directly from a flu virus, or a cytokine storm response (see Influenza's One-Two Punch).

 

These studies, along with a number of others, have enforced the idea that pneumococcal vaccines like PCV7 Pneumococcal Vaccine Would Save Lives In A Pandemic.

 

Given this past research, it shouldn’t come as a terrible surprise that a study that appears today in the journal Pediatrics found, among other things, that a co-infection with MRSA was associated with a higher mortality rate among healthy kids infected with the 2009 H1N1 pandemic virus.

 

First a link to the study, and an excerpt from the abstract, then I’ll be back with more.

 

Critically Ill Children During the 2009–2010 Influenza Pandemic in the United States

Adrienne G. Randolph,Frances Vaughn, Ryan Sullivan, Lewis Rubinson, B. Taylor Thompson, Grace Yoon, Elizabeth Smoot, Todd W. Rice, Laura L. Loftis, Mark Helfaer,Allan Doctor, Matthew Paden, Heidi Flori, Christopher Babbitt, Ana Lia Graciano, Rainer Gedeit, Ronald C. Sanders, John S. Giuliano, Jerry Zimmerman, Timothy M. Uyeki

(EXCERPT)

Overall, 71 (8.5%) of the patients had a presumed diagnosis of early (within 72 hours after PICU admission) Staphylococcus aureus coinfection of the lung with 48% methicillin-resistant S aureus (MRSA). In multivariable analyses, preexisting neurologic conditions or immunosuppression, encephalitis (1.7% of cases), myocarditis (1.4% of cases), early presumed MRSA lung coinfection, and female gender were mortality risk factors. Among 251 previously healthy children, only early presumed MRSA coinfection of the lung (relative risk: 8 [95% confidence interval: 3.1–20.6]; P < .0001) remained a mortality risk factor.

Conclusions: Children with preexisting neurologic conditions and immune compromise were at increased risk of pH1N1-associated death after PICU admission. Secondary complications of pH1N1, including myocarditis, encephalitis, and clinical diagnosis of early presumed MRSA coinfection of the lung, were mortality risk factors.

 

The entire study is behind a pay wall, but we’ve a lengthy press release available with considerable detail.

 

Why Did Healthy Children Fall Critically Ill in the 2009 H1N1 Flu Pandemic?

Largest study to date finds co-infection with MRSA increased death risk 8-fold; flu vaccination urged

 

BOSTON, Nov. 7, 2011 /PRNewswire-USNewswire/ -- During the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic, many previously healthy children became critically ill, developing severe pneumonia and respiratory failure, sometimes fatal. The largest nationwide investigation to date of influenza in critically ill children, led by Children's Hospital Boston, found one key risk factor: Simultaneous infection with methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) increased the risk for flu-related mortality 8-fold among previously healthy children.

 

Moreover, almost all of these co-infected children were rapidly treated with vancomycin, considered to be appropriate treatment for MRSA. The fact that they died despite this treatment is especially alarming given the rising rates of MRSA carriage among children in the community.

 

"There's more risk for MRSA to become invasive in the presence of flu or other viruses," says study leader Adrienne Randolph, MD, MsC, of the Division of Critical Care Medicine at Children's Hospital Boston. "These deaths in co-infected children are a warning sign."

 

The researchers hope their findings, published November 7 by the journal Pediatrics, (eFirst pages) will promote flu vaccination among all children aged 6 months and older. (No flu vaccine is currently available for children younger than 6 months.)

 

(Continue . . . )

 

As we’ve discussed before, a small percentage of the population is known to carry either MRSA or non-resistant S. aureus in their nasal cavities.

 

This from the CDC:

Definition of MRSA

colorized scanning electron micrograph (SEM) of MRSA

 

While 25% to 30% of people are colonized* in the nose with staph, less than 2% are colonized with MRSA (Gorwitz RJ et al. Journal of Infectious Diseases. 2008:197:1226-34.).

*Colonized:
When a person carries the organism/bacteria but shows no clinical signs or symptoms of infection. For Staph aureus the most common body site colonized is the nose.

 

While 2% doesn’t sound like a lot, there are signs that number may be increasing. Once considered primarily a hospital acquired infection, CA-MRSA (community acquired) is growing in incidence.

 

For instance, In Firefighters & Paramedics At Greater Risk Of MRSA and Firefighters & MRSA Revisited we looked at research showing a 10x’s greater incidence of MRSA colonization (20%) among a sampling of firefighters tested in Washington State.

 

Most of the time our immune systems keep these bacteria in check, and we display no outward signs of infection.

 

But when our immune systems are weakened, such as when we are stricken by influenza, these resistant bacteria can suddenly bloom and become invasive.

 

Again, from the Press Release:

 

Influenza appears to suppress the immune response, making children who are already colonized more susceptible to invasive bacterial disease.

 

"Previously, MRSA has not been considered a common cause of pneumonia in kids but this may be changing," Randolph says. "It's likely that flu and other viral infections let MRSA invade and that there's some synergistic reaction between flu and these bacteria."

 

While this study specifically links MRSA to bad outcomes among children with pandemic H1N1, the 2008 study by Shanks and Brundage found that during the 1918 pandemic:

 

. . .  the bacteria most often recovered from the sputum, lungs, and blood of pneumonia patients, alive or dead, were common colonizers of the upper respiratory tracts of healthy persons, i.e., Hemophilus influenzae, Streptococcus pneumoniae, S. pyogenes, and/or Staphylococcus aureus.

 

Whether it is the routine carriage of bacteria in our respiratory system, or the make up of the microflora in our gut biome, scientists are increasingly linking our health, and the progression and outcome of some diseases, to our individual body’s ecosystem.

 

Which may explain, at least partially, why 99 out of 100 people can catch the flu and recover quickly and without incident, while an unlucky 1% may endure a serious and sometimes fatal illness.

 

The authors of today’s study advise:

 

Physicians seeing children with serious lower-respiratory-tract disease during flu season are urged to give early antiviral treatment (Tamiflu or zanamivir [Relenza]) and antibiotics covering MRSA and other flu-associated bacteria, even before suspected infections are confirmed in the lab, the researchers say.

 

But other approaches are urgently needed. "MRSA is hard to develop a vaccine against – researchers have been trying since the 1960s and have been unsuccessful," says Randolph. "So the only way to prevent these severe complications is to get everyone vaccinated against the flu, and do more studies of MRSA colonization so we can prevent it in the community and in kids."

 

Further evidence, as if we needed it, that influenza and its complications can be complex, difficult, and occasionally deadly foes.